Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence - User contributions [en]

Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations (Book)

2026-05-18T17:47:18Z

Enadmin:

{{author
| author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compiler =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}{{infobox book
| title = Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations
| image = Elections_and_Shia_Political_Jurisprudence_Foundations_and_Obligations.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Political jurisprudence
| genre = Analytical-Descriptive
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volumes = 1
| pages = 484
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Imam Sadiq University
| publication place = Tehran
| publication date = 2023 (1402 SH)
| printing = First
| print run =
| isbn =
| media type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic version =
| other volumes =
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations''' (انتخابات و فقه سیاسی شیعه؛ مبانی و الزام‌ها) is a book in the field of political jurisprudence, authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University. In this work, considering the close connection between the foundations of political thought and the formation of political structures, the author begins his discussion with the foundations of elections. Given the importance of the foundations of the state's legitimacy in Shia political thought, he examines and analyzes it in a separate chapter. Subsequently, bearing in mind that jurisprudential research means issuing a Sharia ruling for subjects—or issues—he addresses the issues of elections.

Relying on the principle of monotheism (''tawhid'') and the presumption of the absence of guardianship (''istishab 'adam al-wilayah''), the author rejects any domination over human beings without rational or transmitted evidence (''dalil naqli''). He argues that guardianship is granted only to certain individuals due to the judgment of intellect and the necessity of governance, making obedience to them obligatory. He considers social life without a government impossible because some affairs cannot be managed individually and require a ruler. He places the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency (''khilafat Allah'') as the foundation of popular sovereignty and considers political participation an undeniable right, without which a government is not legitimate. He rejects dictatorship and views the people's participation in decision-making as the best way to combat tyranny; elections are a means to preserve people's rights and their participation in decision-making, although their nature is more about shaping decisions. The author considers the duties of the Islamic government to be gaining public satisfaction, social discipline, and guidance. He views the majority vote not as a definitive authoritative proof (''hujjah''), but as a preferable option (''tarjih''), considering it valid only in the absence of other preferrers. He considers the right to be elected negated in affairs pertaining to guardianship (''umur wilayi'') and permissible in non-guardianship affairs (''umur ghayr wilayi''). Of course, only qualified individuals—such as Muslims, Shias, those of integrity, and those possessing religious knowledge—can become candidates, and he does not consider announcing candidacy without the approval of elites to be appropriate. Regarding voting, although the foundation of divine vicegerency might lead to unequal voting rights, the principle of the absence of guardianship creates challenges for the right to vote in guardianship matters, which can be answered by distinguishing between guardianship (''wilayah'') and compliance (''tawalli'').

== Overview and Structure Report ==
The book "Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations," authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University, is a work in the field of political jurisprudence that examines the issue of elections from the perspective of Shia political jurisprudence. This work, the first edition of which was published in 2023 (1402 SH) by Imam Sadiq (a) University Press, is organized in 488 pages.

The structure of the book is arranged into three chapters. At the beginning, the table of contents and the introduction are presented, and at the end, the sources and indices are included. The first chapter is dedicated to examining the role of the people and the foundations of the legitimacy of the Islamic government in the thought of contemporary jurists (''fuqaha''). In it, the author introduces and analyzes four categories of theories in this field during the contemporary era; including the appointment theory (''nadhariyyat al-nasb''), the appointment and election theory (''nadhariyyat al-nasb wa al-nakhab''), the assumption of responsibility theory (''nadhariyyat al-tasaddi''), and reactive theories (pp. 33–128). The second chapter addresses the foundations of elections in Shia jurisprudence and discusses various principles and foundations such as the principle of the absence of guardianship, humanity's divine vicegerency, the negation of dictatorship in Islamic thought, the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the status and effect of the majority vote, the rule of preserving the system (''hifz al-nizam''), etc. (pp. 129–286). In the third chapter, the obligations of elections from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence are examined. Among its topics are the right to be elected, announcing candidacy, the qualification of candidates, voting, campaign requirements, financial issues of campaigns, transparency, and supervision (pp. 287–448).

== Examining the Foundations of Elections from a Jurisprudential Perspective ==

==== The Principle of the Absence of Guardianship ====
Relying on fundamental principles such as monotheism (''tawhid''), the free creation of humans, the presumption of the absence of guardianship (''istishab 'adam al-wilayah''), as well as verses (''ayat'') and narrations (''riwayat'') that restrict guardianship to God, the author rejects any domination and guardianship over human beings, unless rational or transmitted evidence proves otherwise. In his view, standing opposite the "principle of the absence of guardianship" is the judgment of intellect regarding the necessity of the existence of a government and a ruler; therefore, God Almighty, by virtue of this necessity, has excepted certain individuals from the rule of the absence of guardianship and granted them guardianship. Consequently, obedience to these individuals is obligatory and necessary (pp. 129–145).

By resorting to the rational proof regarding the impossibility of realizing social life without the existence of a governmental system, the author deduces the necessity of forming a government. He believes that in social life there are matters that neither possess the capability of individual management nor can be left unmanaged; hence, an individual must be appointed as the "ruler" to manage these affairs (pp. 145–151).

==== Humanity's Divine Vicegerency ====
The author founds the proof of the right to popular sovereignty on the unconditionality (''itlaq'') of the evidences for the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. The result of this viewpoint is unconditionality in humanity's succession (''khilafah'') from God. This unconditionality, in the realm of creation (''takwin''), means the permissibility of human disposal over the earth to build and develop it, and in the legislative realm (''tashri'''), it means humanity's right to govern the earth. Based on this, human beings possess the right to govern, and this very right is considered the foundation of their political participation. Therefore, in this theory, the right to sovereignty and political participation is counted among the undeniable rights of the people, such that without referring to public votes, no government will possess legitimacy (pp. 152–166).

==== Negation of Dictatorship and Tyranny in Islamic Thought ====
After elucidating the condemnation of tyranny (''jabariyyah'') in Islamic narrations, the author analyzes the concept of "tyrant" (''jabbar'') by referring to its lexical and exegetical meanings, and then presents solutions for the ruler to be freed from this title. These solutions form the foundations of electoral thought in an Islamic government. In his belief, the participation of the people and the involvement of a group of them in the ruler's decision-making removes the description of tyranny from him. Elections are one of the effective tools toward observing the people's rights by the ruler, and simultaneously, involving the people in some of the macro-political decisions. The author clarifies that elections in their current form have more of a "decision-shaping" nature than "consultation" (''mashwarah''); nevertheless, delegating a part of decision-making to the people can be a path to exit despotism (pp. 183–209).

== The Duties of the Islamic Government Towards the People and the Status of the Majority Vote ==
In elucidating the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the author enumerates three main duties that can be considered the foundation for the formation of the institution of elections: first, gaining public satisfaction; second, disciplining and bringing order to society; and third, education and guidance (pp. 209–228).

In the discussion of the [[majority vote]], the author proposes a theory in which the majority vote is posited not out of independent authority (''hujjiyyah''), but as a criterion and a preferrer (''murajjih''). Based on this viewpoint, whenever an issue has the capability of being referred to public votes, the option that the majority leans towards is recognized as the final choice. The proofs that the proponents of this theory have established to prove it are: the proof of intellect, the [[practice of the rational people]] (''sirat al-'uqala'''), certain narrations, as well as the practical conduct (''sirah'') of the Holy Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a).

However, in his own analysis, the author raises an objection to the rational proof and the practice of the rational people. He states that a government can be designed in such a way that it is realized without resorting to force and without relying on the majority vote, and even under conditions of public silence and apathy. Furthermore, he doubts the claim of the perpetual preference of the majority vote over the minority and considers it unacceptable.

Subsequently, the author engages in a detailed critique of the reliance on the narrations and the conduct of the Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a), and based on this, considers the reasons presented regarding the authority of the majority vote insufficient and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the only case where the majority vote has the capability of being relied upon in his view is the reliance on the [[Maqbula of Umar b. Hanzala]]. In this specific case, if there is a disagreement among experts and other preferrers are unavailable, the majority can be considered as a preferrer, provided that it can rationally discover reality and the more correct opinion. In such an assumption, paying attention to the majority vote is rationally commendable; but beyond this, neither rational proof nor transmitted proof has the capability to prove the authority or general praise of the majority vote (pp. 236–265).

== Obligations of Elections in Shia Jurisprudence ==

=== The Right to Be Elected ===
In elucidating the status of the right to candidacy for assuming positions, the author initially, by citing the principle of the absence of guardianship, states: In the realm of guardianship affairs, the primary principle is the absence of guardianship; hence, the principle is that no individual member of society, initially, has the right to candidacy and entry into such positions; unless valid evidence is established contrary to this principle. Because candidacy for this position is, in fact, a claim to the right to exercise guardianship, and this matter is considered negated by principle. Conversely, in non-guardianship affairs, the principle of the absence of guardianship does not apply; therefore, regarding these affairs, there is no prohibition on the existence of the right to candidacy for the general public, and the principle is its possibility and permissibility (pp. 287–298).

Following this, the author expresses his viewpoint in light of the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. From his perspective, if we consider the position of divine vicegerency to be acquired, then the unconditionality of vicegerency for all human beings will not be acceptable. In this understanding, the claim that was based on the unconditionality of vicegerency and, consequently, equality in the right to sovereignty, participation, and other political rights for all humans, becomes invalid. Because even though the scope of the vicegerent's authorities and disposals on earth is absolute, the scope of this position's inclusion regarding individuals is limited and only includes those who possess the necessary competencies to bear this position. Therefore, only these individuals possess the right to sovereignty and naturally benefit from rights such as the right to be elected (pp. 287–298). Regarding the right to be elected in guardianship positions, the author believes in limitation, bringing attention to two characteristics (being non-Muslim and non-Shia) and (maleness), and explains the evidence for them. (pp. 298-300)

=== Announcing Candidacy ===
After examining three groups of narrations that have warned against seeking positions and leadership (''riyasah''), the author, by way of summation, states: Considering the spiritual dangers of leadership, such as the possibility of otherworldly punishment and its difficulties, the primary principle for every individual is fleeing from leadership. As a result, one who volunteers to accept this position must possess high certainty regarding the competence of their own soul; whereas such certainty is not only rationally difficult but also contrary to numerous narrations that have placed humans in a position of accusation and suspicion toward themselves. Based on this, a person should not expose themselves to leadership and should not initiate the announcement of candidacy.

He suggests that one must move toward rational methods for legitimizing candidacy, such as the candidate entering the electoral arena upon the insistence of the wise elders of the community, qualified jurists, or religious and political figures. This model must be incorporated into the electoral structure; for example, the process of registering for elections and announcing candidacy should only be possible with the approval of religious and political elites (pp. 300–316).

=== Qualification of Candidates ===
The author introduces "Islam and Shi'ism," "not being a transgressor" (''fasiq''), "knowledge of the divine rulings related to the duties and authorities of the position for which one is a candidate," and the "condition of maleness" as transmitted (''naqli'') characteristics. He subsequently points to rational characteristics, including "competence in administration," "popularity and the influence of one's word among the people," "being free from effective accusations of financial corruption," "non-dependence on the enemy," "alignment with religious values," etc. (pp. 316-322).

=== Voting ===
Regarding the equality or inequality of people's voting rights, in the author's view, although based on the foundation of humanity's divine vicegerency the result is unequal voting rights, it does not prevent the emergence of other foundations. This is because this foundation only proves the voting rights of individuals who have acquired the attribute of humanity's divine vicegerency and does not negate the voting rights of other individuals. Furthermore, the preservation of the system also only proves the right to vote in cases where preserving the system requires it and does not negate other cases. But the problem of the principle of the absence of guardianship remains. The principle of the absence of guardianship eliminates the right to vote in guardianship affairs. The answer to this is distinguishing between guardianship (''wilayah'') and compliance (''tawalli''). In compliance with affairs, the people have the right to vote; but in guardianship, this right does not exist. Based on this, the right to vote is only in these affairs and based on what was stated regarding public satisfaction, with the condition of not contradicting Sharia (pp. 322-328).

=== The Right to Vote in Narrations ===
Kazemi clarifies that the narrations related to consultation and participation refer to differences in the status of consulting and decision-shaping, not differences in the right to vote. In his belief, in many religious texts, equality among the people is assumed; including in the evidences related to allegiance (''bay'ah''), wherein no difference is observed among those giving allegiance. Therefore, the principle is the equality of people's political rights, although in practice certain limits might be considered for it (pp. 328–332).

=== The Obligation of Participating in Elections, Voting for the Most Qualified and the Accepted Qualified ===
From the author's perspective, voting is not a right, but a prescriptive ruling (''hukm taklifi''); therefore, it cannot be waived, and participating in elections is obligatory. If non-participation means declaring a vote (e.g., a negative vote), it might fall outside the scope of abandoning an obligatory act. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of an Islamic government, this abandonment could fall under a secondary title, such as weakening the Islamic system, and consequently become forbidden (''haram'').

Kazemi considers [[Voting for the most qualified candidate|voting for the most qualified]] (''aslah'') to be obligatory based on rational preference and the expediency (''maslahah'') of the Muslims. If voting for the most qualified causes a greater corruption (''mafsadah''), the Sharia duty is to remove that corruption and provide the groundwork for the qualified (''salih'') individual to receive votes (pp. 339–347).

=== Campaign Requirements ===
The author examines topics such as deception through ignorance (''ighra' bi al-jahl''), fraud (''tadlis''), seeking fame (''shuhrah''), campaigning for someone who is not the most qualified, critique, painting a bleak picture (''siyah-namayi''), and defamation (''takhrib''). According to him, taking action to gain fame in electoral campaigns and prior to it does not have a Sharia prohibition; however, in designing the ideal electoral system in the Islamic system, and due to the severe reprehensibility of seeking fame in the narrations, it is fitting that this issue be given attention. For this reason, taking action to gain fame is reprehensible (''madhmum''). He views the way out of this problem to be rational solutions; such as others campaigning for the individual, or the individual's entry into the competitive arena being based on a sense of duty derived from the wise believers. These instances remove the act of seeking fame from being reprehensible in Sharia (pp. 347–396).

== Financial Issues of Elections ==
In Kazemi's belief, since elections, like judgment (''qada''') and jihad, are considered among public interests, using the public treasury (''bayt al-mal'') to cover their costs is permissible. However, if a candidate is in a state or position that customarily holds no benefit for the elections, the funds spent on them from the public treasury are considered a form of wasting public wealth, and the candidate will be responsible for compensating these costs. Here, the criterion of benefit for the elections is a rational matter, and security, political, media, and cultural dimensions are involved in it (pp. 396–405).

Regarding financial campaign contributions in the form of gifts (''hadiyyah''), Kazemi states that if the gift is not concerning a forbidden subject and does not cause corruption in the transaction, accepting it is not problematic. Therefore, receiving a gift for electoral campaigns is also unproblematic (pp. 405–414).

He places the jurisprudential examination of the ceiling for electoral expenses within the framework of two secondary titles: "extravagance" (''israf'') and "corruption" (''fasad''). In his view, the fundamental act of spending for campaigns has no problem in itself, but if these expenses reach the level of extravagance or occur in a situation that customarily leads to corruption, it falls under the Sharia prohibition. The criterion for identifying corruption is custom ('''urf'') and previous experiences of elections, and it is determined based on the practice of the rational people (pp. 414–428).

In conclusion, Kazemi emphasizes the necessity of financial and behavioral transparency in elections and considers it necessary from two aspects: first, the people's right to know and preventing deception through ignorance; second, preventing probable corruptions. Based on this, he believes transparency must be seriously considered in electoral laws and executive bylaws (pp. 428–433).

== Supervision ==
Kazemi clarifies that one cannot conclude the lack of duty to examine the qualifications of candidates by citing the principle of exoneration (''asl al-bara'ah''), which is applied in cases of doubt. The reason is that electoral qualifications do not solely pertain to negative attributes (such as not being corrupt), but also have positive attributes, such as "good management" (''husn al-tadbir''), which must be ascertained (''ihraz''). Therefore, in the supervision process, the principle is the ascertainment of the necessary characteristics, not merely the negation of obstacles (pp. 433–440).

In the author's belief, principles such as the principle of correctness (''asl al-sihhah''), the principle of justice (''asl al-'adalah''), or having a good opinion (''husn al-zann'') are also insufficient to prove the existence of qualifications. These principles are only applied in cases where we want to negate the effects of ugliness (''qubh''), not to attach effects such as proving goodness and qualification to them. In other words, the Lawgiver (''Shari''') has not obliged us to arrange the effects based on goodness, but has only forbidden arranging the effects based on ugliness.

The author also clarifies that executing the principle of correctness in supervising elections is similar to executing it in examining the conditions of candidates, meaning it is inappropriate and invalid. This is because the principle of correctness applies where correctness or corruption is established from the perspective of Sharia, whereas regarding the correctness of elections, what is at stake is legal validity and governmental legitimacy, not a direct Sharia ruling. For this reason, one cannot employ the principle of correctness as a valid foundation in the process of supervising elections (pp. 440–448).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about elections]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi]]
[[Category:Books by Imam Sadiq University]]
[[fa:انتخابات و فقه سیاسی شیعه، مبانی و الزام‌ها (کتاب)]]

Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani

2026-04-19T15:19:15Z

Enadmin:

{{author
|author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compilation =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}

{{Infobox person
| known_as = Ayatollah Milani
| name = Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani
| birth_date = 1313 AH
| death_date = 1395 AH
| image = milani.jpg
| image_size =
| caption =
| position = Marja' al-Taqlid
| religion = Shia
| nationality = Iran
| field = Fiqh and Usul
| works_in_contemporary_jurisprudence = Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya
| views =
| teachers = [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]], [[Muhammad Husayn Gharavi Na'ini]], Agha Ziya Iraqi
| students = [[Sayyid Ali Husayni Khamenei]], Muhammad Taqi Ja'fari, Azizullah Attardi, Kazim Modir Shanehchi
| website =
}}

*'''Abstract'''

'''Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani''' (in Persian: [[:fa:سید_محمدهادی_حسینی_میلانی|سید محمدهادی حسینی میلانی]]) was one of the Shia Marja' al-Taqlids in the fourteenth Hijri century. He studied in the [[Najaf Seminary]] and [[Karbala Seminary|Karbala]] and was a student of [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]] and [[Mirza Mohammad-Hossein Gharavi Na'ini]], and he himself engaged in teaching Fiqh, Usul al-Fiqh, Exegesis, and Theology. Milani then migrated to Mashhad, and during his 22-year presence in this city, he revived [[Mashhad Seminary|its seminary]] and established a modern educational system within it. In his jurisprudential works, correspondences, and istiftas (responses to legal inquiries), there is attention to current issues and the needs of the time. The book Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya is among his important Fiqh works, in which discussions on prayer, Khums, Zakat, and sale (Bay') have been researched and published in independent volumes. Milani has offered new opinions in the fields of [[Medical Fiqh]], [[Economic Fiqh]], [[Worship Fiqh]], and [[Art Fiqh]].

==Scientific and Political Biography==
Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani is one of the Shia Marja' al-Taqlids who studied and taught in Najaf and Karbala and attended the lessons of [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]], [[Mirza Mohammad-Hossein Gharavi Na'ini]], and Agha Ziya Iraqi for a long time. Milani migrated to Mashhad in 1333 SH (1954), and it is said that the reform of the condition of the [[Mashhad Seminary]] was accomplished through his efforts. He founded a new educational system in five stages, which took at least 15 years to complete and covered everything from preliminary studies to the specialized course of Fiqh and Usul. Specialization in other Islamic sciences was also organized based on the students' requests. Milani also established high-level seminary schools to upgrade the scientific level of students.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 59-61, 111-114, 238-242.</ref>

Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani is considered part of the second generation of scholars after the Constitutional Revolution who engaged less in political activities. However, several events caused his entry into the political arena, including: World War II and the emergence of anti-colonial movements in the Islamic world, support for the struggle against Reza Shah regarding the unveiling of Hijab (Kashf-e Hijab), support for Navvab Safavi and the idea of [[Islamic Government]], support for the movement for the Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry, accompanying the struggle of Iraqi tribes against the British, opposition to the activities of the Tudeh Party, and support for the movement of Imam Khomeini during the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 271-277.</ref>

Although Milani did not author a book himself, his scattered notes and lesson transcriptions have been published in 15 titles; including Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya (an examination of various Fiqh topics, in ten volumes), Qadatuna Kayfa Na'rifuhum? (The lives of the fourteen Infallibles, in eight volumes), Nukhbat al-Masa'il (practical treatise), and the exegesis of Surah Al-Jumu'ah and At-Taghabun.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 54-56.</ref> Attention to newly emerged issues (Masa'il Mustahdatha) as well as Ayatollah Milani's views on Contemporary Jurisprudence exist scatteredly in his books, which can be categorized into several fields such as [[Medical Fiqh]], [[Economic Fiqh]], [[Art Fiqh]], and [[Worship Fiqh]].

==Medical and Biological Fiqh==
===Artificial and Voluntary Insemination===
Based on Ayatollah Milani's view, voluntary [[artificial insemination]] is not permissible, although ostensibly there is no explicit text in verses and narrations regarding its prohibition. Nevertheless, the child resulting from insemination belongs to the owner of the sperm in terms of lineage, and if the father is not identified, the child has the ruling of a child of unknown lineage. This act is not considered Zina (adultery) for the woman. Regarding inheritance, the child inherits from the mother, and if the father is identified, from him and other relatives according to the classes of inheritance. The [[Nafaqa]] (maintenance) of the child is upon the father, and if the father is not specified, it is upon the mother, and in case of the mother's poverty, it will be upon the [[Bayt al-Mal]]. Furthermore, regarding the spread of prohibition (Mahramiyat), the child is considered the same as children resulting from legal marriage.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 189 & 386.</ref> Also, the insemination of a foreign man's sperm into a woman's womb is religiously contrary to Islamic regulations. However, if such insemination is performed and a child is born, the child cannot be considered Walad al-Zina (child of adultery).<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 320.</ref>

===Transplantation of Muslim and Non-Muslim Body Parts===
Milani does not consider the transplantation of Muslim body parts, such as a kidney and the cornea of the eye, to be permissible, whether from a dead body or a living body; but the use of body parts of the [[Ahl al-Kitab]] (People of the Book) who do not adhere to the Islamic Dhimma laws, and also from the body of an apostate, a Nasibi, and other Kafirs (disbelievers), is not impeded. According to him, in case of using a dead Muslim's body parts, his [[Diya]] must be paid and spent on charity for that deceased person. In his belief, the use of a dead Kafir's body parts is permissible if, after transplantation, it becomes part of the Muslim's body.<ref name=":0">Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 203-256.</ref>

===Dissection of Dead Bodies for Educational Purposes===
Based on Milani's opinion, [[Autopsy|dissection]] of a Muslim's body religiously necessitates the payment of Diya, the amount of which is specified based on the type of limb and is calculated as one-tenth of a living Muslim's Diya. This Diya must be spent on charity for the deceased, and the heirs do not inherit from it. However, the dissection of a Kafir's body has no Diya. In case of medical necessity, the dissection of a Muslim's body is permissible; but its Diya is not waived and must be paid.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 203 & 232.</ref>

===Contraception with Pills===
According to Milani, preventing pregnancy before the formation of the sperm (Nutfah), such as using pills or other methods, provided that the semen does not enter the woman's womb at all and the woman also consents, has no problem religiously. Also, if by using pills or similar methods, the man's seed is prevented from reaching the woman's seed (ovum), there is apparently no impediment. But if after the Nutfah is formed—meaning the man's seed has reached the woman's seed—an action is taken that causes its destruction and prevents the birth of the child, this act is considered a sin, and the perpetrator must pay fifteen mithqals of coined gold as Diya.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 387 & 388.</ref>

===Consuming Alcohol-based Medicine===
In Milani's belief, the use of medicines that contain alcohol in their composition depends on the certainty and doubt of the Mukallaf (person obligated to observe precepts). If the person does not know whether the alcohol present in the medicine is of the intoxicating type or taken from an intoxicating liquid, avoiding it is not obligatory. But if he is certain that it is so, he must avoid it. In this regard, investigation and examination about the type of alcohol are not necessary. Even if the alcohol present in the medicine is of the intoxicating type, provided that its effect has been consumed (dissipated) and it does not have potential intoxicating properties, the use of those medicines is not impeded.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 317.</ref>

== Fiqh of Edibles ==
===Slaughtering Animals by Machine===
If the slaughter of animals is performed by a machine, but the real and actual attribution of the slaughter is given to the human—meaning the human uses the machine for slaughter with will and religious intent, according to Milani's view, there is no problem, only other religious conditions of slaughter such as mentioning God's name, cutting the four vessels, and the direction of Qibla must be observed, and it is considered a lawful (Shar'i) slaughter.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 254.</ref>

===Eating Fish with Small Scales===
Eating the meat of fish that have small scales on their skin or are sparsely scaled, provided they possess even a slight amount of scales (Fals), is permissible based on Milani's opinion. Therefore, the criterion for the permissibility of eating fish meat is the existence of scales—even if minimal—on the body of the fish.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 363 & 364.</ref>

==Economic and Banking Fiqh==
===Credit Value of Banknotes===
In response to a question about the financial value (Maliyyat) of banknotes and its relation to the concept of government property being "Unknown Owner" (Majhul al-Malik) (relating to the Pahlavi government and before the Islamic Revolution), Ayatollah Milani believes that if the banknotes current among the people are considered government property and we consider the government as Majhul al-Malik, this view faces serious jurisprudential problems. Because:

If banknotes are Majhul al-Malik, they must be given as charity and only the poor have the right to use them; consequently, the wealthy do not own them.

Transactions with these banknotes become void or the buyer remains indebted in the Dhimma of the seller.

In inheritance, if the heirs are deserving of charity, whoever acts first takes the banknotes, and inheritance has no meaning regarding them.

These problems show that [[Nature of Money|banknotes]] cannot be considered Majhul al-Malik. Therefore, if we consider the banknote as a means to wealth and a document for it, the document being Majhul al-Malik does not create a problem, and if the banknote itself possesses financial value, its initial origin (i.e., general permissibility/Ibahah) is presumed via Istishab; meaning it is assumed that it remains permissible. Anyone—poor or rich—who possesses the banknote and intends to own it, is considered its owner, and all effects of ownership apply to it; including the attachment of Khums, validity of transactions, and realization of profit. Another point is that ownership is a credit-based (I'tibari) matter, and its subject does not need to be an external existent; rather, it can simply be a mental and contractual credit.<ref>Milani, Risalah Mujazah, pp. 12-20; Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 103-104.</ref>

In response to the question "Are banknotes considered among counted items (Ma'dudat), and is buying and selling them with increase and decrease, whether with a condition or without a condition, permissible?" he has issued a Fatwa that the ruling on buying and selling banknotes with increase and decrease depends on the person's perception of the nature of the banknote; therefore:

If the banknote merely has the aspect of being a document—meaning it is considered only as a draft or representative of real wealth, in this case, buying and selling it with increase and decrease is not permissible and falls under the ruling of [[Riba]].

But if the banknote possesses financial value in itself—meaning the banknote itself is recognized as independent wealth—in this case, the banknote is considered among counted items (Ma'dudat), and in counted items, transactional Riba does not apply; therefore, buying and selling it with increase and decrease is permissible.

Diagnosing whether the banknote in a specific transaction has the aspect of documentality or intrinsic financial value is upon the Mukallaf, and he must determine it by carefully considering the conditions of the transaction and the intent of the parties.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 387-388.</ref>

===Discounting Checks===
In Milani's belief, a [[Check]] as a financial document is not tradable; rather, the transaction must apply to what is in the Dhimma (i.e., the real debt existing in the Dhimma of the check issuer). Therefore, if the subject of the transaction is cash (banknotes) and not the check itself, and the transaction is performed correctly and religiously, there is no impediment and it is not considered Riba. Consequently, a transaction in which a check for the amount of one hundred Tomans is sold at the price of ninety Tomans will only be religious and non-usurious if the transaction is performed based on the real debt and with the observance of Fiqh conditions, not merely the buying and selling of the check document.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 323-324.</ref>

==Fiqh of Art and Media==
===Chess for Sports and Strengthening Intelligence===
In Milani's belief, the game of [[Chess]]—even if performed with the aim of entertainment and strengthening intelligence and lacks betting—is religiously Haram (forbidden). The reasons for the prohibition of chess in the Quran and narrations from his perspective are:

During the game, the entire thought and heart of the human becomes focused on the game, and this state is a type of Lahw (vain amusement) and complete negligence of the remembrance of God.

The psychological conflict resulting from winning and losing in the game can create negative moral effects between the parties.

This atmosphere provides a ground for the dominance of Satan and the commanding self (Nafs al-Ammara).

Therefore, even in the absence of betting or competition, the very engagement in chess is not permissible jurisprudentially.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 208, 235, 196, & 240.</ref>

===Painting, Sculpting, and Statue Making===

Milani considers drawing the image of humans and animals and making [[Sculpture|statues]] of beings possessing a soul to be problematic religiously; but he considers keeping a statue, provided it is for a rational purpose, to be without problem.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 304-307.</ref>

==Fiqh of Acts of Worship==
=== Validity of Moon Sighting and Horizon Difference ===
Milani has accepted the validity of [[Moon Sighting]] at the beginning of the lunar month without differentiating between the unity or difference of the horizon in cities. That is, if the sighting of the moon is achieved in a city, even if that city is not the residence of the fasting person, it is sufficient to prove the first of the month.

This basis rests on several principles:

The absolute nature (Itlaq) of the narrations implies that sighting the moon at any point on earth is sufficient to prove the first of the month.

The definition of the first of the month is the moon exiting from under the rays (Taht al-Sha'a), which is a cosmic and factual matter (Nafs al-Amri); unlike the sunrise and sunset which is a relative matter and dependent on geographical location.

Moon sighting has the quality of being a path (Tariqiyya), meaning it is a way to discover reality. If knowledge is obtained that the moon has exited from under the rays, that time will definitely be the first of the month.

Therefore, the first of the lunar month is a cosmic reality that is provable by sighting the moon—even in a city other than the fasting person's location—and the difference of horizon has no effect on this ruling.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 278-279.</ref>

===Qibla and Prayer Times in Space Travel===
Milani says the following regarding the status of performing prayer for astronauts:

Prayer Qasr (Shortened) and Tamam (Full) in Space Travel: Travel to outside the planet Earth is jurisprudentially the same as travel inside the Earth. Therefore, if the religious conditions of travel are realized, the rulings of Qasr or Tamam prayer will also be applicable according to the same criteria.
Determining Qibla in Space or Other Spheres: The Qibla is still the Kaaba. To determine the direction of the Qibla in space or other planets, the Mukallaf must either diagnose the direction himself with sufficient knowledge, or refer to the opinion of experts and obtain assurance from their statement.
Prayer Times Outside Earth: If the person is in space and in Earth's orbit, he must perform five prayers in every rotation of the Earth around itself, observing the time intervals. These intervals must be adjusted based on the times of morning, noon, and Maghrib of his earthly residence. But if he is on another planet that has day and night like Earth, he must adjust the prayer times based on the morning, noon, and Maghrib of that same planet. Of course, if the rotation of that planet is slower than Earth, he must practice caution; meaning he should pray both according to the times of his earthly location and according to the times of that planet.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 195-196.</ref>

==Impurity of the People of the Book==
Milani believes that the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), according to obligatory caution, are considered Najis (impure) and must be avoided. This avoidance is not only due to physical contamination but due to religious interests, practical wisdom, and religious policy; because contact and association with them might cause the transmission of spiritual and psychological harms. He considers the impurity of the People of the Book to be intrinsic impurity (Dhati), not merely resulting from carelessness or physical contamination. This ruling is based on numerous narrations that indicate the necessity of avoidance.

According to him, some scholars might consider Christians to be monotheists, in the sense that in their belief, the three hypostases (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) are not parallel to each other, but they consider the other two hypostases as created and manifestations of divine attributes and intermediaries in grace. However, this understanding has no effect on the Fiqh ruling, and caution in avoiding them is still necessary.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 46 & 335-342.</ref>

==Footnotes==
{{Footnotes}}
==References==
{{References}}
Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Didgah-haye Elmi: Pasokh be Porsesh-haye Fiqhi, Kalami, Falsafi, Erfani, Tafsiri va Tarikhi, effort by Gholamreza Jalali, Mashhad, Islamic Research Foundation, 1386 SH.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Risalah Mujazah fi Ahkam al-Kumbyalat (al-Sanadat), Najaf: Nu'man Printing House.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Mukhtasar al-Ahkam, Tehran, Saduq, n.d.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Makatabat-e Hazrat Ayatollah al-Uzma Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani, Tehran, Sahl Publications, 1396 SH.

Mehrizi, Mahdi, Shenakht-nameh Hazrat Ayatollah al-Uzma Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani, Tehran, Sahl Publications, 1395 SH.

[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:سید محمدهادی حسینی میلانی]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]

File:Milani.jpg

2026-04-19T15:17:44Z

Enadmin:

Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani

2026-04-19T15:17:30Z

Enadmin:

{{author
|author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compilation =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}

{{Infobox person
| known_as = Ayatollah Milani
| name = Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani
| birth_date = 1313 AH
| death_date = 1395 AH
| image = milani.jpg
| image_size =
| caption =
| position = Marja' al-Taqlid
| religion = Shia
| nationality = Iran
| field = Fiqh and Usul
| works_in_contemporary_jurisprudence = Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya
| views =
| teachers = [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]], [[Muhammad Husayn Gharavi Na'ini]], Agha Ziya Iraqi
| students = [[Sayyid Ali Husayni Khamenei]], Muhammad Taqi Ja'fari, Azizullah Attardi, Kazim Modir Shanehchi
| website =
}}

*'''Abstract'''

'''Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani''' (in Persian: [[:fa:سید_محمدهادی_حسینی_میلانی|سید محمدهادی حسینی میلانی]]) was one of the Shia Marja' al-Taqlids in the fourteenth lunar Hijri century. He studied in the [[Najaf Seminary]] and [[Karbala Seminary|Karbala]] and was a student of [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]] and [[Mirza Mohammad-Hossein Gharavi Na'ini]], and he himself engaged in teaching Fiqh, Usul al-Fiqh, Exegesis, and Theology. Milani then migrated to Mashhad, and during his 22-year presence in this city, he revived [[Mashhad Seminary|its seminary]] and established a modern educational system within it. In his jurisprudential works, correspondences, and istiftas (responses to legal inquiries), there is attention to current issues and the needs of the time. The book Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya is among his important Fiqh works, in which discussions on prayer, Khums, Zakat, and sale (Bay') have been researched and published in independent volumes. Milani has offered new opinions in the fields of [[Medical Fiqh]], [[Economic Fiqh]], [[Worship Fiqh]], and [[Art Fiqh]].

==Scientific and Political Biography==
Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husayni Milani is one of the Shia Marja' al-Taqlids who studied and taught in Najaf and Karbala and attended the lessons of [[Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani]], [[Mirza Mohammad-Hossein Gharavi Na'ini]], and Agha Ziya Iraqi for a long time. Milani migrated to Mashhad in 1333 SH (1954), and it is said that the reform of the condition of the [[Mashhad Seminary]] was accomplished through his efforts. He founded a new educational system in five stages, which took at least 15 years to complete and covered everything from preliminary studies to the specialized course of Fiqh and Usul. Specialization in other Islamic sciences was also organized based on the students' requests. Milani also established high-level seminary schools to upgrade the scientific level of students.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 59-61, 111-114, 238-242.</ref>

Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani is considered part of the second generation of scholars after the Constitutional Revolution who engaged less in political activities. However, several events caused his entry into the political arena, including: World War II and the emergence of anti-colonial movements in the Islamic world, support for the struggle against Reza Shah regarding the unveiling of Hijab (Kashf-e Hijab), support for Navvab Safavi and the idea of [[Islamic Government]], support for the movement for the Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry, accompanying the struggle of Iraqi tribes against the British, opposition to the activities of the Tudeh Party, and support for the movement of Imam Khomeini during the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 271-277.</ref>

Although Milani did not author a book himself, his scattered notes and lesson transcriptions have been published in 15 titles; including Mahadarat fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya (an examination of various Fiqh topics, in ten volumes), Qadatuna Kayfa Na'rifuhum? (The lives of the fourteen Infallibles, in eight volumes), Nukhbat al-Masa'il (practical treatise), and the exegesis of Surah Al-Jumu'ah and At-Taghabun.<ref>Mehrizi, Shenakht-nameh, pp. 54-56.</ref> Attention to newly emerged issues (Masa'il Mustahdatha) as well as Ayatollah Milani's views on Contemporary Jurisprudence exist scatteredly in his books, which can be categorized into several fields such as [[Medical Fiqh]], [[Economic Fiqh]], [[Art Fiqh]], and [[Worship Fiqh]].

==Medical and Biological Fiqh==
===Artificial and Voluntary Insemination===
Based on Ayatollah Milani's view, voluntary [[artificial insemination]] is not permissible, although ostensibly there is no explicit text in verses and narrations regarding its prohibition. Nevertheless, the child resulting from insemination belongs to the owner of the sperm in terms of lineage, and if the father is not identified, the child has the ruling of a child of unknown lineage. This act is not considered Zina (adultery) for the woman. Regarding inheritance, the child inherits from the mother, and if the father is identified, from him and other relatives according to the classes of inheritance. The [[Nafaqa]] (maintenance) of the child is upon the father, and if the father is not specified, it is upon the mother, and in case of the mother's poverty, it will be upon the [[Bayt al-Mal]]. Furthermore, regarding the spread of prohibition (Mahramiyat), the child is considered the same as children resulting from legal marriage.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 189 & 386.</ref> Also, the insemination of a foreign man's sperm into a woman's womb is religiously contrary to Islamic regulations. However, if such insemination is performed and a child is born, the child cannot be considered Walad al-Zina (child of adultery).<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 320.</ref>

===Transplantation of Muslim and Non-Muslim Body Parts===
Milani does not consider the transplantation of Muslim body parts, such as a kidney and the cornea of the eye, to be permissible, whether from a dead body or a living body; but the use of body parts of the [[Ahl al-Kitab]] (People of the Book) who do not adhere to the Islamic Dhimma laws, and also from the body of an apostate, a Nasibi, and other Kafirs (disbelievers), is not impeded. According to him, in case of using a dead Muslim's body parts, his [[Diya]] must be paid and spent on charity for that deceased person. In his belief, the use of a dead Kafir's body parts is permissible if, after transplantation, it becomes part of the Muslim's body.<ref name=":0">Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 203-256.</ref>

===Dissection of Dead Bodies for Educational Purposes===
Based on Milani's opinion, [[Autopsy|dissection]] of a Muslim's body religiously necessitates the payment of Diya, the amount of which is specified based on the type of limb and is calculated as one-tenth of a living Muslim's Diya. This Diya must be spent on charity for the deceased, and the heirs do not inherit from it. However, the dissection of a Kafir's body has no Diya. In case of medical necessity, the dissection of a Muslim's body is permissible; but its Diya is not waived and must be paid.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 203 & 232.</ref>

===Contraception with Pills===
According to Milani, preventing pregnancy before the formation of the sperm (Nutfah), such as using pills or other methods, provided that the semen does not enter the woman's womb at all and the woman also consents, has no problem religiously. Also, if by using pills or similar methods, the man's seed is prevented from reaching the woman's seed (ovum), there is apparently no impediment. But if after the Nutfah is formed—meaning the man's seed has reached the woman's seed—an action is taken that causes its destruction and prevents the birth of the child, this act is considered a sin, and the perpetrator must pay fifteen mithqals of coined gold as Diya.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 387 & 388.</ref>

===Consuming Alcohol-based Medicine===
In Milani's belief, the use of medicines that contain alcohol in their composition depends on the certainty and doubt of the Mukallaf (person obligated to observe precepts). If the person does not know whether the alcohol present in the medicine is of the intoxicating type or taken from an intoxicating liquid, avoiding it is not obligatory. But if he is certain that it is so, he must avoid it. In this regard, investigation and examination about the type of alcohol are not necessary. Even if the alcohol present in the medicine is of the intoxicating type, provided that its effect has been consumed (dissipated) and it does not have potential intoxicating properties, the use of those medicines is not impeded.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 317.</ref>

== Fiqh of Edibles ==
===Slaughtering Animals by Machine===
If the slaughter of animals is performed by a machine, but the real and actual attribution of the slaughter is given to the human—meaning the human uses the machine for slaughter with will and religious intent, according to Milani's view, there is no problem, only other religious conditions of slaughter such as mentioning God's name, cutting the four vessels, and the direction of Qibla must be observed, and it is considered a lawful (Shar'i) slaughter.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 254.</ref>

===Eating Fish with Small Scales===
Eating the meat of fish that have small scales on their skin or are sparsely scaled, provided they possess even a slight amount of scales (Fals), is permissible based on Milani's opinion. Therefore, the criterion for the permissibility of eating fish meat is the existence of scales—even if minimal—on the body of the fish.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 363 & 364.</ref>

==Economic and Banking Fiqh==
===Credit Value of Banknotes===
In response to a question about the financial value (Maliyyat) of banknotes and its relation to the concept of government property being "Unknown Owner" (Majhul al-Malik) (relating to the Pahlavi government and before the Islamic Revolution), Ayatollah Milani believes that if the banknotes current among the people are considered government property and we consider the government as Majhul al-Malik, this view faces serious jurisprudential problems. Because:

If banknotes are Majhul al-Malik, they must be given as charity and only the poor have the right to use them; consequently, the wealthy do not own them.

Transactions with these banknotes become void or the buyer remains indebted in the Dhimma of the seller.

In inheritance, if the heirs are deserving of charity, whoever acts first takes the banknotes, and inheritance has no meaning regarding them.

These problems show that [[Nature of Money|banknotes]] cannot be considered Majhul al-Malik. Therefore, if we consider the banknote as a means to wealth and a document for it, the document being Majhul al-Malik does not create a problem, and if the banknote itself possesses financial value, its initial origin (i.e., general permissibility/Ibahah) is presumed via Istishab; meaning it is assumed that it remains permissible. Anyone—poor or rich—who possesses the banknote and intends to own it, is considered its owner, and all effects of ownership apply to it; including the attachment of Khums, validity of transactions, and realization of profit. Another point is that ownership is a credit-based (I'tibari) matter, and its subject does not need to be an external existent; rather, it can simply be a mental and contractual credit.<ref>Milani, Risalah Mujazah, pp. 12-20; Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 103-104.</ref>

In response to the question "Are banknotes considered among counted items (Ma'dudat), and is buying and selling them with increase and decrease, whether with a condition or without a condition, permissible?" he has issued a Fatwa that the ruling on buying and selling banknotes with increase and decrease depends on the person's perception of the nature of the banknote; therefore:

If the banknote merely has the aspect of being a document—meaning it is considered only as a draft or representative of real wealth, in this case, buying and selling it with increase and decrease is not permissible and falls under the ruling of [[Riba]].

But if the banknote possesses financial value in itself—meaning the banknote itself is recognized as independent wealth—in this case, the banknote is considered among counted items (Ma'dudat), and in counted items, transactional Riba does not apply; therefore, buying and selling it with increase and decrease is permissible.

Diagnosing whether the banknote in a specific transaction has the aspect of documentality or intrinsic financial value is upon the Mukallaf, and he must determine it by carefully considering the conditions of the transaction and the intent of the parties.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 387-388.</ref>

===Discounting Checks===
In Milani's belief, a [[Check]] as a financial document is not tradable; rather, the transaction must apply to what is in the Dhimma (i.e., the real debt existing in the Dhimma of the check issuer). Therefore, if the subject of the transaction is cash (banknotes) and not the check itself, and the transaction is performed correctly and religiously, there is no impediment and it is not considered Riba. Consequently, a transaction in which a check for the amount of one hundred Tomans is sold at the price of ninety Tomans will only be religious and non-usurious if the transaction is performed based on the real debt and with the observance of Fiqh conditions, not merely the buying and selling of the check document.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 323-324.</ref>

==Fiqh of Art and Media==
===Chess for Sports and Strengthening Intelligence===
In Milani's belief, the game of [[Chess]]—even if performed with the aim of entertainment and strengthening intelligence and lacks betting—is religiously Haram (forbidden). The reasons for the prohibition of chess in the Quran and narrations from his perspective are:

During the game, the entire thought and heart of the human becomes focused on the game, and this state is a type of Lahw (vain amusement) and complete negligence of the remembrance of God.

The psychological conflict resulting from winning and losing in the game can create negative moral effects between the parties.

This atmosphere provides a ground for the dominance of Satan and the commanding self (Nafs al-Ammara).

Therefore, even in the absence of betting or competition, the very engagement in chess is not permissible jurisprudentially.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 208, 235, 196, & 240.</ref>

===Painting, Sculpting, and Statue Making===

Milani considers drawing the image of humans and animals and making [[Sculpture|statues]] of beings possessing a soul to be problematic religiously; but he considers keeping a statue, provided it is for a rational purpose, to be without problem.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 304-307.</ref>

==Fiqh of Acts of Worship==
=== Validity of Moon Sighting and Horizon Difference ===
Milani has accepted the validity of [[Moon Sighting]] at the beginning of the lunar month without differentiating between the unity or difference of the horizon in cities. That is, if the sighting of the moon is achieved in a city, even if that city is not the residence of the fasting person, it is sufficient to prove the first of the month.

This basis rests on several principles:

The absolute nature (Itlaq) of the narrations implies that sighting the moon at any point on earth is sufficient to prove the first of the month.

The definition of the first of the month is the moon exiting from under the rays (Taht al-Sha'a), which is a cosmic and factual matter (Nafs al-Amri); unlike the sunrise and sunset which is a relative matter and dependent on geographical location.

Moon sighting has the quality of being a path (Tariqiyya), meaning it is a way to discover reality. If knowledge is obtained that the moon has exited from under the rays, that time will definitely be the first of the month.

Therefore, the first of the lunar month is a cosmic reality that is provable by sighting the moon—even in a city other than the fasting person's location—and the difference of horizon has no effect on this ruling.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 278-279.</ref>

===Qibla and Prayer Times in Space Travel===
Milani says the following regarding the status of performing prayer for astronauts:

Prayer Qasr (Shortened) and Tamam (Full) in Space Travel: Travel to outside the planet Earth is jurisprudentially the same as travel inside the Earth. Therefore, if the religious conditions of travel are realized, the rulings of Qasr or Tamam prayer will also be applicable according to the same criteria.
Determining Qibla in Space or Other Spheres: The Qibla is still the Kaaba. To determine the direction of the Qibla in space or other planets, the Mukallaf must either diagnose the direction himself with sufficient knowledge, or refer to the opinion of experts and obtain assurance from their statement.
Prayer Times Outside Earth: If the person is in space and in Earth's orbit, he must perform five prayers in every rotation of the Earth around itself, observing the time intervals. These intervals must be adjusted based on the times of morning, noon, and Maghrib of his earthly residence. But if he is on another planet that has day and night like Earth, he must adjust the prayer times based on the morning, noon, and Maghrib of that same planet. Of course, if the rotation of that planet is slower than Earth, he must practice caution; meaning he should pray both according to the times of his earthly location and according to the times of that planet.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, pp. 195-196.</ref>

==Impurity of the People of the Book==
Milani believes that the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), according to obligatory caution, are considered Najis (impure) and must be avoided. This avoidance is not only due to physical contamination but due to religious interests, practical wisdom, and religious policy; because contact and association with them might cause the transmission of spiritual and psychological harms. He considers the impurity of the People of the Book to be intrinsic impurity (Dhati), not merely resulting from carelessness or physical contamination. This ruling is based on numerous narrations that indicate the necessity of avoidance.

According to him, some scholars might consider Christians to be monotheists, in the sense that in their belief, the three hypostases (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) are not parallel to each other, but they consider the other two hypostases as created and manifestations of divine attributes and intermediaries in grace. However, this understanding has no effect on the Fiqh ruling, and caution in avoiding them is still necessary.<ref>Milani, Didgah-haye Elmi, p. 46 & 335-342.</ref>

==Footnotes==
{{Footnotes}}
==References==
{{References}}
Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Didgah-haye Elmi: Pasokh be Porsesh-haye Fiqhi, Kalami, Falsafi, Erfani, Tafsiri va Tarikhi, effort by Gholamreza Jalali, Mashhad, Islamic Research Foundation, 1386 SH.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Risalah Mujazah fi Ahkam al-Kumbyalat (al-Sanadat), Najaf: Nu'man Printing House.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Mukhtasar al-Ahkam, Tehran, Saduq, n.d.

Milani, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi, Makatabat-e Hazrat Ayatollah al-Uzma Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani, Tehran, Sahl Publications, 1396 SH.

Mehrizi, Mahdi, Shenakht-nameh Hazrat Ayatollah al-Uzma Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani, Tehran, Sahl Publications, 1395 SH.

[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:سید محمدهادی حسینی میلانی]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]

File:Mohammad Hassan Shushtari.jpg

2026-04-19T15:16:04Z

Enadmin:

The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective (Book)

2026-04-03T12:18:01Z

Enadmin:

{{author
|author = Mahdi Shajarian
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective
| image = The_Objectives_of_Punishments_in_Sexual_Crimes_An_Islamic_Perspective.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = [[Rahim Nowbahar]]
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Sexual Crimes
| genre =
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =
| pages = 408
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy
| publication_place = Qom
| publication_date = 2010 (1389 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}'''Abstract'''

'''The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective''' (اهداف مجازات‌ها در جرایم جنسی؛ چشم‌اندازی اسلامی), written by [[Rahim Nowbahar]], re-examines the philosophy of punishments in [[sexual crimes]] in Islamic jurisprudence with an objective-oriented approach (extracting Sharia purposes) and a holistic view (a comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the subject). Moving beyond a purely devotional (''ta'abbudi'') perspective, this work argues that in Islam, punishments are tools for realizing transcendent goals such as executing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and deterrence.

By distinguishing between "individual lapses" and "crimes against public morality," this book shows that the Lawgiver's (''Shari''') approach toward these two categories is entirely different. In the first type, by making the methods of proof difficult, the emphasis is placed on covering up (''pardeh-pushi'') and repentance (''tawbah''), but in the second type, the main goal is the decisive defense of social values. Ultimately, by analyzing the "conflict" (''tazahum'') between executing prescribed punishments (''hudud'') and higher interests (such as avoiding the [[Maxim of alienating from religion|alienation from religion]]), the research concludes that the Islamic penal system is flexible and dynamic. In it, the Islamic sovereignty can and must, for the realization of the true objectives of punishments, apply necessary changes in the quality and even the very execution of punishments through [[Maxim of Expediency|expediency evaluation]] (''maslahat-sanji'').

== Brief Overview ==
The book The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective, penned by Rahim Nowbahar, is among the books of judicial jurisprudence with a focus on sexual crimes. This book was first published by the [[Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy]] in 2010 (1389 SH) in 408 pages.

=== Structure of the Book ===
This research is organized into an introduction and five main chapters: The first chapter presents the theoretical foundations and methods for recognizing the objectives of Islamic punishments (pp. 56-126). The second chapter analyzes the objectives of punishments in [[sexual crimes]] warranting ''hadd'' (adultery/fornication [''zina''], sodomy [''liwat''], and lesbianism [''musahaqah'']), with an emphasis on the difficulty of proof and the principle of covering up (pp. 127-180). The third chapter is dedicated to discretionary (''ta'ziri'') sexual crimes that have the nature of an individual error (pp. 180-239). The fourth chapter examines crimes against public morality (such as [[procuring (''qawwadi'')]]) (pp. 241-288). The final chapter addresses the discussion of the conflict (''tazahum'') between executing ''hudud'' and higher interests, such as the maxim of "[[Maxim of No Hardship|social hardship of Muslims]]" and the "[[Prohibition of alienating from religion|prohibition of alienating from religion]]" (pp. 291-406).

== Objectives of Islamic Punishments ==
=== First Section: Ways of Discovering the Objectives of Islamic Punishments ===
In the author's belief, several ways can be utilized to discover the objectives of punishments in Islam:

'''Recognizing the General Objectives of Islam:''' Principles such as justice, which is one of the goals of the prophets' mission, and purification (''tazkiyah''), mercy (''rahmah''), and dignity (''karamah''), which are employed for the reformation of the individual, are strategic principles for directing the goals of the penal system (pp. 56-59).

'''Deduction from the Text and the Apparent Meaning of Texts:''' By contemplating verses and narrations, as well as the rationale and wisdom mentioned for certain rulings, one can discover the objectives of the Lawgiver. On this path, one should not content oneself with definitive texts (''nusus''); rather, valid apparent meanings (''zawahir'') and even the understanding derived from the totality of the evidences (the spirit of the law) are also authoritative (''hujjah'') (pp. 59-69).

'''Studying the History of Punishments:''' Examining the historical background of punishments and the developments that occurred in their execution during the time of the Infallibles (a) is very illuminating. For example, the change in the punishment for drinking alcohol from forty lashes to eighty lashes during the time of the second Caliph. This change, which occurred with the suggestion of Imam Ali (a) and because the previous punishment was not a deterrent, shows that "deterrence" is one of the key objectives (pp. 69-70).

Whether Punishments are Endorsed (''Imda'i'') or Established (''Ta'sisi''): Almost all corporal punishments in Islam (stoning [''rajm''], flogging, amputation of the hand) were prevalent before Islam as well. Now, did the Lawgiver consider these punishments a rational practice and endorse them with the condition of "being prevalent" (restrictive aspect or ''haythiyyat taqyidiyyah''), or was the reason for the Lawgiver's endorsement solely their prevalence (causative aspect or ''haythiyyat ta'liliyyah'')? If the condition of prevalence is part of the subject (''mawdu'''), then with the disappearance of the rational prevalence of a punishment, the subject of the ruling is also nullified. This discussion raises the possibility of changing punishments based on social and cultural developments (pp. 74-75).

'''The Type of Punishments and the Method of Their Execution:''' The type of punishments (such as [[execution]] or [[imprisonment]]) and the manner of their execution (publicly or privately) can indicate the legislator's objectives. Islam's emphasis on executing punishment in the presence of a group of believers indicates the aspect of public deterrence and universal supervision (pp. 84-85).

'''Cases of the Nullification (''Suqut'') of Punishments:''' Factors such as repentance (''tawbah''), the complainant's forgiveness, and the ruler's pardon, which cause the nullification of the punishment, show that the rehabilitation of the offender and compensation for the victim's loss are among the important objectives of Islam's penal system (pp. 86-87).

'''The Ruling of Punishments in the Assumption of Conflict (''Tazahum''):''' Sometimes a conflict arises between the [[expediency]] (''maslahah'') of executing a punishment and other expediencies or corruptions (''mafasid''); scrutinizing the legislator's rulings in cases of conflict regarding the execution of a punishment or overlooking it reveals the legislator's attitude toward punishment and its objectives (p. 87).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Islamic Punishments ===
The author explains the objectives of Islamic punishments as follows:

'''Execution of Justice:''' Justice is the ultimate goal of the prophets' mission and the spirit governing all Islamic rulings; the emphasis on "retribution in kind" (''qisas bi al-mithl'') and the prohibition of extravagance in killing are manifestations of this fundamental goal. Islamic justice pays attention to expediency evaluation and consequentialism, and is mingled with pardon and mercy (pp. 99-106).

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' Purification and upbringing are among the main goals of religion. The prominent role of repentance in the nullification of many punishments and the religious leaders' emphasis on the reformation of and clemency toward the offender clearly show that rehabilitation and returning the individual to society are among the important goals of Islamic punishments (pp. 107-109).

'''Defense of Society and Its Values:''' Alongside attention to the individual, Islam also cares for the foundation and values of society. Punishments such as imprisonment and exile for dangerous offenders have been legislated with the goal of protecting society (pp. 111-113).

'''Private and Public Deterrence:''' Creating fear and serving as an example for the offender themselves (private deterrence) and others (public deterrence) are among the clear objectives of punishments (p. 116). The intensification of punishment in the event of repeating the crime and the public execution of certain punishments are carried out with this very objective (p. 118).

'''Compensation for the Victim:''' In crimes where the rights of others are violated, the Lawgiver has paid attention to compensating for the loss and soothing the victim's suffering. Institutions such as [[blood money]] (''diyah''), the right to retribution (''qisas''), and the necessity of the complainant's consent in crimes involving the rights of people (''haqq al-nas'') show the importance of this objective (pp. 121-122).

== Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd ==
This chapter first presents the punishment for [[sexual crimes]] warranting ''hadd'' (adultery/fornication, sodomy, and lesbianism), then examines the objectives of their punishment (pp. 125-178).

=== First Section: Punishment for Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd and Their Judicial Proof ===
Regarding the punishment for fornication (''zina''), the famous theory of jurists is that at the beginning of Islam, its punishment was life imprisonment in the house ([[Verse 15 of Surah al-Nisa']]), but this ruling was abrogated by [[Verse 2 of Surah al-Nur]], which determined the punishment as one hundred lashes. Thereafter, one hundred lashes were designated for the punishment of fornication by an unmarried person (''ghayr muhsan''), and stoning (''rajm'') for adultery by a married person (''muhsan'') (pp. 131-132).

Regarding the punishment for sodomy (''liwat''), the famous theory of Shia jurists is [[execution]], but in the method of its execution, the ruler has the choice among methods such as killing with a sword, burning, [[stoning]], throwing from a height, or collapsing a wall upon him. Sunni jurists disagree on this matter; Abu Hanifa considers sodomy to warrant discretionary punishment (''ta'zir''), and Al-Shafi'i and Malik consider its ''hadd'' similar to the ''hadd'' for fornication/adultery (stoning or flogging depending on marital status [''ihsan'']) (p. 140).

Based on the famous fatwa of Shia jurists, lesbianism (''musahaqah'') is among the crimes warranting ''hadd'', carrying a punishment of one hundred lashes. In the event of repeating the crime and the ''hadd'' being executed three times, the perpetrator is executed on the fourth occasion. The majority of Sunni jurists consider lesbianism to warrant ''ta'zir'' (pp. 142-143).

In the author's belief, despite the severe punishments foreseen for these crimes, the Holy Lawgiver has been extremely strict in their judicial proof. Proving these crimes requires the testimony of four just men who have seen the act clearly and without any ambiguity; a matter which is practically almost impossible. Furthermore, [[spying/snooping]] (''tajassus'') to discover the sin and even looking at the crime scene to bear witness is not permissible. If the number of witnesses does not reach the required quorum, they themselves are sentenced to the ''hadd'' for false accusation of unchastity (''qadhf'') (eighty lashes) (pp. 143-144). The other way of proof is the individual's own confession, which must also be four times and in separate sessions. The conduct (''sirah'') of the Prophet (s) and Imam Ali (a) was to dissuade individuals from confessing and to encourage them to repent and cover up (pp. 144-147).

This entire set of strictures shows that the Lawgiver's main objective is preserving reputation, preventing unjust accusations, and providing the opportunity for repentance and reformation for wrongdoers, not punishing and disgracing individuals. In reality, the sensitivity of Islam's penal system is aimed more at preventing corruption from becoming public and spreading in society than being focused on the hidden sin itself (pp. 150-151).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd ===
By analyzing the totality of the regulations, the author arrives at the objectives of punishment in sexual crimes warranting ''hadd''. He believes that Islam's approach is not pure retributivism based on focusing on the crime and the moral responsibility of the criminal; rather, consequentialism exists within it as well; because factors such as repentance, doubt (''shubhah''), and the ruler's pardon can nullify the punishment (pp. 152-156).

The author explains the objectives of these punishments under the following headings:

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' This objective is the most central goal. The abundant emphasis on repentance and its acceptance for the nullification of the ''hadd'', and the Infallibles' (a) encouragement to repent instead of confessing, bear witness to this claim. By leaving the path of repentance open, the Lawgiver seeks the true reformation of the individual (pp. 157-162).

'''Private and Public Deterrence:''' Punishments such as flogging and exile, in addition to physical pain, deter the individual from repeating the crime by creating a sense of degradation. Executing the punishment in the presence of a group of believers is also with the goal of society drawing a lesson and strengthening public deterrence. However, Islam, by emphasizing the presence of a small group (''ta'ifah'') and not all the people, as well as setting conditions for those present, has prevented the execution of punishment from turning into a public spectacle that could cause irreparable damage to the individual's personality (pp. 162-165).

'''Restorative Justice:''' Islam's penal system pays special attention to compensating for loss and soothing the victim's suffering in crimes that have a specific victim (such as rape). In these cases, the nullification of the punishment through repentance is conditional upon obtaining the victim's consent, which shows the official recognition of the victim's rights in the penal process (pp. 170-174).

Ultimately, the author concludes that ''hadd'' punishments in [[sexual crimes]] have been established to protect values such as "[[chastity]]" and "sexual health," but the Lawgiver, through extreme strictness in proof and emphasis on repentance and covering up, has shown that He has no inclination toward the widespread execution of these punishments and His main goal is reformation and prevention (pp. 174-178).

== Objectives of Punishments in Discretionary (''Ta'ziri'') Sexual Crimes ==
This chapter examines the objectives of punishment in crimes whose nature is a moral error but do not reach the level of fornication and sodomy and have a "discretionary" (''ta'ziri'') punishment (at the discretion of the ruler).

=== First Section: Textually Specified (''Mansus'') Discretionary Sexual Crimes ===
By examining the crimes for which ''ta'zir'' has been determined in narrations, the author analyzes the Lawgiver's approach. Instances such as two non-mahram individuals sleeping under one cover, kissing out of lust, [[deflowering]], [[bestiality]], and masturbation have been condemned in narrations and ''ta'ziri'' punishments (such as flogging less than the ''hadd'' amount) have been mentioned for them (pp. 181-184). The author discusses deflowering, sexual intercourse with animals, masturbation, [[sexual intercourse with minors]], and [[sexual violence]] (pp. 185-201).

=== Second Section: Principles Governing Discretionary Sexual Crimes ===
By analyzing the previous discussions, the author extracts several principles for the ''ta'zir'' system in sexual crimes:

'''Difficulty of Judicial Proof:''' The strict approach and the inclination toward covering up that govern ''hudud'' flow a fortiori in ''ta'ziri'' crimes as well. Spying to discover hidden sins is forbidden, and the principle is non-penal intervention (pp. 203-207).

'''The Effect of Repentance:''' Repentance, just as it nullifies ''hudud'', also nullifies ''ta'ziri'' punishments, which possess the nature of a sin. In this case, even if doubt exists, the [[Maxim of Dar']] (warding off punishments) prevents the execution of punishment upon the repentant (pp. 211-219).

'''Diversity in Penal Sanctions:''' Unlike ''hudud'', in ''ta'zirat'' there is no obligation to use the punishment of flogging. The author rejects the idea that flogging is an ideal Islamic punishment and believes this punishment was a product of the culture and conditions of its time, and the Lawgiver, by delegating ''ta'zir'' to the ruler's opinion, has left the path open for the use of efficient, humane punishments suitable for every era (pp. 219-220).

'''The Necessity of Avoiding Punitive Extremism:''' The principle that [[Ta'zir is less than Hadd]] (''al-ta'zir bima duna al-hadd'') indicates the Lawgiver's tolerant approach in this domain. The ruler must content himself with the minimum punishment that secures the educational and deterrent objectives and avoid severity (pp. 220-224).

=== Third Section: Strategies for Determining the Objectives of Punishments ===
Considering the aforementioned principles, the author proposes the following strategies for determining the objectives of punishment in ''ta'ziri'' sexual crimes:

'''The Principle of Preventing Widespread Criminalization:''' Every forbidden (''haram'') act must not necessarily be considered a crime. [[Criminalization]] must be carried out based on public interest and with caution to prevent penal inflation (pp. 225-227).

'''The Principle of Preferring Covering Up:''' Regarding sexual errors that have a private aspect, the principle is encouraging repentance and concealment (''istitar''), and non-penal intervention (pp. 227-228).

'''The Principle of Minimal Use of Punishment to Defend Morality:''' The protection of moral values is not necessarily achieved through punishment; therefore, cultural and educational tools must be utilized, and punishment should be considered the last resort (pp. 228-230).

'''The Principle of Caring for the Reformation of the Offender:''' The main goal in these crimes must be the rehabilitation and reformation of the individual, not merely retribution (pp. 203-231).

'''The Principle of Proportionate Defense and Compensation:''' Where a crime damages the rights of others, one must react with proportionality and justice, and completely secure the rights of the victim (pp. 231-233).

'''The Principle of the Diversity and Humaneness of Punishments:''' A wide spectrum of penal reactions appropriate to the criminal's personality and the conditions of society, including alternative punishments, must be used, and the human dignity of the offender must be emphasized at all stages (pp. 234-238).

== Objectives of Punishments in Crimes Harmful to Public Morality ==
In this chapter, the author examines crimes that, unlike personal errors, directly target the public morality of society. By citing some Western thinkers, he shows that preserving public morality has always been a concern for legislators. In the contemporary era as well, with the expansion of technology, phenomena such as [[pornography]] and [[human trafficking]] have become serious challenges, and international human rights documents have also emphasized the necessity of protecting morality and public decency (pp. 241-244).

=== First Section: Penal Titles Appropriate to the Violation of Public Morality ===
In this section, among the crimes related to the [[violation of public morality]], the author examines three penal titles: "[[procuring (''qawwadi'')]]", "[[Enmity against God (''moharebeh'')|enmity against God (''muharabah'')]] and [[Corruption on earth|corruption on earth (''ifsad fi al-ard'')]]", and the "[[buying and selling of humans]]".

"Procuring" (''qawwadi'') in jurisprudence means bringing a man and a woman together for fornication or sodomy, and according to the famous opinion of Imami jurists, it warrants ''hadd'' (75 lashes and exile). Through a detailed critique of the evidences for this fatwa, the author concludes that ''qawwadi'' is a crime warranting ''ta'zir'', not ''hadd''. This conclusion opens the path for determining more appropriate and efficient punishments for the new and complex forms of ''qawwadi'' in today's world (pp. 247-265).

In the author's belief, some laws after the revolution have considered crimes such as operating centers of corruption or the production and distribution of obscene materials as instances of corruption on earth and warranting the ''hadd'' for ''muharabah''. By analyzing [[Verse 33 of Surah al-Ma'idah]], the author believes that corruption on earth cannot be considered an independent crime warranting ''hadd''. Also, generalizing this title to [[crimes against public morality]] lacks clear evidence and is contrary to the [[Principle of precaution|principle of precaution (''ihtiyat'')]] in blood and ''hudud'' (pp. 265-275).

In the author's belief, the buying and selling of humans, which is a clear instance of violating human dignity, is forbidden and void in Islam. Narrations that have determined the punishment of amputating the hand for the seller of a free human cannot be the basis for a ruling of ''hadd'' due to weakness in their chains of transmission; therefore, this crime also warrants ''ta'zir'' (pp. 275-281).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Penal Reaction to Crimes Against Public Morality ===
Considering previous examinations, the author explains three objectives in penal reactions to crimes against public morality:

'''Defense of Society and Public Morality:''' The main goal is the decisive defense of society and its values. The penal reaction must be efficient and deterrent enough that criminals, especially organized gangs, do not dare to transgress upon the sanctuary of public morality. In this domain, one cannot adhere to the strictures of proof that exist in ''hudud''; rather, the crime must be proven and combated using customary methods (pp. 283-286).

'''Compensation for the Victim of the Crime:''' In many of these crimes, there are specific victims (such as women and children) who require serious protection. The penal system must be such that the material and spiritual rights of these individuals are completely compensated (pp. 286-287).

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' Even in severe crimes, the objective of reformation and rehabilitation should not be neglected; rather, especially concerning situational offenders and those who themselves have been victims of circumstances, an educational approach must be taken, and the path for their return to society must be left open (p. 287).

== Execution of Hudud in the Event of Conflict (''Tazahum'') ==
The author poses this question: "If the execution of fixed ''hudud'' conflicts with more important expediencies and the intended objectives of them are not realized, what is the duty?" (p. 290). He then raises three headings:

'''Non-Realization of Expected Objectives:''' If the execution of a ''hadd'' (like flogging) in specific conditions has no deterrence, insisting on its execution is futile. Since punishments are a means and not a goal, with the non-realization of the goal, the means also loses its thematic relevance (''mawdu'iyyah'') (pp. 291-297).

'''Realization of Contradictory Effects:''' If the execution of a ''hadd'' brings about a reverse result (for instance, the public execution of a ''hadd'' upon a woman exposes her to greater harm, or executing a ''hadd'' in enemy territory causes the individual to join the disbelievers), by the judgment of intellect and citing the conduct of the Infallibles (a), one must refrain from executing it (pp. 298-301).

'''Conflict with Collateral Corruptions (''Mafasid''):''' Sometimes the execution of a ''hadd'' possesses an expediency, but entails a greater corruption; like unconventional harm to the convict, [[Maxim of No Hardship|severe hardship for the Islamic society]], or the alienation and aversion of the people from religion. Through a detailed analysis of the [[Maxim of the prohibition of alienating from religion]], the author shows that this maxim is a rational and Sharia principle that governs many primary rulings, including the execution of ''hudud''. If executing a ''hadd'' like stoning causes the degradation (''wahn'') of Islam and people's aversion to religion, the Islamic ruler is obliged to halt its execution. These expediency evaluations, which have a precedent in the conduct of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a), do not mean the suspension (''ta'til'') of ''hudud'', but mean their wise execution and making them efficient (pp. 302-345).

The book concludes by presenting several approaches and suggestions. It is emphasized that since Islam's penal system is not a one-dimensional and retributivist system, but rather consequentialist and purposeful, it possesses the capacity, through dynamic and contemporary ''ijtihad'', to constantly maintain its efficiency and harmonize with the needs of every era (pp. 346-362).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books by Rahim Nowbahar]]
[[Category:Books on judicial jurisprudence]]
[[fa:اهداف مجازات‌ها در جرایم جنسی (کتاب)]]

File:The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes An Islamic Perspective.jpg

2026-04-03T11:59:56Z

Enadmin:

The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective (Book)

2026-04-03T11:59:53Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahdi Shajarian |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective | image = The_Objectives_of_Punishments_in_Sexual_Crimes_An_Islamic_Perspective.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Rahim Nowbahar | date_of_writing = | subject = Sexual Crimes | genre = | language = Persian | editor = | corrected..."

{{author
|author = Mahdi Shajarian
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective
| image = The_Objectives_of_Punishments_in_Sexual_Crimes_An_Islamic_Perspective.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = [[Rahim Nowbahar]]
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Sexual Crimes
| genre =
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =
| pages = 408
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy
| publication_place = Qom
| publication_date = 2010 (1389 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}'''Abstract'''

'''The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective''' (اهداف مجازات‌ها در جرایم جنسی؛ چشم‌اندازی اسلامی), written by [[Rahim Nowbahar]], re-examines the philosophy of punishments in [[sexual crimes]] in Islamic jurisprudence with an objective-oriented approach (extracting Sharia purposes) and a holistic view (a comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the subject). Moving beyond a purely devotional (''ta'abbudi'') perspective, this work argues that in Islam, punishments are tools for realizing transcendent goals such as executing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and deterrence.

By distinguishing between "individual lapses" and "crimes against public morality," this book shows that the Lawgiver's (''Shari''') approach toward these two categories is entirely different. In the first type, by making the methods of proof difficult, the emphasis is placed on covering up (''pardeh-pushi'') and repentance (''tawbah''), but in the second type, the main goal is the decisive defense of social values. Ultimately, by analyzing the "conflict" (''tazahum'') between executing prescribed punishments (''hudud'') and higher interests (such as avoiding the [[Maxim of alienating from religion|alienation from religion]]), the research concludes that the Islamic penal system is flexible and dynamic. In it, the Islamic sovereignty can and must, for the realization of the true objectives of punishments, apply necessary changes in the quality and even the very execution of punishments through [[Maxim of Expediency|expediency evaluation]] (''maslahat-sanji'').

== Brief Overview ==
The book The Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes: An Islamic Perspective, penned by Rahim Nowbahar, is among the books of judicial jurisprudence with a focus on sexual crimes. This book was first published by the [[Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy]] in 2010 (1389 SH) in 408 pages.

=== Structure of the Book ===
This research is organized into an introduction and five main chapters: The first chapter presents the theoretical foundations and methods for recognizing the objectives of Islamic punishments (pp. 56-126). The second chapter analyzes the objectives of punishments in [[sexual crimes]] warranting *hadd* (adultery/fornication [*zina*], sodomy [*liwat*], and lesbianism [*musahaqah*]), with an emphasis on the difficulty of proof and the principle of covering up (pp. 127-180). The third chapter is dedicated to discretionary (''ta'ziri'') sexual crimes that have the nature of an individual error (pp. 180-239). The fourth chapter examines crimes against public morality (such as [[procuring (''qawwadi'')]]) (pp. 241-288). The final chapter addresses the discussion of the conflict (''tazahum'') between executing *hudud* and higher interests, such as the maxim of "[[Maxim of No Hardship|social hardship of Muslims]]" and the "[[Prohibition of alienating from religion|prohibition of alienating from religion]]" (pp. 291-406).

== Objectives of Islamic Punishments ==
=== First Section: Ways of Discovering the Objectives of Islamic Punishments ===
In the author's belief, several ways can be utilized to discover the objectives of punishments in Islam:

'''Recognizing the General Objectives of Islam:''' Principles such as justice, which is one of the goals of the prophets' mission, and purification (''tazkiyah''), mercy (''rahmah''), and dignity (''karamah''), which are employed for the reformation of the individual, are strategic principles for directing the goals of the penal system (pp. 56-59).

'''Deduction from the Text and the Apparent Meaning of Texts:''' By contemplating verses and narrations, as well as the rationale and wisdom mentioned for certain rulings, one can discover the objectives of the Lawgiver. On this path, one should not content oneself with definitive texts (''nusus''); rather, valid apparent meanings (''zawahir'') and even the understanding derived from the totality of the evidences (the spirit of the law) are also authoritative (''hujjah'') (pp. 59-69).

'''Studying the History of Punishments:''' Examining the historical background of punishments and the developments that occurred in their execution during the time of the Infallibles (a) is very illuminating. For example, the change in the punishment for drinking alcohol from forty lashes to eighty lashes during the time of the second Caliph. This change, which occurred with the suggestion of Imam Ali (a) and because the previous punishment was not a deterrent, shows that "deterrence" is one of the key objectives (pp. 69-70).

'''Whether Punishments are Endorsed (''Imda'i'') or Established (''Ta'sisi''):''' Almost all corporal punishments in Islam (stoning [*rajm*], flogging, amputation of the hand) were prevalent before Islam as well. Now, did the Lawgiver consider these punishments a rational practice and endorse them with the condition of "being prevalent" (restrictive aspect or *haythiyyat taqyidiyyah''), or was the reason for the Lawgiver's endorsement solely their prevalence (causative aspect or *haythiyyat ta'liliyyah'')? If the condition of prevalence is part of the subject (''mawdu'''), then with the disappearance of the rational prevalence of a punishment, the subject of the ruling is also nullified. This discussion raises the possibility of changing punishments based on social and cultural developments (pp. 74-75).

'''The Type of Punishments and the Method of Their Execution:''' The type of punishments (such as [[execution]] or [[imprisonment]]) and the manner of their execution (publicly or privately) can indicate the legislator's objectives. Islam's emphasis on executing punishment in the presence of a group of believers indicates the aspect of public deterrence and universal supervision (pp. 84-85).

'''Cases of the Nullification (''Suqut'') of Punishments:''' Factors such as repentance (''tawbah''), the complainant's forgiveness, and the ruler's pardon, which cause the nullification of the punishment, show that the rehabilitation of the offender and compensation for the victim's loss are among the important objectives of Islam's penal system (pp. 86-87).

'''The Ruling of Punishments in the Assumption of Conflict (''Tazahum''):''' Sometimes a conflict arises between the [[expediency]] (''maslahah'') of executing a punishment and other expediencies or corruptions (''mafasid''); scrutinizing the legislator's rulings in cases of conflict regarding the execution of a punishment or overlooking it reveals the legislator's attitude toward punishment and its objectives (p. 87).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Islamic Punishments ===
The author explains the objectives of Islamic punishments as follows:

'''Execution of Justice:''' Justice is the ultimate goal of the prophets' mission and the spirit governing all Islamic rulings; the emphasis on "retribution in kind" (''qisas bi al-mithl'') and the prohibition of extravagance in killing are manifestations of this fundamental goal. Islamic justice pays attention to expediency evaluation and consequentialism, and is mingled with pardon and mercy (pp. 99-106).

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' Purification and upbringing are among the main goals of religion. The prominent role of repentance in the nullification of many punishments and the religious leaders' emphasis on the reformation of and clemency toward the offender clearly show that rehabilitation and returning the individual to society are among the important goals of Islamic punishments (pp. 107-109).

'''Defense of Society and Its Values:''' Alongside attention to the individual, Islam also cares for the foundation and values of society. Punishments such as imprisonment and exile for dangerous offenders have been legislated with the goal of protecting society (pp. 111-113).

'''Private and Public Deterrence:''' Creating fear and serving as an example for the offender themselves (private deterrence) and others (public deterrence) are among the clear objectives of punishments (p. 116). The intensification of punishment in the event of repeating the crime and the public execution of certain punishments are carried out with this very objective (p. 118).

'''Compensation for the Victim:''' In crimes where the rights of others are violated, the Lawgiver has paid attention to compensating for the loss and soothing the victim's suffering. Institutions such as [[blood money]] (''diyah''), the right to retribution (''qisas''), and the necessity of the complainant's consent in crimes involving the rights of people (''haqq al-nas'') show the importance of this objective (pp. 121-122).

== Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd ==
This chapter first presents the punishment for [[sexual crimes]] warranting *hadd* (adultery/fornication, sodomy, and lesbianism), then examines the objectives of their punishment (pp. 125-178).

=== First Section: Punishment for Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd and Their Judicial Proof ===
Regarding the punishment for fornication (''zina''), the famous theory of jurists is that at the beginning of Islam, its punishment was life imprisonment in the house ([[Verse 15 of Surah al-Nisa']]), but this ruling was abrogated by [[Verse 2 of Surah al-Nur]], which determined the punishment as one hundred lashes. Thereafter, one hundred lashes were designated for the punishment of fornication by an unmarried person (''ghayr muhsan''), and stoning (''rajm'') for adultery by a married person (''muhsan'') (pp. 131-132).

Regarding the punishment for sodomy (''liwat''), the famous theory of Shia jurists is [[execution]], but in the method of its execution, the ruler has the choice among methods such as killing with a sword, burning, [[stoning]], throwing from a height, or collapsing a wall upon him. Sunni jurists disagree on this matter; Abu Hanifa considers sodomy to warrant discretionary punishment (''ta'zir''), and Al-Shafi'i and Malik consider its *hadd* similar to the *hadd* for fornication/adultery (stoning or flogging depending on marital status [*ihsan*]) (p. 140).

Based on the famous fatwa of Shia jurists, lesbianism (''musahaqah'') is among the crimes warranting *hadd*, carrying a punishment of one hundred lashes. In the event of repeating the crime and the *hadd* being executed three times, the perpetrator is executed on the fourth occasion. The majority of Sunni jurists consider lesbianism to warrant *ta'zir* (pp. 142-143).

In the author's belief, despite the severe punishments foreseen for these crimes, the Holy Lawgiver has been extremely strict in their judicial proof. Proving these crimes requires the testimony of four just men who have seen the act clearly and without any ambiguity; a matter which is practically almost impossible. Furthermore, [[spying/snooping]] (''tajassus'') to discover the sin and even looking at the crime scene to bear witness is not permissible. If the number of witnesses does not reach the required quorum, they themselves are sentenced to the *hadd* for false accusation of unchastity (''qadhf'') (eighty lashes) (pp. 143-144). The other way of proof is the individual's own confession, which must also be four times and in separate sessions. The conduct (''sirah'') of the Prophet (s) and Imam Ali (a) was to dissuade individuals from confessing and to encourage them to repent and cover up (pp. 144-147).

This entire set of strictures shows that the Lawgiver's main objective is preserving reputation, preventing unjust accusations, and providing the opportunity for repentance and reformation for wrongdoers, not punishing and disgracing individuals. In reality, the sensitivity of Islam's penal system is aimed more at preventing corruption from becoming public and spreading in society than being focused on the hidden sin itself (pp. 150-151).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Punishments in Sexual Crimes Warranting Hadd ===
By analyzing the totality of the regulations, the author arrives at the objectives of punishment in sexual crimes warranting *hadd*. He believes that Islam's approach is not pure retributivism based on focusing on the crime and the moral responsibility of the criminal; rather, consequentialism exists within it as well; because factors such as repentance, doubt (''shubhah''), and the ruler's pardon can nullify the punishment (pp. 152-156).

The author explains the objectives of these punishments under the following headings:

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' This objective is the most central goal. The abundant emphasis on repentance and its acceptance for the nullification of the *hadd*, and the Infallibles' (a) encouragement to repent instead of confessing, bear witness to this claim. By leaving the path of repentance open, the Lawgiver seeks the true reformation of the individual (pp. 157-162).

'''Private and Public Deterrence:''' Punishments such as flogging and exile, in addition to physical pain, deter the individual from repeating the crime by creating a sense of degradation. Executing the punishment in the presence of a group of believers is also with the goal of society drawing a lesson and strengthening public deterrence. However, Islam, by emphasizing the presence of a small group (''ta'ifah'') and not all the people, as well as setting conditions for those present, has prevented the execution of punishment from turning into a public spectacle that could cause irreparable damage to the individual's personality (pp. 162-165).

'''Restorative Justice:''' Islam's penal system pays special attention to compensating for loss and soothing the victim's suffering in crimes that have a specific victim (such as rape). In these cases, the nullification of the punishment through repentance is conditional upon obtaining the victim's consent, which shows the official recognition of the victim's rights in the penal process (pp. 170-174).

Ultimately, the author concludes that *hadd* punishments in [[sexual crimes]] have been established to protect values such as "[[chastity]]" and "sexual health," but the Lawgiver, through extreme strictness in proof and emphasis on repentance and covering up, has shown that He has no inclination toward the widespread execution of these punishments and His main goal is reformation and prevention (pp. 174-178).

== Objectives of Punishments in Discretionary (''Ta'ziri'') Sexual Crimes ==
This chapter examines the objectives of punishment in crimes whose nature is a moral error but do not reach the level of fornication and sodomy and have a "discretionary" (''ta'ziri'') punishment (at the discretion of the ruler).

=== First Section: Textually Specified (''Mansus'') Discretionary Sexual Crimes ===
By examining the crimes for which *ta'zir* has been determined in narrations, the author analyzes the Lawgiver's approach. Instances such as two non-mahram individuals sleeping under one cover, kissing out of lust, [[deflowering]], [[bestiality]], and masturbation have been condemned in narrations and *ta'ziri* punishments (such as flogging less than the *hadd* amount) have been mentioned for them (pp. 181-184). The author discusses deflowering, sexual intercourse with animals, masturbation, [[sexual intercourse with minors]], and [[sexual violence]] (pp. 185-201).

=== Second Section: Principles Governing Discretionary Sexual Crimes ===
By analyzing the previous discussions, the author extracts several principles for the *ta'zir* system in sexual crimes:

'''Difficulty of Judicial Proof:''' The strict approach and the inclination toward covering up that govern *hudud* flow a fortiori in *ta'ziri* crimes as well. Spying to discover hidden sins is forbidden, and the principle is non-penal intervention (pp. 203-207).

'''The Effect of Repentance:''' Repentance, just as it nullifies *hudud*, also nullifies *ta'ziri* punishments, which possess the nature of a sin. In this case, even if doubt exists, the [[Maxim of Dar']] (warding off punishments) prevents the execution of punishment upon the repentant (pp. 211-219).

'''Diversity in Penal Sanctions:''' Unlike *hudud*, in *ta'zirat* there is no obligation to use the punishment of flogging. The author rejects the idea that flogging is an ideal Islamic punishment and believes this punishment was a product of the culture and conditions of its time, and the Lawgiver, by delegating *ta'zir* to the ruler's opinion, has left the path open for the use of efficient, humane punishments suitable for every era (pp. 219-220).

'''The Necessity of Avoiding Punitive Extremism:''' The principle that [[Ta'zir is less than Hadd]] (''al-ta'zir bima duna al-hadd'') indicates the Lawgiver's tolerant approach in this domain. The ruler must content himself with the minimum punishment that secures the educational and deterrent objectives and avoid severity (pp. 220-224).

=== Third Section: Strategies for Determining the Objectives of Punishments ===
Considering the aforementioned principles, the author proposes the following strategies for determining the objectives of punishment in *ta'ziri* sexual crimes:

'''The Principle of Preventing Widespread Criminalization:''' Every forbidden (''haram'') act must not necessarily be considered a crime. [[Criminalization]] must be carried out based on public interest and with caution to prevent penal inflation (pp. 225-227).

'''The Principle of Preferring Covering Up:''' Regarding sexual errors that have a private aspect, the principle is encouraging repentance and concealment (''istitar''), and non-penal intervention (pp. 227-228).

'''The Principle of Minimal Use of Punishment to Defend Morality:''' The protection of moral values is not necessarily achieved through punishment; therefore, cultural and educational tools must be utilized, and punishment should be considered the last resort (pp. 228-230).

'''The Principle of Caring for the Reformation of the Offender:''' The main goal in these crimes must be the rehabilitation and reformation of the individual, not merely retribution (pp. 203-231).

'''The Principle of Proportionate Defense and Compensation:''' Where a crime damages the rights of others, one must react with proportionality and justice, and completely secure the rights of the victim (pp. 231-233).

'''The Principle of the Diversity and Humaneness of Punishments:''' A wide spectrum of penal reactions appropriate to the criminal's personality and the conditions of society, including alternative punishments, must be used, and the human dignity of the offender must be emphasized at all stages (pp. 234-238).

== Objectives of Punishments in Crimes Harmful to Public Morality ==
In this chapter, the author examines crimes that, unlike personal errors, directly target the public morality of society. By citing some Western thinkers, he shows that preserving public morality has always been a concern for legislators. In the contemporary era as well, with the expansion of technology, phenomena such as [[pornography]] and [[human trafficking]] have become serious challenges, and international human rights documents have also emphasized the necessity of protecting morality and public decency (pp. 241-244).

=== First Section: Penal Titles Appropriate to the Violation of Public Morality ===
In this section, among the crimes related to the [[violation of public morality]], the author examines three penal titles: "[[procuring (''qawwadi'')]]", "[[Enmity against God (''moharebeh'')|enmity against God (''muharabah'')]] and [[Corruption on earth|corruption on earth (''ifsad fi al-ard'')]]", and the "[[buying and selling of humans]]".

"Procuring" (''qawwadi'') in jurisprudence means bringing a man and a woman together for fornication or sodomy, and according to the famous opinion of Imami jurists, it warrants *hadd* (75 lashes and exile). Through a detailed critique of the evidences for this fatwa, the author concludes that *qawwadi* is a crime warranting *ta'zir*, not *hadd*. This conclusion opens the path for determining more appropriate and efficient punishments for the new and complex forms of *qawwadi* in today's world (pp. 247-265).

In the author's belief, some laws after the revolution have considered crimes such as operating centers of corruption or the production and distribution of obscene materials as instances of corruption on earth and warranting the *hadd* for *muharabah*. By analyzing [[Verse 33 of Surah al-Ma'idah]], the author believes that corruption on earth cannot be considered an independent crime warranting *hadd*. Also, generalizing this title to [[crimes against public morality]] lacks clear evidence and is contrary to the [[Principle of precaution|principle of precaution (''ihtiyat'')]] in blood and *hudud* (pp. 265-275).

In the author's belief, the buying and selling of humans, which is a clear instance of violating human dignity, is forbidden and void in Islam. Narrations that have determined the punishment of amputating the hand for the seller of a free human cannot be the basis for a ruling of *hadd* due to weakness in their chains of transmission; therefore, this crime also warrants *ta'zir* (pp. 275-281).

=== Second Section: Objectives of Penal Reaction to Crimes Against Public Morality ===
Considering previous examinations, the author explains three objectives in penal reactions to crimes against public morality:

'''Defense of Society and Public Morality:''' The main goal is the decisive defense of society and its values. The penal reaction must be efficient and deterrent enough that criminals, especially organized gangs, do not dare to transgress upon the sanctuary of public morality. In this domain, one cannot adhere to the strictures of proof that exist in *hudud*; rather, the crime must be proven and combated using customary methods (pp. 283-286).

'''Compensation for the Victim of the Crime:''' In many of these crimes, there are specific victims (such as women and children) who require serious protection. The penal system must be such that the material and spiritual rights of these individuals are completely compensated (pp. 286-287).

'''Reformation and Rehabilitation of the Offender:''' Even in severe crimes, the objective of reformation and rehabilitation should not be neglected; rather, especially concerning situational offenders and those who themselves have been victims of circumstances, an educational approach must be taken, and the path for their return to society must be left open (p. 287).

== Execution of Hudud in the Event of Conflict (''Tazahum'') ==
The author poses this question: "If the execution of fixed *hudud* conflicts with more important expediencies and the intended objectives of them are not realized, what is the duty?" (p. 290). He then raises three headings:

'''Non-Realization of Expected Objectives:''' If the execution of a *hadd* (like flogging) in specific conditions has no deterrence, insisting on its execution is futile. Since punishments are a means and not a goal, with the non-realization of the goal, the means also loses its thematic relevance (''mawdu'iyyah'') (pp. 291-297).

'''Realization of Contradictory Effects:''' If the execution of a *hadd* brings about a reverse result (for instance, the public execution of a *hadd* upon a woman exposes her to greater harm, or executing a *hadd* in enemy territory causes the individual to join the disbelievers), by the judgment of intellect and citing the conduct of the Infallibles (a), one must refrain from executing it (pp. 298-301).

'''Conflict with Collateral Corruptions (''Mafasid''):''' Sometimes the execution of a *hadd* possesses an expediency, but entails a greater corruption; like unconventional harm to the convict, [[Maxim of No Hardship|severe hardship for the Islamic society]], or the alienation and aversion of the people from religion. Through a detailed analysis of the [[Maxim of the prohibition of alienating from religion]], the author shows that this maxim is a rational and Sharia principle that governs many primary rulings, including the execution of *hudud*. If executing a *hadd* like stoning causes the degradation (''wahn'') of Islam and people's aversion to religion, the Islamic ruler is obliged to halt its execution. These expediency evaluations, which have a precedent in the conduct of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a), do not mean the suspension (''ta'til'') of *hudud*, but mean their wise execution and making them efficient (pp. 302-345).

The book concludes by presenting several approaches and suggestions. It is emphasized that since Islam's penal system is not a one-dimensional and retributivist system, but rather consequentialist and purposeful, it possesses the capacity, through dynamic and contemporary *ijtihad*, to constantly maintain its efficiency and harmonize with the needs of every era (pp. 346-362).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books by Rahim Nowbahar]]
[[Category:Books on judicial jurisprudence]]
[[fa:اهداف مجازات‌ها در جرایم جنسی (کتاب)]]

File:Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh.jpg

2026-04-03T11:50:43Z

Enadmin:

Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh (Book)

2026-04-03T11:49:21Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahmoud Sadeqi |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh | image = Nuclear_Energy_from_the_Perspective_of_Imami_Fiqh.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Mohammad Javad Heydarian Dowlatabadi | date_of_writing = | subject = Nuclear Energy | genre = Descriptive-Analytical, Inferential Jurisprudence | language = Persi..."

{{author
|author = Mahmoud Sadeqi
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh
| image = Nuclear_Energy_from_the_Perspective_of_Imami_Fiqh.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Mohammad Javad Heydarian Dowlatabadi
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Nuclear Energy
| genre = Descriptive-Analytical, Inferential Jurisprudence
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =
| pages = 218
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Chatr-e Danesh
| publication_place = Tehran
| publication_date = 2019 (1398 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

* '''Abstract'''
'''Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh''' (انرژی هسته‌ای از منظر فقه امامیه) is a book examining the jurisprudential dimensions of producing and utilizing [[nuclear energy]]. Mohammad Javad Heydarian Dowlatabadi authored this book in Persian in four chapters. In this book, he investigates the jurisprudential maxims (''qawa'id fiqhiyyah'') cited for the permissibility of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the maxims prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons, and the maxims of liability (''daman'') and civil responsibility concerning the use of nuclear energy.

In the third chapter, by citing the [[Maxim of the Negation of Domination|Maxim of the Negation of Domination]] (''nafy al-sabil''), the preliminary of an obligatory act (''muqaddamat al-wajib''), and [[Maxim of Expediency|expediency]] (''maslahah''), the author advocates for the permissibility of the peaceful production and use of nuclear energy. In his view, according to the Maxim of the Negation of Domination, this energy will play an important role in the empowerment of Muslims and in preventing the domination of disbelievers (''kuffar''). Also, according to him, based on the maxim of the preliminary of an obligatory act, securing energy through nuclear energy is introduced as a way to provide welfare for the Islamic society. Ultimately, the author states that in the contemporary era, the Guardian Jurist (''Wali al-Faqih'') can, based on the Maxim of Expediency, deem the production of nuclear energy essential, and this ruling is binding for everyone.

In the fourth chapter, relying on maxims such as the [[Maxim of Burden|Maxim of Burden]] (''qa'idat al-wizr''), the principle of fulfilling covenants (''wafa' bi al-'ahd''), the [[Maxim of Compulsion|Maxim of Compulsion]] (''ilzam''), and the maxim of the prohibition of terror, the author believes in the prohibition of using [[Weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons]]. According to him, the use of nuclear weapons leads to the killing of innocent human beings, which is prohibited according to the Maxim of Burden. By citing the necessity of fulfilling covenants in international treaties such as the NPT, he does not consider the production of nuclear weapons permissible from a jurisprudential viewpoint. The author also, by citing narrations on the prohibition of using poison in war and comparing it with nuclear weapons, advocates for the prohibition of such weapons. The maxim of the prohibition of terror also serves as the author's documentary evidence for the prohibition of using weapons of mass destruction, as he considers it an advanced form of terror. The maxim of the obligation to repel probable harm (''wujub daf' al-darar al-muhtamal'') is also raised by him, concluding its prohibition due to the dangerous consequences of using nuclear weapons.

The author also believes, by citing the Maxim of Destruction (''itlaf'') and Causation (''tasbib''), that any damage resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be compensated by the user to the injured party.

== Overview and Structure of the Book ==
Nuclear Energy from the Perspective of Imami Fiqh is a Persian book concerning the production and use of nuclear energy, authored in four chapters by Mohammad Javad Heydarian Dowlatabadi and published in 2019 (1398 SH) by Chatr-e Danesh Publications.

In the first chapter, the author elucidates the concept of nuclear energy, its history in Iran and the world, the importance of this energy, and the economic, social, and environmental considerations related to it (pp. 13-23). The second chapter of the book is dedicated to the various applications of nuclear energy, including electricity generation, use in the medical and health sectors, veterinary medicine, animal husbandry, agriculture, water resources management, and industry (pp. 30-48). In this chapter, the author also examines the jurisprudential requirements for employing nuclear energy in various fields and, by citing the [[Maxim of Destruction]] (''itlaf'') and the [[Maxim of Causation]] (''tasbib''), provides documentary evidence for Sharia liability (''daman'') and civil responsibility regarding damages arising from this energy (pp. 49-62).

The third chapter of the book investigates the jurisprudential reasons for the permissibility of the production and [[peaceful use of nuclear energy]]. In this chapter, the author examines the role of maxims such as the [[Maxim of the Negation of Domination|Negation of Domination]] (''nafy al-sabil'') (pp. 67-86), the [[Maxim of the preliminary of an obligatory act|preliminary of an obligatory act]] (''muqaddamat al-wajib'') (pp. 87-110), and [[Maxim of Expediency|expediency]] (''maslahah'') in legitimizing the peaceful production and use of nuclear energy (pp. 110-144). In the fourth chapter, the author expounds upon the jurisprudential foundations and maxims regarding the [[prohibition of using nuclear weapons]]. In this chapter, he examines the [[Maxim of Burden]] (''wizr'') (pp. 146-151), the [[Principle of fulfilling covenants|principle of fulfilling covenants]] (p. 154), the [[Principle of not imposing the religion of Islam on others|principle of not imposing the religion of Islam on others]] (p. 162), and the [[Maxim of Compulsion|Maxim of Compulsion]] (''ilzam'') (p. 163). Furthermore, he elucidates the viewpoints of jurists (''fuqaha'') concerning [[Incendiary weapons|incendiary weapons]] (p. 175), the [[Prohibition of terror|prohibition of terror]] (p. 176), the prohibition of [[Assassination|assassination]] (''ightiyal'') (p. 182), the prohibition of transgression (''ta'addi'') (p. 183), and the [[Maxim of the obligation to repel probable harm]] (p. 189).

== Evidences for the Permissibility of Producing Nuclear Energy ==
In the third chapter, the author examines the jurisprudential maxims (''qawa'id fiqhiyyah'') cited for the permissibility of producing peaceful nuclear energy (p. 67).

=== Maxim of the Negation of Domination (''Nafy al-Sabil'') ===
In the author's belief, powerful countries are those that are more advanced in the field of modern sciences and technologies, including the use of peaceful nuclear energy, and this very factor will lead to playing an effective role in the world. He believes that, based on the [[Maxim of the Negation of Domination]], obtaining and peacefully utilizing nuclear energy is a necessity today; because it aids the empowerment and stability of Muslim countries (p. 67). The author also believes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the Maxim of the Negation of Domination and the production of nuclear energy; because producing peaceful nuclear energy prevents the domination and supremacy of enemies over Muslims (pp. 83-86).

=== Maxim of the Preliminary of an Obligatory Act (''Muqaddamat al-Wajib'') ===
To permit, or even mandate, obtaining peaceful nuclear energy technology, the author also utilizes the [[Maxim of the preliminary of an obligatory act]] (p. 87). In this regard, he emphasizes that one of the fundamental duties of governments is striving to secure the welfare and comfort of the people; a welfare and comfort that is defined in every era according to the conditions of that time. In his belief, in the present age, one of the main indicators of welfare is securing energy, and given the ever-increasing depletion of fossil fuel resources, the high costs of extraction, and the resulting environmental damages, human societies are compelled to replace these resources. The author believes that nuclear energy, as one of the cleanest, most economical, and most efficient energy sources, has the capability to replace fossil fuels. Therefore, from the perspective of the maxim of the preliminary of an obligatory act, it is obligatory upon the Islamic ruler to strive for the production of nuclear energy so that through it, the welfare and comfort of the Islamic community (''ummah'') are secured (pp. 109-110).

=== Maxim of Expediency (''Maslahah'') ===
Another maxim cited by the author to legitimize peaceful nuclear activities is the [[Maxim of Expediency]] (p. 110). This maxim is applied in situations where an issue lacks a definitive ruling of obligation or prohibition, but the Islamic ruler, considering the expediencies, declares that issue obligatory or prohibited (p. 111). He examines several methods for discerning expediency, including: benefit (p. 125), necessity (p. 126), the number of individuals in the society (p. 128), effectiveness (p. 130), harmony with the objectives of Sharia (''maqasid al-shari'ah'') (p. 132), and observing the rule of the more important over the important (''al-ahamm wa al-muhimm'') (p. 134). The author believes that expediency finds meaning in conditions of conflict and emergency, and is used to solve a problem and prefer some rulings over others. Also, expediency is implemented when both sides of the matter possess importance and combining them is impossible; however, in cases where the two sides do not have much importance, the Maxim of Expediency is not applied (p. 117).

Based on the parameters established for implementing the Maxim of Expediency, the author emphasizes that to implement this maxim in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, one must refer to a jurist (''faqih''), because a contrary ruling might have been issued by the Lawgiver (''Shari''') in matters other than independent rational judgments (''mustaqillat 'aqliyyah''). Therefore, it is essential for a non-jurist to refer to a jurist in these cases (pp. 118 and 120-123). In his belief, in the contemporary era, the fully qualified Guardian Jurist (''Wali al-Faqih''), as the ruler of the society, can, based on certain expediencies, deem the production of peaceful nuclear energy a necessary and essential matter, and it is obligatory upon everyone to follow him (p. 144).

== Prohibition of Using Nuclear Weapons ==
The use of unconventional weapons such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons has been declared forbidden (''haram'') in Islam. By stating this jurisprudential ruling, the author mentions the maxims and reasons by which one can elucidate the jurisprudential foundations for the prohibition of using [[nuclear weapons]] (p. 145).

=== Maxim of Burden (''Wizr'') ===
One of the maxims that the author believes can be used to prove the prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons is the [[Maxim of Burden]]. According to him, based on this maxim, killing innocent human beings due to the sins of some wrongdoers is not permissible, whereas by using such weapons, many innocent individuals will be killed. This maxim has not been posited independently in the works of past and later scholars; but whenever it has been utilized, it has relied on [[Verse 164 of Surah al-An'am]], namely "[[and no bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another]]" (''wa la taziru waziratun wizra ukhra'') (pp. 146-151).

=== Maxim of Fulfilling Covenants ===
Pointing to the [[Principle of fulfilling covenants]], the author believes that a commitment is a kind of binding contract that is highly emphasized in Islam and is considered a foundation for peaceful international relations (p. 154). By citing the conduct (''sirah'') of the Messenger of God (s) in adhering to his covenant with the disbelievers of Quraysh (p. 155) and Imam Ali's (a) faithfulness to his pacts (p. 156), he states that, based on certain international laws and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), countries are committed not to produce these weapons; therefore, considering the principle of the necessity of fulfilling covenants, the production of nuclear weapons is forbidden from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence (p. 157). According to the author, observing ethical principles in war from the perspective of Islam is a certain and undeniable matter. Based on this, Muslims are not permitted to commit just any act during wartime (p. 157).

=== Maxim of Compulsion (''Ilzam'') ===
In the author's belief, one of the maxims cited for the prohibition of using nuclear weapons is the [[Maxim of Compulsion]]. He believes that the prohibition of using these weapons can be proven by citing the prohibition of using poison in war. In the author's view, although chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons did not exist during the time of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a), from the stance of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) regarding the use of poison in war, this ruling can be generalized to today's unconventional weapons, and their use can be considered forbidden (p. 168). According to the author's opinion, although there are numerous narrations concerning the prohibition of using poison in war, the primary criterion for this prohibition is the unconventional nature of the weapon and the mass killing resulting from it. Therefore, in the contemporary era, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons also possess these two characteristics: firstly, they are unconventional, and secondly, they cause the widespread killing of innocent individuals; hence, their use is not permissible (p. 169).

The author points out that many jurists, including Shaykh al-Tusi, Ibn Idris, Muhaqqiq al-Thani, al-Shahid al-Awwal, al-Shahid al-Thani, Allamah al-Hilli, and the author of *Jawahir*, based on these narrations, have declared the use of poison and unconventional weapons forbidden, both in war and outside of war (pp. 170-172). Additionally, many contemporary sources of emulation (''maraji' al-taqlid''), including the Supreme Leader and Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, have deemed the use of unconventional weapons of war, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, to be forbidden (p. 173).

=== Prohibition of Using Incendiary Weapons ===
According to Heydarian, among the reasons by which the use of nuclear weapons can be deemed forbidden are narrations in which the use of incendiary weapons has been explicitly prohibited. Based on this, considering these narrations, one can conclude that the use of atomic and nuclear weapons, which today cause widespread fires in the environment, is forbidden (p. 174). He also refers to some opinions of Shia jurists such as Muhaqqiq al-Hilli and Muhaqqiq al-Thani, and believes that according to narrations and the edicts (''fatawa'') of jurists, the use of unconventional armaments in war is forbidden, because these armaments are recognized as instances of incendiary weapons (p. 175).

=== Maxim of the Prohibition of Terror ===
According to the author, narrations prohibiting the terrorizing of individuals in non-war conditions can be among the reasons cited for the prohibition of using tools of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons. He states that the use of tools of mass destruction in the contemporary era is considered an advanced form of terror; therefore, it is covered by the evidences of prohibition (pp. 176-187). The author subsequently considers assassination (''ightiyal'') to be like terror, which is prohibited in war (p. 182).

The author also concludes from the maxim of the prohibition of transgression (''ta'addi'') that the excessive use of unconventional tools that cause mass killing is forbidden; beyond this, based on numerous verses and narrations, he believes that the use of these tools is considered forbidden both in war and outside of war (p. 183). In this context, Heydarian points to some Shia and Sunni narrations that confirm the prohibition of aggression (pp. 177-186). Furthermore, the viewpoints of some Shia jurists regarding the use of tools of war that lead to mass killing are mentioned subsequently (p. 188).

=== Maxim of the Obligation to Repel Probable Harm ===
According to the author, based on the [[Maxim of the obligation to repel probable harm]], the use of nuclear weapons is not permissible; because employing these weapons causes others to rise in retaliation, resulting in the killing of innocent individuals. Therefore, to prevent the occurrence of these wars and the casualties arising from them, the use of nuclear weapons and mass killing is unauthorized (pp. 189-190).

== Liability (''Daman'') and Civil Responsibility in the Use of Nuclear Energy ==
In a part of the second chapter of the book, the author raises the issue of the potential harms of using nuclear energy and the resulting damages to the human and non-human [[Environmental destruction|environment]]. By citing maxims such as the [[Maxim of Destruction]] (''itlaf'') and the [[Maxim of Causation]] (''tasbib''), he advocates for Sharia liability (''daman'') and justifies the civil responsibility of utilizing peaceful nuclear energy in Islam (p. 48).

=== Maxim of Destruction (''Itlaf'') ===
Pointing to the opinion of jurists who cite the Maxim of Destruction to prove Sharia liability and civil responsibility, the author believes this maxim can also be cited in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. To explain how to cite the Maxim of Destruction to justify the legitimacy of Sharia liability and civil responsibility in the use of peaceful nuclear energy, he points to several points in this regard:

* Based on verses, narrations, and the judgment of intellect, the life, property, honor, and reputation of all human beings are respected, and no one can violate them without a Sharia reason (pp. 49-50). In addition to human property, environmental elements such as water, soil, and air are also respected, because these elements are essential and vital for the continuation of human life; therefore, any violation, destruction, or pollution of them is not permissible, and if damage occurs, it must be compensated (p. 57). Also, environmental resources and elements are considered part of public wealth and properties, and are at the disposal of the state; therefore, personal disposal of these resources without the permission of the Imam is not permissible, and in the event of such disposal, the individual is recognized as a sinner and a usurper (''ghasib''). On this basis, according to the Maxim of Destruction, anyone who causes damage to these public properties is liable and obliged to compensate for the damage (p. 58).
* Objects and resources that do not have a specific owner, meaning they are neither private property nor state property, are free for the use of the general public. No one has the right to deprive people of exploiting these environmental resources, because such deprivation might cause harms that have been negated based on the Maxim of No Harm (''la darar'') (p. 59). Some jurists believe that if someone damages these resources (which are neither private nor state property), they are not liable, although they are a sinner; however, another group of jurists believes that the individual in such cases, in addition to being a sinner, will also be liable. By citing the Maxim of Destruction, one can advocate that a thing being owned is not essential for the realization of liability; for this reason, damaging unowned elements and objects will also cause liability and civil responsibility, even if this damage was not done intentionally or voluntarily; because in the Maxim of Destruction, the existence of intent and volition regarding destruction and harming others is not a condition (p. 60).
* Some believe the Maxim of Destruction is specific to property and cannot be generalized to non-property. However, the majority of Shia and Sunni jurists have considered "respect for property" as the criterion for liability. Thus, this criterion can also be extended to non-property. Based on this, every human being possesses rights such as the right to life, the right to health, the right to have a healthy environment, and the right to mental and psychological tranquility, and violating these rights and damaging them brings about harms for the rights holders; therefore, the one who wastes these rights will be responsible and liable. Hence, there should be no doubt in citing the Maxim of Destruction in non-financial rights as well (p. 61).

=== Maxim of Causation (''Tasbib'') ===
According to the author, many jurists consider the Maxim of Causation an instance of the Maxim of Destruction; with the difference, of course, that it causes damage indirectly. Based on this, any act issued from a sane and autonomous individual that causes harm to the property or life of Muslims, rationally and customarily, holds the individual responsible (p. 62). According to the author, this maxim does not only include financial damages; rather, it encompasses bodily harms as well. For example, if an individual in an environment with nuclear medical activities suffers harm caused by radioactive materials, the employer is obliged to compensate for the inflicted damage according to the judge's opinion (p. 64).

The author also points out that if a lack of timely action by individuals, institutions, or responsible organizations causes the destruction or pollution of environmental elements (such as the inappropriate use of nuclear energy) and this causes damage to the human and natural environment, according to the Maxim of Causation, the responsibility for compensation will rest upon the cause (''musabbib''). Furthermore, individuals who do not observe the necessary precautions in using nuclear energy and cause damage to persons or the environment will be responsible for compensating the damage (p. 66).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Javad Heydarian Dowlatabadi]]
[[Category:Books about nuclear energy]]
[[fa:انرژی هسته‌ای از منظر فقه امامیه (کتاب)]]

File:Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence Foundations and Obligations.jpg

2026-04-03T11:28:18Z

Enadmin:

Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations (Book)

2026-04-03T11:28:11Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab | author2 = | author3 = | compiler = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }}{{infobox book | title = Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations | image = Elections_and_Shia_Political_Jurisprudence_Foundations_and_Obligations.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi | date_of_writing = | subject = Political jurisprudence | genre = Analyti..."

{{author
| author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compiler =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}{{infobox book
| title = Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations
| image = Elections_and_Shia_Political_Jurisprudence_Foundations_and_Obligations.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Political jurisprudence
| genre = Analytical-Descriptive
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count = 1
| pages = 484
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Imam Sadiq University
| publication_place = Tehran
| publication_date = 2023 (1402 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
| other_volumes =
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations''' (انتخابات و فقه سیاسی شیعه؛ مبانی و الزام‌ها) is a book in the field of political jurisprudence, authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University. In this work, considering the close connection between the foundations of political thought and the formation of political structures, the author begins his discussion with the foundations of elections. Given the importance of the foundations of the state's legitimacy in Shia political thought, he examines and analyzes it in a separate chapter. Subsequently, bearing in mind that jurisprudential research means issuing a Sharia ruling for subjects—or issues—he addresses the issues of elections.

Relying on the principle of monotheism (''tawhid'') and the presumption of the absence of guardianship (''istishab 'adam al-wilayah''), the author rejects any domination over human beings without rational or transmitted evidence (''dalil naqli''). He argues that guardianship is granted only to certain individuals due to the judgment of intellect and the necessity of governance, making obedience to them obligatory. He considers social life without a government impossible because some affairs cannot be managed individually and require a ruler. He places the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency (''khilafat Allah'') as the foundation of popular sovereignty and considers political participation an undeniable right, without which a government is not legitimate. He rejects dictatorship and views the people's participation in decision-making as the best way to combat tyranny; elections are a means to preserve people's rights and their participation in decision-making, although their nature is more about shaping decisions. The author considers the duties of the Islamic government to be gaining public satisfaction, social discipline, and guidance. He views the majority vote not as a definitive authoritative proof (''hujjah''), but as a preferable option (''tarjih''), considering it valid only in the absence of other preferrers. He considers the right to be elected negated in affairs pertaining to guardianship (''umur wilayi'') and permissible in non-guardianship affairs (''umur ghayr wilayi''). Of course, only qualified individuals—such as Muslims, Shias, those of integrity, and those possessing religious knowledge—can become candidates, and he does not consider announcing candidacy without the approval of elites to be appropriate. Regarding voting, although the foundation of divine vicegerency might lead to unequal voting rights, the principle of the absence of guardianship creates challenges for the right to vote in guardianship matters, which can be answered by distinguishing between guardianship (''wilayah'') and compliance (''tawalli'').

== Overview and Structure Report ==
The book "Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations," authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University, is a work in the field of political jurisprudence that examines the issue of elections from the perspective of Shia political jurisprudence. This work, the first edition of which was published in 2023 (1402 SH) by Imam Sadiq (a) University Press, is organized in 488 pages.

The structure of the book is arranged into three chapters. At the beginning, the table of contents and the introduction are presented, and at the end, the sources and indices are included. The first chapter is dedicated to examining the role of the people and the foundations of the legitimacy of the Islamic government in the thought of contemporary jurists (''fuqaha''). In it, the author introduces and analyzes four categories of theories in this field during the contemporary era; including the appointment theory (''nadhariyyat al-nasb''), the appointment and election theory (''nadhariyyat al-nasb wa al-nakhab''), the assumption of responsibility theory (''nadhariyyat al-tasaddi''), and reactive theories (pp. 33–128). The second chapter addresses the foundations of elections in Shia jurisprudence and discusses various principles and foundations such as the principle of the absence of guardianship, humanity's divine vicegerency, the negation of dictatorship in Islamic thought, the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the status and effect of the majority vote, the rule of preserving the system (''hifz al-nizam''), etc. (pp. 129–286). In the third chapter, the obligations of elections from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence are examined. Among its topics are the right to be elected, announcing candidacy, the qualification of candidates, voting, campaign requirements, financial issues of campaigns, transparency, and supervision (pp. 287–448).

== Examining the Foundations of Elections from a Jurisprudential Perspective ==

==== The Principle of the Absence of Guardianship ====
Relying on fundamental principles such as monotheism (''tawhid''), the free creation of humans, the presumption of the absence of guardianship (''istishab 'adam al-wilayah''), as well as verses (''ayat'') and narrations (''riwayat'') that restrict guardianship to God, the author rejects any domination and guardianship over human beings, unless rational or transmitted evidence proves otherwise. In his view, standing opposite the "principle of the absence of guardianship" is the judgment of intellect regarding the necessity of the existence of a government and a ruler; therefore, God Almighty, by virtue of this necessity, has excepted certain individuals from the rule of the absence of guardianship and granted them guardianship. Consequently, obedience to these individuals is obligatory and necessary (pp. 129–145).

By resorting to the rational proof regarding the impossibility of realizing social life without the existence of a governmental system, the author deduces the necessity of forming a government. He believes that in social life there are matters that neither possess the capability of individual management nor can be left unmanaged; hence, an individual must be appointed as the "ruler" to manage these affairs (pp. 145–151).

==== Humanity's Divine Vicegerency ====
The author founds the proof of the right to popular sovereignty on the unconditionality (''itlaq'') of the evidences for the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. The result of this viewpoint is unconditionality in humanity's succession (''khilafah'') from God. This unconditionality, in the realm of creation (''takwin''), means the permissibility of human disposal over the earth to build and develop it, and in the legislative realm (''tashri'''), it means humanity's right to govern the earth. Based on this, human beings possess the right to govern, and this very right is considered the foundation of their political participation. Therefore, in this theory, the right to sovereignty and political participation is counted among the undeniable rights of the people, such that without referring to public votes, no government will possess legitimacy (pp. 152–166).

==== Negation of Dictatorship and Tyranny in Islamic Thought ====
After elucidating the condemnation of tyranny (''jabariyyah'') in Islamic narrations, the author analyzes the concept of "tyrant" (''jabbar'') by referring to its lexical and exegetical meanings, and then presents solutions for the ruler to be freed from this title. These solutions form the foundations of electoral thought in an Islamic government. In his belief, the participation of the people and the involvement of a group of them in the ruler's decision-making removes the description of tyranny from him. Elections are one of the effective tools toward observing the people's rights by the ruler, and simultaneously, involving the people in some of the macro-political decisions. The author clarifies that elections in their current form have more of a "decision-shaping" nature than "consultation" (''mashwarah''); nevertheless, delegating a part of decision-making to the people can be a path to exit despotism (pp. 183–209).

== The Duties of the Islamic Government Towards the People and the Status of the Majority Vote ==
In elucidating the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the author enumerates three main duties that can be considered the foundation for the formation of the institution of elections: first, gaining public satisfaction; second, disciplining and bringing order to society; and third, education and guidance (pp. 209–228).

In the discussion of the [[majority vote]], the author proposes a theory in which the majority vote is posited not out of independent authority (''hujjiyyah''), but as a criterion and a preferrer (''murajjih''). Based on this viewpoint, whenever an issue has the capability of being referred to public votes, the option that the majority leans towards is recognized as the final choice. The proofs that the proponents of this theory have established to prove it are: the proof of intellect, the [[practice of the rational people]] (''sirat al-'uqala'''), certain narrations, as well as the practical conduct (''sirah'') of the Holy Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a).

However, in his own analysis, the author raises an objection to the rational proof and the practice of the rational people. He states that a government can be designed in such a way that it is realized without resorting to force and without relying on the majority vote, and even under conditions of public silence and apathy. Furthermore, he doubts the claim of the perpetual preference of the majority vote over the minority and considers it unacceptable.

Subsequently, the author engages in a detailed critique of the reliance on the narrations and the conduct of the Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a), and based on this, considers the reasons presented regarding the authority of the majority vote insufficient and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the only case where the majority vote has the capability of being relied upon in his view is the reliance on the [[Maqbula of Umar b. Hanzala]]. In this specific case, if there is a disagreement among experts and other preferrers are unavailable, the majority can be considered as a preferrer, provided that it can rationally discover reality and the more correct opinion. In such an assumption, paying attention to the majority vote is rationally commendable; but beyond this, neither rational proof nor transmitted proof has the capability to prove the authority or general praise of the majority vote (pp. 236–265).

== Obligations of Elections in Shia Jurisprudence ==

=== The Right to Be Elected ===
In elucidating the status of the right to candidacy for assuming positions, the author initially, by citing the principle of the absence of guardianship, states: In the realm of guardianship affairs, the primary principle is the absence of guardianship; hence, the principle is that no individual member of society, initially, has the right to candidacy and entry into such positions; unless valid evidence is established contrary to this principle. Because candidacy for this position is, in fact, a claim to the right to exercise guardianship, and this matter is considered negated by principle. Conversely, in non-guardianship affairs, the principle of the absence of guardianship does not apply; therefore, regarding these affairs, there is no prohibition on the existence of the right to candidacy for the general public, and the principle is its possibility and permissibility (pp. 287–298).

Following this, the author expresses his viewpoint in light of the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. From his perspective, if we consider the position of divine vicegerency to be acquired, then the unconditionality of vicegerency for all human beings will not be acceptable. In this understanding, the claim that was based on the unconditionality of vicegerency and, consequently, equality in the right to sovereignty, participation, and other political rights for all humans, becomes invalid. Because even though the scope of the vicegerent's authorities and disposals on earth is absolute, the scope of this position's inclusion regarding individuals is limited and only includes those who possess the necessary competencies to bear this position. Therefore, only these individuals possess the right to sovereignty and naturally benefit from rights such as the right to be elected (pp. 287–298). Regarding the right to be elected in guardianship positions, the author believes in limitation, bringing attention to two characteristics (being non-Muslim and non-Shia) and (maleness), and explains the evidence for them. (pp. 298-300)

=== Announcing Candidacy ===
After examining three groups of narrations that have warned against seeking positions and leadership (''riyasah''), the author, by way of summation, states: Considering the spiritual dangers of leadership, such as the possibility of otherworldly punishment and its difficulties, the primary principle for every individual is fleeing from leadership. As a result, one who volunteers to accept this position must possess high certainty regarding the competence of their own soul; whereas such certainty is not only rationally difficult but also contrary to numerous narrations that have placed humans in a position of accusation and suspicion toward themselves. Based on this, a person should not expose themselves to leadership and should not initiate the announcement of candidacy.

He suggests that one must move toward rational methods for legitimizing candidacy, such as the candidate entering the electoral arena upon the insistence of the wise elders of the community, qualified jurists, or religious and political figures. This model must be incorporated into the electoral structure; for example, the process of registering for elections and announcing candidacy should only be possible with the approval of religious and political elites (pp. 300–316).

=== Qualification of Candidates ===
The author introduces "Islam and Shi'ism," "not being a transgressor" (''fasiq''), "knowledge of the divine rulings related to the duties and authorities of the position for which one is a candidate," and the "condition of maleness" as transmitted (''naqli'') characteristics. He subsequently points to rational characteristics, including "competence in administration," "popularity and the influence of one's word among the people," "being free from effective accusations of financial corruption," "non-dependence on the enemy," "alignment with religious values," etc. (pp. 316-322).

=== Voting ===
Regarding the equality or inequality of people's voting rights, in the author's view, although based on the foundation of humanity's divine vicegerency the result is unequal voting rights, it does not prevent the emergence of other foundations. This is because this foundation only proves the voting rights of individuals who have acquired the attribute of humanity's divine vicegerency and does not negate the voting rights of other individuals. Furthermore, the preservation of the system also only proves the right to vote in cases where preserving the system requires it and does not negate other cases. But the problem of the principle of the absence of guardianship remains. The principle of the absence of guardianship eliminates the right to vote in guardianship affairs. The answer to this is distinguishing between guardianship (''wilayah'') and compliance (''tawalli''). In compliance with affairs, the people have the right to vote; but in guardianship, this right does not exist. Based on this, the right to vote is only in these affairs and based on what was stated regarding public satisfaction, with the condition of not contradicting Sharia (pp. 322-328).

=== The Right to Vote in Narrations ===
Kazemi clarifies that the narrations related to consultation and participation refer to differences in the status of consulting and decision-shaping, not differences in the right to vote. In his belief, in many religious texts, equality among the people is assumed; including in the evidences related to allegiance (''bay'ah''), wherein no difference is observed among those giving allegiance. Therefore, the principle is the equality of people's political rights, although in practice certain limits might be considered for it (pp. 328–332).

=== The Obligation of Participating in Elections, Voting for the Most Qualified and the Accepted Qualified ===
From the author's perspective, voting is not a right, but a prescriptive ruling (''hukm taklifi''); therefore, it cannot be waived, and participating in elections is obligatory. If non-participation means declaring a vote (e.g., a negative vote), it might fall outside the scope of abandoning an obligatory act. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of an Islamic government, this abandonment could fall under a secondary title, such as weakening the Islamic system, and consequently become forbidden (''haram'').

Kazemi considers [[Voting for the most qualified candidate|voting for the most qualified]] (''aslah'') to be obligatory based on rational preference and the expediency (''maslahah'') of the Muslims. If voting for the most qualified causes a greater corruption (''mafsadah''), the Sharia duty is to remove that corruption and provide the groundwork for the qualified (''salih'') individual to receive votes (pp. 339–347).

=== Campaign Requirements ===
The author examines topics such as deception through ignorance (''ighra' bi al-jahl''), fraud (''tadlis''), seeking fame (''shuhrah''), campaigning for someone who is not the most qualified, critique, painting a bleak picture (''siyah-namayi''), and defamation (''takhrib''). According to him, taking action to gain fame in electoral campaigns and prior to it does not have a Sharia prohibition; however, in designing the ideal electoral system in the Islamic system, and due to the severe reprehensibility of seeking fame in the narrations, it is fitting that this issue be given attention. For this reason, taking action to gain fame is reprehensible (''madhmum''). He views the way out of this problem to be rational solutions; such as others campaigning for the individual, or the individual's entry into the competitive arena being based on a sense of duty derived from the wise believers. These instances remove the act of seeking fame from being reprehensible in Sharia (pp. 347–396).

== Financial Issues of Elections ==
In Kazemi's belief, since elections, like judgment (''qada''') and jihad, are considered among public interests, using the public treasury (''bayt al-mal'') to cover their costs is permissible. However, if a candidate is in a state or position that customarily holds no benefit for the elections, the funds spent on them from the public treasury are considered a form of wasting public wealth, and the candidate will be responsible for compensating these costs. Here, the criterion of benefit for the elections is a rational matter, and security, political, media, and cultural dimensions are involved in it (pp. 396–405).

Regarding financial campaign contributions in the form of gifts (''hadiyyah''), Kazemi states that if the gift is not concerning a forbidden subject and does not cause corruption in the transaction, accepting it is not problematic. Therefore, receiving a gift for electoral campaigns is also unproblematic (pp. 405–414).

He places the jurisprudential examination of the ceiling for electoral expenses within the framework of two secondary titles: "extravagance" (''israf'') and "corruption" (''fasad''). In his view, the fundamental act of spending for campaigns has no problem in itself, but if these expenses reach the level of extravagance or occur in a situation that customarily leads to corruption, it falls under the Sharia prohibition. The criterion for identifying corruption is custom ('''urf'') and previous experiences of elections, and it is determined based on the practice of the rational people (pp. 414–428).

In conclusion, Kazemi emphasizes the necessity of financial and behavioral transparency in elections and considers it necessary from two aspects: first, the people's right to know and preventing deception through ignorance; second, preventing probable corruptions. Based on this, he believes transparency must be seriously considered in electoral laws and executive bylaws (pp. 428–433).

== Supervision ==
Kazemi clarifies that one cannot conclude the lack of duty to examine the qualifications of candidates by citing the principle of exoneration (''asl al-bara'ah''), which is applied in cases of doubt. The reason is that electoral qualifications do not solely pertain to negative attributes (such as not being corrupt), but also have positive attributes, such as "good management" (''husn al-tadbir''), which must be ascertained (''ihraz''). Therefore, in the supervision process, the principle is the ascertainment of the necessary characteristics, not merely the negation of obstacles (pp. 433–440).

In the author's belief, principles such as the principle of correctness (''asl al-sihhah''), the principle of justice (''asl al-'adalah''), or having a good opinion (''husn al-zann'') are also insufficient to prove the existence of qualifications. These principles are only applied in cases where we want to negate the effects of ugliness (''qubh''), not to attach effects such as proving goodness and qualification to them. In other words, the Lawgiver (''Shari''') has not obliged us to arrange the effects based on goodness, but has only forbidden arranging the effects based on ugliness.

The author also clarifies that executing the principle of correctness in supervising elections is similar to executing it in examining the conditions of candidates, meaning it is inappropriate and invalid. This is because the principle of correctness applies where correctness or corruption is established from the perspective of Sharia, whereas regarding the correctness of elections, what is at stake is legal validity and governmental legitimacy, not a direct Sharia ruling. For this reason, one cannot employ the principle of correctness as a valid foundation in the process of supervising elections (pp. 440–448).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about elections]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi]]
[[Category:Books by Imam Sadiq University]]
[[fa:انتخابات و فقه سیاسی شیعه، مبانی و الزام‌ها (کتاب)]]

File:Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence.jpg

2026-04-03T11:19:49Z

Enadmin:

Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence (Book)

2026-04-03T11:18:46Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence | image = Elections_from_the_Perspective_of_Jurisprudence.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Ruhollah Shariati | date_of_writing = | subject = Political jurisprudence | genre =Analytical | language =Persian | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_by = |..."

{{author
|author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence
| image = Elections_from_the_Perspective_of_Jurisprudence.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Ruhollah Shariati
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Political jurisprudence
| genre =Analytical
| language =Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages = 392
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy
| publication_place =Qom
| publication_date = 2015 (1394 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence''' (انتخابات از نگاه فقه), written by [[Ruhollah Shariati]], is a book in the field of [[political jurisprudence]]. In this work, the author examines the jurisprudential foundations for the election of officials and the political system by the people. This book is organized into four sections: generalities, the jurisprudential foundations of elections, the domains of elections (referendum, election of legislators, and ruler), and issues of elections.

By citing the Quran, Sunnah, intellect, and the conduct (''sirah'') of the Infallibles (a), Shariati examines the legitimacy of the majority vote, consultation (''shura''), and allegiance (''bay'ah''), considering elections as an instance of allegiance. He emphasizes the non-imposition of the ruler's view and the necessity of consulting with the people, and deems a referendum legitimate provided it does not contradict divine rulings. Furthermore, he prefers the election of legislators and rulers with the participation of both the public and the elites, and analyzes the qualifications of voters and candidates based on jurisprudence.

== Overview and Structure of the Book ==
Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence is a book in the field of [[political jurisprudence]] that examines the jurisprudential foundations and documentary evidence for the election of officials by the people. The jurisprudential examination of the election of the country's ruler, legislators, administrators, and officials, and ultimately the form of the country's political system, are among the secondary issues of this book. The author of this work, [[Ruhollah Shariati]], is a faculty member of the Political Jurisprudence Department of the Institute of Islamic Sciences and Thought, and [[Rules of Political Jurisprudence (book)|Rules of Political Jurisprudence]] and [[Rights and Duties of Non-Muslims in Islamic Society (book)|Rights and Duties of Non-Muslims in Islamic Society]] are among his other works in the field of contemporary jurisprudence. The book Elections from the Perspective of Jurisprudence was published by the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy in 2015 (1394 SH) in 392 pages.

The main discussions of the book are organized into four sections. The table of contents and the book's introduction are at the beginning, and the bibliography and indices are at the end. In the first section, the author addresses concepts such as [[political jurisprudence]], elections, referendums, consultation, and democracy, as well as general topics like the history of elections, types of participation, and electoral systems (pp. 29-69). He considers the holding of elections permissible only for matters that do not oppose Sharia, intellect, custom ('''urf''), and the supreme interests of the country (p. 60). He dedicates the second section of the book to the jurisprudential foundations of elections and examines the validity of the majority vote, council (''shura''), and allegiance (''bay'ah'') (pp. 75-125). The most extensive section of the book is the third section, which studies the important domains of elections—namely referendums, the election of legislators, and the election of the ruler—in three chapters (pp. 129-295). Various issues of elections, including the qualifications of voters and candidates, are examined in the final section of the book (pp. 299-358).

In this book, after stating the topics, Shariati engages in identifying their jurisprudential evidence. In each section, he examines the positive and negative aspects of each topic by citing proofs and evidence related to each side, and ultimately proves his own viewpoint.

== Jurisprudential Foundations of Elections ==
In the second section of the book, the important jurisprudential foundations of elections—namely the validity of the majority vote, consultation, and allegiance—are examined.

=== Legitimacy of the Majority Vote ===
To validate the majority vote, Shariati cites the Quran, Sunnah, the practical conduct (''sirah 'amaliyyah'') of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a), the judgment of intellect, and secondary titles ('''anawin thanawiyyah'') (such as [[preservation of the political system|preservation of the system]]). He believes that Quranic verses insisting on not following the majority pertain to unseen matters (''umurt ghaybiyyah'') (such as the attributes and actions of God, the characteristics of the Resurrection, and divine decree and destiny) and do not encompass political and social issues (pp. 77-87).

=== Validity of Consultation ===
According to the author, elections are an updated and organized form of public consultation, which is emphasized in religious teachings, and its legitimacy is certain. Nevertheless, the author argues for its legitimacy using numerous proofs such as verses, narrations, conduct (''sirah''), and the practice of the rational people (''bana' al-'uqala''). According to the author's account, some jurists do not consider it obligatory for the ruler to act upon the consultation, but the author, who considers the probability of the consultation's outcome being correct to be higher than the ruler's individual view, deems it obligatory for the ruler to act upon the consultation (pp. 88-103).

=== Elections as an Instance of Allegiance (''Bay'ah'') ===
Shariati argues for the legitimacy of elections by [[purifying the rationale]] (''tanqih al-manat'') of the legitimacy of allegiance (which was prevalent during the time of the Infallibles) (p. 126). He considers allegiance to be a binding contract ('''aqd lazim al-wafa'') wherein the people pledge to follow and obey, and the ruler pledges to manage their affairs (p. 120). In the author's view, although Imam Ali (a) was chosen directly by the Prophet (s) and God for the caliphate, his governance was only established after the people pledged allegiance to him (p. 116).

== Methods of Decision-Making in Important Matters ==
In the second section of the book, the author examines methods for decision-making in important political matters.

=== Non-Imposition of Individual View in Sharia ===
In the author's view, the principle in Sharia is the non-imposition of an individual's view, and imposing a view is only legitimate in exceptional cases and considering the conditions of society. By examining the reasons for the legitimacy or illegitimacy of imposing the ruler's view, the author has concluded that religion generally is incompatible with imposing the ruler's view (whether infallible or non-infallible); rather, it aligns with not imposing his view. This is because, in the governance of the Infallibles, various individuals were constantly consulted, and in their method, imposing views and ignoring the opinions of individuals, especially the elites of society, is not observed. He also believes that the philosophy behind many matters, such as consultation, is applying a collective view and utilizing the opinions of others in governance, and this is incompatible with imposing the ruler's view (pp. 134-139).

=== Referendum ===
According to the author, since a referendum does not contradict divine rulings and is compatible with the political structure of Islamic societies, it has been accepted by Islamic societies. He enumerates the reasons for the legitimacy of a referendum as follows: the emphasis of the Book (Quran) and Sunnah on consultation, the resemblance of a referendum to a type of legislation, the rule of the necessity of fulfilling contracts (''awfu bi al-'uqud''), the conduct of the Infallibles (a), the maxim of dominion (''al-nasu musallatuna 'ala amwalihim''), and the principle of non-guardianship over others (''asl 'adam al-wilayah 'ala al-ghayr''). Furthermore, even assuming the impermissibility of a referendum as a primary ruling (''hukm awwali''), by utilizing various secondary titles such as expediency (''maslahah'') and the preservation of the system, the legitimacy of a referendum can be deemed permissible, or rather, obligatory. Also, in some cases, one can utilize referendums and custom ('''urf''), which are sources for identifying the subject matter of rulings (pp. 140-155).

==== Referendum in the Form of the Political System ====
After the author deems a referendum legitimate, he states Islam's viewpoint regarding determining the form of the political system. For this purpose, he examines two assumptions: the "existence of a specific structure" and the "non-existence of a specific structure," by mentioning the proofs related to them. By citing the following reasons, he concludes that the second assumption is more compatible with Islam's viewpoint:

* There is no explicit textual evidence (''nass'') indicating that the Prophet's (s) form of government was exclusive;
* The form of government is among customary and rational matters that differ with the change of time and place;
* The form of government changed even in the early days of Islam;
* The texts and principles that somewhat guide us to the form of government are compatible with various forms of governments and do not specify a single form of government (pp. 156-170).

=== Indirect Elections (Delegating Elections to Elites) ===
One of the methods of decision-making in important matters is delegating it to elite individuals. Of course, the author has examined this decision-making method not in the third section of the book, but in the first section (generalities section). By citing the verse [[Verse 43 of Surah al-Nahl|So ask the people of the message]] (''fa-s'alu ahl al-dhikr''), and relying on narrations, intellect, and the conduct of the rational people, the author believes that the election of government officials can be delegated to the elites of society (pp. 43-47).

== Election of Legislators ==
After stating the benefits of legislation and mentioning various classifications for laws, Ruhollah Shariati considers the right of legislation to belong solely to God. He proceeds to mention two viewpoints of jurists regarding the need for human laws (in addition to divine legislation) and examines their reasons (pp. 171-181).

=== Reasons for Not Needing Human Law and the Responses to Them ===
According to the author, some jurists believe that with the existence of God's legislation, there is no need for human law. Their reasons are as follows:
# According to Quranic verses such as "[[Verse 57 of Surah al-An'am|Legislation is not but for Allah]]" (''in al-hukmu illa lillah''), legislation belongs exclusively to God (pp. 182-183). In the author's view, this reason is only correct if human laws are considered parallel (''fi 'ard'') to God's laws. But if they are longitudinal to (''fi tul'') divine laws, no problem arises (p. 198).
# According to verses such as "[[Verse 59 of Surah al-An'am|And not a moist or dry [thing] but that it is in a clear record]]" (''wa la ratbin wa la yabisin illa fi kitabin mubin'') and narrations from the Infallibles (a), the Sharia is complete, and the ruling for everything a human needs exists in the religion (pp. 183-184). In the author's view, religious laws pertain to Sharia matters, and in that domain, it is comprehensive and complete, but human laws are for customary laws (p. 198).
# Human legislation contradicts the Sharia (pp. 186-188). In the author's view, such a contradiction is not proven (p. 199).
=== Reasons for the Need for Human Law ===
The author, who believes in the legitimacy and necessity of legislation, mentions the following reasons in support of the legitimacy and necessity of legislation: the practice of the rational people (''bana' al-'uqala''), Islam's emphasis on council and consultation, the non-entry of Sharia into certain domains, planning and management toward executing divine law, preventing the [[Disruption of the system|disruption of the system]] and chaos, the necessity of applying subjects to rules, actualizing the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil (''amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar''), and cooperating in righteousness and piety (pp. 188-206).

=== Methods for Appointing Legislators ===
Although a legislator can be appointed by the ruler, and the conduct of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a) indicates its validity, in the author's view, the election of legislators by the people yields better outcomes and benefits. These include: elevating the level of law-abidingness among the people, enhancing public satisfaction, national unity and support for the government, the society benefiting from diverse views and thoughts, and elevating the political growth of the society. Shariati has articulated the following reasons for this viewpoint:

* Verses and narrations that emphasize the importance of council and consulting with the people;
* Narrations indicating the responsibility of the general public, such as "Every one of you is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock" (''kullukum ra'in wa kullukum mas'ulun 'an ra'iyyatih'');
* The maxim of dominion "People have dominion over their properties" (''al-nasu musallatuna 'ala amwalihim'');
* The principle of non-guardianship over others;
* The maxim "Gain is accompanied by liability for loss" (''man lahu al-ghunm fa-'alayhi al-ghurm'');
* Expediency (''maslahah'') and preservation of the system (pp. 207-228).

In Shariati's view, even in the government of an Infallible, the election of a legislator by the people is preferred over their appointment by the Infallible; therefore, in the government of the Imam's deputy or the government of a just non-jurist ('''adil-i ghayr-i faqih''), the election of legislators by the people will also be permissible. He believes that in an oppressive government that lacks legitimacy, if the election of legislators by the people leads to a reduction in the ruler's oppression, this action is obligatory (pp. 241-243).

== Election of the Ruler ==
After stating the methods for determining the ruler among Muslims (Shia and Sunni) and pointing to the topic of "using force in government" and "the necessity of public satisfaction in government," the author addresses the jurisprudential theories of governance during the era of Occultation (''Ghaybah'') (pp. 244-268).

=== The Method of Determining the Ruler (Based on the General Guardianship of Jurists) ===
To determine the ruler based on the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist (''Wilayat al-Faqih''), the author presents the two theories of "appointment" (''intisab'') and "election" (''intikhab''), along with the documentation for each. Among the proofs for the appointment theory, he enumerates the [[Maqbula of Umar b. Hanzala]], the [[Mashhura of Abu Khadija]], the signed letter (''tawqiw''') of the Imam of the Time ("And as for the newly occurring circumstances, refer them to the narrators of our hadith"), and rational evidence. Furthermore, his reasons for the "election" theory include: the judgment of intellect, the maxim of dominion, respect for social contracts, delegation (''istinabah''), evidences for the legitimacy of council, allegiance (''bay'ah''), the practice of the rational people, the social addresses of the Quran, and the divine vicegerency (''khilafah'') of the human being (pp. 269-287).

Ruhollah Shariati has preferred the election theory over the appointment theory; because he believes that, according to the election theory, for the exercise of guardianship, there is no separation between the stage of establishing (''ja'l'') and determining the ruler. Also, in this viewpoint, the opinion of the people, who directly or indirectly vote for the ruler, is valued and considered to have Sharia effect. Of course, adherents of this theory also prefer that the election of the ruler be carried out by a group of experts and scholars accepted by the people, so that both the opinion of experts is observed, and propaganda has less effect on the voters. Nevertheless, in his belief, no specific method for electing a ruler is prescribed in jurisprudence, and according to the rule, one must utilize rational and customary methods chosen by rational people based on time and place (p. 293).

== Issues of Elections ==
The final section of the book is dedicated to examining some issues related to elections. Whether voting should be secret or public, electoral campaigns, electoral districts, supervision over elections, the presence of political parties in elections, and elucidating the Sharia ruling of voting as an action of an accountable person (''mukallaf'') are among the secondary issues related to elections that the author examines from a jurisprudential perspective (pp. 336-356).

=== Qualifications of Voters ===
In the author's view, puberty, sanity, and capability are among the general qualifications of voters. The proofs he cites for his claim are: intellect, the practice of the rational people, the concomitance of right and duty, and the maxim "gain is accompanied by liability for loss." He subsequently examines other conditions such as age, maturity (''rushd''), citizenship, maleness, and Islam regarding this subject. By relying on certain proofs, he believes that women, as well as non-Muslims residing in an Islamic country, have the right to vote (pp. 300-323).

=== Qualifications of the Candidate ===
According to Shariati, the individual elected by the people, in addition to possessing the necessary qualifications of voters, must be capable, knowledgeable, and the most qualified (''aslah''). They must also possess the attributes mentioned in narrations for a counselor; positive attributes of a counselor such as: intellect, religiosity, giving good counsel (''nasihah''), and keeping secrets, and the absence of negative attributes such as miserliness, cowardice, greed, and a servile nature.

In the author's belief, regarding the condition of Islam for the candidate, one must consider the principles of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, if the election of a non-Muslim leads to their domination (''sultah'') over an Islamic country (such as electing them as the head of the branches of government, as a minister, or to important and sensitive posts in an Islamic country), such a matter is forbidden; because in Sharia, the domination of disbelievers over Muslims is decisively negated (pp. 324-335).

[[Category:Books about elections]]
[[Category:Books by Ruhollah Shariati]]
[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books of the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy]]
[[fa:انتخابات از نگاه فقه (کتاب)]]

File:Environmental Theology.jpg

2026-04-03T11:15:02Z

Enadmin:

Environmental Theology (Book)

2026-04-03T11:14:26Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki | author2 = | author3 = | compiler = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{Other books | author_category = Books by Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad | study_sources = | subject_books_category = }} {{Infobox book | title = Environmental Theology (Book) | image = Environmental_Theology.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad | date_of_writing = | subject = Envi..."

{{author
| author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compiler =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{Other books
| author_category = Books by Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad
| study_sources =
| subject_books_category =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Environmental Theology (Book)
| image = Environmental_Theology.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad
| date_of_writing =
| subject = [[Environmental Jurisprudence]]
| genre = Analytical
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count = 1
| pages = 265
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Iranian Institute of Philosophy
| publication_place = Tehran
| publication_date = 2014 (1393 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
| other_volumes =
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Environmental Theology''' (الهیات محیط زیست) is a research work in the field of [[environmental jurisprudence]] that elucidates the connection among theological concepts, religious ethics, and jurisprudential maxims in confronting contemporary environmental issues and crises. In writing this book, Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad, the author, has utilized philosophical, historical, religious, Quranic, and jurisprudential perspectives to evaluate the status of nature in the Islamic intellectual system and the moral duty of human beings towards it.

In the jurisprudential section of the book, by referring to jurisprudential principles and maxims such as the "[[Maxim of No Harm|Maxim of No Harm]]" (''qa'idat la darar''), "[[Maxim of Destruction|Maxim of Destruction]]" (''itlaf''), "Prohibition of Extravagance" (''hurmat israf''), "[[Preservation of the political system|Preservation of the System]]" (''hifz al-nizam''), and "Civil Liability" (''mas'uliyyat-i madani''), the author examines the possibility of reinterpreting these concepts in the context of environmental preservation and discusses the capacity of Imami jurisprudence to formulate rulings governing the rights of nature and the duties of human beings towards it. Continuing this section, a set of proposals is presented for compiling "Environmental Jurisprudence" within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence; proposals that focus on the necessity of strengthening the moral and Sharia responsibility of human beings in protecting natural resources and preventing environmental damage, as well as the entry of religious institutions into the arena of education and the development of environmental culture.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book Environmental Theology, written by [[Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad]], is organized into eleven sections and examines the links between Islamic theology, religious ethics, and Islamic jurisprudence with contemporary environmental issues and challenges. The structure of the book is developed with philosophical, theological, historical, religious, Quranic, and jurisprudential approaches. This book was published in 2014 (1393 SH) by the Iranian Institute of Philosophy in 265 pages.

The philosophical sections of the book are dedicated to critiquing the modern anthropocentric view of nature and the desecration of the environment. In the religious and Quranic sections, the author provides a comparison among religions regarding their attitude towards the environment. By citing Quranic verses and monotheistic concepts, he considers nature a manifestation of divine signs and an arena for the realization of spirituality, and depicts the relationship between humans and nature based on duty and responsibility. In the environmental ethics section, the role of the human being as God's vicegerent (''khalifah'') on earth and the necessity of environmental education in religious and educational institutions are addressed, and in the historical section, the behavior of Iranian civilization towards nature is examined.

The tenth section of the book is dedicated to jurisprudential discussions and comprises approximately one-fourth of the work's volume. In this section, by citing jurisprudential maxims such as the Maxim of No Harm (''la darar''), destruction (''itlaf''), prohibition of extravagance (''israf''), preservation of the system (''hifz al-nizam''), and civil liability, the author assesses the feasibility of the foundations of environmental jurisprudence within Islamic jurisprudence and highlights the capacities of Imami jurisprudence in regulating rights and duties related to the environment. At the end of this section, proposals are presented for the formulation of "Environmental Jurisprudence" within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence and the development of the moral and Sharia responsibility of humans in preserving nature.

== Nature as a Divine Sign and Word ==
In the fifth section of the book, entitled "The Quran's Perspective on the Environment," the author explores Quranic terms and concepts related to nature. This analysis is conducted by direct reference to Quranic verses, and examples of natural phenomena in Quranic oaths—such as the sun (''shams''), moon (''qamar''), star (''najm''), and mount (''tur'')—and terms like "the All-Encompassing" (''Al-Muhit''), "the Earth" (''Al-Ard''), "the Sky" (''Al-Sama'''), "the Mountains" (''Al-Jibal''), and "the Rivers" (''Al-Anhar'') are examined. Additionally, verses related to topics such as [[Corruption on earth|corruption on earth]] (''fasad fi al-ard''), human responsibility, and balance in creation are introduced as central elements of environmental theology.

Relying on mystical and philosophical exegeses, including the views of philosophers such as Mulla Sadra, Avicenna, al-Farabi, Allama Tabatabai, and William Chittick, the author demonstrates that nature in the Quranic perspective is not merely a physical or instrumental reality, but a sign (''ayah'') of the transcendent truth. This interpretation paves the way for the formation of a spiritual and responsible view of nature and provides a theoretical foundation for environmental jurisprudence and ethics in the Islamic tradition (pp. 87-123).

In the ninth section of the book, entitled "The Manifestation of God's Word in Nature," the author examines the divine attribute of "Speech" (''takallum'') and, based on Quranic verses and narrations, considers creatures and the entire universe to be manifestations of God's Word. By citing mystical and philosophical perspectives, he shows that in Mulla Sadra's intellectual system, the universe, encompassing both the horizons and the souls (''afaq wa anfus''), is the form and manifestation of the Exalted Truth (the emergence of a thing without an intermediary), not merely a symbol (an effect and intermediary for inferring the cause). This section provides an epistemological basis for understanding human interaction with nature as a divine text and, from this perspective, elucidates the philosophical and Quranic foundations of environmental responsibility (pp. 163-175).

== Islam's Legal System Regarding the Environment ==
To elucidate the jurisprudential aspect of the environmental issue, Mohaghegh Damad addresses several matters in this regard; including the ownership of environmental resources, the Sharia limits of possessing/utilizing environmental resources, the jurisprudential rulings on environmental resources, and the Sharia liability (''daman'') for environmental damages.

=== Jurisprudential Ownership of Environmental Resources ===
Initially, the author explains the concept of ownership in Islamic jurisprudence and categorizes environmental resources into three categories: [[Private ownership|personal ownership]], [[State ownership|state ownership]], and [[Public ownership|national ownership]]. Public wealth (''anfal''), as public (state) property, is at the disposal of the legitimate government and includes forests, seas, mountains, pastures, space, air, and other natural resources. These properties are neither subject to personal ownership nor transferable; rather, they must remain in the service of public interests; because, according to the explicit text of the Quran, *anfal* belong to God and the Messenger (s), and in the view of Islamic jurists, during the presence of the Infallible (''Ma'sum''), they are at his disposal, and during the Occultation (''Ghaybah''), they are at the disposal of the legitimate government (p. 182).

=== Sharia Limits of Authority in Utilizing Environmental Resources ===
Under the heading "Limits of Authority in Utilizing Environmental Resources," the author first addresses the rights and duties of management regarding public properties and emphasizes that legitimate management over these properties is not absolute and unrestrained (p. 183). According to Islamic jurisprudence, the government is obliged to prevent encroachment upon environmental resources and to permit their exploitation only within the framework of real needs and public interests (''masalih 'umumiyyah''); personal utilizations or unchecked transfers carried out without considering public interests lack Sharia legitimacy, and the responsibility for them, both from a Sharia and civil perspective, falls upon the sovereignty. Furthermore, forests and pastures are introduced as the most important instances of *anfal*, and the necessity of their preservation and protection is emphasized (p. 185). Likewise, seas, coasts, and public waters, similar to forests, are counted among public properties whose ownership rests with the [[Islamic government]]. Pointing to some Quranic verses, the author considers the pollution of water resources, encroachment upon the boundaries of seas, and unauthorized exploitation as clear instances of Sharia violation (p. 187).

By analyzing [[Verse 204 of Surah al-Baqarah|verses 204]] to [[Verse 206 of Surah al-Baqarah|206 of Surah al-Baqarah]], particularly [[Verse 205 of Surah al-Baqarah|verse "And when he goes away, he strives throughout the land to cause corruption therein"]] (''wa-idha tawalla sa'a fi al-ardi liyufsida fiha''), he places destructive utilizations of environmental resources under the heading of "[[Corruption on earth|corruption on earth]]" and considers it forbidden by Sharia (p. 193). The author also addresses the preservation of environmental resources from the perspective of numerous narrations that emphasize the preservation of trees, avoidance of pollution, observance of animal rights, and the prohibition of destroying natural resources (p. 199).

=== Environmental Resources and Their Jurisprudential Rulings ===
Mohaghegh Damad places environmental resources into four categories and mentions their jurisprudential rulings.
* Earth and Soil: In Islamic jurisprudence, the earth is not only a place to live, but also a place of prostration (''sujud'') and a means of purification (''taharah''). Any pollution or destruction of the soil is forbidden from a Sharia perspective (p. 200).
* Air and Space: Air, as a public resource, is at the disposal of the government, and polluting it—through smoke, toxic gases, or harmful waves—entails Sharia liability (''daman'') (p. 205).
* [[Broadcasting harmful waves into space]]: The emission of harmful waves, such as radio or industrial waves, if it causes harm to humans or nature, is forbidden jurisprudentially (p. 212).
* Unrestrained sale of building density: Selling building density without considering the environmental capacity of cities is an instance of encroaching upon public rights and entails the Sharia responsibility of urban management (p. 212).

=== Environmental Damages and Their Sharia Liability ===
Under the heading "Environmental Damages," the author, while examining the history of the term "environmental damage" and raising the question of whether the victim of these damages is the human being or the environment itself, analyzes the legal perspectives in answering this question (p. 215). Then, he proceeds to elucidate the jurisprudential sources related to liability for environmental damages from the perspective of the Quran and the maxims of ownership and other jurisprudential maxims.

* '''The Quran and the Prohibition of Corruption and Destruction of the Earth'''
Numerous verses of the Quran, directly or indirectly, indicate the preservation of the natural environment and the prohibition of corruption on the earth, including instances such as the destruction or pollution of human and natural resources (p. 220). Using Quranic verses regarding the cultivation and development of the earth, and utilizing the rules of the principles of jurisprudence (''usul al-fiqh''), the author extracts from the verses the prescriptive rulings (''ahkam taklifiyyah'') of prohibition and liability regarding the corruption, destruction (''itlaf''), and ruin of earth's resources, presenting it as the jurisprudential documentation for prohibiting environmental destruction (p. 221).

Extravagance (''israf''), in the author's view, is also considered an instance of corruption and destruction. From the prescriptive ruling of the prohibition of extravagance, a declarative ruling (''hukm wad'i'') is inferred regarding civil responsibility and non-contractual liability (''daman qahri''); a responsibility whose scope encompasses not only private rights but also has a public dimension (p. 223). The author considers the destruction of environmental resources to be covered by the [[Maxim of Destruction]] (''qa'idat al-itlaf'') and views the liability arising from the ruin of *anfal* and public properties as definitive, even in cases where personal exploitation leads to damage to shared resources (p. 224).

By citing verses related to ingratitude for blessings (''kufran al-ni'mah''), which stand in opposition to faith and gratitude (''shukr''), the author introduces the correct utilization of natural resources as an instance of practical gratitude, and considers damaging them as a form of ingratitude for blessings that brings about divine punishment. He further explains the connection between ingratitude for blessings and various types of divine punishments (p. 226).

* '''Jurisprudential Maxims of Ownership and Destructive Actions'''
In this section, by citing the [[Jurisprudential maxim of dominion]] (''al-nasu musallatuna 'ala amwalihim''), the author enumerates three characteristics for ownership in Islamic jurisprudence: exclusivity, permanence, and absoluteness. In examining the third characteristic, namely "absoluteness" (''itlaq''), he raises this question: Can the absoluteness of an owner's authority over their property lead to actions that cause the destruction of the environment? (p. 230) In response to this question, emphasizing that the maxim of dominion is restricted by other jurisprudential principles, the author introduces the [[Maxim of No Harm]] (''qa'idat la darar'') as the main restrictor of this maxim. Based on this maxim, any proprietary action that causes harm to others or damage to public resources is forbidden jurisprudentially and entails Sharia liability (p. 230).

* '''The Maxim of the Obligation to Repel Probable Harm'''
In the discussion concerning the "[[Maxim of the obligation to repel probable harm]]" (''qa'idat wujub daf' al-darar al-muhtamal''), Mohaghegh Damad clarifies that this maxim is discussed in the principles of jurisprudence (''usul al-fiqh''), not in jurisprudence (''fiqh'') itself, and its documentation is based on rational standards, not transmitted evidence (''adillah naqliyyah''). He considers the substance of the maxim to pertain to the prescriptive ruling (''hukm taklifi'') and the obligation of precaution and prevention, not the declarative ruling (''hukm wad'i'') of liability (''daman''). Based on this maxim, even in cases where there is a rational probability of harm occurring to environmental resources, it necessitates the obligation of prevention and the prohibition of actions that might lead to destruction (p. 236).

== Jurisprudential Conclusions and Proposals ==
At the end of the section on environmental jurisprudence, Mohaghegh Damad independently raises eleven jurisprudential issues and states the Sharia ruling for each case based on the maxims of Imami jurisprudence. Some of these issues include:
* The prohibition of high-rise construction in vulnerable climatic zones.
* The prohibition (''hurmah'') of excessive extraction of water from underground aquifers in arid regions.
* The prohibition of cutting down forest trees for the purpose of urban development.
* The prohibition of discharging sewage into natural water resources.
* The prohibition of using polluting vehicles.
* Sharia liability arising from noise and visual pollution.
* The obligation of the government's responsibility in preventing the destruction of natural resources.
* The prohibition of using environmentally damaging weapons in wartime conditions (pp. 231-241).

Subsequently, after summarizing and presenting a recap of the book's contents, emphasizing the cultural and religious responsibility of religious institutions, the author provides recommendations for the development of [[environmental jurisprudence]]. Among these recommendations are:
* Promoting public education regarding proper behavior towards nature by cultural institutions and religious authorities.
* Maintaining a multicultural approach and striving to achieve a global and international system of environmental ethics.
* Forming an association of scientists and representatives of various religions for the preservation of the environment, with a permanent secretariat.
* The necessity of formulating an Islamic worldview regarding nature and the natural sciences by utilizing all Islamic sources, from the Quran and Sunnah to traditional works on philosophy, theology, cosmology, and other sciences (pp. 243-249).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books on environmental jurisprudence]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad]]
[[fa:الهیات محیط زیست (کتاب)]]

Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq (Book)

2026-04-03T09:31:29Z

Enadmin:

{{author
|author = Mahdi Shajarian
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq
| image = Al-Marah_al-Mafahim_wa_al-Huquq.png
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| original_title =
| author =Ahmad al-Qabbanji
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| genre =
| language =Arabic
| original_language =
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages =331
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Manshurat Sayyidi
| publication_place =Najaf
| publication_date =2004
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq: Qira'ah Jadidah li Qadaya al-Mar'ah fi al-Khitab al-Dini''' (Woman, Concepts and Rights: A New Reading of Women's Issues in Religious Discourse) is the title of a research work in the field of [[women's jurisprudence]] by Ahmad al-Qabbanji. In this book, the author critiques the traditional jurisprudential (''fiqhi'') reading of the status of women in Islam and, in contrast, presents a reformist and rational approach. The main axis of the book is based on the idea that many of the common rulings and concepts regarding women are not devotional (''ta'abbudi'') and eternal rulings; rather, they are rooted in the culture, custom ('''urf''), and social conditions of the era of revelation.

By distinguishing between "religion" (''din*—fixed Quranic principles) and "Sharia" (historically variable laws), the author considers many famous narrations (''riwayat'') and fatwas to be the product of a patriarchal culture and specific temporal conditions that are in conflict with the spirit of the Quran and the criterion of rational justice. Ultimately, by examining instances such as [[Men's guardianship over women|guardianship (''qawwamiyyah'')]], [[blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], and [[Women's political positions|political positions]], the book concludes that with changing conditions, these rulings are also subject to revision and change in order to realize true justice—which has a fixed concept, but its instances vary according to temporal and spatial requirements—and that the Muslim woman enjoys equal rights with man in human, social, and legal arenas.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq: Qira'ah Jadidah li Qadaya al-Mar'ah fi al-Khitab al-Dini (المرأة، المفاهيم والحقوق) is a research work in the field of [[women's jurisprudence]] in Arabic by Ahmad al-Qabbanji, organized in 331 pages and published by Manshurat Sayyidi in the city of Najaf in 2004. In this book, the author speaks of the intellectual and cultural conflict between two main currents regarding women's issues: the "jurisprudential Islamic current" or traditional one, and the "reformist Islamic current" or conscientious one. According to him, both currents represent a vast segment of Muslim thinkers and scholars, and one cannot accuse one of a lack of sincerity and consider the other to be true Islam (pp. 5-6).

According to the author's report, the traditional current is based on foundations such as the "universality of the mission and the continuation of the Sharia until the Day of Resurrection," the "devotional (''ta'abbudi'') nature of legal rulings," and the "[[Comprehensiveness of religion|comprehensiveness of religion]] for all aspects of life"; in contrast, the reformist current believes in the "historicity of the Sharia," the "human nature of jurisprudential deductions," the "separation between religion and the variable Sharia," and the "ability of human intellect for [[legislation]]." In this book, the author supports the second reading (pp. 6-7).

=== Structure ===
The discussions of the book are organized into an introduction and two main sections.

* The first section, entitled "Woman in the Circle of Concepts," critically analyzes the derogatory perceptions and narrations regarding women, such as the manner of woman's creation, the deficiency of her intellect and faith, and the necessity of her absolute obedience to her husband.
* The second section, entitled "Woman in the Circle of Rights," examines, on a case-by-case basis, key jurisprudential rulings such as the [[Men's guardianship over women|right of guardianship (''qawwamiyyah'')]], [[Women's hijab|hijab]], [[Woman leaving the house|leaving the house]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], [[Woman's blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Women's political positions|political positions]], marriage, divorce, and [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]]. In each topic, the author first presents the perspective of traditional jurisprudence and then, by referring to the Quran, intellect, and the conditions of the times, critiques it and presents his alternative viewpoint.

== The Position of Islam Regarding Woman ==
Acknowledging that Islam elevated the status of woman (pp. 10-11) and that the general texts of the Quran emphasize the equality of man and woman in innate rights (pp. 11-12), the author raises the question of whether Islamic jurisprudence has also secured all the rights of woman. In this regard, he points to three viewpoints:
* Most jurists (''fuqaha'') believe that the Sharia has guaranteed the most complete rights for the woman (pp. 13-14).
* Some modernists say that due to the unfavorable cultural and social conditions of the era of revelation, Islam could not realize all the rights of woman and contented itself with a minimum, so that in the future, with the evolution of human intellect, these rights would be completed (pp. 14-16).
* The author himself believes that the legislations of Islam regarding woman were "just and reasonable" within their cultural and social context, but this does not mean their fixity; and with the change of time and place, their instances also change (pp. 16-17).

Based on the foundation of the separation of "religion" from "Sharia," the author believes that "religion" includes general doctrinal and moral values, and is a "fixed" matter; however, "Sharia" is the set of specific laws for every nation (''ummah'') that has been established according to the conditions of time and place, and is a "variable" matter. Accordingly, the Quranic concepts indicating the equality of man and woman in humanity are part of "religion," whereas the jurisprudential rulings related to woman are part of "Sharia" and have interacted with the social realities of their era, and they change with changing conditions (pp. 18-19).

== Woman in the Circle of Concepts ==
In this section, the author examines the common concepts regarding woman in religious texts that have influenced the deduction of jurisprudential rulings (pp. 21-60). These concepts, although not directly jurisprudential, play a fundamental role in the formation of the issues of [[women's jurisprudence]] and [[contemporary jurisprudence]]. By referring to narrations, the author investigates issues such as the manner of woman's creation, the existence of woman being an evil, women being deficient in intellect and faith, the prostration of the wife to the husband, not consulting with women, the allocation of the Houri (''hur al-'ayn'') to men in Paradise, and the reprehensibility (''karahah'') of education for women. By examining the chains of transmission (''sanad'') of the narrations and critiquing their contents, he finds these interpretations to be in conflict with the spirit of the religion of Islam.

=== The Creation of Woman ===
According to the author, there are two viewpoints in the narrations regarding the creation of Eve (''Hawwa''). One group, influenced by the Torah, considers her to have been created from Adam's left rib, and the other group calls her the product of the surplus of Adam's clay, both of which are derogatory viewpoints toward woman (pp. 23-27). Rejecting these narrations, the author believes that the Quran considers the creation of man and woman to be from a "single soul" (''nafs wahidah''), which indicates equality in creation (pp. 27-30).

=== Women Being Deficient in Intellect and Deficient in Faith ===
Pointing to the description of women in Nahj al-Balagha as being "deficient in intellect, faith, and shares" (''naqisat al-'aql wa al-iman wa al-huzuz'') (p. 33), the author rejects this description and explains that abandoning worship during menstruation is obedience to the divine command, not a deficiency of faith; the lesser share in inheritance is due to the different financial responsibilities of man; and the predominance of emotion, which has been interpreted as a deficiency of intellect, is a perfection for fulfilling the maternal role (pp. 33-35).

=== Opposition to Consulting with Women ===
The author believes that the narrations that recommend against consulting with women and acting contrary to their opinions are a reflection of a patriarchal culture and explicitly oppose the Quran and the Prophetic conduct (''sirah'') (p. 46). The Quran has endorsed positive examples such as consulting with the daughter of Shu'ayb and acting upon the opinion of the Queen of Sheba (''Malikat Saba'''), and the Prophet also acted upon the opinion of Umm Salama during the event of Hudaybiyyah (pp. 47-52).

== Woman in the Circle of Rights ==
In this section, using a new approach, the author examines the jurisprudential rulings related to women, such as the [[Men's guardianship over women|right of guardianship]], [[Woman leaving the house|leaving the house]], [[Women's hijab|hijab]], [[Holding political positions|holding political positions]], [[Woman's blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]], divorce, and marriage.

=== The Right of Guardianship ===
According to the author, the [[Verse 34 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women"]] (''al-rijalu qawwamuna 'ala al-nisa''') is the main foundation for traditional jurists regarding the inherent superiority of man and his right to head the family (pp. 63-64); however, the author believes that *qawwam* does not mean "head/supervisor", but rather means "protector and caretaker of affairs" (pp. 66-69). In his view, this guardianship in the Quran is accompanied by conditions such as "justice" (''qist'') and "goodness" (''ma'ruf''), and is granted to the man for two reasons: "by what Allah has preferred" (''bima faddala Allah'') and "by what they spend" (''bima anfaqu''); therefore, if the woman participates in the living expenses, one of the pillars of this right is eliminated (pp. 69-72). The author also believes that this verse is highly likely in the position of "informing" (''ikhbar'') about a social reality at that time, not the "establishment" (''insha''') of an eternal Sharia ruling (pp. 76-77).

=== Leaving the House ===
The author considers the fatwa of the [[Woman leaving the house|prohibition of a woman leaving the house without her husband's permission]], even for obligatory and recommended affairs (pp. 87-89), to be based on evidences such as the verse of guardianship (p. 89), the [[Right of compliance|right of marital compliance (''tamkin'')]] (p. 104), and narrations stating that a woman is deserving of the angels' curses if she leaves the house without her husband's permission (pp. 91-92). In contrast, the author challenges these evidences in detail. He believes that the verse of guardianship is either in the position of stating a past social reality or is conditional upon justice and financial support (''infaq''), which might not be realized in today's world (pp. 90-91). The cited narrations are also weak in terms of their chain of transmission (''sanad''), contrary to the explicit text of the Quran regarding the mutual rights of man and woman, such as the [[Verse 228 of Surah al-Baqarah|verse "And due to the wives is similar to what is expected of them"]] (''lahunna mithlu alladhi 'alayhinn''), and in conflict with intellect and a sound conscience (pp. 92-100).

In the author's belief, the adherence of some jurists to traditional fatwas about women is rooted in their ideological thinking, which, by ignoring the developments of civil society, attempts to impose rulings that were effective for yesterday's society onto today's world. By proposing the distinction between the "concept" and the "instances" of justice, he states that although the concept of justice is fixed, its instances change in accordance with culture and time (pp. 124-126).

=== Hijab ===
By distinguishing between "Islamic hijab" and the "seclusion of woman" (''hajb''), the author believes that [[Women's hijab|hijab]], as a Sharia ruling, is not an obstacle to a woman's social participation; rather, the problem is a strict type of covering that has in practice led to "seclusion" (''hajb'') or marginalizing women from society (pp. 129-131). According to the author, two extremist discourses—namely the "traditional religious discourse" and the "Western secular discourse"—both damage the status of woman in different ways. The religious discourse, by emphasizing isolation, limits the woman to the roles of mother and wife, and the Western discourse, by emphasizing absolute freedom, destabilizes the foundation of the family. The author emphasizes that extremism in exerting pressure for hijab and gender segregation has had inverse results and has led to the spread of corruption and moral collapse (pp. 131-133).

The author emphasizes that the social presence and activity of woman is a necessity, not a deviation. This necessity can be examined from several aspects: 1) forming a healthy family (pp. 149-152); 2) the psychological health of the woman (pp. 152-153); and 3) the progress of society (pp. 154-155).

=== Holding Political and Social Positions ===
The author critiques the evidences of the opponents of women holding political and social positions from several aspects.

* '''Critique of the Argument from the Quran'''
The author considers the opponents' argument using the [[Verse 33 of Surah al-Ahzab|verse "And abide in your houses"]] (''wa qarna fi buyutikunn'') to be weak; because its address is specifically to the wives of the Prophet (s) and it possesses an advisory (''irshadi'') nature, not an obligatory one. Secondly, the conduct of believing women in the early days of Islam, including the Prophet's wives, involved leaving the house to participate in Friday prayers, [[jihad]], and visiting the sick, and no jurist has issued a fatwa on the absolute obligation for a woman to stay at home (pp. 191-192).

He also considers the reliance on the [[Verse 18 of Surah al-Zukhruf|verse "Or is one brought up in ornaments"]] (''a-wa-man yunashsha'u fi al-hilyah'') to be rejected; because this verse describes the condition of women in the culture of the pre-Islamic era of ignorance (''Jahiliyyah''), where they were deprived of education and upbringing, not the condition of the woman in the faithful and cultural atmosphere of Islam, which develops her personality (pp. 192-193).

* '''Critique of the Argument from Narrations'''
The author divides the narrations related to women into three categories:

# Narrations consistent with intellect and the Quran: such as "Women are the twin halves of men" (''al-nisa' shaqa'iq al-rijal'') and "Paradise is at the feet of mothers" (''al-jannah tahta aqdam al-ummahat''), which are in complete accordance with the Quran and conscience (pp. 194-196).
# Narrations contrary to intellect and the Quran: such as "Women are deficient in intellects" (''al-nisa' naqisat al-'uqul'') or "Woman is entirely evil" (''al-mar'ah kulluha sharr''), which, due to their explicit opposition to the spirit of the Quran and the dignity of the Prophet and the Imams, are fabricated and constructed by the culture of their time (pp. 196-197).
# Narrations worthy of contemplation: such as "A people who entrust their affairs to a woman will never succeed" (''lan yufliha qawmun wallaw amrahum imra'ah''). These narrations, even if issued by the Infallible (''Ma'sum''), do not express a devotional and eternal Sharia ruling, but are propositions observing the external reality and the cultural and social conditions of that era. He considers the stark difference between the Quran and many narrations to be indicative of the historicity of the narrations and their being influenced by the culture of the time (pp. 197-201).

* '''Critique of the Argument from Consensus'''
In the author's belief, the claimed consensus (''ijma''') on the impermissibility of women holding political positions is a "document-based consensus" (''ijma' madraki'') and lacks authority (''hujjiyyah''). Furthermore, such a consensus fundamentally does not exist, and many early and later jurists have opposed it (pp. 207-210).

* '''Critique of Approbationary Aspects (''Wujuh Istihsani'')'''
The author considers reasons such as the viewpoint of the author of *Jawahir*, who said "it is not appropriate for a woman to sit with men," to be merely based on personal taste and founded upon undesirable customs (pp. 210-213). In his belief, the root of these viewpoints in traditional jurisprudence is, on the one hand, preferring the side of "chastity" ('''iffah'') over women's rights, and on the other hand, the deep-rooted patriarchal culture that views woman as a second-class being meant solely for service in the home (pp. 213-215).

=== Woman's Blood Money (''Diyah'') ===
Traditional jurists, to justify the fatwa of a woman's blood money being half that of a man's, argue that blood money is not the price of human blood, but rather a kind of "financial compensation" arising from the loss of the murdered individual. Since the economic role of the man in the family is generally greater than that of the woman, the loss caused by his murder is also greater, and therefore his blood money is double. In response to the objection that today women also have active economic participation, it is said that laws are legislated based on the "predominant state" of society, not exceptional cases (pp. 220-221).

To present a new solution, the author proposes three premises:

# Distinction between Islam and Islamic thought: One must differentiate between "religion" as a sacred entity and "religious thought" which is the product of human understanding and influenced by time and place; thus, critiquing a famous fatwa does not mean opposing Islam (pp. 222-225).
# The impact of time and place on jurisprudential deduction: Jurisprudence is a dynamic entity, and with changes in social, cultural, and epistemic conditions, the fatwas also change (pp. 225-232).
# The primacy of the Quran over narrations: Many challenging jurisprudential rulings (such as the ruling on [[apostasy (''irtidad'')|apostasy]], [[stoning (''rajm'')|stoning]], and the halving of a woman's blood money) are solely documented by narrations. By proposing the theory of the "fixed and the variable," the author believes the general and fixed principles of religion are stated in the Quran, and the narrations have primarily addressed variable issues. Therefore, in legal and social issues like blood money, one must refer back to the Quranic principle of "justice" and "equality," and interpret opposing narrations in light of their historical conditions of issuance (pp. 232-233).

In the author's belief, the economic value of the work that a woman performs at home is no less than the work of a man outside, and her loss also inflicts a great economic loss upon the family. Moreover, the harm caused by the loss of a mother, from an emotional perspective for the children, is far heavier than the loss of a father, and the law of blood money should not ignore this aspect. Insisting on the halving of blood money in such conditions must either lead to pure devotional adherence (''ta'abbud''), which is incompatible with legal rationality, or it must be based on a logical cause that no longer exists externally (pp. 237-239).

The author ultimately concludes that, given the fundamental change in the economic and social role of women, the past economic justification for the difference in blood money can no longer be accepted. Since this ruling has no Quranic roots and is in conflict with the general principle of justice, and considering that the instances of justice transform with changing times, insisting on a woman's blood money being half is incompatible with the spirit of Islam and the requirements of today's world (pp. 239-240).

=== Woman's Inheritance ===
In the author's belief, legal rulings such as inheritance, unlike devotional (''ta'abbudi'') rulings, are based on a specific goal like "justice" and, for this reason, have the capability of rational analysis and adaptation to the conditions of the time (pp. 243-244). Emphasizing the overall superiority of Islam's inheritance system compared to the pre-Islamic era of ignorance (''Jahiliyyah'') and Western societies, the author examines challenging cases in which the issue of justice and legal equality for women is raised (p. 244).

The author presents the three main cases in which the inheritance shares of man and woman differ: the different shares of spouses, the double share of sons compared to daughters, and the deprivation of the wife from the husband's immovable properties (pp. 244-245).

In analyzing the first two cases, the author states the traditional justification of the jurists, who consider this difference to be just due to the greater financial responsibilities of the man (such as financial support [*infaq*] for the wife and children) (pp. 245-246); however, he raises this fundamental question: if in a society, women also participate in providing for living expenses, will this difference still be just? The author believes that although one cannot simply bypass the explicit text of the Quran, if the cause ('''illah'') of a ruling disappears, one can revise it by relying on the general principle of "justice." As a legal solution, he suggests that equality in inheritance can be realized through civil law and with the consent of the heirs (either directly or through elected representatives in parliament) (pp. 246-251).

The most important part of the author's critique is directed at "the deprivation of the wife from inheriting the husband's land." He emphasizes that this fatwa has no Quranic root and is in conflict with the absoluteness (''itlaq'') of the [[Verse 12 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse "And for them is a fourth of what you leave"]] (''wa lahunna al-rubu' mimma taraktum'') (p. 251). By analyzing the narrations documenting this fatwa, the author divides them into three categories and shows that the narrations indicating deprivation are in conflict with more authentic narrations that affirm the wife's right to inherit from all properties (pp. 253-260). The author also points to the opposition of great jurists like Muhaqqiq al-Ardabili to this fatwa in the past and endorses their view that the wife inherits from all of the husband's properties (pp. 260-268).

=== Marriage and Divorce ===
The author challenges the traditional viewpoint regarding the "right of marriage" and the "right of divorce." In this regard, he points to the issue of "[[Father's guardianship over the marriage of a virgin daughter|the father's guardianship over the marriage of a virgin daughter]]" (''wilayat al-ab 'ala zawaj al-bikr''), where many contemporary jurists consider an "obligatory precaution" (''ihtiyat wajib'') in the necessity of obtaining permission from the father, although this precaution has turned into a condition for the validity of the contract in general custom (pp. 279-280). In contrast, the author cites the famous viewpoint of early jurists, including Muhaqqiq al-Hilli and al-Sharif al-Murtada, who considered the father's guardianship over the marriage of a mature and sensible (''rashidah'') daughter to be dropped (p. 280). He mentions reasons to prove this viewpoint:
* The principle of non-guardianship (''asl 'adam al-wilayah''): The foundational principle is that every mature and sane human being has dominion over all their own affairs, and guardianship over them is contrary to the principle and requires definitive evidence (p. 281).
* Quranic generalities ('''umumat''): Verses such as "[[Verse 1 of Surah al-Ma'idah|Fulfill the contracts]]" (''awfu bi al-'uqud'') and "[[Verse 3 of Surah al-Nisa'|marry those that please you of women]]" (''fa-nkihu ma taba lakum min al-nisa''') have generally delegated the choice of marriage to the individuals themselves (p. 281).
* Explicit narrations: Numerous narrations have been transmitted from the Imams (a) that confirm the independence of the daughter in the matter of marriage (p. 282).
* The weakness of opposing evidences: The narrations used to prove the father's guardianship are weak in terms of their chain of transmission, and in the case of conflict as well, the narrations indicating the woman's independence take precedence due to greater fame (''shuhrah'') and agreement with the Quran (p. 283).

The author also rejects the common argument that "divorce is in the hands of the man because the man is more rational." He believes that in practice, it is the woman who, due to emotional attachment and social pressures, strives more to preserve the family (pp. 288-291). With a new interpretation of the famous hadith "Divorce is in the hand of the one who takes the leg [i.e., the spouse]" (''al-talaqu bi-yadi man akhadha bi al-saq''), the author believes this hadith places the right of divorce at the disposal of the "spouses" and strips it from others (like the father), not that it restricts it solely to the man (pp. 291-292).

He emphasizes the woman's right to "[[Khul' divorce|divorce by relinquishing her dower]]" (''talaq al-khul'''), and by citing the conduct of the Prophet (s) in the incident of Thabit bin Qays's wife, he states that if a woman has an aversion to living with her husband and relinquishes her dower (''mahriyyah''), the Sharia judge (''hakim al-shar''') is obliged to execute the decree of divorce (p. 292). Criticizing fatwas that limit a woman's right to divorce even under difficult conditions, the author considers these fatwas to be contrary to the spirit of justice and the [[Maxim of No Hardship|maxim of no hardship]] (''qa'idat la haraj'') (pp. 293-295).

=== Custody ===
Regarding the [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]] of a child after divorce, there are various fatwas. The famous fatwa is that the custody of a boy up to two years of age and a girl up to seven years of age is with the mother. Some jurists consider the custody of both to be with the mother until seven years of age (pp. 299-301). By examining the narrations, the author considers the famous fatwa (differentiating between the boy and the girl) to be an "unwarranted reconciliation" (''jam' tabarru'i'') without narrative and rational evidence. By reconciling the three categories of existing narrations (the narrations of two years, seven years, and until the mother's remarriage), he comes to the conclusion that the strongest and most just opinion is the mother's right of custody up to seven years of age for both children (boy and girl). This opinion is compatible with the more authentic narrations, as well as with the emotional and psychological needs of the child at these ages, and with intellect and custom. After seven years of age, priority is with the father, unless the child's best interest dictates otherwise, in which case the determination lies with a competent court (pp. 304-315).

In the author's view, the condition of "Islam" for the mother to have custody is also rejected. The [[Verse 141 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse of negating dominion]] (''ayat nafy al-sabil'') that is cited for it, applies to domination and governance, whereas custody is an emotional and service-oriented relationship. Furthermore, at an early age, a child does not have a proper understanding of beliefs for the danger of their deviation to be posed (pp. 317-320).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books on women's jurisprudence]]
[[Category:Books by Ahmad al-Qabbanji]]
[[fa:المرأة، المفاهيم والحقوق (کتاب)]]

File:Al-Marah al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq.png

2026-04-03T09:30:55Z

Enadmin:

Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq (Book)

2026-04-03T09:29:48Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahdi Shajarian |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq | image = Al-Marah_al-Mafahim_wa_al-Huquq.png | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | original_title = | author =Ahmad al-Qabbanji | date_of_writing = | subject = | genre = | language =Arabic | original_language = | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_by = | compiler = | illustrator = | cover..."

{{author
|author = Mahdi Shajarian
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq
| image = Al-Marah_al-Mafahim_wa_al-Huquq.png
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| original_title =
| author =Ahmad al-Qabbanji
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| genre =
| language =Arabic
| original_language =
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages =331
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Manshurat Sayyidi
| publication_place =Najaf
| publication_date =2004
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq: Qira'ah Jadidah li Qadaya al-Mar'ah fi al-Khitab al-Dini''' (Woman, Concepts and Rights: A New Reading of Women's Issues in Religious Discourse) is the title of a research work in the field of [[women's jurisprudence]] by Ahmad al-Qabbanji. In this book, the author critiques the traditional jurisprudential (''fiqhi'') reading of the status of women in Islam and, in contrast, presents a reformist and rational approach. The main axis of the book is based on the idea that many of the common rulings and concepts regarding women are not devotional (''ta'abbudi'') and eternal rulings; rather, they are rooted in the culture, custom ('''urf''), and social conditions of the era of revelation.

By distinguishing between "religion" (''din*—fixed Quranic principles) and "Sharia" (historically variable laws), the author considers many famous narrations (''riwayat'') and fatwas to be the product of a patriarchal culture and specific temporal conditions that are in conflict with the spirit of the Quran and the criterion of rational justice. Ultimately, by examining instances such as [[Men's guardianship over women|guardianship (''qawwamiyyah'')]], [[blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], and [[Women's political positions|political positions]], the book concludes that with changing conditions, these rulings are also subject to revision and change in order to realize true justice—which has a fixed concept, but its instances vary according to temporal and spatial requirements—and that the Muslim woman enjoys equal rights with man in human, social, and legal arenas.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book Al-Mar'ah, al-Mafahim wa al-Huquq: Qira'ah Jadidah li Qadaya al-Mar'ah fi al-Khitab al-Dini (المرأة، المفاهيم والحقوق) is a research work in the field of [[women's jurisprudence]] in Arabic by Ahmad al-Qabbanji, organized in 331 pages and published by Manshurat Sayyidi in the city of Najaf in 2004. In this book, the author speaks of the intellectual and cultural conflict between two main currents regarding women's issues: the "jurisprudential Islamic current" or traditional one, and the "reformist Islamic current" or conscientious one. According to him, both currents represent a vast segment of Muslim thinkers and scholars, and one cannot accuse one of a lack of sincerity and consider the other to be true Islam (pp. 5-6).

According to the author's report, the traditional current is based on foundations such as the "universality of the mission and the continuation of the Sharia until the Day of Resurrection," the "devotional (''ta'abbudi'') nature of legal rulings," and the "[[Comprehensiveness of religion|comprehensiveness of religion]] for all aspects of life"; in contrast, the reformist current believes in the "historicity of the Sharia," the "human nature of jurisprudential deductions," the "separation between religion and the variable Sharia," and the "ability of human intellect for [[legislation]]." In this book, the author supports the second reading (pp. 6-7).

=== Structure ===
The discussions of the book are organized into an introduction and two main sections.

* The first section, entitled "Woman in the Circle of Concepts," critically analyzes the derogatory perceptions and narrations regarding women, such as the manner of woman's creation, the deficiency of her intellect and faith, and the necessity of her absolute obedience to her husband.
* The second section, entitled "Woman in the Circle of Rights," examines, on a case-by-case basis, key jurisprudential rulings such as the [[Men's guardianship over women|right of guardianship (''qawwamiyyah'')]], [[Women's hijab|hijab]], [[Woman leaving the house|leaving the house]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], [[Woman's blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Women's political positions|political positions]], marriage, divorce, and [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]]. In each topic, the author first presents the perspective of traditional jurisprudence and then, by referring to the Quran, intellect, and the conditions of the times, critiques it and presents his alternative viewpoint.

== The Position of Islam Regarding Woman ==
Acknowledging that Islam elevated the status of woman (pp. 10-11) and that the general texts of the Quran emphasize the equality of man and woman in innate rights (pp. 11-12), the author raises the question of whether Islamic jurisprudence has also secured all the rights of woman. In this regard, he points to three viewpoints:
* Most jurists (''fuqaha'') believe that the Sharia has guaranteed the most complete rights for the woman (pp. 13-14).
* Some modernists say that due to the unfavorable cultural and social conditions of the era of revelation, Islam could not realize all the rights of woman and contented itself with a minimum, so that in the future, with the evolution of human intellect, these rights would be completed (pp. 14-16).
* The author himself believes that the legislations of Islam regarding woman were "just and reasonable" within their cultural and social context, but this does not mean their fixity; and with the change of time and place, their instances also change (pp. 16-17).

Based on the foundation of the separation of "religion" from "Sharia," the author believes that "religion" includes general doctrinal and moral values, and is a "fixed" matter; however, "Sharia" is the set of specific laws for every nation (''ummah'') that has been established according to the conditions of time and place, and is a "variable" matter. Accordingly, the Quranic concepts indicating the equality of man and woman in humanity are part of "religion," whereas the jurisprudential rulings related to woman are part of "Sharia" and have interacted with the social realities of their era, and they change with changing conditions (pp. 18-19).

== Woman in the Circle of Concepts ==
In this section, the author examines the common concepts regarding woman in religious texts that have influenced the deduction of jurisprudential rulings (pp. 21-60). These concepts, although not directly jurisprudential, play a fundamental role in the formation of the issues of [[women's jurisprudence]] and [[contemporary jurisprudence]]. By referring to narrations, the author investigates issues such as the manner of woman's creation, the existence of woman being an evil, women being deficient in intellect and faith, the prostration of the wife to the husband, not consulting with women, the allocation of the Houri (''hur al-'ayn'') to men in Paradise, and the reprehensibility (''karahah'') of education for women. By examining the chains of transmission (''sanad'') of the narrations and critiquing their contents, he finds these interpretations to be in conflict with the spirit of the religion of Islam.

=== The Creation of Woman ===
According to the author, there are two viewpoints in the narrations regarding the creation of Eve (''Hawwa''). One group, influenced by the Torah, considers her to have been created from Adam's left rib, and the other group calls her the product of the surplus of Adam's clay, both of which are derogatory viewpoints toward woman (pp. 23-27). Rejecting these narrations, the author believes that the Quran considers the creation of man and woman to be from a "single soul" (''nafs wahidah''), which indicates equality in creation (pp. 27-30).

=== Women Being Deficient in Intellect and Deficient in Faith ===
Pointing to the description of women in Nahj al-Balagha as being "deficient in intellect, faith, and shares" (''naqisat al-'aql wa al-iman wa al-huzuz'') (p. 33), the author rejects this description and explains that abandoning worship during menstruation is obedience to the divine command, not a deficiency of faith; the lesser share in inheritance is due to the different financial responsibilities of man; and the predominance of emotion, which has been interpreted as a deficiency of intellect, is a perfection for fulfilling the maternal role (pp. 33-35).

=== Opposition to Consulting with Women ===
The author believes that the narrations that recommend against consulting with women and acting contrary to their opinions are a reflection of a patriarchal culture and explicitly oppose the Quran and the Prophetic conduct (''sirah'') (p. 46). The Quran has endorsed positive examples such as consulting with the daughter of Shu'ayb and acting upon the opinion of the Queen of Sheba (''Malikat Saba'''), and the Prophet also acted upon the opinion of Umm Salama during the event of Hudaybiyyah (pp. 47-52).

== Woman in the Circle of Rights ==
In this section, using a new approach, the author examines the jurisprudential rulings related to women, such as the [[Men's guardianship over women|right of guardianship]], [[Woman leaving the house|leaving the house]], [[Women's hijab|hijab]], [[Holding political positions|holding political positions]], [[Woman's blood money (''diyah'')|blood money]], [[Woman's inheritance|inheritance]], [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]], divorce, and marriage.

=== The Right of Guardianship ===
According to the author, the [[Verse 34 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women"]] (''al-rijalu qawwamuna 'ala al-nisa''') is the main foundation for traditional jurists regarding the inherent superiority of man and his right to head the family (pp. 63-64); however, the author believes that *qawwam* does not mean "head/supervisor", but rather means "protector and caretaker of affairs" (pp. 66-69). In his view, this guardianship in the Quran is accompanied by conditions such as "justice" (''qist'') and "goodness" (''ma'ruf''), and is granted to the man for two reasons: "by what Allah has preferred" (''bima faddala Allah'') and "by what they spend" (''bima anfaqu''); therefore, if the woman participates in the living expenses, one of the pillars of this right is eliminated (pp. 69-72). The author also believes that this verse is highly likely in the position of "informing" (''ikhbar'') about a social reality at that time, not the "establishment" (''insha''') of an eternal Sharia ruling (pp. 76-77).

=== Leaving the House ===
The author considers the fatwa of the [[Woman leaving the house|prohibition of a woman leaving the house without her husband's permission]], even for obligatory and recommended affairs (pp. 87-89), to be based on evidences such as the verse of guardianship (p. 89), the [[Right of compliance|right of marital compliance (''tamkin'')]] (p. 104), and narrations stating that a woman is deserving of the angels' curses if she leaves the house without her husband's permission (pp. 91-92). In contrast, the author challenges these evidences in detail. He believes that the verse of guardianship is either in the position of stating a past social reality or is conditional upon justice and financial support (''infaq''), which might not be realized in today's world (pp. 90-91). The cited narrations are also weak in terms of their chain of transmission (''sanad''), contrary to the explicit text of the Quran regarding the mutual rights of man and woman, such as the [[Verse 228 of Surah al-Baqarah|verse "And due to the wives is similar to what is expected of them"]] (''lahunna mithlu alladhi 'alayhinn''), and in conflict with intellect and a sound conscience (pp. 92-100).

In the author's belief, the adherence of some jurists to traditional fatwas about women is rooted in their ideological thinking, which, by ignoring the developments of civil society, attempts to impose rulings that were effective for yesterday's society onto today's world. By proposing the distinction between the "concept" and the "instances" of justice, he states that although the concept of justice is fixed, its instances change in accordance with culture and time (pp. 124-126).

=== Hijab ===
By distinguishing between "Islamic hijab" and the "seclusion of woman" (''hajb''), the author believes that [[Women's hijab|hijab]], as a Sharia ruling, is not an obstacle to a woman's social participation; rather, the problem is a strict type of covering that has in practice led to "seclusion" (''hajb'') or marginalizing women from society (pp. 129-131). According to the author, two extremist discourses—namely the "traditional religious discourse" and the "Western secular discourse"—both damage the status of woman in different ways. The religious discourse, by emphasizing isolation, limits the woman to the roles of mother and wife, and the Western discourse, by emphasizing absolute freedom, destabilizes the foundation of the family. The author emphasizes that extremism in exerting pressure for hijab and gender segregation has had inverse results and has led to the spread of corruption and moral collapse (pp. 131-133).

The author emphasizes that the social presence and activity of woman is a necessity, not a deviation. This necessity can be examined from several aspects: 1) forming a healthy family (pp. 149-152); 2) the psychological health of the woman (pp. 152-153); and 3) the progress of society (pp. 154-155).

=== Holding Political and Social Positions ===
The author critiques the evidences of the opponents of women holding political and social positions from several aspects.

* '''Critique of the Argument from the Quran'''
The author considers the opponents' argument using the [[Verse 33 of Surah al-Ahzab|verse "And abide in your houses"]] (''wa qarna fi buyutikunn'') to be weak; because its address is specifically to the wives of the Prophet (s) and it possesses an advisory (''irshadi'') nature, not an obligatory one. Secondly, the conduct of believing women in the early days of Islam, including the Prophet's wives, involved leaving the house to participate in Friday prayers, [[jihad]], and visiting the sick, and no jurist has issued a fatwa on the absolute obligation for a woman to stay at home (pp. 191-192).

He also considers the reliance on the [[Verse 18 of Surah al-Zukhruf|verse "Or is one brought up in ornaments"]] (''a-wa-man yunashsha'u fi al-hilyah'') to be rejected; because this verse describes the condition of women in the culture of the pre-Islamic era of ignorance (''Jahiliyyah''), where they were deprived of education and upbringing, not the condition of the woman in the faithful and cultural atmosphere of Islam, which develops her personality (pp. 192-193).

* '''Critique of the Argument from Narrations'''
The author divides the narrations related to women into three categories:

# Narrations consistent with intellect and the Quran: such as "Women are the twin halves of men" (''al-nisa' shaqa'iq al-rijal'') and "Paradise is at the feet of mothers" (''al-jannah tahta aqdam al-ummahat''), which are in complete accordance with the Quran and conscience (pp. 194-196).
# Narrations contrary to intellect and the Quran: such as "Women are deficient in intellects" (''al-nisa' naqisat al-'uqul'') or "Woman is entirely evil" (''al-mar'ah kulluha sharr''), which, due to their explicit opposition to the spirit of the Quran and the dignity of the Prophet and the Imams, are fabricated and constructed by the culture of their time (pp. 196-197).
# Narrations worthy of contemplation: such as "A people who entrust their affairs to a woman will never succeed" (''lan yufliha qawmun wallaw amrahum imra'ah''). These narrations, even if issued by the Infallible (''Ma'sum''), do not express a devotional and eternal Sharia ruling, but are propositions observing the external reality and the cultural and social conditions of that era. He considers the stark difference between the Quran and many narrations to be indicative of the historicity of the narrations and their being influenced by the culture of the time (pp. 197-201).

* '''Critique of the Argument from Consensus'''
In the author's belief, the claimed consensus (''ijma''') on the impermissibility of women holding political positions is a "document-based consensus" (''ijma' madraki'') and lacks authority (''hujjiyyah''). Furthermore, such a consensus fundamentally does not exist, and many early and later jurists have opposed it (pp. 207-210).

* '''Critique of Approbationary Aspects (''Wujuh Istihsani'')'''
The author considers reasons such as the viewpoint of the author of *Jawahir*, who said "it is not appropriate for a woman to sit with men," to be merely based on personal taste and founded upon undesirable customs (pp. 210-213). In his belief, the root of these viewpoints in traditional jurisprudence is, on the one hand, preferring the side of "chastity" ('''iffah'') over women's rights, and on the other hand, the deep-rooted patriarchal culture that views woman as a second-class being meant solely for service in the home (pp. 213-215).

=== Woman's Blood Money (''Diyah'') ===
Traditional jurists, to justify the fatwa of a woman's blood money being half that of a man's, argue that blood money is not the price of human blood, but rather a kind of "financial compensation" arising from the loss of the murdered individual. Since the economic role of the man in the family is generally greater than that of the woman, the loss caused by his murder is also greater, and therefore his blood money is double. In response to the objection that today women also have active economic participation, it is said that laws are legislated based on the "predominant state" of society, not exceptional cases (pp. 220-221).

To present a new solution, the author proposes three premises:

# Distinction between Islam and Islamic thought: One must differentiate between "religion" as a sacred entity and "religious thought" which is the product of human understanding and influenced by time and place; thus, critiquing a famous fatwa does not mean opposing Islam (pp. 222-225).
# The impact of time and place on jurisprudential deduction: Jurisprudence is a dynamic entity, and with changes in social, cultural, and epistemic conditions, the fatwas also change (pp. 225-232).
# The primacy of the Quran over narrations: Many challenging jurisprudential rulings (such as the ruling on [[apostasy (''irtidad'')|apostasy]], [[stoning (''rajm'')|stoning]], and the halving of a woman's blood money) are solely documented by narrations. By proposing the theory of the "fixed and the variable," the author believes the general and fixed principles of religion are stated in the Quran, and the narrations have primarily addressed variable issues. Therefore, in legal and social issues like blood money, one must refer back to the Quranic principle of "justice" and "equality," and interpret opposing narrations in light of their historical conditions of issuance (pp. 232-233).

In the author's belief, the economic value of the work that a woman performs at home is no less than the work of a man outside, and her loss also inflicts a great economic loss upon the family. Moreover, the harm caused by the loss of a mother, from an emotional perspective for the children, is far heavier than the loss of a father, and the law of blood money should not ignore this aspect. Insisting on the halving of blood money in such conditions must either lead to pure devotional adherence (''ta'abbud''), which is incompatible with legal rationality, or it must be based on a logical cause that no longer exists externally (pp. 237-239).

The author ultimately concludes that, given the fundamental change in the economic and social role of women, the past economic justification for the difference in blood money can no longer be accepted. Since this ruling has no Quranic roots and is in conflict with the general principle of justice, and considering that the instances of justice transform with changing times, insisting on a woman's blood money being half is incompatible with the spirit of Islam and the requirements of today's world (pp. 239-240).

=== Woman's Inheritance ===
In the author's belief, legal rulings such as inheritance, unlike devotional (''ta'abbudi'') rulings, are based on a specific goal like "justice" and, for this reason, have the capability of rational analysis and adaptation to the conditions of the time (pp. 243-244). Emphasizing the overall superiority of Islam's inheritance system compared to the pre-Islamic era of ignorance (''Jahiliyyah'') and Western societies, the author examines challenging cases in which the issue of justice and legal equality for women is raised (p. 244).

The author presents the three main cases in which the inheritance shares of man and woman differ: the different shares of spouses, the double share of sons compared to daughters, and the deprivation of the wife from the husband's immovable properties (pp. 244-245).

In analyzing the first two cases, the author states the traditional justification of the jurists, who consider this difference to be just due to the greater financial responsibilities of the man (such as financial support [*infaq*] for the wife and children) (pp. 245-246); however, he raises this fundamental question: if in a society, women also participate in providing for living expenses, will this difference still be just? The author believes that although one cannot simply bypass the explicit text of the Quran, if the cause ('''illah'') of a ruling disappears, one can revise it by relying on the general principle of "justice." As a legal solution, he suggests that equality in inheritance can be realized through civil law and with the consent of the heirs (either directly or through elected representatives in parliament) (pp. 246-251).

The most important part of the author's critique is directed at "the deprivation of the wife from inheriting the husband's land." He emphasizes that this fatwa has no Quranic root and is in conflict with the absoluteness (''itlaq'') of the [[Verse 12 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse "And for them is a fourth of what you leave"]] (''wa lahunna al-rubu' mimma taraktum'') (p. 251). By analyzing the narrations documenting this fatwa, the author divides them into three categories and shows that the narrations indicating deprivation are in conflict with more authentic narrations that affirm the wife's right to inherit from all properties (pp. 253-260). The author also points to the opposition of great jurists like Muhaqqiq al-Ardabili to this fatwa in the past and endorses their view that the wife inherits from all of the husband's properties (pp. 260-268).

=== Marriage and Divorce ===
The author challenges the traditional viewpoint regarding the "right of marriage" and the "right of divorce." In this regard, he points to the issue of "[[Father's guardianship over the marriage of a virgin daughter|the father's guardianship over the marriage of a virgin daughter]]" (''wilayat al-ab 'ala zawaj al-bikr''), where many contemporary jurists consider an "obligatory precaution" (''ihtiyat wajib'') in the necessity of obtaining permission from the father, although this precaution has turned into a condition for the validity of the contract in general custom (pp. 279-280). In contrast, the author cites the famous viewpoint of early jurists, including Muhaqqiq al-Hilli and al-Sharif al-Murtada, who considered the father's guardianship over the marriage of a mature and sensible (''rashidah'') daughter to be dropped (p. 280). He mentions reasons to prove this viewpoint:
* The principle of non-guardianship (''asl 'adam al-wilayah''): The foundational principle is that every mature and sane human being has dominion over all their own affairs, and guardianship over them is contrary to the principle and requires definitive evidence (p. 281).
* Quranic generalities ('''umumat''): Verses such as "[[Verse 1 of Surah al-Ma'idah|Fulfill the contracts]]" (''awfu bi al-'uqud'') and "[[Verse 3 of Surah al-Nisa'|marry those that please you of women]]" (''fa-nkihu ma taba lakum min al-nisa''') have generally delegated the choice of marriage to the individuals themselves (p. 281).
* Explicit narrations: Numerous narrations have been transmitted from the Imams (a) that confirm the independence of the daughter in the matter of marriage (p. 282).
* The weakness of opposing evidences: The narrations used to prove the father's guardianship are weak in terms of their chain of transmission, and in the case of conflict as well, the narrations indicating the woman's independence take precedence due to greater fame (''shuhrah'') and agreement with the Quran (p. 283).

The author also rejects the common argument that "divorce is in the hands of the man because the man is more rational." He believes that in practice, it is the woman who, due to emotional attachment and social pressures, strives more to preserve the family (pp. 288-291). With a new interpretation of the famous hadith "Divorce is in the hand of the one who takes the leg [i.e., the spouse]" (''al-talaqu bi-yadi man akhadha bi al-saq''), the author believes this hadith places the right of divorce at the disposal of the "spouses" and strips it from others (like the father), not that it restricts it solely to the man (pp. 291-292).

He emphasizes the woman's right to "[[Khul' divorce|divorce by relinquishing her dower]]" (''talaq al-khul'''), and by citing the conduct of the Prophet (s) in the incident of Thabit bin Qays's wife, he states that if a woman has an aversion to living with her husband and relinquishes her dower (''mahriyyah''), the Sharia judge (''hakim al-shar''') is obliged to execute the decree of divorce (p. 292). Criticizing fatwas that limit a woman's right to divorce even under difficult conditions, the author considers these fatwas to be contrary to the spirit of justice and the [[Maxim of No Hardship|maxim of no hardship]] (''qa'idat la haraj'') (pp. 293-295).

=== Custody ===
Regarding the [[child custody (''hadanah'')|custody]] of a child after divorce, there are various fatwas. The famous fatwa is that the custody of a boy up to two years of age and a girl up to seven years of age is with the mother. Some jurists consider the custody of both to be with the mother until seven years of age (pp. 299-301). By examining the narrations, the author considers the famous fatwa (differentiating between the boy and the girl) to be an "unwarranted reconciliation" (''jam' tabarru'i'') without narrative and rational evidence. By reconciling the three categories of existing narrations (the narrations of two years, seven years, and until the mother's remarriage), he comes to the conclusion that the strongest and most just opinion is the mother's right of custody up to seven years of age for both children (boy and girl). This opinion is compatible with the more authentic narrations, as well as with the emotional and psychological needs of the child at these ages, and with intellect and custom. After seven years of age, priority is with the father, unless the child's best interest dictates otherwise, in which case the determination lies with a competent court (pp. 304-315).

In the author's view, the condition of "Islam" for the mother to have custody is also rejected. The [[Verse 141 of Surah al-Nisa'|verse of negating dominion]] (''ayat nafy al-sabil'') that is cited for it, applies to domination and governance, whereas custody is an emotional and service-oriented relationship. Furthermore, at an early age, a child does not have a proper understanding of beliefs for the danger of their deviation to be posed (pp. 317-320).

[[Category:Bibliography articles]]
[[Category:Books on women's jurisprudence]]
[[Category:Books by Ahmad al-Qabbanji]]
[[fa:المرأة، المفاهيم والحقوق (کتاب)]]

Category:Books about Islamic economics

2026-04-03T09:20:24Z

Enadmin: Created blank page

File:Al-Majmu fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami.jpg

2026-04-03T09:19:41Z

Enadmin:

Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami (Book)

2026-04-03T09:19:38Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Abd al-Hadi Fayyaz |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami | image = Al-Majmu_fi_al-Iqtisad_al-Islami.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Rafiq Yunus al-Masri | date_of_writing = | subject = Books on Economic Jurisprudence | genre = Argumentative | language = Arabic | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_by = | illustrato..."

{{author
|author = Abd al-Hadi Fayyaz
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}

{{Infobox book
| title = Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami
| image = Al-Majmu_fi_al-Iqtisad_al-Islami.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Rafiq Yunus al-Masri
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Books on [[Economic Jurisprudence]]
| genre = Argumentative
| language = Arabic
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count = 1
| pages = 623
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Dar al-Maktabi
| publication_place = Damascus
| publication_date = 2006
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami''' (المجموع فی الاقتصاد الاسلامی) is a research work in the field of [[economic jurisprudence]] written by Rafiq Yunus al-Masri. This book provides a comprehensive report of the theoretical framework and practical topics of [[Islamic economics]] in the light of Sunni jurisprudence (''fiqh''). The author, with a clear inclination toward the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, has attempted to reinterpret and analyze concepts such as [[ownership]], the [[market]], the legitimacy of [[financial contracts]], and the role of the state in the economy, based on jurisprudential maxims (''qawa'id fiqhiyyah'') such as "harm must be eliminated" (''al-darar yuzal'') and "gain is accompanied by liability for loss" (''al-ghunm bi al-ghurm'').

The author's central idea is that the Islamic economy is not merely a collection of scattered rulings concerning transactions; rather, it possesses an independent, purposeful structure aimed at regulating social relations in the spheres of production, distribution, and consumption. He clarifies that [[Islamic economics]] should not be equated with the "jurisprudence of transactions" (''fiqh al-mu'amalat''). He considers the economic system of Islam to be based neither on absolute state intervention nor on the absolute freedom of the market, but introduces it as an "ethics-centered" system in which both Sharia rules and ethical principles oversee the regulation of economic relations.

The structure of the book is organized in an intra-jurisprudential manner and addresses economic issues from an inferential (''ijtihadi'') perspective, without entering into the technical discussions of modern economics. The reliance on classical sources, the coherence of arguments, and the breadth of topics have turned this work into one of the prominent Arabic sources in the field of economic jurisprudence (''fiqh al-iqtisad''), although it has limitations from the perspective of macroeconomic theorization.

== Brief Overview and Status ==
The book Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami, authored by [[Rafiq Yunus al-Masri]], was published in 2006 (1426 AH) by Dar al-Maktabi in Damascus. This work is written in a single volume comprising 623 pages, and endeavors to organize a relatively complete collection of topics in economic jurisprudence within the framework of Sunni *ijtihad*. The author, contrary to the customary method in some texts on the jurisprudence of transactions, does not enter into jurisprudential chapters from the beginning; rather, he first attempts to provide a theoretical and principled picture of Islamic economics and elucidate its foundations from a jurisprudential perspective. The book has a systematic and intra-jurisprudential structure that the author has founded upon an *ijtihadi* path. Instead of initially addressing the details of jurisprudence or transactional rulings, the author begins with theoretical topics and attempts to clarify the intellectual foundations and jurisprudential principles governing the Islamic economic system.

The word "Al-Majmu'" (The Comprehensive Collection) in the book's title is indicative of the author's holistic approach; he intended to present not merely the jurisprudential rulings of transactions, but the foundations, objectives, maxims, structure, and acceptable tools in the Islamic economy under a single theoretical-jurisprudential framework. This work cannot be considered merely a commentary on the [[jurisprudence of transactions]] (''fiqh al-mu'amalat''); rather, it is a kind of effort to present a "coherent jurisprudential picture of the Islamic economic system."

Rafiq Yunus al-Masri, a contemporary Syrian author, is among the active figures in the contemporary Arabic economic jurisprudence sphere and has numerous works in the fields of [[Islamic banking]], [[financial contracts]], and Islamic economic theories. Al-Masri has been active for years in the academic circles of Syria and Lebanon and has also served as an advisor in some Islamic financial institutions at the regional level.

The significance of the book Al-Majmu' can be evaluated from several aspects:

* First, due to its structural order and effort to organize economic topics within the framework of principled jurisprudential maxims (''qawa'id usuliyyah fiqhiyyah'');
* Second, because the author has strived to move beyond the level of jurisprudential branches (''furu''') and approach the level of economic system-building;
* And third, because of the book's status in the Arabic-speaking educational and research environment, especially in universities and Islamic studies centers.

Although this work has not received much attention in the Persian-speaking academic sphere and few references to it are seen, in recent decades in Arab environments, particularly in subjects such as Islamic banking, it has been recognized as a preliminary and systematic reference.

== Structure ==
The book Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami is structured in the form of an introduction and 8 main chapters. The structure of the book, from beginning to end, is based on the internal coherence of the topics, the precedence of foundations over branches (''furu'''), and a holistic view of the Islamic economy.

* At the beginning of the book, an introductory discussion regarding the nature of Islamic economics and its relationship with the jurisprudence of transactions is presented; with the aim of clarifying that the author's view of Islamic economics is not merely micro-jurisprudence or individual rulings, but also pays attention to structural and social aspects (p. 9).
* After the introduction, a set of general jurisprudential maxims that play a central role in the economic sphere, such as the [[Maxim of the Negation of Harm|maxim of the negation of harm]] (''qa'idat nafy al-darar''), the [[Maxim of Gharar|maxim of uncertainty]] (''qa'idat al-gharar''), the principle of permissibility in transactions (''asl al-ibahah fi al-mu'amalat''), and the [[Maxim of Removing Hardship|maxim of removing hardship]] (''qa'idat raf' al-haraj'') are examined (p. 21). These maxims are considered the basis for analyzing many economic issues in the subsequent chapters of the book.
* Subsequently, the author analyzes topics such as [[Maxim of Justice|justice]], ownership, [[Maxim of Expediency|expediency]] (''maslahah''), the [[Objectives of Sharia|objectives of Sharia]] (''maqasid al-shari'ah''), economic freedom, and the role of the state in the Islamic economy (p. 57). This section of the book practically presents the theoretical dimension of the Islamic economic system based on jurisprudential and principled foundations, and in a way, constitutes the intellectual pillar of the entire work.
* The middle section of the book is dedicated to examining the rulings and structure of the Islamic market. In this section, the author analyzes rulings related to transactions, [[pricing]], [[hoarding]] (''ihtikar''), state supervision, and the legitimacy of incomes with a jurisprudential and social perspective, striving to maintain the connection between jurisprudential logic and economic function (p. 131).
* Following that, the author examines legitimate contracts and financing instruments; such as sale (''bay'''), [[leasing]] (''ijarah''), [[silent partnership]] (''mudarabah''), forward sale (''salam''), partnership (''shirkah''), [[interest-free loan]] (''qard al-hasan''), etc. In the analysis of each of these instruments, both the jurisprudential foundations are emphasized, and their applied capabilities in the Islamic banking system are mentioned (p. 227).
* In parts of the book, there are references to the characteristics of Islamic financial institutions, their differences from usurious banking (''bankdari-yi rabawi''), and the role of the state in the distribution of wealth (p. 325 onwards). Furthermore, the concept of matters such as charitable spending (''infaq''), extravagance (''israf''), productivity, production, and consumption are also analyzed within the framework of jurisprudential rulings.
* At the end of the book, by concluding the discussions, the author emphasizes the necessity of jurisprudential rethinking in the economic sphere and calls for economic jurisprudence to achieve theoretical reconstruction in accordance with the developments of the time (Conclusion, p. 499 onwards).

== Conceptual Framework and Jurisprudential Approach to Economics ==
From the very beginning in the book Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami, the author has emphasized that the Islamic economy is not merely a collection of scattered rulings concerning transactions, but possesses an independent, purposeful structure aimed at regulating social relations in the spheres of production, distribution, and consumption. He clarifies that [[Islamic economics]] should not be equated with the "jurisprudence of transactions" (''fiqh al-mu'amalat''); rather, it must be redefined in the form of "economic jurisprudence" (''fiqh al-iqtisad''); a discipline that seeks to reconstruct the principles and rules of the Islamic economic system within the framework of jurisprudential *ijtihad*. The author has utilized the term "economic jurisprudence" to clarify his methodological boundary with those who merely content themselves with expounding the jurisprudential rulings of transactions. This expression demonstrates that he is seeking to present an intra-jurisprudential system for the Islamic economy, not merely compiling economic rulings.

In this regard, Al-Masri has attempted to extract the operational principles of the Islamic economy by utilizing jurisprudential maxims, such as "harm must be eliminated" (''al-darar yuzal''), "gain is accompanied by liability for loss" (''al-ghunm bi al-ghurm''), "hardship is removed" (''al-haraj marfu'''), and "the foundational principle in transactions is permissibility" (''al-asl fi al-mu'amalat al-ibahah''). He believes that these general maxims possess the power to explain many economic issues if properly employed within a systemic framework. In other words, his book is an endeavor to transition from the jurisprudence of branches (''fiqh al-furu''') toward the jurisprudence of maxims (''fiqh al-qawa'id''). In the author's view, *ijtihad* regarding contemporary economic issues must be conducted in light of these maxims and with attention to the [[Objectives of Sharia|objectives of Sharia]] (''maqasid al-shari'ah''). In numerous instances, he has emphasized the role of these objectives in regulating economic jurisprudential maxims, particularly in issues such as distributive justice, poverty eradication, and support for legitimate production. This emphasis indicates that the author has an inclination toward a "structural objective-based jurisprudence" (''fiqh maqasidi-yi sakhtari''), although he does not employ this exact terminology.

At the beginning of the book, he considers the economic system of Islam to be based neither on absolute state intervention nor on the absolute freedom of the market, but introduces it as an "ethics-centered" system in which both Sharia rules and ethical principles oversee the regulation of economic relations. Therefore, in Al-Masri's analysis of the Islamic economy, two levels of regulation are observed: one is the level of binding jurisprudential rules, and the other is the level of complementary ethical norms. A notable point is that the author, while emphasizing the internality of sources (namely the Quran, Sunnah, consensus [*ijma'*], and analogy [*qiyas*]), is also aware of the concepts of some conventional economic theories, but generally does not utilize them in the context of analysis. He considers the Islamic economy to possess an "independent identity" that requires *ijtihadi* reconstruction, rather than integration with existing systems (pp. 11-12).

== Market Legitimacy and the Order of Transactions ==
One of the important sections of the book is the analysis of the market's role in the Islamic economy and the jurisprudential criteria regulating it. Rafiq Yunus considers the market a legitimate institution within the framework of Islam that officially recognizes economic freedom, but simultaneously conditions it upon the observance of rules that prevent oppression, corruption, and disruption in distribution. According to him, the maxim "the foundational principle in transactions is permissibility" (''al-asl fi al-mu'amalat al-ibahah'') is the basis of this freedom, but this freedom is restricted by maxims such as "[[Maxim of No Harm|no harm]]" (''la darar'') and "the removal of uncertainty" (''raf' al-gharar''). (pp. 133-140)

In discussing financial transactions, the author has emphasized that the condition for the legitimacy of any transaction is the realization of mutual consent, the removal of ambiguity, the non-collection of interest (''riba''), and compliance with the rules of [[economic justice]]. He believes that the Islamic market is neither free from supervision nor completely state-controlled; rather, it is based on a kind of balance between state intervention and the internal mechanisms of the market. In this regard, Al-Masri has addressed the issues of [[hoarding]] (''ihtikar''), [[overpricing]] (''garan-furushi''), fraud, and [[pricing]]. Relying on hadiths and the edicts (''fatawa'') of Shafi'i jurists, he has deemed state intervention in price determination legitimate under conditions of emergency or corruption. His argument is primarily based on the maxim of "giving precedence to public interest over individual interest" (''taqdim al-maslahah al-'ammah 'ala al-maslahah al-fardiyyah''), which he analyzes within the framework of the jurisprudence of public interests (''fiqh al-masalih'') (pp. 157-175).

On the one hand, the author has emphasized the principle of "legitimate earning" (''kasb-i mashru'''), and on the other hand, he has explicitly criticized the "dominance of speculative reason without ethical commitment" in capitalist economics. In his view, the market in the Islamic economy is both an institution for resource allocation and a tool for realizing justice. This dual perspective on the market is repeated throughout his analysis.

== Legitimate Financing Instruments ==
An important chapter of the book is dedicated to examining legitimate financial contracts in the Islamic economy. The author asserts in this chapter that the Islamic economic system, despite the prohibition of interest (''riba''), provides numerous instruments for sound and participatory financing. His analysis focuses on eight fundamental contracts: sale (''bay'''), lease (''ijarah''), silent partnership (''mudarabah''), partnership (''musharakah''), forward sale (''salam''), manufacturing contract (''istisna'''), interest-free loan (''qard al-hasan''), and agency (''wakalah''). In examining each contract, the author first analyzes its jurisprudential basis by referencing verses (''ayat''), narrations (''riwayat''), and the statements of jurists, and then addresses its conditions of validity and areas of application. For instance, regarding *mudarabah*, he considers it one of the prominent financing instruments in Islam which, by sharing profit and accepting risk on the part of the owner and the agent, is considered a legitimate alternative to usurious lending (pp. 268-281).

In analyzing the *salam* sale, his emphasis is on the role of this contract in supporting production and providing advance financing for the producer; and concerning *ijarah* and *istisna'*, he points to the function of these instruments in infrastructural and industrial projects. In all these cases, the author attempts to make the connection between the jurisprudence of contracts and contemporary needs possible through an expansive interpretation of jurisprudential maxims.

A key point in Al-Masri's approach is the emphasis on the non-necessity of the superficial conformity of Islamic instruments with Western financial systems. He believes that any adaptation is legitimate only if the spirit of jurisprudential rules and the objectives of Sharia are preserved; otherwise, according to him, it would be a "Sharia facade for the face of usury" (a religious loophole for *riba'') (p. 293).

In this chapter, while relying on jurisprudential edicts (''fatawa''), the author also pays attention to banking innovations, but primarily from the perspective of Sharia legitimation, not economic analysis. For this reason, his analyses are more jurisprudence-centered than economics-centered, emphasizing the legitimacy of the instrument more than its efficiency.

== State, Justice, and Objectives of Sharia in the Islamic Economic System ==
In the view of Rafiq Yunus al-Masri, the Islamic state is not solely an observer over the proper implementation of rulings, but is one of the main elements in regulating economic relations; provided that its intervention is limited, purposeful, and aligned with the realization of justice. In the middle sections of the book (particularly from p. 325 onwards), he examines the role of the state in three fundamental areas: the equitable distribution of wealth, market supervision, and the financing of public services.

From the author's perspective, instruments such as [[Zakat|alms]] (''zakat''), the one-fifth tax (''khums''), [[Tax|fair taxes]], obligatory charities (''sadaqat-i wajib''), and public properties (''amwal-i 'umumiyyah'') must be placed in the service of wealth redistribution. He has addressed these resources in relative detail and considered them complementary to each other, not alternatives. In his view, the legitimacy of levying taxes in the Islamic system hinges on observing public interests and preventing economic corruption. For instance, in discussing public expenditures, by citing the maxim "the ruler's disposal over people's properties is contingent upon public interest" (''tasarruf al-hakim fi amwal al-nas manut bi al-maslahah''), he emphasizes the legitimacy of state financing through non-*zakat* avenues under emergency conditions (pp. 348-352).

Al-Masri views [[economic justice]] not merely in the sense of equality in income, but in the distribution of opportunities, supporting the needy, and limiting the concentration of wealth. In numerous instances, he has cited verses and narrations that indicate the condemnation of wealth accumulation and the encouragement of charitable spending (''infaq'') and cooperation (''ta'awun''). He considers this approach part of the "social objectives of Sharia" (''maqasid al-shari'ah al-ijtima'iyyah'') that must be factored into economic policymaking.

In Al-Masri's analysis, economic justice is realized not through the expropriation of [[private ownership]], but through controlling speculative motives, preventing hoarding, supervising prices, and directing resources toward lawful (''halal'') production. In this context, he has used terms such as "faithful economy," "non-socialist supportive system," and "the balance between individual right and public interest." These expressions show that his approach is an emphasis on the boundary between the Islamic economy and absolute socialist or capitalist models.

Methodologically, the author endeavors to establish a link between jurisprudential maxims and the macro-objectives of the Islamic economy. In other words, he not only pays attention to rulings, but also connects them with general objectives such as eradicating poverty, supporting the weak, realizing [[human dignity]], and preserving social balance. For example, in discussing charitable spending and alms, he also points to the psycho-social role of these institutions in strengthening social cohesion (pp. 386-392).

From the author's standpoint, the Islamic state has the duty to prevent the formation of monopolies, economic discrimination, and structural inequality through active yet limited supervision. However, he emphasizes that the instrument of this supervision must remain within the framework of Sharia rules and not lead to economic despotism. This perspective is the sum of Islamic [[political jurisprudence]] and the principles of economic justice in his view.

== Conclusion, Methodological View, and the Horizon of Economic Jurisprudence ==
In the final chapter of the book, Al-Masri once again emphasizes the point that the Islamic economy is an independent intellectual-practical system that must be reconstructed on the basis of methodical jurisprudential *ijtihad*. He believes that until jurisprudential maxims are analyzed from a macro perspective and in connection with economic structures, economic jurisprudence will remain at the level of partial rulings and individual issues and will be incapable of responding to the systemic needs of Islamic societies (pp. 503-505).

In various instances throughout the book, the author has attempted to demonstrate that he has moved beyond "issue-centered jurisprudence" (''fiqh-i mas'alah-mihwar'') and is pursuing "structure-centered jurisprudence" (''fiqh-i sakhtar-mihwar''); a jurisprudence that concurrently considers general maxims, the objectives of Sharia, and newly emerged economic realities. For this reason, in different chapters, he has not merely contented himself with edicts (''fatawa'') or case-by-case analysis, but has sought to present a framework of Islamic economic relations, rules, and principles; particularly through jurisprudential maxims and the theory of objectives (''maqasid'').

Among his final emphases is the necessity of revising economic *ijtihad* relying on three axes: first, rereading jurisprudential sources with an objective-based (''maqasidi'') approach; second, precisely recognizing current economic structures; and third, training jurists who are also familiar with the language of modern economics. He has clarified that without the jurist's familiarity with the fundamental concepts of economics, *ijtihad* in this domain will be incomplete and sometimes deviant (p. 508).

In this same vein, Al-Masri has suggested that the teaching of Islamic economics in religious and seminary institutions be expanded, and interdisciplinary studies between jurisprudence and economics be strengthened. This perspective is a reflection of a concern seen throughout the book: bringing jurisprudence closer to economic reality without breaking away from the Sharia framework.

Although no independent discussion regarding economic system-building or the design of executive policies is seen in his book, he has altogether endeavored to provide a jurisprudential foundation for what he himself terms the "Islamic economic system." The repetition of the discussion on general maxims, fundamental concepts (such as expediency, justice, cooperation, the legitimacy of wealth), and alternative instruments for usurious financing demonstrates that the author seeks to remain faithful not only to rulings but also to the approach and spirit of Islamic economic jurisprudence.

Methodologically, Al-Masri utilizes a combination of the Shafi'i *ijtihadi* tradition with an emphasis on objective-based (''maqasidi'') maxims, and in some topics, implicitly displays a critical inclination toward liberal capitalism. Concurrently, his approach remains conservative and intra-jurisprudential, entering less into the arena of economic theorization or modeling.

== Academic Critiques and Final Summary ==
Despite the structural strengths and intra-jurisprudential coherence of the book Al-Majmu' fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami, some critics have made observations regarding its limitations in the realm of theorization and dialogue with modern economics and other jurisprudential schools. Among these critiques is the overemphasis on the traditional framework of jurisprudential maxims and the relative disregard for contemporary economic analyses;<ref>Critical analysis on the Ensani.ir research portal under the article: "The Relationship between Jurisprudence and Economic Policymaking in the Approach of Economic Jurisprudence".</ref> such that macroeconomic topics like fiscal policies, economic growth, or market analysis within the framework of modern economic methodology are less reflected.<ref>Ahmad al-Raysuni, academic dialogue with Al-Fikr Network regarding the challenges of economic *ijtihad*, alukah.net</ref> Additionally, some researchers like Abd al-Halim Abu Shuqqah have emphasized the point that although the author skillfully utilizes jurisprudential maxims, he approaches structural *ijtihad* to a lesser extent when it comes to application to newly emerged issues (''masa'il mustahdathah'').<ref>Abd al-Halim Abu Shuqqah, Objectives of Sharia and Jurisprudential Maxims (''Maqasid al-Shari'ah wa al-Qawa'id al-Fiqhiyyah''), Journal of Contemporary Jurisprudential Research (''Majallat al-Buhuth al-Fiqhiyyah al-Mu'asirah''), 2014.</ref>

From the perspective of policymaking as well, the book does not provide clear guidance in determining the relationship between jurisprudential rulings and the executive decision-making system, remaining more focused on the legislative layer.<ref>Nasir Abdullah al-'Awdah, "Critique of the Application of Jurisprudential Maxims in Contemporary Financial Transactions", Journal of Islamic Economics (''Majallat al-Iqtisad al-Islami''), 2019.</ref> Furthermore, the limited references to other Islamic denominations (''madhahib'') have caused the book to be a subject of debate in terms of jurisprudential diversity, and its Shafi'i-centric viewpoint has given less room for inter-denominational dialogues in Islamic economics.<ref>International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Comparative Review of Islamic Economic Theorization, internal report, 2018.</ref> Nevertheless, the present work is considered among Arabic works on Islamic economics as one of the relatively successful examples in the systematic and educational compilation of economic jurisprudence.

== Footnotes ==
{{Footnotes}}

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about Islamic economics]]
[[Category:Books by Rafiq Yunus al-Masri]]
[[fa:المجموع فی الاقتصاد الاسلامی (کتاب)]]

File:Iqtisaduna.jpg

2026-04-03T09:12:12Z

Enadmin:

Iqtisaduna (Book)

2026-04-03T09:11:00Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Iqtisaduna | image = Iqtisaduna.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | original_title = | author = Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr | date_of_writing = | subject = Economic Jurisprudence | genre = | language =Arabic | original_language = | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_by = | compiler = | illustrator = | cove..."

{{author
|author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}

{{Infobox book
| title = Iqtisaduna
| image = Iqtisaduna.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| original_title =
| author = Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Economic Jurisprudence
| genre =
| language =Arabic
| original_language =
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =
| pages = 924
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher =Dar al-Ta'aruf
| publication_place =Beirut
| publication_date =1961
| edition =First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

*'''Abstract'''

'''Our Economics''' (Iqtisaduna), is an Arabic book written by [[Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]] (1935-1980 [1313-1359 SH]), with the aim of discovering the foundations, structure, and methodology of [[Islamic economics]], in opposition to Marxist and capitalist economic schools. Within this framework, concepts such as [[social justice]], ownership, economic freedom, and the role of the [[Islamic state]] in regulating economic relations have been analyzed.

The [[Mintaqat al-Faragh|theory of the discretionary sphere (Mintaqat al-Faragh)]] is among the concepts introduced in the book, representing the domain lacking a mandatory and immutable ruling in jurisprudence (''fiqh''). Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr asserts that the Islamic state can regulate the economic relations of the Islamic society through legislation in this sphere and respond to the changing and customary needs of the society within the framework of the Sharia. Alongside this, the structure of ownership in Islam is introduced as a tripartite system (private, public, and state ownership), attempting to establish a balance between the individual and society.

The book Iqtisaduna examines economic freedom within the framework of two types of limitations—intrinsic and objective—and considers it restricted by the rulings of Sharia and public interests. Social justice is also elucidated in the form of two principles, "general mutual responsibility" (''takaful 'amm'') and "social balance" (''tawazun ijtima'i''), being introduced as one of the main pillars of the Islamic economic system.

In the section on the method of achieving the Islamic economic theory, the author utilizes the "theory of discovery" (''kashf'') to extract the economic school of Islam and emphasizes synthesizing partial rulings to reach a general theory. The role of economic concepts in jurisprudential deduction (''ijtihad''), the impact of the jurist's (''faqih'') personality on the deduction process, and the necessity of simultaneous attention to the scriptural texts (''nusus'') and the practical realities of the era of the Prophethood are among the other analytical focal points of the book.

== About the Author ==
[[Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]] (1940-1980 [1359-1400 AH]), a jurist (''faqih''), philosopher, and economist, and one of the prominent professors of the Islamic seminary (''hawza 'ilmiyya'') of Najaf, who authored numerous works in the fields of philosophy, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence (''usul al-fiqh''), and economics. One of his most important books is Iqtisaduna, which he wrote during the period of Marxist influence and the boom of communist parties in Islamic countries. In it, he analyzes the Islamic economic system and presents Islamic solutions to the economic challenges of the contemporary world.

Among his other notable works are Our Philosophy (Falsafatuna) and The Usury-Free Bank in Islam (Al-Bank al-la Ribawi fi al-Islam), in which he addresses the philosophical and economic foundations of Islam. He was also active in the political struggle against the Ba'athist regime of Iraq, and for this reason, he was assassinated in 1980.

== Status and Critique of the Book ==
The book Iqtisaduna was written in two volumes and eight main sections, along with 17 appendices (observations), and each section addresses a fundamental topic in economics. [[Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani]], a Shia jurist, maintains that Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's book Iqtisaduna is the "Quran of Islamic economics" and that the intellectual output of Islamic economics is indebted to this work; a book that attempted to present the model of Islamic economics against capitalist and socialist economics, based on Islamic jurisprudential and principled foundations.<ref>Hadavi Tehrani, "Iqtisaduna is the Quran of Islamic Economists," p. 132.</ref>

Iqtisaduna, like other similar contemporary Islamic works, was written along with a critique of the capitalist and Marxist economic schools, and in contrast, it articulates the Islamic perspective on alms (''zakat''), distribution of wealth, production, consumption, labor, and justice.<ref>Zahedi Vafa and Bagheri, "An Analysis of the Theory of Value and Distribution in Iqtisaduna," p. 58.</ref> According to Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, an Iraqi Shia politician, one-third of the book is devoted to critiquing and refuting Marxism, and less attention has been paid to critiquing capitalism; because when al-Sadr was writing the book, Marxism had taken root in Iraq and was considered the primary threat from his perspective. He also believes that Iqtisaduna suffers from weakness in its empirical aspect and has only developed theoretically; whether in critiquing and refuting Marxism and capitalism, or in presenting the theory of Islamic economics, which could have been based on articulating the functions, practical programs, and the establishment and management of economic institutions within the state.<ref>Al-Rubaie, "Iqtisaduna fi al-Alfiyyah al-Thalithah" [Our Economics in the Third Millennium].</ref>

It has been stated that in Iqtisaduna, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr employs a special jurisprudential and inferential (''ijtihadi'') method, different from the traditional method of jurists, and in articulating some concepts of Islamic economics, he speaks not by relying on the explicit statements of verses and narrations, but by deriving from the collection of rulings and the principles governing them. Furthermore, from among the edicts (''fatawa'') and deductions of other jurists, he selected theories that were consistent with the principles of Islamic economics, even if they were not compatible with his own edict.<ref>Amiri Tehranizadeh and Afrough, "Critique of the Methodology of Islamic Economics of Martyr Sadr from the Perspective of Critical Realism," p. 12.</ref>

== Structure, Publication, and Translation ==
The book Iqtisaduna was written in two volumes and eight main sections, along with 17 appendices (observations). It was first published in 1961 by Dar al-Ta'aruf in Beirut. In addition to multiple publishers, the original text and its Persian translation have also been published by the Sadr Specialized Scientific Research Institute (Dar al-Sadr). The structure of the book is as follows:

'''Volume One'''
* Step by step with Marxism (pp. 47-272)
** Theory of historical materialism
** The Marxist school
* Step by step with capitalism (pp. 273-318)
** The main pillars of the capitalist system
** The capitalist system is not the result of scientific laws
** Scientific laws in capitalist economics have a doctrinal framework
** Examination of the fundamental ideas and values of the capitalist school
* The main indicators of the Islamic economy (pp. 319-413)
** General structure of the Islamic economy
** Islamic economy: Part of a whole
** General framework of the Islamic economy
** Islamic economy is not a science
** Separation of distribution relations from the mode of production
** The economic problem from the perspective of Islam and its solutions
'''Volume Two'''
* The process of achieving the economic school (pp. 415-474)
** The economic school and Islam
** The discovery process and the creation process
* The theory of pre-production distribution (pp. 475-638)
** Rulings
** Theory
** Observations
* The theory of post-production distribution (pp. 637-716)
** Theoretical basis for the distribution of factors of production
** Differences between the Islamic and Marxist theories
** The general law of rewarding the material resources of production
** Observations
* The theory of production (pp. 717-770)
** The relationship of the school with production
** Growth of production
** Why do we produce?
** The relationship between production and distribution
** The relationship between production and exchange
** For whom do we produce?
* The responsibility of the government in the Islamic economy (pp. 771-807)
** Social security
** Social balance
** The principle of state intervention

The book Iqtisaduna has multiple translations into Persian, and the following three translations under the title Our Economics (اقتصاد ما) are among the most famous:

# The translation by Sayyid Mohammad Mahdi Borhani (Vol. 1) and Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Hosseini Zharfa (Vol. 2), published by the Islamic Culture Publishing Office (first edition, 1982 [1361 SH]), and the Sadr Specialized Scientific Research Institute (Dar al-Sadr) (first edition, 2014 [1393 SH]).
# The translation by Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Mousavi, Tehran, Amirkabir, first edition, 1983 (1362 SH).
# The translation by Mohammad Mahdi Fooladvand, Islamic Sciences Foundation, 1981 (1360 SH).

== Foundations of Islamic Economics ==
In the first section of the book (Volume One), while explaining the main characteristics of the Islamic economic system, and at the beginning of the second section (Volume Two), in detailing the Islamic economic school, al-Sadr acknowledges that Islamic economics is not a science in the sense of the scientific interpretation of economic phenomena and events and the relations among them; rather, it is an economic school in the sense of an economic method. From al-Sadr's perspective, the economic school is a set of general rules for regulating economic life, which is connected with the concept of [[social justice]]. Overall, al-Sadr believes that Islam possesses comprehensive and complete theories in the field of economics that can be effective in resolving global crises (pp. 361-365, 417-429).

=== Islamic Economy is a Part of the Whole ===
In elucidating the fundamental characteristics of the Islamic economy, al-Sadr asserts that the Islamic economy is a part of the whole and is connected with the other components and principles of the Islamic system. It should not be viewed independently and separately from doctrinal affairs (such as monotheism [*tawhid*]), social affairs (the emotions and sentiments of the society), economic affairs (private ownership), and political affairs (the powers of the Islamic ruler). Consequently, the Islamic economy acquires specific characteristics and boundaries (pp. 337-344). Furthermore, in explaining the general framework of the Islamic economy and its distinction from other systems, he points to the consideration of the natural and social interests of the human being, as well as the connection of the world and the economy to God and the hereafter (pp. 347-352); a task that cannot be properly realized solely through human science and effort, thereby justifying humanity's need for religion and the sending of messengers (pp. 352-360).

The viewpoint of the harmony of the Islamic economy with the other pillars of Islam's intellectual and political system has also been proposed among other jurists. Some, including [[Abbasali Amid Zanjani]], stipulate that the Islamic economy must be examined and understood within the political system of Islam, and that political management (the guardian jurist or *Wali al-Faqih'') is even superior and more comprehensive than economic management.<ref>Amid Zanjani, Political Jurisprudence (''Fiqh-i Siyasi''), Vol. 4: Political Economy, pp. 13-14.</ref>

=== The Three Main Pillars of the Islamic Economy ===
In the book Iqtisaduna, [[Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]] has defined the fundamental pillars of the Islamic economy based on three principles: 1. Tripartite ownership, 2. Limited freedom, and 3. Social justice. At the same time, one of the critiques directed at al-Sadr and the book Iqtisaduna is its focus on theoretical foundations and the failure to provide practical solutions and executive programs for the management of economic institutions in the Islamic society.<ref>Jedari Aali, "Critique of the Book Iqtisaduna," p. 167.</ref>

::'''1. Tripartite Ownership in Islam: Balance Between the Individual and Society'''

The issue of ownership in the Islamic economy is one of the key topics addressed by al-Sadr in this book. He asserts that Islam, unlike capitalist and socialist systems, simultaneously recognizes the three domains of private, public, and state ownership, which, from al-Sadr's viewpoint, is a symbol of the justice and flexibility of the Islamic economic system in creating a balance between the individual and society.

Al-Sadr believes that in private ownership, individuals only have the right to manage their wealth within the framework of the rulings of the Sharia (without [[usury]] [*riba*], [[hoarding]] [*ihtikar*], exploitation, or oppression). On the other hand, public ownership, encompassing natural resources such as water, mines, and forests, must serve the entire society according to the Islamic perspective. Furthermore, state ownership, such as the [[Khums during the Occultation|one-fifth tax]] (''khums'') and [[Zakat|alms]] (''zakat''), which is under the supervision of the Islamic state, must be employed to secure public interests (pp. 321-324, 392-395, 488).

::'''2. Economic Freedom within the Bounds of Jurisprudence and Sharia'''

In al-Sadr's view, economic freedom in Islam is accompanied by two types of limitations; one is the intrinsic limitation rooted in the essence and innate nature (''fitrah'') of humans and their Islamic character and upbringing, and the second is the objective limitation; meaning external restrictions enacted by the laws of Islam, which are applied in two forms: 1. The framework of Sharia and its rulings, such as the prohibition of usury and hoarding, which have been established to preserve economic health and social justice, and 2. Limitations determined by the ruler or the Islamic state, based on expediency (''maslahah'') and considering social and economic conditions (pp. 325-329).

::'''3. Islamic Economy Based on Social Justice'''

Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr perceives the form and structure of social justice in the Islamic economy manifested in two principles: 1. General cooperation, and 2. Social balance (p. 331). In expounding social justice, he points to the two attributes of the Islamic economy being realistic and ethical. In his view, the Islamic economy, in terms of its objective, is a realistic economy compatible with human reality, not like Marxism, which is founded upon an imaginary economy and an unrealistic goal. The ethical nature of the Islamic economy from al-Sadr's perspective implies that, unlike Marxism, it does not consider economic goals based on the material conditions of production; rather, it guarantees them based on practical and moral values whose realization is essential (pp. 332-335).

== Distribution of Public Wealth Based on Labor and Need ==
Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr defines the system of wealth distribution in the Islamic economy on the basis of labor and need: labor leads to an individual's ownership over the outcome of their action, not its valuation, and need is a human right and a tool for the equitable distribution of resources in the Islamic society.

=== Human Oppression, the Cause of Economic Problems ===
According to al-Sadr, capitalism sees the main economic problem as the scarcity of natural resources, while Marxism identifies the contradiction between the mode of production and distribution as the cause of economic crisis; however, in the view of Islam and based on the verses of the Quran, God has placed all the necessary materials for life and the fulfillment of human material needs in this world. In al-Sadr's view, economic problems arise from two types of human oppression and ingratitude (''kufr''): 1. Oppression rooted in the economic system and the unjust distribution of wealth and natural resources, and 2. Negligence in exploiting these resources and ingratitude toward divine blessings (pp. 379-381).

=== Labor and Need: Tools of Distribution in the Islamic Economy ===
In al-Sadr's opinion, in the Islamic economic system, wealth must be equitably distributed among the individuals of society, in a way that the rights of both the individual and society are realized simultaneously. From his perspective, the Islamic organization of distribution is founded upon two main tools: labor and need, both of which play a shared role in the distribution process.

In this system, labor is the basis of ownership, and ownership resulting from labor is considered a natural human right. Differences in the type of ownership are also shaped by differences in the type of labor; thus, if work is performed individually, the natural inclination is toward individual ownership; and if the work is social in nature, the natural tendency will be toward collective ownership (pp. 382-383, 596).

Furthermore, in elucidating the role of need in the structure of distribution, al-Sadr categorizes the individuals of society into three groups and explains the distribution system based on the principles of Islamic economics as follows:

# Owners of labor and productive elites: Individuals who enjoy a higher standard of living due to intellectual superiority and practical capacity. In this group, labor is the foundation of ownership and the primary tool of distribution, and need plays no role in the distribution process.
# Those in need of work and support: People who operate at the level of securing the basic necessities of life. To reach the general level of welfare, this group depends simultaneously on labor and need.
# Need-based beneficiaries: Individuals who are excluded from productive activities due to physical or mental disabilities. The income of this group is determined solely based on need, and they benefit from the distribution of wealth on the basis of the principle of general cooperation and the moral and religious responsibility of the Islamic society (pp. 385-387).

=== The Tripartite Structure of Distribution ===
A significant portion of the second volume of the book Iqtisaduna is dedicated to examining three fundamental issues concerning the distribution of wealth from the perspective of Islam and al-Sadr's theorization:

# Pre-production distribution: Analysis of the manner of distributing wealth and natural resources such as land, mines, waters, and other natural assets (pp. 475-615).
# Post-production distribution: Examination of the manner of distributing incomes, the role of material factors and means of production, and the issue of usury (pp. 639-716).
# Theory of production: Analysis of the foundations and structure of production, the concepts of wealth and commerce, and the relationship of production with them (pp. 717-770).

== Al-Sadr's Jurisprudential Method for Extracting the Islamic Economic Theory ==
=== Theory of Discovery Versus the Formation of an Economic System ===
In Iqtisaduna, al-Sadr names his jurisprudential method "discovery" (''kashf''); as opposed to capitalist and socialist economic systems where the economic system undergoes scientific "formation" (''takwin'') (p. 431). In the theory of discovering the economic school, he emphasizes the point that Islamic rulings should not be studied in isolation from other sectors; rather, by "synthesizing" partial rulings, one can arrive at a general theory. Therefore, in economic jurisprudence, we need to discover the economic system from the synthesis of the rulings (p. 438).

=== The Importance of Economic Concepts in Jurisprudential Ijtihad ===
In the process of economic deduction (''ijtihad''), al-Sadr points out the key role of economic concepts and believes that these concepts are an important part of Islamic culture and must be given serious attention in the analysis of legislative texts (''nusus tashri'iyyah''). Accordingly, he examines concepts such as ownership and commerce through an approach of jurisprudential analysis of Islamic texts (pp. 439-443).

Al-Sadr's proposed method involves considering economic rulings and concepts as the superstructure, and discovering the principles and theories of Islamic economics as the infrastructure.

=== Mintaqat al-Faragh: Fixed and Variable Rulings and the Role of the Islamic State ===
The [[Mintaqat al-Faragh|theory of the discretionary sphere (Mintaqat al-Faragh)]] is one of the jurisprudential innovations of the martyr Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, proposed in the book Iqtisaduna as a framework for the flexibility of the Islamic economic system. Since the economy is a variable and dynamic matter directly related to the conditions of time and place, al-Sadr presented the theory of Mintaqat al-Faragh to resolve the challenge of linking the fixed rulings of Sharia with changing economic needs. Al-Sadr raises this theory in two sections of the book:

* Ijtihad and discovering the Islamic economic system: In some economic domains, the Sharia has not provided fixed, definitive, and mandatory rulings, leaving a space for responding to the changing needs of the society and for legislation by jurists (''mujtahids'') (p. 443).
* In elucidating the role of the Islamic state: Al-Sadr discusses the possibility of legislating in the discretionary sphere (''Mintaqat al-Faragh'') and asserts that the Islamic state can make economic decisions in line with public objectives. Based on this, the state, by utilizing Islamic and modern financial instruments (such as alms [*zakat*] and taxes), assumes the duty of directing, supervising, and regulating economic relations while observing public interests (pp. 799-806).

=== The Impact of the Intellectual Personality and Jurisprudential Method of the Mujtahid ===
From al-Sadr's perspective, the intellectual personality and jurisprudential method of the jurist (''mujtahid'') are considered among the fundamental issues and even obstacles in the process of discovering the economic school of Islam. In this process, the jurist (''faqih'') must take into account a collection of texts (''nusus'') and evidence (''adillah''), but these texts are often not explicit and unambiguous and are accompanied by doubts and difficulties in many cases. Under such circumstances, *ijtihad* to properly understand the texts becomes a more complex matter, and different jurisprudential methods can lead to different results.

Al-Sadr cautions that, considering our chronological distance from the era of the issuance of the texts, the influence and interference of the personality and taste of the *faqih* and *mujtahid* in discovering the Islamic economic theory can be even more dangerous. In this regard, he points out four fundamental problems and then explains each one: 1. Justifying reality, 2. Confining the text within a limited framework, 3. Removing religious evidence from its conditions and exigencies, and 4. The jurist's predispositions when confronting the text (pp. 445-448).

To resolve this problem and achieve the Islamic economic school, al-Sadr sees the solution in selecting one type of *ijtihad* among various types of *ijtihad*; an *ijtihad* that is distanced from the personal impressions of the *faqih* and is carried out on the basis of established, definitive, and proven rulings within the framework of a coherent inferential apparatus and method. Such an *ijtihad* must have the utmost reliance on the Book (Quran) and the Sunnah and be closer to the reality of legislation (p. 459).

=== Misunderstanding the Practical Aspects of the Prophetic Era ===
Al-Sadr believes that in the process of discovering the Islamic economic system, in addition to the theoretical problems in the operation of *ijtihad* from legislative texts, the issue of comprehending the practical and economic aspects of the prophetic era is also of importance. Sometimes, the *mujtahid* considers these practical aspects independently and separately from the texts, an approach which al-Sadr deems incorrect. Hence, one must simultaneously pay attention to legislative texts and the practical and historical realities of the Islamic economy to be able to reach a correct and coherent theory. For instance, some individual freedoms or a specific type of [[private ownership]] that existed during the era of the Prophethood might mistakenly be perceived as a sign of Islam's alignment with the capitalist school, whereas such an interpretation is incompatible with the theoretical foundations of Islam (pp. 468-474).

== Footnotes ==
{{Footnotes}}

== Sources ==
* Al-Rubaie, Mowaffaq, [https://mbsadr.ir/ar/2020/09/23/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A9/ "Iqtisaduna fi al-Alfiyyah al-Thalithah"] [Our Economics in the Third Millennium], Markaz al-Abhath wa al-Dirasat al-Takhasusiyyah lil-Shahid al-Sadr.
* Amid Zanjani, Abbasali, Political Jurisprudence (''Fiqh-i Siyasi''): Vol. 4: Political Economy, Tehran, Amirkabir, 2005 (1384 SH).
* Amiri Tehranizadeh, Sayyid Mohammad Reza, and Emad Afrough, "Critique of the Methodology of Islamic Economics of Martyr Sadr from the Perspective of Critical Realism," *Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities* Quarterly, No. 78, Spring 2014 (1393 SH).
* Hadavi Tehrani, Mahdi, "Iqtisaduna is the Quran of Islamic Economists," *Sadra Islamic Humanities* Magazine, Spring 2016 (1395 SH), No. 17.
* Jedari Aali, "Critique of the Book Iqtisaduna," *Islamic Economics* Quarterly, No. 1, Spring 2001 (1380 SH).
* Zahedi Vafa, Mohammad Hadi, and Ali Bagheri, "An Analysis of the Theory of Value and Distribution in Iqtisaduna," *Studies in Islamic Economics* Biannual Journal, No. 13, Fall and Winter 2014 (1393 SH).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about Islamic economics]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]]
[[fa:اقتصادنا (کتاب)]]

File:Political Jurisprudence Political Economy.jpg

2026-04-03T08:47:14Z

Enadmin:

Political Jurisprudence: Political Economy (Book)

2026-04-03T08:45:24Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Political Jurisprudence: Political Economy | image = Political_Jurisprudence_Political_Economy.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Abbasali Amid Zanjani | date_of_writing = 2003 (1382 SH) | subject = Political jurisprudence | genre =Analytical | language =Persian | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_b..."

{{author
|author = Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}

{{Infobox book
| title = Political Jurisprudence: Political Economy
| image = Political_Jurisprudence_Political_Economy.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Abbasali Amid Zanjani
| date_of_writing = 2003 (1382 SH)
| subject = Political jurisprudence
| genre =Analytical
| language =Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages = 277
| format =
| collection = Political Jurisprudence
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Amirkabir
| publication_place =Tehran
| publication_date = 2004 (1383 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes = [[Constitutional Law and the Foundations of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (book)|Volume 1]] • [[The Political System and Leadership in Islam (book)|Volume 2]] • [[Islamic International Law (book)|Volume 3]] • [[Political Economy (book)|Volume 4]] • [[The Rights and Rules of Conflicts in the Field of Islamic Jihad and Islamic International Law (book)|Volume 5]] • [[Principles and Regulations Governing Armed Conflicts (book)|Volume 6]] • [[Foundations of Public Law in Islam (book)|Volume 7]] • [[Jurisprudence and Politics (book)|Volume 8]] • [[The Rules of Political Jurisprudence: Expediency (book)|Volume 9]] • [[Political Thought in the Contemporary Islamic World (book)|Volume 10]]
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Political Economy (اقتصاد سیاسی)''', is the title and subject of the fourth volume of the [[Ten-Volume Collection of "Political Jurisprudence"|ten-volume collection of "Political Jurisprudence"]], written by [[Abbasali Amid Zanjani]]. He speaks of the dependence of the Islamic economy on its political system (Imamate) and explains the macroeconomic topics of Islamic political economy within this framework and through the lens of Islamic jurisprudence (''fiqh'') (Shia and Sunni), while also discussing the legal issues and the constitution of the Islamic Republic as appropriate: poverty and poverty alleviation, population and economy, state subsidies, per capita income and public welfare, state resources and properties, free and state economy, economic development, and foreign trade.

In the author's view, the financial and economic institutions of Islam, which serve as the financial resources of the Islamic state, do not require internal transformation; rather, if placed in a suitable context and updated in terms of executive programs, they will play a highly effective role in economic growth and development.

== Structure of the Book ==
Political Economy is the title of the fourth volume of the ten-volume collection of Political Jurisprudence written by Abbasali Amid Zanjani. The first edition of the book was published in 2004 (1383 SH) by Amirkabir Publications in Tehran.

The book Political Economy consists of thirteen chapters, and after general discussions and the raising of issues (in the first chapter and roughly one-fourth of the book's volume), it discusses macroeconomic topics from the perspective of the Islamic political system: poverty alleviation (in four chapters), population and economy, subsidies, per capita income and public welfare, allocation of state resources and properties, independent and dependent economy, free and state economy, economic development, and foreign trade.

=== Author ===
Amid Zanjani (1937–2011 [1316–1390 SH]), the author of the book, was a jurist (''mujtahid''), legal scholar, university professor, and political science researcher. He had studied in the Islamic seminaries (''hawzat al-'ilmiyyah'') of Qom and Najaf under masters such as [[Sayyid Hossein Borujerdi]], [[Sayyid Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini|Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini]], [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Khoei]], and [[Sayyid Muhsin Hakim]]. The ten-volume collection of Political Jurisprudence is among his famous works in political jurisprudence, which has been reprinted multiple times. He also holds a record of political presence by representing in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) and the Assembly of Experts.

== The Superiority and Inclusiveness of the Element of Politics over Economy in the System of Wilayah ==
Amid Zanjani views the Islamic economy and the attainment of the desired economy from within the political system; thus, he believes the system of Imamate (the political management of Islam) encompasses economic management as well, and furthermore, political management possesses superiority and inclusiveness over economic management. As a result, the Imam, who is the principal official of the Islamic system, can also act in accordance with expediency (''maslahah'') regarding economic regulations. Therefore, in the Islamic system, due to the superiority and dominance of the political element (guardianship or *wilayah''), the final decision in economic management is also made at the level of the head of the Islamic state. The definition of Islamic economics from his perspective, considering the superiority of political management, is as follows: "Political economy is an objective and practical viewpoint, method, or approach that, through the Imamate (the Islamic state), demonstrates the path to social justice in the distribution of power and wealth" (pp. 13-14).

== The Meaning of Political Economy from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence ==
The meaning of political economy in the realm of political jurisprudence is the general policies of the Islamic state, with Islamic objectives, regarding the equitable distribution of wealth, so that instead of wealth accumulation (''takathur''), boasting (''tafakhur''), poverty, class conflict, playing with wealth, vain pursuits and worldly attachment, miserliness (''bukhl''), extravagance (''israf''), squandering (''tabdhir''), dependency, and the forgetting of God and oneself, the society is steered toward charitable spending (''infaq''), brotherhood, equality, detachment, altruism (''ithar''), poverty alleviation, self-sufficiency, growth, and development, thereby laying the groundwork for the realization of justice (''qist'').

After defining Islamic economy and political economy within the structure of dependency on the political management of the Imamate system, the author of the book does not overlook the new and scientific issues of economics. He immediately emphasizes that political economy must be able to solve these issues and problems; such as: economic dependency, the dichotomy between traditional and modern economies, the balance between the production and distribution of goods and services, low per capita income levels, "inflation and high prices, population growth rate, capital flight, and overt and covert unemployment" (p. 15).

== The Jurisprudential Definition of Poverty is Subject to the Conditions and Development of Societies ==
The author of the book Political Economy has dedicated the second to the fifth chapters (about 50 pages) to the subject of poverty alleviation, which includes the definition of poverty and its causes, poverty alleviation policies and strategies, the calculation of the poverty line, and supportive policies. He initially terms poverty as a political dilemma before being an economic problem (p. 76) and considers its jurisprudential definition to be "lacking the minimum conventional living standard." He believes its criterion is customary ('''urfi'') and subject to the conditions of society; hence, in some societies, possessing a personal vehicle is among the basic necessities of life, not a luxury (p. 86). Therefore, poverty in the first sense is the deprivation of the absolute minimum essential needs such as shelter, food, and medicine, and in the second sense, it takes on a relative concept and is defined as the imbalance in people's benefit from the available facilities in society (p. 86).

The author then divides poverty from a political dimension into oppressive and normal poverty, and subsequently divides normal poverty into two types: first, poverty arising from the general conditions and shortcomings of society, and second, poverty that, despite social welfare, is chosen voluntarily for spiritual elevation, falling under the concepts of asceticism (''zuhd'') and "poverty is my pride" (''al-faqr fakhri''); this should not be considered an economic deficiency (pp. 87-88). The subsequent topics cover the causes of poverty and whether poverty is a cause or an effect (pp. 89-93).

== Increasing the Level of National Income; The Duty of the Imamate and Among the Rights of the Ummah ==
In the fifth chapter, Amid Zanjani has addressed the practical methods of poverty alleviation, including upgrading the level of national per capita income (increasing the public wealth or *tawfir al-fay'''). In his view, increasing the level of national income is not merely an economic goal; rather, on the one hand, it is among the strategic objectives in the field of politics and national security, and on the other hand, according to the statement of Imam Ali (a), increasing public wealth is among the responsibilities of the Imamate state and the social rights of the nation.

The author of the book Political Economy explains the meaning of increasing the level of national income and its relationship with free capitalism devoid of responsibility or social justice. He points out that asceticism (''zuhd'') does not mean abandoning the world; rather, its correct meaning is asceticism in consumption, not in production aimed at the quantitative and qualitative development and enhancement of incomes, and the benefiting of all members of society from economic justice (pp. 111-112). He also enumerates seven rational and religious beliefs that support development combined with social justice: the sanctity of work, liberation from dependency, self-sufficiency (which transcends mere non-dependency), the spirit of cooperation, the jihadi and altruistic spirit, the concomitance of knowledge and action, and the concomitance of action with piety (''taqwa'') (pp. 113-115).

== The Accumulation of Wealth and Capital is Not Always Illegitimate ==
According to Amid Zanjani in the fifth chapter of the book, the hoarding (''takathur'') and accumulation of wealth and capital resulting from exploitation and the violation of the rights of others is condemned, but capital itself (apart from its owners) is the lifeblood of society and a divine blessing. Therefore, when wealth is not in the hands of capitalists and is in economic circulation by efficient managers, it exits the realm of prohibition and condemnation.

After mentioning this point, Amid Zanjani notes that Islam's emphasis on agriculture over commerce is not because agriculture does not require capital and is solely the product of labor, thereby destroying the accumulation of capital (the Marxist view). Rather, jurisprudentially, in commerce, it is also not necessary for the exchange to take place as capital and by a capitalist; hence, silent partnership (''mudarabah''), partnership (''shirkah''), and employment by craftsmen and professionals are also considered commerce and income generation. On the other hand, with the economic rulings and institutions of Islamic jurisprudence (such as endowment [*waqf*], retention [*habs*], alms [*zakat*], the one-fifth tax [*khums*], properties of unknown ownership [*amwal-i majhul al-malik*], public wealth [*anfal*], silent partnership, partnership, and leasing [*ijarah*]), there is the possibility for the circulation of capital and the equitable distribution of profit among all strata of society. Therefore, Islam's negative view toward capital accumulation is targeted and does not encompass all instances of it (pp. 118-120).

== Instrumental Use of Religion and the Clergy for Population Control ==
The sixth chapter of the book is about population and economy, and the author does not consider population control an easy solution to economic and social problems. He analyzes that in the West, this approach has also caused multiple social problems and undesirable economic effects, aside from moral tragedies (such as family dissolution, moral corruption, and abortion). He also refers to a period of policies by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, where, based on poverty line statistics, employment levels, and population growth rates, the country's future was depicted with the visage of absolute poverty. Subsequently, by obtaining religious permissions, the [[Sterilization (medicine)|sterilization of men and women]] was publicly and openly propagated and implemented, and even mosques were utilized to promote and advocate this practice. In his view, this action lacked educational and cultural preliminaries and entailed moral and cultural problems; moreover, with the slogan "a better life with fewer children," religion and the clergy were used instrumentally! This is while the teachings of Islam have always been founded on the motto "marry, bear children, and multiply" (pp. 134-135).

== Subsidies and Their Negative and Non-Economic Roles ==
The author speaks about [[State subsidy|subsidies]] in the seventh chapter and cautions that the goal of subsidies is not solely to combat poverty; sometimes, they are a mechanism for price stabilization. Furthermore, production, distribution, service, export, import subsidies, etc., are forms of government intervention in the economy and have different objectives in developed and developing countries. Sometimes they are allocated to basic goods, and other times they are organized with political and even security objectives. By evaluating the negative and positive effects of subsidies, he points out that in contemporary global economic policies, we are witnessing a reduction in subsidies, but in Islamic Iran, the policies do not indicate a cessation or reduction of subsidies.

The author does not provide a jurisprudential discussion on the subject of subsidies but refers to global conditions and the imposition of common models, such as consumption patterns, which turn extravagance (''israf'') into a public culture. He also states that, unfortunately, third-world countries are moving toward adopting Western models, and in the future, Iran must also expect the imposition of more subsidies on the government, meaning the country's economy (pp. 137-148).

== The Government's Role in Employment and Determining Fair Wages ==
In the eighth chapter of the book, titled "Enhancing Per Capita Income and Public Welfare," Amid Zanjani considers the creation of jobs and the determination of fair wages as among the important duties of the state. He then briefly examines the conditions of work and income from five aspects: 1. Unpaid work for the benefit of others; 2. Income without work (consuming wealth in falsehood or *akl mal bi al-batil* in jurisprudential and Quranic terminology); 3. Healthy income and welfare; 4. Creation of new jobs; 5. Harmful work and income (the prohibition of unlawful earnings).

After discussing work and income, the author proceeds to the topic of profit and capital, raising four issues: 1. Illegitimate profitability; 2. Usury (''riba''); 3. Capital without work: silent partnership and partnership without labor; 4. Bank deposits (usury-free banking operations). Then, in the discussion on enhancing per capita income to increase public welfare, he speaks about the culture of consumption and welfare, describing them as among the most difficult cultural issues of society. In his view, the model of sufficiency (''kafaf'') and the measure of need (''qadr-i hajat'') mentioned in Islamic texts articulate a relative and fluid concept of welfare, which is defined at any given time in accordance with economic, social, and political conditions. Hence, absolutizing welfare, as seen in Marxist and sometimes liberal interpretations, represents a disregard for social justice, and he presents the orientation toward social justice as a strategic principle (pp. 149-160).

== Islamic Economy Amidst Free and State Economies ==
According to Amid Zanjani's belief, both free and state economies hold a special place in the Islamic economic system, and the acceptance of one does not imply the negation of the other. Also, state intervention in restricting economic freedoms and applying laws beyond primary rulings (''ahkam awwaliyyah''), in the form of secondary and expedient rulings (''ahkam thanawiyyah* and *maslahati''), are all confined within the rulings of the Sharia and the general criteria governing society. Emphasizing these points, Amid Zanjani enters the discussion of free and state economies and the nature of the Islamic economy.

It can be said that the most important jurisprudential discussions of the book lie in the chapter on free and state economy (chapter eleven). He first presents and critiques the theory of Islamic economic liberalism (Islamic free economy) under the motto "people have dominion over their properties" (''al-nasu musallatun 'ala amwalihim''). Then, he proposes the theory of Islamic socialism with the motto "wealth belongs to God" (''mal Allah'') and articulates the views of its critics. Finally, he briefly outlines the moderation theory (''nadharia al-ta'dil''), whose opponents consider it anti-development and a barrier to economic growth. He warns against the inclination towards free markets and privatization in Iran's development plans, which is incompatible with the spirit of the constitution, and asks the [[Guardian Council]] to prevent it (pp. 190-200).

== Methodology of Islamic Political Economy and the Questions and Challenges Ahead ==
By providing a fourfold classification and mentioning the disputes over methodology in economics, Amid Zanjani attempts to answer whether these four domains of Western economic methodology can also be posited and debated regarding Islamic economics. He finds obtaining the answer difficult, but setting aside the prejudice regarding the conflict between these two schools, he briefly reviews important aspects and raises questions; including:
* Can one use induction and experience conforming to custom ('''urf'') in rulings where there is no explicit textual evidence (''ma la nass fih'')?
* Can Sunni jurisprudents also rely on analogical deduction (''qiyas'') in economic matters?
* Can [[Inflation|inflation]] influence the norms and values of the Islamic economy, such as alimony (''nafaqah''), fair wages, and the validity and permissibility of usury?
* In traditional inference (''ijtihad'') for the methodology of Islamic economics, do the exigencies of time and place have a profound impact on the evaluation and understanding of texts?
* How will the jurisprudential understanding of concepts such as poverty, wealth, justice, oppression, truth and falsehood, marginalization (''istid'af''), and arrogance (''istikbar''), which appear in Islamic texts, be under specific temporal and spatial conditions?
* Is rationality, which plays an effective role in neoclassical economics, also an acceptable method in Islamic political economy? Considering the benefits and corruptions inherent in the rulings, as well as the difference and expansiveness of Islamic rationality compared to Western rationality.
* Since the system of Islamic political economy is dependent on the Islamic political system (Imamate), what is the role and intervention of the Imamate? Planning, determining general policies, and political economy strategy considering the immutable principles of the Sharia and the exigencies of time and place? Here, he introduces jurisprudential expertise (''faqahah'') and erudition as the solution to the dichotomy of the Islamic economic and political system.
* Since the goal and ultimate end of the Islamic economy is nothing but justice (the very purpose of prophethood and the revelation of the Sharia), how is this principle preserved in the selection of economic methodology?

At the end of this discussion, he presents and reviews the political economic thoughts of Imam Khomeini (pp. 201-231).

== Satisfaction as the Alternative to Freedom in Islamic Political Economy ==
At the end of the eleventh chapter (free and state economy), the book's author raises the important discussion of freedom in Western and Islamic economies. Freedom is the main pillar of a free economy, but in Islamic political thought, freedom is always accompanied by responsibility, and the human being is introduced as a free and responsible entity, and based on this, acquires rights and duties. In the Islamic economy as well, freedom and responsibility are not separate or absolute. The author's hypothesis is substituting "satisfaction" (''ridamandi'') for "freedom." In the concept of satisfaction, there are two essential elements: choice (not coercion and reluctance) and the criterion of choice, which can be formed based on religious teachings, responsibilities, and obligations, and does not rely solely on mere rationality.

In comparing freedom and satisfaction, Amid Zanjani defines satisfaction in a way that encompasses freedom as well, and subsequently touches upon the satisfaction of the people in Islamic political thought, which plays a central role. The author explicitly states that in the relations between production and services, worker and employer, the nation and the country's economic system, and labor and capital, as well as economic contracts and other economic issues, the satisfaction of the individual and society plays the principal role. At the conclusion of this discussion, Amid Zanjani states that the relationship between free choice and satisfaction is akin to that of Islam and faith (''iman''), and he then takes a glance at the texts concerning satisfaction (''rida'') and divine displeasure (''sakhat'') (pp. 235-244).

== Islamic Financial Institutions Do Not Need Internal Changes ==
The twelfth chapter of the book Political Economy encompasses the subject of economic development. In this section, the author addresses the role of expediency (''maslahah'') in development and states jurisprudentially that expediency in Islamic jurisprudence has a regulated relationship in two forms:

# Benefits and corruptions (''masalih* and *mafasid''), which are the infrastructure of Islamic political economy. Here, he looks at two jurisprudential methods of Shia and Sunni (such as the [[Objectives of Sharia|objectives of Sharia]]).
# Expediency and [[Governmental ruling|governmental rulings]], which are in the nature of executive directives, not primary or secondary rulings. These rulings are issued by the Imam and leader of the Islamic society when dilemmas cannot be resolved through ordinary means. Here, he cites the ratification of the labor law in the Islamic Republic as an example.

Furthermore, Amid Zanjani addresses the relationship between development and financial institutions, ultimately emphasizing that Islamic financial and economic institutions (such as spoils of war, *khums*, *zakat*, poll tax [*jizyah*], barren lands [*mawat*], land tax [*kharaj*], public wealth [*anfal*], and financial taxes) can play a highly effective role in development whenever placed in a suitable context. Also, these institutions, which are the financial resources of the Islamic state, do not require internal changes; rather, what must undergo change and transformation are the executive programs of these institutions, which must continually be updated (pp. 245-257).

== Governing Islamic Principles in Foreign Trade ==
The final chapter of the book Political Economy is about foreign trade and Islamic political economy. Initially, Amid Zanjani enumerates ten jurisprudential and Islamic principles governing foreign trade and provides a brief explanation: mutual respect, economic independence, negation of oppression, negation of consuming wealth in falsehood, non-reliance on foreigners, protection of the oppressed and marginalized, defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-commitment to the arrogant, and mutual peace with non-belligerent countries.

The author continues the discussion of Islamic economy in the field of foreign trade by debating whether foreign trade is free or restricted, as well as its relationship with international issues. He addresses and explains the principles of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as Article 44 (the state ownership of major and mother industries) and Article 112 (the Expediency Discernment Council) (pp. 259-270).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books on political jurisprudence]]
[[Category:Books by Abbasali Amid Zanjani]]
[[fa:اقتصاد سیاسی (کتاب)]]

Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence (Book)

2026-04-03T08:33:35Z

Enadmin:

{{author
|author = Mahdi Mohammadi
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence
| image = Economy_in_Islamic_Jurisprudence.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Islamic Economy
| genre =Analytical
| language =Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages = 384
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah
| publication_place =Tehran
| publication_date = 1991 (1370 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

* '''Abstract'''
Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence (اقتصاد در فقه اسلامی), a work by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh, examines the foundations of the Islamic economic system. This system is based on three principles: 1. Diverse ownership (private, public, and state), which fundamentally differs from ownership in capitalism and socialism; 2. Economic freedom conditional upon Sharia laws, including intrinsic (moral) and objective (state laws) limitations; 3. [[Social justice]] centered on the provision of basic livelihood and class balance.

By citing verses (''ayat'') and narrations (''riwayat''), the authors consider [[private ownership]] to be based on labor, public ownership to encompass natural resources, and state ownership to include public wealth (''anfal'') and the Islamic one-fifth tax (''khums''). Furthermore, they elucidate the role of the government in economic supervision and the realization of justice (such as the prohibition of hoarding and usury). This work demonstrates that the Islamic economy is neither capitalist nor socialist; rather, it presents an independent model centered on human dignity and economic equilibrium.

== Brief Overview ==
Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence, a book in the field of [[Islamic economics]], is the result of a joint research project by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh. The authors examine three principles: diverse ownership (private, public, and state), [[economic freedom]] (conditional upon compliance with regulations), and [[social justice]] as the main foundations of the Islamic economic school.

This book was published in Persian by Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah publications in Tehran in 1991 (1370 SH) in 384 pages.

=== Structure and Content of the Book ===
In the introductory section of the book, Hosseini and Qazizadeh have examined the concept of ownership (p. 9) and ownership in the prominent economic systems of the world (p. 31). Subsequently, they have separately explained the main topics of the book, namely the general structure of the Islamic economic system, under three principles: 1. Diverse ownership (p. 93), 2. Economic freedom limited by regulations (p. 204), and 3. The principle of social justice (p. 322). In this book, the foreword is located at the beginning, and the table of contents and sources are placed at the end of the work.

== Comparison of Ownership in World Economic Systems and Islam ==
After analyzing the principle of ownership in capitalist and Marxist systems, the authors have concluded that ownership in the Islamic economy fundamentally differs from these two systems. In the capitalist system, individual ownership is officially recognized, whereas socialism negates private ownership. In contrast, Islam advocates for diverse ownership (pp. 70-71).

According to the authors of the book, from the perspective of Islam, property and wealth are divine trusts, and God is considered the true and absolute owner of wealth; because God created property and wealth, and He placed human beings as His vicegerents (''khalifah'') on earth to cultivate it and benefit from its natural bounties. Islam has established the equal use of natural bounties for all people as a principle, without differentiating among individuals in society; because all are the creations and dependents of God (p. 85).

The authors believe that, in the view of Islam, the human being is the fundamental axis, not the economy, as they have deemed the ultimate goal to be the perfection of humanity, not property and wealth; therefore, all economic activities of production and distribution must be planned based on the preservation of human personality and dignity (p. 88).

== The Role of the Government in the Islamic Economy ==
Based on the contents of this research, the Islamic economy can only be fully implemented in society at any time and place under the aegis of an Islamic government that adheres to all the doctrinal, moral, and spiritual foundations of Islam; because most of the problems that humanity faces, past and present, pertain to the issue of incorrect and unjust production and distribution of manufactured goods, to the extent that in the contemporary world, more attention is paid to raising the level of production and improving the method of its distribution, which has been a focus of Islam since the past; as Imam Ali (a) ordered the observance of this crucial matter in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar (pp. 89-90). Subsequently, the authors examine the Islamic economic system under three principles:

== The Principle of Diverse Ownership ==
It is stated in this book that the religion of Islam has accepted private, public, and state ownership together, but not in the sense that the Islamic theory is a combination of capitalist and socialist systems; because the perspective of Islam is founded on principles that fundamentally differ from socialist and capitalist principles (pp. 94-95).

=== Private Ownership and the Ways of its Realization ===
According to the authors, in Islam, private ownership, the foundation of which is labor, is respected to a certain extent, and the basis of ownership in Islam is the respect for the rights of individuals and the preservation of their motivation for free effort and striving; as, based on evidence such as [[Verse 39 of Surah al-Najm]], human beings only own their own labor. Of course, in cases such as gift (''hibah'') and settlement (''sulh'') where individuals become owners without performing work, the acquisition is still based on labor, because it is the natural right of every individual to be able to freely transfer to others what they have acquired through work (pp. 100-102). Among the ways articulated in Islam for the realization of private ownership are:
* Revitalization of dead lands (''ihya' al-mawat''); conditions are mentioned for owning dead lands, including: the land has not been enclosed (''tahjir''), it is not a place of worship, it has not been granted to someone else for revitalization, etc. (pp. 102-116).
* Acquisition (''hiyazah''); by citing narrations, consensus (''ijma'''), and the conduct of the rational (''sirat al-'uqala''), the authors have argued for the ownership of permissible things (''mubahat'') through acquisition (pp. 117-121).
* Hunting (''sayd''); by citing narrations, consensus, and the conduct of the rational, private ownership by means of hunting is undoubtedly accepted (pp. 122-125).
In the opinion of the authors, in the issue of inheritance (''irth'') and alimony (''nafaqah'') where individuals become owners without performing work, ownership is executed by the decree of the Lawgiver (''Shari'''), and in these two cases, the general rule of "labor is the basis of ownership" is breached (p. 127).

=== Public Ownership ===
Hosseini and Qazizadeh believe that whatever possesses public ownership has two aspects: negative and positive; the negative aspect indicates the prohibition of individual and private ownership; the positive aspect points to the permissibility of utilization for all individuals. Furthermore, they divide public ownership into two categories:

# The ownership of all human beings, whether Muslim or non-Muslim; such as public ownership over waters and plants. However, in another section of the book, forests and seas are considered part of public wealth (''anfal'') and the property of the Infallible (''Ma'sum'') (pp. 172-175), and no explanation has been provided regarding the difference between these two sections;
# The ownership of all Muslims; such as the ownership of all Muslims over cultivated lands that the army of Islam has conquered through war (pp. 130-131).

=== State Ownership ===
In the view of Hosseini and Qazizadeh, in Islam, a portion of properties and wealth has been placed in the possession of the state and the Islamic ruler. State ownership serves the purpose that the incumbent of the position of Imamate and the guardianship of society can secure the interests of Islam and Muslims (such as the needs of the armed forces, the propagation of knowledge, assistance to the needy, and the expenses of the progress and exaltation of society) (p. 138). The authors have examined state ownership under three headings: public wealth (''anfal'') (including barren lands, lands without owners, mines, oceans and major rivers, forests, etc.), the one-fifth tax (''khums''), and the public treasury (''bayt al-mal'') (including alms (''zakat''), the poll tax on protected non-Muslims (''jizyah ahl al-dhimmah''), financial penalties (''ta'zirat-i mali''), properties of unknown ownership (''amwal-i majhul al-malik''), and land tax (''kharaj'')). Many pages of the book are dedicated to the Quranic and narrative examination of the instances of these three headings (pp. 138-199).

In accordance with the discussion of the public treasury, the authors address how the public treasury was managed during the time of the third Caliph and refer to the Muslims' protests against his methods. They regard the Muslims' protests against Uthman as evidence of the un-Islamic nature of his conduct; for this reason, they believe that Uthman's behavior cannot be considered as derived from Islam and used to conclude that Islam entails feudalism and a class-based society (pp. 199-203).

== The Principle of Economic Freedom Limited by Religious Regulations ==
According to the authors of the book, Islam has established two types of limitations regarding social freedom in the economic sphere. The first type is "intrinsic and essential limitation," which stems from the depths of the human soul, and its goal is to create true spirituality in a free human being; for this reason, human beings do not consider it a restriction upon themselves. The matters that cause the emergence and realization of this intrinsic and essential limitation include: ethics, charitable spending (''infaq''), charity (''sadaqah''), altruism (''ithar''), avoiding the acquisition of unlawful (''haram'') property, and the like. Furthermore, to explain these concepts, the verses and narrations related to them have been mentioned (pp. 204-217).

The second type is "objective and external limitation." The purpose of this type of limitation is a force outside the essence of the human being that determines their social behavior and conduct, and controls their activities and freedom (pp. 219-220). This limitation is implemented in two ways:

* State control and supervision; in Islam, to prevent economic abuses, the state has been granted the right to supervise all activities in order to protect public interests.
* Specific economic laws; some of the controlling laws that deter oppression and tyranny are as follows: the prohibition of selling weapons to enemies, the prohibition of renting for unlawful work, the prohibition of assuming governance on behalf of an unjust ruler, the prohibition of printing and publishing misleading books (''kutub al-dalal''), the prohibition of fraud, the prohibition of shortchanging (''kam-foroushi''), the prohibition of gambling, the prohibition of bribery, the prohibition of hoarding (''ihtikar''), the prohibition of usury (''riba''), the prohibition of extravagance (''israf''), and the rule of no harm (''qa'idat la darar''). Approximately one hundred pages of the book are dedicated to explaining these prohibited trades (''makasib muharramah''), citing their proofs, and the statements of jurisprudents (''fuqaha'') (pp. 221-319).

== The Principle of Social Justice ==
In the opinion of Hosseini and Qazizadeh, in the Islamic economic system, the distribution of wealth has been designed in such a way that the realization of social justice is possible. In their view, the establishment of brotherhood and fraternity between the Emigrants (''Muhajirun'') and the Helpers (''Ansar'') by the Prophet (s), as well as God establishing financial obligations as part of Sharia acts of worship, were intended to increase the human spirit of benevolence and consolidate social justice (pp. 321-323).

According to the authors, the principle of social security is based on two pillars: universal sponsorship (''kafalah hamagani'') and the society's share in natural resources (social balance) (p. 325). To prove the mutual responsibility of Muslims and universal sponsorship, they have cited twenty narrations, concluding that the wealthy have a responsibility towards the needy and must provide for their minimum livelihood (pp. 326-339). By citing nine narrations, the authors also consider the state responsible towards all members of society to strive to alleviate the life deficiencies of low-income and no-income individuals (pp. 341-348).

To realize social justice, in addition to providing the minimum livelihood of the people, the state must also establish social balance so that the class gap is minimized, all individuals in society enjoy relative welfare and comfort, and a balanced and harmonious society is created. For this very reason, based on some narrations, alms (''zakat'') can be given to the poor until they reach the general economic level of the society (pp. 349-358).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about Islamic economics]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini]]
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Qazizadeh]]
[[fa:اقتصاد در فقه اسلامی (کتاب)]]

File:Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence.jpg

2026-04-03T08:27:04Z

Enadmin:

Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence (Book)

2026-04-03T08:25:54Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author |author = Mahdi Mohammadi |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} {{Infobox book | title = Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence | image = Economy_in_Islamic_Jurisprudence.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh | date_of_writing = | subject = Islamic Economy | genre =Analytical | language =Persian | editor = | corrected_by = | effort_by = | compiler = | illustrator = |..."

{{author
|author = Mahdi Mohammadi
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{Infobox book
| title = Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence
| image = Economy_in_Islamic_Jurisprudence.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh
| date_of_writing =
| subject = Islamic Economy
| genre =Analytical
| language =Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| effort_by =
| compiler =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| volume_count =1
| pages = 384
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah
| publication_place =Tehran
| publication_date = 1991 (1370 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
|electronic_version=
|other_volumes =
}}

'''Abstract'''
Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence (اقتصاد در فقه اسلامی), a work by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh, examines the foundations of the Islamic economic system. This system is based on three principles: 1. Diverse ownership (private, public, and state), which fundamentally differs from ownership in capitalism and socialism; 2. Economic freedom conditional upon Sharia laws, including intrinsic (moral) and objective (state laws) limitations; 3. [[Social justice]] centered on the provision of basic livelihood and class balance.

By citing verses (''ayat'') and narrations (''riwayat''), the authors consider [[private ownership]] to be based on labor, public ownership to encompass natural resources, and state ownership to include public wealth (''anfal'') and the Islamic one-fifth tax (''khums''). Furthermore, they elucidate the role of the government in economic supervision and the realization of justice (such as the prohibition of hoarding and usury). This work demonstrates that the Islamic economy is neither capitalist nor socialist; rather, it presents an independent model centered on human dignity and economic equilibrium.

== Brief Overview ==
Economy in Islamic Jurisprudence, a book in the field of [[Islamic economics]], is the result of a joint research project by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini and Mohammad Qazizadeh. The authors examine three principles: diverse ownership (private, public, and state), [[economic freedom]] (conditional upon compliance with regulations), and [[social justice]] as the main foundations of the Islamic economic school.

This book was published in Persian by Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah publications in Tehran in 1991 (1370 SH) in 384 pages.

=== Structure and Content of the Book ===
In the introductory section of the book, Hosseini and Qazizadeh have examined the concept of ownership (p. 9) and ownership in the prominent economic systems of the world (p. 31). Subsequently, they have separately explained the main topics of the book, namely the general structure of the Islamic economic system, under three principles: 1. Diverse ownership (p. 93), 2. Economic freedom limited by regulations (p. 204), and 3. The principle of social justice (p. 322). In this book, the foreword is located at the beginning, and the table of contents and sources are placed at the end of the work.

== Comparison of Ownership in World Economic Systems and Islam ==
After analyzing the principle of ownership in capitalist and Marxist systems, the authors have concluded that ownership in the Islamic economy fundamentally differs from these two systems. In the capitalist system, individual ownership is officially recognized, whereas socialism negates private ownership. In contrast, Islam advocates for diverse ownership (pp. 70-71).

According to the authors of the book, from the perspective of Islam, property and wealth are divine trusts, and God is considered the true and absolute owner of wealth; because God created property and wealth, and He placed human beings as His vicegerents (''khalifah'') on earth to cultivate it and benefit from its natural bounties. Islam has established the equal use of natural bounties for all people as a principle, without differentiating among individuals in society; because all are the creations and dependents of God (p. 85).

The authors believe that, in the view of Islam, the human being is the fundamental axis, not the economy, as they have deemed the ultimate goal to be the perfection of humanity, not property and wealth; therefore, all economic activities of production and distribution must be planned based on the preservation of human personality and dignity (p. 88).

== The Role of the Government in the Islamic Economy ==
Based on the contents of this research, the Islamic economy can only be fully implemented in society at any time and place under the aegis of an Islamic government that adheres to all the doctrinal, moral, and spiritual foundations of Islam; because most of the problems that humanity faces, past and present, pertain to the issue of incorrect and unjust production and distribution of manufactured goods, to the extent that in the contemporary world, more attention is paid to raising the level of production and improving the method of its distribution, which has been a focus of Islam since the past; as Imam Ali (a) ordered the observance of this crucial matter in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar (pp. 89-90). Subsequently, the authors examine the Islamic economic system under three principles:

== The Principle of Diverse Ownership ==
It is stated in this book that the religion of Islam has accepted private, public, and state ownership together, but not in the sense that the Islamic theory is a combination of capitalist and socialist systems; because the perspective of Islam is founded on principles that fundamentally differ from socialist and capitalist principles (pp. 94-95).

=== Private Ownership and the Ways of its Realization ===
According to the authors, in Islam, private ownership, the foundation of which is labor, is respected to a certain extent, and the basis of ownership in Islam is the respect for the rights of individuals and the preservation of their motivation for free effort and striving; as, based on evidence such as [[Verse 39 of Surah al-Najm]], human beings only own their own labor. Of course, in cases such as gift (''hibah'') and settlement (''sulh'') where individuals become owners without performing work, the acquisition is still based on labor, because it is the natural right of every individual to be able to freely transfer to others what they have acquired through work (pp. 100-102). Among the ways articulated in Islam for the realization of private ownership are:

Revitalization of dead lands (''ihya' al-mawat''); conditions are mentioned for owning dead lands, including: the land has not been enclosed (''tahjir''), it is not a place of worship, it has not been granted to someone else for revitalization, etc. (pp. 102-116).

Acquisition (''hiyazah''); by citing narrations, consensus (''ijma'''), and the conduct of the rational (''sirat al-'uqala''), the authors have argued for the ownership of permissible things (''mubahat'') through acquisition (pp. 117-121).

Hunting (''sayd''); by citing narrations, consensus, and the conduct of the rational, private ownership by means of hunting is undoubtedly accepted (pp. 122-125).

In the opinion of the authors, in the issue of inheritance (''irth'') and alimony (''nafaqah'') where individuals become owners without performing work, ownership is executed by the decree of the Lawgiver (''Shari'''), and in these two cases, the general rule of "labor is the basis of ownership" is breached (p. 127).

=== Public Ownership ===
Hosseini and Qazizadeh believe that whatever possesses public ownership has two aspects: negative and positive; the negative aspect indicates the prohibition of individual and private ownership; the positive aspect points to the permissibility of utilization for all individuals. Furthermore, they divide public ownership into two categories:

The ownership of all human beings, whether Muslim or non-Muslim; such as public ownership over waters and plants. However, in another section of the book, forests and seas are considered part of public wealth (''anfal'') and the property of the Infallible (''Ma'sum'') (pp. 172-175), and no explanation has been provided regarding the difference between these two sections;
The ownership of all Muslims; such as the ownership of all Muslims over cultivated lands that the army of Islam has conquered through war (pp. 130-131).

=== State Ownership ===
In the view of Hosseini and Qazizadeh, in Islam, a portion of properties and wealth has been placed in the possession of the state and the Islamic ruler. State ownership serves the purpose that the incumbent of the position of Imamate and the guardianship of society can secure the interests of Islam and Muslims (such as the needs of the armed forces, the propagation of knowledge, assistance to the needy, and the expenses of the progress and exaltation of society) (p. 138). The authors have examined state ownership under three headings: public wealth (''anfal'') (including barren lands, lands without owners, mines, oceans and major rivers, forests, etc.), the one-fifth tax (''khums''), and the public treasury (''bayt al-mal'') (including alms (''zakat''), the poll tax on protected non-Muslims (''jizyah ahl al-dhimmah''), financial penalties (''ta'zirat-i mali''), properties of unknown ownership (''amwal-i majhul al-malik''), and land tax (''kharaj'')). Many pages of the book are dedicated to the Quranic and narrative examination of the instances of these three headings (pp. 138-199).

In accordance with the discussion of the public treasury, the authors address how the public treasury was managed during the time of the third Caliph and refer to the Muslims' protests against his methods. They regard the Muslims' protests against Uthman as evidence of the un-Islamic nature of his conduct; for this reason, they believe that Uthman's behavior cannot be considered as derived from Islam and used to conclude that Islam entails feudalism and a class-based society (pp. 199-203).

== The Principle of Economic Freedom Limited by Religious Regulations ==
According to the authors of the book, Islam has established two types of limitations regarding social freedom in the economic sphere. The first type is "intrinsic and essential limitation," which stems from the depths of the human soul, and its goal is to create true spirituality in a free human being; for this reason, human beings do not consider it a restriction upon themselves. The matters that cause the emergence and realization of this intrinsic and essential limitation include: ethics, charitable spending (''infaq''), charity (''sadaqah''), altruism (''ithar''), avoiding the acquisition of unlawful (''haram'') property, and the like. Furthermore, to explain these concepts, the verses and narrations related to them have been mentioned (pp. 204-217).

The second type is "objective and external limitation." The purpose of this type of limitation is a force outside the essence of the human being that determines their social behavior and conduct, and controls their activities and freedom (pp. 219-220). This limitation is implemented in two ways:

State control and supervision; in Islam, to prevent economic abuses, the state has been granted the right to supervise all activities in order to protect public interests.
Specific economic laws; some of the controlling laws that deter oppression and tyranny are as follows: the prohibition of selling weapons to enemies, the prohibition of renting for unlawful work, the prohibition of assuming governance on behalf of an unjust ruler, the prohibition of printing and publishing misleading books (''kutub al-dalal''), the prohibition of fraud, the prohibition of shortchanging (''kam-foroushi''), the prohibition of gambling, the prohibition of bribery, the prohibition of hoarding (''ihtikar''), the prohibition of usury (''riba''), the prohibition of extravagance (''israf''), and the rule of no harm (''qa'idat la darar''). Approximately one hundred pages of the book are dedicated to explaining these prohibited trades (''makasib muharramah''), citing their proofs, and the statements of jurisprudents (''fuqaha'') (pp. 221-319).

== The Principle of Social Justice ==
In the opinion of Hosseini and Qazizadeh, in the Islamic economic system, the distribution of wealth has been designed in such a way that the realization of social justice is possible. In their view, the establishment of brotherhood and fraternity between the Emigrants (''Muhajirun'') and the Helpers (''Ansar'') by the Prophet (s), as well as God establishing financial obligations as part of Sharia acts of worship, were intended to increase the human spirit of benevolence and consolidate social justice (pp. 321-323).

According to the authors, the principle of social security is based on two pillars: universal sponsorship (''kafalah hamagani'') and the society's share in natural resources (social balance) (p. 325). To prove the mutual responsibility of Muslims and universal sponsorship, they have cited twenty narrations, concluding that the wealthy have a responsibility towards the needy and must provide for their minimum livelihood (pp. 326-339). By citing nine narrations, the authors also consider the state responsible towards all members of society to strive to alleviate the life deficiencies of low-income and no-income individuals (pp. 341-348).

To realize social justice, in addition to providing the minimum livelihood of the people, the state must also establish social balance so that the class gap is minimized, all individuals in society enjoy relative welfare and comfort, and a balanced and harmonious society is created. For this very reason, based on some narrations, alms (''zakat'') can be given to the poor until they reach the general economic level of the society (pp. 349-358).

[[Category:Bibliography articles]]
[[Category:Books about Islamic economics]]
[[Category:Books by Sayyid Jafar Hosseini]]
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Qazizadeh]]
[[fa:اقتصاد در فقه اسلامی (کتاب)]]

File:Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence.jpg

2026-04-01T13:15:57Z

Enadmin:

Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence (Book)

2026-04-01T13:15:03Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence | image = Islamic_Economy_in_Jurisprudence.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Mohammad Mehdi Ghaffari Sattar | date_of_writing = 2022 (1401 SH) | subject = Economic Jurisprudence | style = Reporting | language = Persian | editor = | corrected_by = | b..."

{{author
| author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence
| image = Islamic_Economy_in_Jurisprudence.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Mohammad Mehdi Ghaffari Sattar
| date_of_writing = 2022 (1401 SH)
| subject = Economic Jurisprudence
| style = Reporting
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| compiled_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 219
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Bartar Andishan
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2023 (1402 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
| other_volumes =
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence''' (اقتصاد اسلامی در فقه) is a Persian book written by Sayyid Mohammad Mehdi Ghaffari Sattar, intended to describe the Islamic economic system from a jurisprudential perspective. In three chapters, the author addresses topics such as economic schools of thought, their differences and impacts, the elucidation of economic principles from the perspective of Islam, the application of jurisprudential rules in economics, stating the position of ownership (Malikiyyah), labor, and production, and the role of these matters in the poverty and wealth of society, as well as elucidating the position and foundations of the Resistance Economy (Iqtisad-e Muqawamati) within the Islamic economy.

He considers resolving economic problems as a necessary prerequisite (Muqaddamah Wajib) known as serving the Islamic society. In his belief, discovering the Islamic economic system is possible through the process of independent reasoning (Ijtihad). According to the author, general and specific jurisprudential rules will help create the frameworks of the Islamic economic system. In his view, the Resistance Economy will lead to the growth and strengthening of the Islamic society from an economic standpoint.

== Introduction and Report on Structure ==
The book Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence, written by Sayyid Mohammad Mehdi Ghaffari Sattar, is a research work aimed at explaining and elucidating the principles of economics from the perspective of Islam, which was published in 2023 (1402 SH) in 205 pages. This book is organized into three chapters. In the first chapter, the author states generalities and introductory definitions of economics, its types, and its importance (pp. 19-28), economic schools of thought and ways of founding an economic school (pp. 28-37), and finally addresses the Islamic economic system and the research methodology within it (pp. 49-60), as well as the Resistance Economy and its requirements (pp. 61-83). In the second chapter, by stating the possibility of applying jurisprudential rules in economics and examining them (pp. 87-94), he points to the importance, types, and etiquettes of production and earning in jurisprudential and narrational sources (pp. 94-120), as well as examining personal interest and utilitarianism and their limitations (pp. 120-129), and mentioning instances of production in jurisprudential and narrational sources (pp. 129-139). In the third chapter, utilizing Islamic foundations (pp. 147-156), he discusses the position of economic jurisprudence in advancing the goals of the Resistance Economy (pp. 157-186).

The author's method in this book has merely been collecting verses, narrations, and jurisprudential opinions regarding certain economic topics and explaining them in categories; there is no analysis, examination, critique, or presentation of new opinions in the book.

== The Islamic Economic System and Its Importance ==
Considering verses from the Quran, including [[Verse 89 of Surah al-Nahl]] and [[Verse 20 of Surah al-Muzzammil]], and also relying on certain narrations, the author believes that solving economic issues and problems is a prerequisite for an obligation (Wajib) known as serving the Islamic society (pp. 19-25). In his belief, a specific school of economics is not delineated in Islamic sources; but by bringing together a collection of rulings, rights, and concepts, one can discover the general principles and fundamental theories regarding the Islamic economic school. According to him, Islamic economics is not a one-sided and purely economic perspective. Relying on the theory of [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]] and the [[sphere of the permissible|rule of the sphere of the permissible]] (Qa'idah Mintaqah al-Faragh), he believes that one of the most important ways of founding the Islamic economic system is the government and sovereignty (Hakimiyyah). He then points out that Islamic economics strives to adopt a method that is both realistic and ethical (pp. 33-43).

=== Method of Discovering the Islamic Economic System ===
In the author's belief, the method of discovering the economic system in Islam is possible through the pathway of *Ijtihad*; because establishing a connection between particular and secondary matters (Umur Juz'i wa Far'i) that take on the color and scent of time and place, and the fixed rulings of the school of thought (Maktab), will only be possible within the process of *Ijtihad*. Therefore, through *Ijtihad*, we must derive the rulings from the sources and express the theoretical design of the economic system based on the foundations of goals, values, strategies, and rulings (pp. 49-61).

=== The Theory of the Resistance Economy ===
The author considers the theory of the Resistance Economy to be a product of the Islamic economic system; because it is by employing the economic commands of Islam that one can achieve the requirements and characteristics of this theory. He continues by explaining, elucidating, and stating the characteristics of the Resistance Economy; including that the Resistance Economy attempts to change the existing economic structures and localize them based on the Islamic worldview and its goals. He also makes a reference to the background of the Resistance Economy theory and says: As an example, one can point to the establishment of the Islamiyyah Company by scholars ('Ulama) and merchants during the Tobacco Protest movement around the years 1300 AH (pp. 61-68). The fundamental principles of the Resistance Economy theory, according to the author, are: economic independence, social justice, the prosperity of work and production, [[private property]], increasing productivity, avoiding extravagance (Israf), jihadi movement, and attention to knowledge (pp. 69-83).

== Application of Jurisprudential Rules in Economics ==
Under the heading of the application of jurisprudential rules in economics, the author begins his discussion with the question: do jurisprudential rules have an application in economics or not? Before answering his question, he first divides jurisprudential rules into two categories: general jurisprudential rules like the [[No-Harm rule]] (Qa'idah La Darar) and the [[Rule of Negation of Authority]] (Qa'idah Nafi al-Sabil), and specific jurisprudential rules like the [[rule of destruction]] (Qa'idah Itlaf), the [[rule of acquisition]] (Qa'idah Hiyazah), and the [[rule of dominion]] (Qa'idah Taslit). He points out that general rules are applicable in all economic, political, and social dimensions; but specific rules are effective only in a specific aspect like economics (pp. 87-94).

According to the author, the No-Harm rule applies in economics in two ways: first, any ruling and law that causes harm and loss to individuals and society must be annulled; and second, all laws regarding business, production, etc., must be formulated according to this rule, otherwise that law lacks religious validity. He believes that according to the Rule of Negation of Authority, any kind of economic domination by disbelievers over Muslims is negated, such as not creating a right of pre-emption (Haqq al-Shuf'ah) for disbelievers and not accepting the trusteeship (Tawliyyah) of disbelievers over Muslim endowments (Mawqufat) (pp. 87-91). Based on the rule of destruction, which is derived from [[Verse 194 of Surah al-Baqarah]], the author considers wasting the properties of others without their permission as one of the instances of transgression (Ta'addi), which must be taken from the transgressor in the exact same amount (pp. 91-92). He also enumerates the rules of acquisition and dominion among the factors that create ownership, which jurists have documented according to verses and narrations (pp. 92-93).

== The Role of the Producer in Islamic Economy in Jurisprudence ==
Under the heading of the role of the producer in the economy, the author of the book, while referring to narrations about the importance of production and business (pp. 94-101), states the types of production in jurisprudential and narrational sources. Relying on narrations and jurisprudential books, he divides production into three types: forbidden (Haram), reprehensible (Makruh), and permissible (Mubah). The forbidden businesses mentioned in the book are: intrinsically impure substances (A'yan Najisah), instruments of amusement (Lahw) and gambling, selling weapons to the enemy, sculpting, singing (Ghina'), teaching magic and sorcery, renting out a house or animal for a forbidden act, and backbiting (Ghibah) (pp. 101-111). Money changing (Sarrafi), selling shrouds, hoarding food (Ihtikar), butchery, weaving, and cupping (Hijamah) are enumerated as reprehensible businesses in the book (pp. 111-115). The author considers awareness of the rulings of trade, cancellation of a contract (Iqalah), refraining from swearing oaths in buying and selling, etc., as part of the etiquettes of production that must be observed by producers (pp. 115-120). At the end of the second section of the book, the author considers agriculture and farming, animal husbandry, and trade and commerce as instances of production emphasized by narrations, for which a reward has been promised (pp. 129-139).

=== The Position of Personal Interest and Utilitarianism in Islamic Economy ===
In answering the question of whether personal interest and utilitarianism (profit maximization) are endorsed by narrations or not, the author of the book, by examining narrations, concludes that one cannot conceive a place for these two factors in Islam and they are not the foundation of the producer's behavior in the Islamic economy. Rather, what is important in the producer's behavior is the effort to produce goods to meet the needs of the Islamic society and one's own family (pp. 120-129).

== Foundations of Islamic Economy ==
Regarding the foundations of Islamic economy, by referring to the Holy Quran, the author believes that principles such as the principle of divine creatorship (Khaliqiyyah) and lordship (Rububiyyah), and the principle of divine ownership (Malikiyyah) and provision (Raziqiyyah) are the foundation of all discussions in Islamic economy. Also, in his belief, the belief in the Resurrection (Ma'ad) and accountability are among the principles that bring life to the Islamic economy and will have a significant impact on the Islamic economy from various aspects (pp. 147-156).

== The Position of Economic Jurisprudence in Advancing the Goals of the Resistance Economy ==
In the final chapter of the book, the author examines the foundations and position of the Resistance Economy within the Islamic economy. According to him, economic jurisprudence is an important part of Islamic jurisprudence that encompasses public and state properties (meaning Zakat, Anfal, Khums, and taxes); the religious means of acquiring ownership, generalizing, and protecting wealth (reviving dead lands or *Ihya' al-Mawat*, acquisition or *Hiyazah*, hunting, inheritance, slaughtering, endowment or *Waqf*, etc.); and commerce and other economic contracts (sale, trade, *Mudharabah*, etc.). He then proceeds to examine the position and the result of implementing each of these items in the Resistance Economy (pp. 157-173).

=== Islamic Management of the Market and Economic Transactions ===
The author considers the comprehensive management and supervision over production, distribution, and consumption as one of the fundamental matters of the economy, for the realization of which the provision of prerequisites is needed, which must be carried out by the Islamic government. He states that one of the important aspects of this supervision and management is discretionary punitive (Ta'ziri) measures against economic corrupters, including those who hoard (Ihtikar) items needed by the people. Furthermore, he refers to banks and states that the progress and preservation of production and the flourishing of the economy are possible with an efficient and healthy monetary and banking system (pp. 173-180).

=== Goals of the Resistance Economy ===
In the final section of the book, the author has stated matters such as the political sovereignty of Islam, the consolidation of spiritual and ethical values, self-sufficiency, development and growth, public welfare, and the increase of the economic power of the Islamic society as the goals of the Resistance Economy (pp. 180-186).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about Islamic Economy]]
[[Category:Sayyid Mohammad Mehdi Ghaffari Sattar Books]]
[[fa:اقتصاد اسلامی در فقه (کتاب)]]

File:Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking.jpg

2026-04-01T13:12:38Z

Enadmin:

Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking (Book)

2026-04-01T13:12:00Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mehdi Mohammadi | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }}{{infobox book | title = Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking | image = Granting_Facilities_in_Islamic_Banking.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Fatemeh Moghimi'an | date_of_writing = | subject = | style = Reporting-Analytical, Argumentative Jurisprudence | language = Persian | editor = | corrected_by = | by_the_ef..."

{{author
| author = Mehdi Mohammadi
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}{{infobox book
| title = Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking
| image = Granting_Facilities_in_Islamic_Banking.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Fatemeh Moghimi'an
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| style = Reporting-Analytical, Argumentative Jurisprudence
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 157
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Khorsandi
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2020 (1399 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

* '''Abstract'''
'''Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking''' (اعطای تسهیلات در بانکداری اسلامی) is a Persian book in the field of [[economic jurisprudence]] (Fiqh al-Iqtisadi). According to Fatemeh Moghimi'an, the author of the book, the main characteristic of participatory contracts (Uqud Musharakati) is the prohibition of determining a definitive profit before the completion of the economic activity. In a sleeping partnership contract ('Aqd al-Mudharabah), the loss resulting from trade will be borne by both parties, and unfortunately, bank operators are aware of the fictitious nature of the *Mudharabah* but pay no attention to its validity and religious compliance (Shar'i).

In the author's belief, in a partnership contract ('Aqd al-Shirkah), the partnership share (Sahm al-Shirkah) must be joint (Musha'). In exchange contracts (Uqud Mubadala'i), the profit rate can be determined as definitive and fixed. She states that in lease-to-own (Ijarah bi-Shart al-Tamlik), banks have placed the determination of the lessee's violations upon the banks themselves, which does not seem logical and fair. She calls reward contracts (Ju'alah) the "Mother of Contracts" (Umm al-'Uqud) and states that the legal relations in a *Ju'alah* contract are very complex; she also considers installment sales (Farush-e Aqsati) as identical to credit sales (Bay' Nasi'ah). According to the author, the maximum service fee rate in loan facilities (Tashilat-e Qardh) is 4 percent, but some banks charge a fee of up to 26 percent. Taking late payment penalties (Jarimah Ta'khir Ta'diyah), which is a discretionary punishment (Ta'zir) for capable debtors, is considered among other flaws of loan facilities.

== Introduction and Structure of the Book ==
The book "Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking" is the result of research by Fatemeh Moghimi'an, published in Persian by Khorsandi Publications in 2020 (1399 SH). Moghimi'an holds a master's degree in Islamic jurisprudence and law.

This book is organized into three chapters. The first chapter examines participatory contracts in the granted facilities under the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law (p. 19). In the second chapter, the exchange contracts existing in the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law regarding the granting of facilities are examined (p. 59), and the third chapter is dedicated to the loan contract ('Aqd al-Qardh) through which banks grant facilities to applicants (p. 119).

== Participatory Contracts ==
In examining participatory contracts (Uqud Musharakati), the author emphasizes that in these types of contracts, the bank provides the necessary capital to launch an economic activity and shares the resulting profit with the customer. The main characteristic of these contracts is the prohibition of determining a definitive profit before the end of the activity, and only determining the profit ratio between the parties is permissible.

=== The Mudharabah Contract ===
In the discussion of sleeping partnership (Mudharabah), the author considers it a revocable contract (Aqd Ja'iz) in which the capital is from one side and the labor from the other, and the potential profit is divided between them. *Mudharabah* in banking operations is implemented in such a way that the bank is the investor and the customer is the agent (Amil); the agent receives the capital, buys goods, and after selling, pays the agreed-upon profit to the bank (pp. 23–27). Among the characteristics of *Mudharabah* is its commutative (Mu'awwad) nature; meaning the agent provides a service, and in case of realizing a profit, the owner also has a share. However, this profit is not definitive, and in the absence of profit, the agent does not receive a substitute ('Iwadh). Also, the condition of determining a specific profit or absolving the owner from liability for loss is incompatible with the essence of the *Mudharabah* contract (pp. 24–26).

=== Critique of Banking Mudharabah Transactions ===
The flaws related to banking transactions in the field of granting facilities based on *Mudharabah* have several parts, and an attempt is made to address the most important of these flaws.

* The fictitious nature of the transactions: In the author's view, the first flaw in banking *Mudharabahs* is the fictitious (Suri) nature of many of these contracts; meaning their signing is not done based on the real intention (Qasd) of the parties. In most cases, the recipients of the facilities act merely to supply temporary financial needs and not to execute a real *Mudharabah*. Bank operators are also sometimes aware of this intention but overlook it. This is while the religious validity of the contract depends on the true intention of the parties (p. 31). If the borrower, without the intention of *Mudharabah*, acts merely to receive funds and repay them with an added amount, this act is considered usury (Riba); because the legitimacy of *Mudharabah* depends on its actual realization and not just the apparent signing of the contract (p. 31).

* Determining definitive profit: The author considers one of the important flaws in the execution of banking *Mudharabahs* to be the determination of a definitive profit. According to the directive, the bank must insert the minimum and maximum expected profit into the contract according to the resolution of the Money and Credit Council, whereas the real estimation of profit must be done based on multiple factors such as the customer's experience, the type and price of goods, the duration of the sale, and the amount of capital. However, in practice, banks at the time of settlement only suffice with the minimum determined profit (p. 34). Also, although the predicted profit varies within a range, determining a specific percentage as the bank's minimum share in the contract can cause the *Mudharabah* to distance itself from its real and religious form (pp. 33-35).

* Imposing loss on the customer: Banks, contrary to the principle of sharing in profit and loss in the *Mudharabah* contract, take a commitment from the agent to compensate for all the loss and receive heavy collaterals to guarantee it. This unilateral condition is incompatible with the participatory nature of *Mudharabah*. Although it is not problematic in the case of the agent's real consent, borrowers usually have no choice but to accept this condition (p. 36).

* Imposing insurance costs on the recipients of facilities: While according to the executive directive of *Mudharabah*, the insurance cost is upon the bank, the lack of initial investigation into the readiness of the conditions for concluding the contract, and the inexactness of the real duration required in the *Mudharabah* contract, are among other flaws directed at the usury-free banking system (pp. 32-38).

=== Partnership Contracts ===
Based on this research, "partnership" (Shirkah) in jurisprudence means the joint (Musha') ownership of several people in a property. In the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law as well, "civil partnership" (Musharakat-e Madani) refers to the combination of cash or non-cash partnership shares of natural or legal persons to gain profit based on a contract. In this type of partnership, the bank can enter into a transaction with one or more partners, and the partnership share must be joint; meaning none of the partners owns a specific part of the property, rather all of them are partners in the whole of it (pp. 40–44).

=== Critique of Banking Participatory Transactions ===
Some believe that the partnership contract (Aqd al-Musharakah) should be removed from the system of granting facilities. In their view, this type of contract requires precise religious and economic supervision, which is not realized in practice. Either the bank, seemingly and without real supervision, seeks a specific profit, which is incompatible with the nature of partnership; or it must employ expert appraisers for each project, which is beyond the capacity of commercial banks. Also, risks such as a lack of profitability or the provision of unrealistic reports by the customer might cause a loss to the bank (pp. 47–48).

In contrast, another group emphasizes the high importance of participatory contracts and even considers them a suitable alternative to other contracts. Pointing to the flexibility and high capacity of civil partnership, this group believes this contract can have positive performance in banks regarding return and profitability. From their perspective, inserting the "minimum expected profit" in civil partnership can act as an alternative to the "interest rate" in usurious banking and give high maneuvering power to banks (p. 49).

== Exchange Contracts ==
Exchange contracts (Uqud Mubadala'i) are a category of contracts in which a fixed profit rate can be determined, meaning that in exchange contracts, the bank, in return for paying a financial grant, can deduct a fixed and definitive percentage of its profit regularly from the customer's account.

=== 1. Lease-to-Own Contract ===
Based on the author's viewpoint, one of the most important contracts used by banks for granting facilities is the lease-to-own contract (Aqd Ijarah bi-Shart al-Tamlik* or Leasing). In this contract, it is stipulated that the lessee becomes the owner of the leased object at the end of the lease period and upon adherence to the provisions of the contract. Although the main goal of this contract is the development of service, agricultural, industrial, and mining activities, banks often apply it in the housing sector. The determination of the rent (Mal al-Ijarah) is also based on the cost price, the bank's expected profit, and the duration of the lease, and the duration of the lease must not exceed the useful life of the leased object (pp. 68-72).

'''Critique of Banking Lease-to-Own Transactions:''' According to the researcher, there is little inclination among applicants to receive facilities in the form of a lease-to-own contract. The main reason for this reluctance is the imbalance in the bargaining power of the parties; because the bank, as a capitalist institution, tries to gain the most profit with the least risk, while the other party, namely the customer, due to financial inability, is forced to accept the bank's conditions. This situation has caused unfair conditions to be imposed in the contracts (p. 74):

* The determination of the lessee's violation is placed upon the bank, and the lessee has no right to object.
* The responsibility for any loss, without transgression or negligence (Ta'addi wa Tafrit), is upon the lessee, and the bank determines the amount of the loss.
* The right of cancellation (Haqq al-Faskh) is stripped from the lessee and reserved unilaterally for the bank.
* In case of not paying even one installment, the contract is cancelled and the leased object is taken back.
* All costs of insurance, registration, and the attorney fee (Haqq al-Wikalah) for cancellation are also imposed on the lessee (pp. 75-77).

==== The Nature of the Lease-to-Own Contract ====
As quoted by Moghimi'an, one of the most important challenges and criticisms raised regarding the execution of the lease-to-own contract in the banking system is the disagreement over the nature of this contract. Some believe that in the event of a dispute or problem during the execution of the contract, there are no specific rulings and solutions to resolve it. From the perspective of this group, only two clear effects can be identified in this contract: one is the "initial transfer of ownership of the benefit" (Tamlik Ibtida'i Manfa'at) and the other is the "final transfer of ownership of the entity" (Tamlik Naha'i 'Ayn), and its other legal effects are ambiguous and unclear (p. 82). Regarding the nature of this contract, three viewpoints have also been raised. Some consider it merely a lease contract (Aqd al-Ijarah) in which the parties have stipulated that the transfer of ownership of the entity will take place in the future. Another group believes this contract is, in truth, a kind of sale (Bay'), and the lease is merely a cover for paying the transaction price in installments. The third viewpoint considers this contract a kind of independent and specific contract that is not a combination of lease and sale. Nevertheless, Moghimi'an considers the correct view to be that very first assumption and believes the main nature of this contract is a lease (p. 84).

=== 3. Reward Contract (Ju'alah) ===
Based on the author's findings, reward (Ju'alah) is one of the deep-rooted institutions in Islamic jurisprudence and civil law, by virtue of which the rewarder (Ja'il* or employer) commits to paying a specific amount (Ju'l) in exchange for the performance of a specific act. Banks in the usury-free banking system can, in the form of a *Ju'alah*, provide the necessary economic facilities as the agent (Amil) or, when necessary ('Ind al-Iqtida'), as the rewarder (pp. 85 and 90). *Ju'alah*, due to its applicability in all economic sectors, can be a complement or alternative to *Mudharabah*, which is exclusively applied in the field of trade. The breadth of subjects that can be encompassed and the ease of the conditions of this contract have caused some to refer to it as the "Mother of Contracts" (Umm al-'Uqud); because any act that is considered valuable from the perspective of rational people ('Uqala) can be the subject of a *Ju'alah* contract (p. 85).

'''Critique of Banking Ju'alah Transactions:''' Relying on the author's discussions, the granting of facilities in the form of *Ju'alah* by banks faces numerous flaws and shortcomings, some of the most important of which are mentioned in this section. First, the legal relations existing in the *Ju'alah* contract are very complex and intertwined, such that even for individuals familiar with legal concepts, a correct understanding of these relations is not easily possible; while the general public, who often constitute the applicants for these facilities, lack the necessary awareness to precisely understand these relations. Since the realization of the intention (Qasd) and will (Iradah) of the parties is a condition for the validity of any contract, and this matter depends on being aware of the provisions and subject of the contract, it is clear that in such a complex structure, the realization of the creative intention (Qasd Insha'i) is difficult and, consequently, the possibility of the contract being void (Batil) also exists (p. 95).

Another flaw is that based on jurisprudential and legal rules, the determination of the reward amount is upon the rewarder (employer); but in the current banking system, the bank appears in the position of the agent while at the same time determining the reward amount itself, which is incompatible with the legal structure of *Ju'alah* (p. 99). Also, the method of banks gaining profit through the difference between two *Ju'alah* contracts—one in the position of the agent in the primary contract and the other in the position of the rewarder in the secondary contract—is based on the difference in the reward price between these two contracts. This method of gaining profit, from a jurisprudential and ethical perspective, is not considered a proper method for securing banking interests (p. 96).

=== 4. Installment Sale Contract ===
In the author's belief, installment sale (Farush-e Aqsati) is a new phrase for an old transaction, because it is a type of credit sale (Bay' Nasi'ah) where the sold object (Mabi') is sold now and all or a portion of the price (Thaman) is paid later in known installments and over a specified period. It is clear that the price of a credit-sold object is higher than a sold object that is sold in cash; this contract is considered one of the most widely used facilities in the banking facility granting system (pp. 102-106).

'''Critique of Installment Sale Transactions in the Banking System:''' From the perspective of this research, the rate of installment sale (credit) could, due to two characteristics—the profit being known and its being definitive—be introduced as the best alternative to the interest rate. However, determining the installment sale rate in practice based on the interest rate has seriously challenged this optimism (p. 109). According to the executive directive for housing installment sales, banks are obligated to receive an amount as a down payment in cash before the contract, whereas before the contract, an advance receipt will have no relation to a transaction that will be carried out later (p. 110).

=== 5. Forward Sale (Bay' Salaf) ===
The researcher introduces forward sale (Bay' Salaf* or *Salam) as the opposite of credit sale (Nasi'ah), and in this regard says, a forward sale is buying a fungible entity (Kulli) with a term, in exchange for a cash price, contrary to credit sale, and the subject of the forward sale transaction consists of the cash advance purchase of products from production units in the industrial, mining, or agricultural sectors (pp. 112 and 114).

'''The Problem with Salaf Transactions in the Banking System:''' Despite the positive effects that the *Salaf* contract has on the economy and in aiding producers, in practice, banks do not greatly welcome concluding this contract for various reasons. Among these reasons are: paying the entire price of the sold object before receiving the sold object might not be economically viable, the market for the goods might not be in the bank's favor in the future, there is a possibility that the goods are perishable, and banks must pay costs such as warehousing and insurance (p. 117).

=== 6. Loan Contract (Aqd al-Qardh) ===
According to the author's statements, stipulating a benefit (Naf') in a loan (Qardh) is considered usury (Riba), and the condition of excess, whether mentioned in the contract or stated implicitly within it, is usury and forbidden (Haram), and it makes no difference whether the excess is an entity ('Ayn), a benefit (Manfa'at), or an attribute (Sifah); in any case, it is usury and forbidden. The distinguishing point in this contract is that the capital in a loan is always circulating and, through this contract, is placed in the hands of someone who needs it (pp. 124 and 120).

'''Critique of Loan Transactions in the Banking System:''' A considerable volume of the author's material is dedicated to critiquing the performance of banks in granting interest-free loan (Qardh al-Hasanah) facilities. The author believes that in many cases, the service fees received by banks exceed the real cost of the services; while according to the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law, costs must be calculated precisely and separately. Also, despite the determination of a customary fee rate between 2 to 4 percent by the Money and Credit Council, some banks receive up to 26 percent; an issue that some jurists consider an instance of usury (pp. 132 and 133).

The author also criticizes the lack of transparency in announcing the amount of the service fee and writes that in many cases, banks do not announce the exact amount of the fee before concluding the contract. This matter, since there is a possibility of the applicant withdrawing if informed of a high fee, conflicts with the principle of the parties' consent and leads to a contract involving risk/uncertainty (Aqd-e Gharari) (p. 133). Receiving a late payment penalty is also lacking a religious foundation in the author's view; because this penalty is considered a kind of discretionary punishment (Ta'zir), the determination of which is solely at the discretion of the religious ruler (Hakim al-Shar'), and its funds must be allocated to the public treasury (Bayt al-Mal), not deposited into the banks' accounts (p. 133).

Subsequently, the author points to other flaws such as the incomplete allocation of interest-free loan resources, the condition of opening an account and blocking a part of the deposit, deceptive advertisements with prizes, and strictness in granting loans to needy strata, and considers them contrary to the spirit of usury-free banking (pp. 131–136).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Fatemeh Moghimi'an Books]]
[[Category:Books about Bank Facilities]]
[[fa:اعطای تسهیلات در بانکداری اسلامی (کتاب)]]

File:Ghedeh-keramate-ensan.jpg

2026-04-01T13:04:09Z

Enadmin:

The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule (Book)

2026-04-01T13:03:23Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mohammad Ali Soltan-Moradi | compilation = }} {{infobox book | title = The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule | image = Ghedeh-keramate-ensan.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi | date_of_writing = 2021 (1400 SH) | subject = Human Dignity, Inherent Human Rights in Jurisprudence | style = Ijtihadi (Independent Reasoning) | language = Persian | editor = | by_the_effort_of = | illu..."

{{author
| author = Mohammad Ali Soltan-Moradi
| compilation =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule
| image = Ghedeh-keramate-ensan.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi
| date_of_writing = 2021 (1400 SH)
| subject = Human Dignity, Inherent Human Rights in Jurisprudence
| style = Ijtihadi (Independent Reasoning)
| language = Persian
| editor =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes = 1 volume
| number_of_pages = 174 pages
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Saraee
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2021 (1400 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}
* '''Abstract'''

'''The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule''' (اصل کرامت انسان به مثابه قاعده‌ای فقهی) is the title of a book written by [[Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi]], an Iranian Shia jurist (Faqih) and Quranic researcher. This book examines the relationship between the foundations of Shia jurisprudence and the concept of [[human dignity|inherent human dignity]] (Karaman Dhatiyyah). The fundamental question of the book is whether a principle titled "[[human dignity]]" can be derived from certain verses of the Holy Quran—such as [[Verse 70 of Surah al-Isra]]—so that it governs over other religious rulings in case of conflict.

The author, in explaining the concept of dignity (Karamah), distinguishes between the two concepts of inherent dignity and contingent (Iqtida'i) or potential (Isti'dadi) dignity. In his view, the concept of "inherent dignity" can be deduced from the religious foundations of Islam and can be the basis for establishing a jurisprudential principle. The book's claim is that in addition to reason and the Quran, several hundred narrations (Riwaiyat) from the Infallibles (a) contain explanations of inherent dignity and its related domains.

This work presents a report of the views of those who oppose human dignity being a principle and responds to them. It also argues that proving such a principle causes it to govern over all religious rulings, similar to the "principle of justice." This matter will have a significant impact on the jurisprudential rulings regarding women, minorities, slavery, and political and governmental rulings. Among the positive points of this work are its concise volume, simple expression, and explicit arguments. On the other hand, some of the author's statements cause a conflation of the meaning of inherent dignity with accidental ('Aradhi) concepts of dignity, such as "the prohibition of insulting human beings," which can be considered among the work's points of critique.
== Brief Overview ==
The book The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule takes a jurisprudential look at this rational principle. In this book, the author attempts to: 1) clarify the concept of dignity in Quranic literature and customary usages; 2) distinguish the two concepts of "inherent dignity" and "contingent (potential) dignity" from one another; 3) prove that "human dignity" must be a principle governing religious rulings; and 4) answer the objections of the critics of this theory. This book is one of the few works specifically dedicated to this subject and its impact on Shia jurisprudence.
=== Author ===
The author of the book, [[Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi]], born in 1954 (1333 SH), is an Iranian Shia jurist and Quranic researcher. He is a jurisprudential and Quranic researcher at the Islamic Seminary of Qom and a faculty member at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran.
=== Structure ===
In the introduction of the work, the author addresses the lexical definition of dignity and its terminological meaning in the religious texts of Islam. Then he clarifies the position of the principle of dignity among other principles such as justice. He also explains to what extent the recognition and acknowledgment of the existential dimensions of the human being is necessary for achieving a coherent jurisprudential system.

The main body of the work begins by examining the effects and results of deriving the principle of [[human dignity]] and shows what impact this principle will have on the jurist's understanding and interpretation of verses and narrations, what effect it has on the jurist's utilization of the principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh), how it transforms rulings that violate human dignity, and how it answers doubts and objections regarding issues such as "[[jurisprudence and human rights]]", "[[jurisprudence and citizenship rights]]", and "[[women's right to vote]]". In the next chapter, the evidence and foundations of the principle of dignity are examined, evidence such as the verse "And We have certainly honored the children of Adam" (Wa laqad karramna bani Adam) ([[Verse 70 of Surah al-Isra|Isra: 70]]) and "Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you" (Inna akramakum 'inda Allahi atqakum) ([[Verse 13 of Surah al-Hujurat|Hujurat: 13]]). After formulating the content of the mentioned verses, the issues that exist in the path of deriving the principle from these verses are examined: the inherent nature of human dignity, human dignity being a principle, the possibility of using a theological (Kalami) principle in deriving a religious ruling, the scope of the principle of dignity, the method of discovering the criterion of dignity, and examples of conflict between the principle of dignity and jurisprudential rulings.

In concluding the work, the author presents his proposal regarding the establishment of a "Chapter on the Jurisprudence of Dignity" (Bab Fiqh al-Karamah). According to his proposal, in this chapter, those secondary jurisprudential rulings (Furu' al-Fiqh) that will undergo change considering the principle of dignity can be compiled and reviewed.

=== Methodology ===
The book The Principle of Human Dignity is fundamentally related to the "foundations of the science of jurisprudence" (Mabani Danish Fiqh); therefore, the possibility of a purely jurisprudential discussion did not exist in it. The author begins his work with a conceptual analysis of "dignity", then states its philosophical and theological position—alongside Quranic evidence and its exegesis—and finally proceeds to show the effects of such a principle in the science of jurisprudence and the process of deriving religious rulings. At this stage, the author enters into independent jurisprudential (Ijtihadi) discussions and utilizes the principial (Usuli) method.

== Claims ==
The author's main claim is that "dignity" is a principle pertaining to the human being and derived from his essence. In the literature of this work, being inherent (Dhati) means: 1) its actual existence in the human being; 2) its commonality among all human beings of any race, religion, etc.; and 3) its exclusivity to the human being and not other creatures. Therefore, firstly, dignity is a matter related to the quiddity (Mahiyyah) of the human being qua human being, and the discussion of acquiring dignity through effort and endeavor is not applicable. Secondly, no ruling in the Sharia can violate the principle of human dignity. Proving this principle will cause a revision in rulings that are based on gender, racial, ethnic, and even religious superiority.

Opposed to this view, there is a theory that, firstly, does not consider dignity inherent to human nature; rather, it maintains that the religious evidence for dignity merely refers to a human being who possesses the conditions of Islam's value system or even the (Shia) denomination (Madhhab), not all human beings. Secondly, it does not consider it a jurisprudential principle and says that it belongs to other fields of knowledge.

The importance of proving the "inherent nature" of human dignity lies in the fact that the "concept of dignity" can only be a jurisprudential principle through this way. Potential and contingent dignity lacks the capacity (Sha'niyyah) to establish the jurisprudential principle of dignity. If dignity were potential and contingent, the door would be left open for inappropriate behavior with non-Muslims, and this matter is contrary to the conduct (Sirah) of the Infallibles (a) (p. 74).

=== Argument for Inherent and Contingent Dignity ===
Using rational evidence, Quranic proofs, and narrational reasons, the author argues for inherent human dignity. According to the rational argument, the distinction of humans from other creatures and their nobility over them is due to human will, meaning that which causes human free will (Ikhtiyar) to accept or reject the divine ruling, to agree or disagree with the good, and to choose Heaven or Hell. The main reason for human dignity is this very inherent characteristic of the human being. Therefore, dignity is inherent to the human being. From the content and sometimes explicit statements of the author, it also appears that he considers "human dignity"—alongside the principle of the sovereignty of the will and justice as fairness—a philosophical or ultimately theological principle that governs religious rulings, not that it is itself a jurisprudential principle.

The Quranic argument for the principle of dignity is based on [[Verse 70 of Surah al-Isra]]. From the content of this verse and verses with a similar theme, it appears that dignity fundamentally belongs to God, and He has bestowed it upon the human being. This verse begins with the expression "O children of Adam" (Ya bani Adam); thus, it is a ruling about the human species and not a specific group of humans. Also, this verse is not in the position of reporting an event in the past; rather, it enumerates dignity as an inherent characteristic of the human being. Other Quranic signs for inherent human dignity can be listed as follows: the verse of bearing the trust (Amanah), being God's vicegerent (Khilafah Allah) (in the sense of manifesting divine names), the praising of human creation, and the breathing of the divine spirit (Nafkh Ruh Ilahi). It seems the author's final view is that, from the perspective of the Quran, the meaning and importance of dignity—alongside concepts like justice, good (Ma'ruf), and benevolence (Ihsan)—are clear to its audience, and it only points to it by way of guidance to the ruling of reason (p. 83).

The third argument of the book is an argument based on narrations. According to the author, contrary to the claim of opponents of human dignity being a principle, several hundred narrations from the Infallibles (a) contain explanations of dignity and its domains. Although the concept of dignity is not explicitly stated in some of these narrations, they include concepts such as the preciousness of the human being and the safeguarding of human rights, including disbelievers, the dead, and even human fetuses (p. 69). In addition, many other concepts that are called jurisprudential principles today—such as the principle of permissibility (Hilliyyah) and purity (Taharah)—did not appear under the title of a principle in Shia narrational literature.

=== Responding to the Arguments of Opponents of Dignity as a Principle ===
The author attempts to briefly state the arguments of the opponents of human dignity as a principle and respond to them. The summary of the objections and the author's answers is as follows:
* Conflating description and prescription: Some maintain that one cannot derive a legal and jurisprudential prescription from the description of a factual matter (the preciousness of the human being) (p. 103). The author responds that due to the sensitivity and importance of the subject, there is a strong connection between this existential truth and the prescriptive command derived from it, and if this were not the case, mentioning it in the Quran would be futile (Laghw).
* Lack of connection between a theological principle and a jurisprudential rule: The principle of human dignity—assuming it is proven—is a theological principle, and a legal or jurisprudential derivation from it is not possible. In response, the author, pointing to various verses, shows that normative (Hanjari) jurisprudential and legal propositions can be derived from descriptive theological propositions.
* Conflict with definitive and essential rulings: This principle conflicts with definitive rulings such as retaliation (Qisas), stoning (Rajm), etc. The author replies: (First) The principle of dignity only conflicts with Ash'arite-style interpretations of the Quran, not with the explicit text of the Quran. (Second) A careful examination of the narrations shows that the claimed conflicts do not actually exist. (Third) Ultimately, many rulings that are contrary to human dignity and are assumed to be definitive are fundamentally based on solitary (Wahid) or multiple but not widely transmitted (Mutazafir) reports.

=== Effects of the Principle of Dignity on Jurisprudence ===
According to Ayazi's viewpoint, accepting human dignity as a jurisprudential principle is effective in deriving a religious ruling in various ways. 1) It will direct interpretation. 2) It is effective in applying jurisprudential rules; for example, it can serve as one of the main factors of preference (Murajjihat) in resolving conflicts of evidence (Ta'adul wa Tarajih). The application of inherent dignity to its instances is typological (Naw'i) (meaning it depends on the discernment of the human species, not individual discernments) and customary ('Urfi) (meaning its instances are variable depending on changes in time and place).

This principle can also be the basis for many principial (Usuli) rules, such as the principle of non-guardianship (Asalah 'Adam al-Wilayah) (that no one is inherently the guardian of another), the principle of validity (Asalah al-Sihhah) (that the actions of individuals possess legal and religious validity), the principle of exemption (Asalah al-Bara'ah) (the initial innocence of a human being from crime or error), and the principle of purity (Asalah al-Taharah) (the principle of the non-impurity of a human being, whether Muslim or non-Muslim).

Proving this ruling also has a serious impact on the rulings of slavery, whether this issue was imposed on Islam—and the rulings of "emancipation" ('Itq) were Islam's way of gradually freeing society from slavery—or whether it is a reality endorsed by Islam. Also, this principle opposes rulings that are based on gender discrimination and male superiority. This principle negates rulings that humiliate the people of the covenant (Ahl al-Dhimmah) or rulings that negate the citizenship rights of those born of fornication (Walad al-Zina) (pp. 141-157).

=== The Principle of Dignity Among Contemporary Jurists ===
The author cites the opinion and understanding of some contemporary jurists as corroboration for his own understanding. In his view, [[Morteza Motahhari]]'s rational argument for the principle of justice governing the secondary rulings (Furu') is like arguing for human dignity as a principle. [[Hussein-Ali Montazeri]], [[Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah]], and [[Yousef Saanei]] have also pointed to this issue being a principle. In the view of some of them, the principle of human dignity fundamentally includes a set of principles that present the type of worldview governing religious rulings in the station of derivation (p. 95).

== Evaluation of the Work ==
Concise volume, avoidance of verbosity, explicit arguments, and clear expression are among the merits of this work. However, considering that this book is one of the first works to specifically address this subject, it has the potential for improvement and enhancement in various aspects. For example, the structure of presenting the materials is such that it has sometimes led to repetition. Also, the author has included Arabic quotes in parts of the book, which would have been appropriate to use their Persian translation in a Persian-language book.

=== Possibility of Bestowing Dignity ===
The most fundamental claim of this book is the "inherent nature of human dignity." Proving this claim will cause it to be a principle governing all jurisprudential principles and rules; because no principle or rule can contradict the inherent characteristics of its subject.

In philosophical literature, human dignity refers to inherent attributes in a human being whose negation is equivalent to negating human identity.<ref> [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/#KantAccoRespForPers Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Respect: Kant's Account] </ref> In legal literature as well, based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human dignity refers to fundamental rights that are common among all human beings—regardless of any kind of difference—and their deprivation is not permitted under any circumstances.<ref> [https://ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/prs.pdf Text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the website of the United Nations Information Centre in Tehran] </ref> Raising discussions such as examining the cremation of corpses, financial assistance to the needy, and insulting ideological opponents alongside and on the same level as the discussion of freedom of choice and the negation of gender and racial discrimination shows—even though all these have been distinguished from some instances of contingent dignity—that the foundation of the book is not based on this fundamental distinction. This lack of distinction has caused a conflation between inherent and contingent dignity in some cases. Examples such as examining the issue of women's hijab, the sanctity of the family, fulfilling covenants, delaying benevolence, and forgiveness (pp. 133-136) under the concept of dignity indicate that this concept has been considered on par with magnanimity or ultimately the proximity of human status to God (p. 62).

Also, from some of the author's propositions, it appears that "human dignity" is the effect of God's bestowal (p. 55) or, in other words, an adornment with which the human being has been "adorned" (p. 61). Such a claim will lead to the non-inherent nature of this principle, and ultimately, other jurisprudential principles might prevent its application. Therefore, it seems that in parts of this work, there is no clear distinction between human dignity and concepts such as the sanctity (Hurmah) of human beings, the negation of insult, humiliation, and disrespect to human beings.

=== Exegesis of Narrations ===
Throughout the work, the importance of the narrations of the Infallibles (a) in the discussion of human dignity is pointed out; but these narrations are not addressed in detail in any chapter. One of the possibilities that could have led to greater richness of the work was to examine the narrations using a research method—such as the semantics of narrations, or their historical analysis—and to show the importance of the discussion of human dignity in the literature of the Infallibles (a).

== Footnotes ==
{{Footnotes}}

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi Books]]
[[Category:Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence Books]]
[[fa:اصل کرامت انسان به مثابه قاعده‌ای فقهی (کتاب)]]

File:The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law.jpg

2026-04-01T12:59:50Z

Enadmin:

The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law (Book)

2026-04-01T12:59:21Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law | image = The_Principle_of_Expediency_in_the_Islamic_Legislative_System_and_Its_Application_in_Family_Law.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | original_title = | author = Mohammadreza Moradi Posht-e Darba..."

{{author
| author = Sayyid Ali Hosseini Nasab
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law
| image = The_Principle_of_Expediency_in_the_Islamic_Legislative_System_and_Its_Application_in_Family_Law.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| original_title =
| author = Mohammadreza Moradi Posht-e Darbandi
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| style =
| language = Persian
| original_language =
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| compiled_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 293
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Aftab-e Giti
| place_of_publication =
| publication_date = 2020 (1399 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
| other_volumes =
}}
* '''Abstract'''

'''The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law''' (اصل مصلحت در نظام قانونگذاری اسلامی و تطبیق آن در حقوق خانواده) is a book in the field of the [[jurisprudence of expediency]] (Fiqh al-Maslahah) that examines how the rule of expediency is applied in family law. Mohammadreza Moradi Posht-e Darbandi, the author of the book, by articulating the legitimacy of expediency, its applications, the criteria of expediency in issuing [[governmental ruling|governmental rulings]] (Ahkam Hakumati), as well as the evidence for the authority (Hujjiyyah) of governmental and state rulings (Ahkam Wila'i), has investigated the principle of expediency in the [[legislation|Islamic legislative system]]. In this work, he has examined the employment of expediency under various headings such as the philosophy of legislating religious rulings, the reason for deriving religious rulings, and the constraint on the object (Muta'allaq) of religious rulings. Moradi has dedicated an important part of this book to the principle of expediency in the thought of Imam Khomeini, with an emphasis on family law. However, in the final section, where the principle of expediency was supposed to be applied to family issues, no fundamental point has been articulated, and the author has sufficed with reporting topics about the status of the family in Islam.

== Brief Overview and Report on Structure ==
The book The Principle of Expediency in the Islamic Legislative System and Its Application in Family Law is a Persian book in the field of the jurisprudence of expediency, written by Mohammadreza Moradi Posht-e Darbandi, which applies the issue of expediency to family law. This book was published by Aftab-e Giti Publishing Institute in 2020 (1399 SH). The author considers one of the ways of the dynamism of jurisprudence, and consequently the immortality of the religion of Islam, to be connected to the existence of the element of expediency, and believes that governmental jurisprudence is based on expediency, and these two elements seek to introduce religion into all spheres of life, including family law (pp. 10-11).

The book, which seems to have originally been a thesis, contains numerous repetitive discussions and abundant typographical errors, which has reduced its utility.

=== Structure ===
The author has organized the book into four chapters. The first chapter of the book is dedicated to introductory discussions and defining words and terms such as expediency (Maslahah), corruption (Mafsadah), secondary rulings (Ahkam Thanawiyyah), and family (pp. 10-14). In the second chapter, he addresses conceptual and theoretical foundations concerning the conceptualization of Sharia, jurisprudence (Fiqh), independent reasoning (Ijtihad), and the position of expediency in the station of discovering and deriving new rulings and issuing governmental rulings (pp. 16-108).

The third chapter of the book, titled The Principle of Expediency in Jurisprudence and Islamic Legislation, is dedicated to topics such as the position of expediency in Imami jurisprudence, the characteristics of unrestricted interests (Masalih Mursalah) and the scope of its validity in Shia jurisprudence, a comparison between [[unrestricted interests]] and governmental rulings, the role of the expediency of the system in Islamic jurisprudence, and the relationship between jurisprudence and expediency, as well as obligation (Taklif) and expediency (pp. 110-186).

In the final chapter of the book, the principle of expediency in the thought of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] is examined with an emphasis on family law. In this section, topics regarding expediency in various dimensions are discussed, including the relationship between expediency and the subjects of religious rulings, the Expediency Discernment Council, public expediency, the principle of expediency and the family system, etc. (pp. 188-286).

== Main Concepts ==
The author considers divine Sharia to be purposeful and attributes objectives (Maqasid) to Sharia (p. 25), which are pointed to in a large portion of verses and narrations (p. 31). The author also defines jurisprudence and *Ijtihad* and mentions divisions for *Ijtihad*. He views expediency in the very meaning of good (Khayr), rightness (Salah), and benefit (Manfa'at) (p. 44). In a part of the book, he pays attention to the relationship between expediency and necessity (Dharurah) and harm (Darar) (p. 66). The relationship between wisdom (Hikmah) and expediency, as well as the difference between jurisprudential expediency and theological expediency, also form part of the book's contents in explaining the main concepts. The impact of expediencies and corruptions on changing rulings into state rulings or secondary rulings, and the impact of expediencies in the discussion of overlapping rulings (Tazahum al-Ahkam) are also among the topics of this section (pp. 75-79). A detailed section of the book is dedicated to defining unrestricted interests (Masalih Mursalah) and blocking the means (Sadd al-Dhara'i') and their position in Sunni jurisprudence, and the author has also included the view of the Shia in this regard (pp. 82-99).

The title of the second part of the second chapter is Expediency and Jurisprudence, and in it, after referring to the scope of expediency in jurisprudence, the author has also reported instances of the application of expediency in Shia jurisprudence. After repeating the discussion on governmental rulings, he has also pointed to the position of expediency in the field of women's jurisprudence (pp. 98-108).

== Foundations of Paying Attention to Expediency in Deriving Rulings ==
The author considers the foundation for paying attention to the element of expediency in deriving rulings to be the [[subordination of rulings to expediencies and corruptions|subordination of rulings to expediencies and corruptions]] (Taba'iyyah al-Ahkam li al-Masalih wa al-Mafasid). He explains that since expediency is an innate (Fitri) and rational ('Uqala'i) matter, and on the other hand, religious rulings have [[fixed and varying rulings|fixed and varying aspects]], and also due to the immortality of the religion of Islam, and that expediency is rooted in rational good and evil (Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli), one must pay attention to expediency in deriving rulings (pp. 46-48). In his belief, expediency is the basis for enacting and legislating religious rulings, the basis for managing society, and for issuing governmental rulings (pp. 50-61). The author has reported the differences between a governmental ruling and a religious ruling and then examined the role of expediency in governmental rulings (pp. 57-58). He has articulated criteria for issuing governmental rulings based on expediency; including employing expediencies to realize the transcendent goals of Islam, the non-opposition of expediencies to general religious rulings, observing the law of the more important and the important (Ahamm wa Muhimm), and observing expertise and specialized assessment (pp. 61-66).

In the third chapter, titled The Principle of Expediency in Jurisprudence and Islamic Legislation, the author first discusses the position of expediency in the very act of legislation (Asl al-Tashri') and then points to the connection of the word expediency with the terms cause (Sabab), criterion (Milak), and basis (Manat), which should have been placed in the previous chapter. A part of the contents of this chapter is about rulings in which expediency has been considered in the object of the religious ruling (pp. 116-123).

In the third chapter, under the heading of Expediency as a Reason for Deriving Religious Rulings, the author reopens the discussion on unrestricted interests (Masalih Mursalah), and after a report on the opinions of the Sunnis and Imamis regarding its authority, he compares it with governmental rulings and the proof of reason (Dalil al-'Aql), concluding that in a governmental ruling, derivation or legislation does not exist, and the issue falls under the category of overlapping duties (Tazahum) (p. 140).

=== The Role of the Expediency of the System in Islamic Jurisprudence ===
The author of the book, under a section titled The Role of the Expediency of the System in Islamic Jurisprudence, while repeatedly defining certain concepts like expediency, necessity, the ruling of reason, and the like, presents a report on the divisions of rulings into authoritative (Mawlawi), guiding (Irshadi), state (Wila'i), and governmental (Hakumati). He discusses the capability of reason to understand religious rulings, and regarding the role of reason, denies its capability to recognize authoritative rulings but accepts its capability to recognize guiding and [[endorsing rulings|endorsing]] (Imdha'i) rulings (pp. 143-150). After extensive discussions, the author concludes that the Islamic ruler can change some rulings based on the principle of overlapping duties and the rule of the more important and the important (pp. 170-171).

=== Evidence for the Authority of Governmental and State Rulings ===
In Moradi's opinion, the Islamic ruler, by virtue of his expertise in religious knowledge and his familiarity with the requirements of time and place, has an opinion that must be observed in implementing religion, just like any other expert. "Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you" (Ati'u Allah wa ati'u al-Rasul wa uli al-amr minkum) is a guidance toward this reality, and just as the discernment of expediency by a doctor, engineer, etc., possesses rational authority (Hujjiyyah 'Uqala'iyyah) by way of attaining certainty (Itmi'nan), the discernment of expediencies and corruptions and the attainment of certainty by the ruler are also sufficient for enacting and establishing his ruling, and for this reason, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) possesses absolute guardianship (Wilayah Mutlaqah) (pp. 153 to 158).

== Expediency in the Thought of Imam Khomeini ==
The fourth chapter of the book is dedicated to reporting expediency in the thought of Imam Khomeini and its application to the family system. In this chapter, the author again begins the discussion by mentioning theoretical preliminaries, such as the relationship between right (Haqq), expediency, and duty (Taklif), and the divisions of rulings, a large part of which appeared in the previous sections. The author then, in a discussion titled The Role of Expediency in the Conflict of Religious Rulings, addresses the overlapping of rulings (Tazahum al-Ahkam) in governance, and it is unclear why he titled the discussion conflict (Ta'arudh). Through this pathway, he enters the discussion of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System and explains its position, which is actually the position of leadership to resolve disputes between two legislative institutions in Iran (pp. 200-208). However, this discussion is more a historical report on the formation of the Expediency Council rather than theoretical and jurisprudential discussions.

The author, during a detailed discussion about public expediency (Maslahat 'Umumi), concludes that in the view of Imam Khomeini and Shia jurists, public expediency is only applicable in the context of determining the subjects (Mawdhu'at) of secondary rulings (p. 220). He considers the way to discern these public expediencies to be an assembly of experts and specialists in various fields, operating under the supervision of a knowledgeable jurist (pp. 220-226). The author also reports that in Imam Khomeini's literature, terms such as the expediencies of the country, the expediencies of the Muslims, the expediency of the system, the expediency of Islam, and the like have been used, and he concludes that in his literature, the expediency of the people is raised alongside the expediency of Islam, and they accompany each other (pp. 226-237).

According to the book's report, the ruler's ruling must revolve around expediency, and the mechanism for applying expediency must also be based on law, and the ability to discern expediency is itself one of the criteria for selecting a ruler (pp. 239-241). In his belief, the political leadership of the Islamic society during the era of occultation (Ghaybah) is among the positions and duties of the [[Guardian Jurist]] (Wali al-Faqih), who must issue rulings for administering affairs and managing the Islamic society, and implement plans and programs to bring about the material and spiritual progress of the Islamic society. He must observe expediency in designing and executing all his political, economic, and cultural programs, and discern it in consultation with experts and the elite of the Ummah, or entrust its discernment to a group of trustworthy, reliable, and respectable experts. Meanwhile, he must take care that these expediencies do not contradict religious rulings (pp. 255-258).

== Application of the Principle of Expediency to the Family System ==
In the applied section of the book, which focuses on applying the discussion of expediency to the family system, the author initially spends many pages defining the family and related topics that have no connection to the discussion of expediency (pp. 258-275). The only point relevant to the discussion in this section of the book is that the foundation of the formation of the family is based on the principle of collective expediency (p. 277), and the author does not provide any specific explanation about this principle either. He does, however, detail that the collection of legal family laws, from before marriage to the formation of the family, and even in the stage of separation, guarantees the legal consolidation of the family (pp. 282-285).

[[Category:Expediency Jurisprudence Books]]
[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[fa:اصل مصلحت در نظام قانون‌گذاری اسلامی و تطبیق آن در حقوق خانواده (کتاب)]]

File:Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition.jpg

2026-04-01T12:54:36Z

Enadmin:

Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition (Book)

2026-04-01T12:53:40Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mehdi Mohammadi | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition (Book) | image = Women's_Employment_and_the_Limits_of_the_Husband's_Prohibition.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Esrafil Sobhani | date_of_writing = 2016 (1395 SH) | subject = Family Jurisprudence / Women's Employment | style =..."

{{author
| author = Mehdi Mohammadi
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition (Book)
| image = Women's_Employment_and_the_Limits_of_the_Husband's_Prohibition.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Esrafil Sobhani
| date_of_writing = 2016 (1395 SH)
| subject = Family Jurisprudence / [[Women's Employment]]
| style = Argumentative Jurisprudence
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 216
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Khorsandi Publications
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2020 (1399 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website = https://www.khorsandypub.com/
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition''' (اشتغال زن و حدود مانعیت زوج) is a Persian book about women's rights that, from a jurisprudential, legal, and social perspective, seeks to examine the limitations of [[women's employment]] as well as to determine the limits of the husband's authorities in this issue within Islamic society. According to the belief of Shahla Jahanbazi and Fariba Hajiali, the authors of the book, Islam and the Quran have taken great steps in favor of women, have not differentiated between men and women, and have also paid attention to women's employment. According to them, women during the era of the Prophet were engaged in common professions of that time, such as medicine.

In the authors' belief, one of the most important reasons for the permissibility of women's employment is the verse "[[Verse 32 of Surah al-Nisa|And for women is a share of what they have earned]]" (wa lil-nisa'i nasibun mimma iktasabna), and on the other hand, they consider the story of Jethro's (Shu'ayb) daughters and the story of the Queen of Sheba in the Quran as supporting this permissibility. Based on the book's report, the majority of jurists believe in the permissibility of women's employment; although, in the event of a conflict (Tazahum) between work and family interests, they consider the interests to have priority. Among the jurists' reasons is the [[rule of dominion]] (Qa'idah al-Taslit).

In the authors' belief, in Article 28 of the Constitution, having a job is considered one of the natural rights of every individual, whether man or woman; of course, women's competence for employment in the judiciary has been negated by law. Also, according to civil law, a husband has the right to prohibit his wife's employment in specific jobs due to incompatibility with family interests or the dignity of the spouses; however, he cannot prevent the wife's right to employment. Therefore, a woman can change her job so that it is not incompatible with family interests.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition is the result of joint research by Shahla Jahanbazi, holding a master's degree in women's studies, and Fariba Hajiali, an associate professor at the Faculty of Theology at Alzahra University, which was published in Persian by Khorsandi Publications in 2020 (1399 SH). This book is about one of the most important rights of women, namely their employment, and determining the extent of the husband's authorities in imposing limitations on the wife's employment. From a jurisprudential, legal, and social viewpoint, the authors of the book seek to examine the issue of women's employment, the existing problems within it, as well as strategies to solve the dilemmas (p. 13).

=== Structure ===
The book Women's Employment and the Limits of the Husband's Prohibition is organized into eight chapters. The initial chapter deals with generalities and the semantics of concepts such as employment, housewife, women's employment, marital disobedience (Nushuz), and a disobedient wife (Nashizah) (pp. 15-24). The second chapter of the book is dedicated to the history of women's employment in Iran and the world (pp. 25-64). The third chapter addresses the sociological foundations of women's employment. In this chapter, theories such as feminist theories, gender theories, and functionalist theories regarding women's employment have been examined (pp. 65-80). From the fourth chapter, the authors enter into jurisprudential and legal discussions. First, the religious and jurisprudential foundations of women's employment are examined from the perspective of the Quran, Hadiths, and jurists (pp. 81-110); then, in the fifth chapter, the legal and statutory foundations of women's employment are elucidated from the perspective of Iran's domestic laws and rights, as well as international laws and rights (pp. 111-130). In the sixth chapter, the jurisprudential and legal opinions and viewpoints regarding the husband's prohibition of the wife's employment have been considered. In this context, public limitations, gender limitations, and limitations arising from the marital relationship are mentioned (pp. 131-144). In the seventh chapter, the authors engage in a jurisprudential and legal analysis and examination of the discussion of the husband's prohibition of the wife's employment (pp. 145-180), and finally, the pathology of the husband's prohibition of the wife's employment is addressed in the eighth chapter. The authors of the book believe in this regard that the husband's prohibition of the wife's employment causes psychological trauma to the woman and the waste of her talents and abilities (pp. 181-203).

== Women's Employment as a Social Issue ==
Before being a jurisprudential or legal issue, women's employment is an issue with evident impacts in the social sphere on one hand, and in individual spheres on the other. In the authors' belief, this important characteristic has caused women's employment to become a multidimensional category that, in addition to social dimensions, is of importance economically, culturally, and even politically. It is obvious that an effective and wise encounter with such a subject requires a comprehensive view of it. In their view, the universe is constantly moving on a path of indescribable and, of course, purposeful work and effort where unemployment and aimlessness have no meaning in it; the constructive, creativity-bestowing, and flourishing role of work and activity is for all human beings the manifestation and source of acquiring human identity and is perfecting (p. 17).

In the authors' belief, although based on sociological foundations a woman can, in addition to housekeeping and raising children, have economic and social activities outside the home, does she also possess the existential (Takwini) capacity for this work (p. 77)? According to them, undeniably, fulfilling both roles completely is not feasible for a woman; because time limitations do not allow the woman to attend to her child and fulfill the demands of her husband and home during the hours she is engaged in economic and social activities. Limitations in energy also cause the woman to lack the physical strength to properly fulfill the roles of spouse and mother after returning from the workplace (p. 77).

== Recognizing the Financial Independence of Women from the Perspective of Islam ==
The authors believe that Islam and the Quran, in the era of its revelation, took great steps in favor of women and their human rights. This religion did not grant legal privileges and preferences to men over women, but rather observed the principle of human equality regarding men and women. According to them, there are verses in the Quran showing that in the religion of Islam, women can enjoy financial independence just like men (p. 32). Women's employment during the era of the Prophet (PBUH) is also widely evident, and women were present in all common professions of that time, such as medicine, handicrafts, and even trade. In general, one of the goals of the Prophet of Islam was to secure freedom and liberty for women under the shadow of faith and piety (p. 33).

== Religious and Jurisprudential Foundations of Women's Employment ==
According to the authors, addressing the religious and jurisprudential foundations of women's employment can have significant impacts on the thoughts of society in this regard (p. 83). For this purpose, from the perspective of the Quran, Hadiths, and the opinions of jurists, they have proceeded to extract the foundations for the legitimacy of women's employment.

=== Permissibility of Women's Employment from the Perspective of the Quran ===
Based on the authors' report, one of the most important verses from which the permissibility of women's employment can be derived is the [[Verse 32 of Surah al-Nisa|verse of earning]] (Ayat al-Iktisab*: "And for women is a share of what they have earned"). In this verse, women benefiting from what they earn is explicitly stated. They believe that apart from this verse, which speaks very explicitly about women's employment, there are other verses that generally encourage and persuade both men and women toward economic activity (p. 84). Among the most prominent of this group of verses that generally encourages economic activities is [[Verse 10 of Surah al-Jumu'ah]], which calls upon people, both men and women, universally to participate economically after performing the Friday prayer (pp. 84-85). In addition to the mentioned verses, the authors consider other instances from the Quran, such as the story of Jethro's (Shu'ayb) daughters and the story of Bilqis, the Queen of Sheba, as indicative of women's employment throughout history (pp. 86-87). According to the writers of the book, recognizing the woman's right to ownership in the Quran can also be considered one of the signs of the permissibility of women's employment (p. 86).

=== Legitimacy of Women's Employment Relying on Hadiths ===
Relying on the Prophet's tradition (Sunnah), narrations, and Hadiths of the Imams (a), the authors believe in the legitimacy of women's employment. Based on their report, during the Prophet's time, many women engaged in commercial activities, such as Umm Mundhir who sold dates during the Prophet's time, or Asma bint Makhrama who was a perfume seller, importing perfume from Yemen and selling it in Medina, or the Prophet's own wife, Lady Khadijah, who engaged in trade and commerce for many years (p. 87). Moreover, relying on numerous narrations, women in early Islam, aside from the profession of trade, were engaged in various professions including teaching and education, spinning and weaving, hairdressing, cooking, nursing and caring for children, medicine and surgery, especially midwifery which was exclusively in the hands of women, and through this they sought to earn income (pp. 89-93).

=== Women's Employment from the Perspective of Jurists ===
The writers of the book consider the opinions of jurists as another important source in the discussion of women's employment. They point to two categories of jurists' opinions regarding women's employment: 1) a group of jurists who have recommended absolute seclusion in the home for women, and 2) jurists who recognize women's right to employment. According to the authors, most of the negative views on women's employment belong to Sunni jurists, and Imami jurists have acted much more flexibly in this regard (p. 93).

Those who believe in women's employment hold the opinion that in Islam, women have not been prohibited from any job, and Islam always calls upon women to participate in social activities and undertake social duties. They consider the assigning of governmental positions to women in early Islam as indicative of the endorsement of this right to work for women (p. 94). This group of jurists, influenced by Quranic verses, has considered the right to work permissible for women, deeming it an indisputable and natural right of women, and has accepted it without any conditions. In the view of these jurists, Islam has not issued an order for seclusion and non-participation of women, and has no opposition to women's work (p. 94).

Conversely, a group of jurists who forbid women's employment believe that a woman's business and work cause sedition (Fitnah) and corruption; therefore, women are prohibited from engaging in any work. These jurists not only consider women's employment as causing moral corruption in society but also believe that women's employment is not proper and fitting because they bear no financial expenses (Makharj) in the home (p. 95).

=== Equality of Men and Women in Employment Based on the Rule of Dominion ===
Relying on this research, the majority of Imami jurists have not negated the presence of women in economic activities and have accepted the financial independence of women. In addition to relying on Verse 32 of Surah al-Nisa, they have also relied on the [[rule of dominion]] (Qa'idah al-Taslit). According to this rule, all people, whether men or women, have the right to any kind of disposition over their own properties, which are the result of their own earning and income (pp. 102-103).

In the view of [[Abdollah Javadi Amoli|Ayatollah Javadi]], the legal difference between men and women and the issue of their employment have no connection whatsoever to the issue of superiority. Human perfection and executive positions are two separate subjects. The principle is the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, in which men and women are equal, but jobs, positions, and social activities can in no way represent perfection; rather, it is something that is divided according to physical structure and need (p. 103). Allamah Tabataba'i also considers men and women equal in will and work regarding managing the affairs of life; therefore, a woman can, like a man, will independently, work independently, and become the owner of the result of her work and effort. Also, [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]], since he views the economy as a tool for the elevation of Islam, endorses women's employment alongside men with this intention (p. 103).

=== Precedence of Family Interests Over Women's Employment ===
Based on the authors' report, although in the viewpoint of Imami jurists the right to work for women is recognized, and alongside it, financial independence and fair wages are also accepted, nevertheless, considering the necessity of preserving the foundation of the family, the importance of women's work at home, and the compatibility of women's nature and biological characteristics with it, jurists prefer to place the responsibilities of housework and raising children upon women in the division of labor. In the event of a conflict (Tazahum) between women's work outside the home and family interests, the fundamental interests, which are raising children and managing the household (Hamsar-dari), take serious priority (p. 105).

According to the writers, in the laws as well, limitations and regulations have been established for women's work in the area of preserving family interests and the dignity of the husband and wife, such as the fact that if a woman's work necessitates her leaving the house, it is necessary to obtain the husband's permission and consent. Also, since performing hard and heavy labor is not proportionate to the physical and psychological condition of women, therefore this category of work is not fitting for them, and in fact, not only is this type of work not considered a service to women, but it is deemed an oppression against them and an unforgivable injustice to them (pp. 106-109).

== Legal and Statutory Foundations of Women's Employment ==
Relying on the findings of the book's researchers, in the laws related to women's employment in the Islamic Republic of Iran, not only is there no discrimination in the sense of legal injustice against women, but a set of facilities and privileges such as part-time work, maternity leave, early retirement, etc., have been stipulated for the consolidation of the family (p. 113). According to Article 28 of Iran's Constitution, every citizen has the right to choose the job they desire, provided it is not contrary to Islam, public interests, and the rights of others. The government is obligated, while observing society's need for various professions, to create the possibility of employment and equal conditions for attaining jobs for all individuals. As is evident, this article has made no distinction between men and women (p. 115).

According to the authors, in the Labor Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, an effort has been made to not only pay attention to international conventions and recommendations regarding women, but considering the dignity that Islam has accorded to women, regulations have been formulated in a way that women, in addition to being employed in various jobs, are capable of fulfilling their grave duties in the family. In the country's Social Security Law as well, regulations have been anticipated to support the equality of men and women in employment (pp. 117-118).

== Limitations on Women's Employment in Iran ==
Based on the findings of this research, limitations have been anticipated in the constitutional and ordinary laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the employment rights of women and men, such as the job not contradicting Islamic rulings and standards, and the job not conflicting with public interests, both of which are considered general limitations. Furthermore, the law has anticipated specific limitations for women's employment (p. 133); including limitations in [[women's adjudication|acting as a judge]] (Qadhawat), the prohibition of employment in positions within the armed forces, and limitations arising from the marital relationship.

=== Limitations in Acting as a Judge ===
After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, women's competence to act as judges was negated according to the law, and this prohibition was based on the famous opinion (Mashhur) of Imami jurists who considered being a man a condition for attaining the position of a judge. Of course, this prohibition does not conflict in any way with women assuming the roles of advisory judge and investigating judge (pp. 134 and 136). One of the reasons for opposing women acting as judges is the existence of four verses in this regard which have been relied upon by them. Among these Quranic references is [[Verse 18 of Surah al-Zukhruf]]; expert opponents have inferred women's overall weakness and inability compared to men from the content of this verse and have concluded that since women are weaker than men both physically and intellectually, therefore they do not possess the necessary competence to undertake matters such as religious jurisprudence (Fiqahah), judging, and governance, and men, who are stronger than them in every aspect, will be worthy of attaining such positions; although proponents of women acting as judges reject this argument (pp. 136 and 138).

=== Limitations in Armed Forces Services ===
Also, based on the existing laws of the country, women may be employed in military and law enforcement authorities, but in a limited manner, and that only in medical, health, and similar professions, while they are not utilized in heavy jobs. The reason for enacting such laws is also clear and evident, because it falls under the category of enacting protective laws, prohibiting hard and hazardous work for women, and considering their specific condition (p. 141).

=== Limitations Arising from the Marital Relationship ===
In the positive laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, limitations have also been anticipated for married persons. In Article 1117 of the Civil Code, the husband is given the right, under certain conditions, to prohibit his wife from engaging in work; these limitations are expressed in this manner: the husband can, with the court's approval, prohibit his wife from engaging in any job that conflicts with family interests or his own or the wife's dignity. Of course, limitations for men are also seen in the Family Protection Law (p. 142).

== Jurisprudential and Legal Analysis of the Husband's Prohibition of the Wife's Employment ==
In the opinion of the authors, some jurists (Huquq-danan), influenced by the famous theory of religious jurists (Fuqaha), have assumed a broad scope for the husband's headship and have stated: From a jurisprudential perspective, in principle, the wife's leaving the house for whatever purpose must be done with the husband's agreement. Therefore, if the wife was not employed at the time of marriage and the marriage was not concluded with the condition of employment, the husband can absolutely prohibit the wife from engaging in any kind of profession outside the home (p. 153). However, the truth is that according to Article 1117 of the Civil Code, the husband does not have the right to absolutely prohibit his wife's employment; he can only prevent the wife's employment in specific jobs due to incompatibility with family interests or the dignity of the spouses. Thus, if the husband opposes the wife's job for the mentioned reason, the wife must change her job and choose a job that is compatible with the interests of the family and the wife. Therefore, it can be said that the husband can oppose the wife's job, but he cannot oppose the wife's employment; and the result is that the deprivation of the right to employment is not considered among the effects of the marriage contract (p. 155).

Regarding the condition stipulated within the contract (Shart Dhimn al-'Aqd) for employment, it must also be said: The spouses may agree within the marriage contract (Nikah) that the wife be employed, or have a specific job. There is no doubt that the mentioned conditions in this contract are effective (Nafidh) and must be acted upon accordingly; although the famous opinion of Imami jurists does not consider acting upon initial conditions (Shurut Ibtida'i) in a marriage contract as obligatory to fulfill (Lazim al-Wafa') (pp. 172-175).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Books about Women's Employment]]
[[Category:Fariba Hajiali Books]]
[[Category:Shahla Jahanbazi Books]]
[[fa:اشتغال زن و حدود مانعیت زوج (کتاب)]]

Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)

2026-04-01T12:50:13Z

Enadmin:

{{author
| author = Mehdi Khosravi Sereshki
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{other_books
| author_category = Morteza Motahhari Books
| study_sources =
| subject_books_category =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)
| image = Islam and the Needs of Time.jpeg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = [[Morteza Motahhari]]
| date_of_writing =
| subject = [[Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence]]
| style = Argumentative
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes = 2
| number_of_pages = 456 (total of two volumes)
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Sadra Publications
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2002 (1381 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

*'''Abstract'''

'''Islam and the Needs of Time''' (اسلام و نیازهای زمان), is a two-volume book by [[Morteza Motahhari]] that examines the application of Islamic teachings to the changing needs of time. In this work, Motahhari addresses the issue of independent reasoning (Ijtihad) and its necessity in understanding religion and adapting it to the changing conditions of various eras, believing that Islam, through *Ijtihad*, can answer the diverse needs of different periods. He has pointed out temporal differences and social changes, as well as how Islam adapts to these developments.

In this book, issues such as the relativity of ethics, the relativity of justice, historical determinism, human need for religion, the abrogation (Naskh) of rulings, the finality of the Prophet (Khatamiyyah), and relativity in *Ijtihad* are examined, along with the principial (Usuli) method of Islam in responding to the challenges of the modern world based on the Quran, reason ('Aql), and deep understanding (Tafaqquh) in religion. He also analyzes certain intellectual and political currents in the history of Islam and Iran; currents that suffered from a kind of rigidity (Jumud) or ignorance in encountering Islam and the requirements of time; including the Kharijites, Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites, Akhbaris, as well as certain currents during the Constitutional (Mashrutah) period.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book "Islam and the Needs of Time," which was known as "Islam and the Requirements of Time" (Islam wa Muqtadhayat-e Zaman) until its eighteenth printing (Introduction to the nineteenth printing: May 2002), is a collection of 26 lectures by Morteza Motahhari during the month of Ramadan in 1966 (1345 SH), which addresses the adaptation of Islam to the developments of the era with an analytical approach. The structure of the book is organized based on the titles of the lectures; titles that reflect the subject of discussion and their internal logic.

In the first volume, Motahhari addresses the necessity of transformation in religious thought with the changing conditions of the era and distinguishes two types of temporal changes from each other. He considers reason as the tool for moderate movement on the path of social growth and, by analyzing currents such as the Kharijites and Akhbarism, demands intellectual purification in Islam. Examining the threefold roles of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH)—prophethood (Risalah), judgment (Qadhawah), and governance (Hukumah)—in adaptation to temporal requirements, emphasizing dynamic jurisprudence (Fiqh-e Puya), the rule of concomitance (Qa'idah Mulazamah), the position of reason, and modeling after Imam Ali (a), are among the important axes of this volume. Critiquing relativistic theories in justice, ethics, and worship, defending the constant human needs such as worship, and analyzing the issue of abrogation and finality (Khatamiyyah) in connection with justice also form the final section of this volume.

The second volume addresses the philosophy of *Ijtihad*, the foundations of rulings, and the role of reason in the process of derivation (Istinbat). By answering common doubts, Motahhari introduces *Ijtihad* as a living mechanism, time-bound, and subordinate to conditions. The theory of historical determinism, including economic determinism, is critiqued, and with a Quran-centric interpretation, the role of human will in historical transformations is highlighted. At the end, the discussion of absolute or relative ethics is examined with a profound and comparative view, and Islamic ethics is elucidated against relativistic viewpoints.

== Jurisprudence at the Intersection of Tradition and the Era; The Meaning of Adapting Religion to Time ==
Motahhari considers the main concern of his era to be the challenge between Islam and the requirements of the new age. In his belief, enlightened Muslims bear a twofold duty: first, a correct and precise understanding of true Islam as an intellectual, social, divine, and felicitous school of thought; and second, a profound understanding of the conditions of the time, along with distinguishing between scientific and technical achievements and the current of corruption and intellectual deviation (Vol. 1, p. 11).

He views "adapting religion to time" not as changing principles and rulings to harmonize with the varying tastes and desires of people, but as a deeper understanding of religion in the context of the developments and requirements of time. From his perspective, Islam is a dynamic and living religion that has come to answer the perpetual needs of human beings. This responsiveness is only possible through correct *Ijtihad* and a precise understanding of the requirements of time. Islamic jurisprudence, despite the stability of its principles, possesses a high capacity to confront new issues due to the dynamism of the *Ijtihad* method. He considers attributing rigidity and stagnation to Islam a fallacy resulting from an incorrect understanding of time and religion; because the fixed principles are that very straight path that extends from the beginning to the end of human life (Vol. 1, pp. 13-15).

== Reason and Ijtihad; The Synergy of Rationality and Sharia ==
Relying on [[Verse 72 of Surah al-Ahzab]], Motahhari highlights the role of reason and free will in understanding the religious responsibility of a human being. Reason has the ability to comprehend the conditions of time, and only a human being, by utilizing it, is capable of choosing between the path of felicity and wretchedness (Vol. 1, pp. 22, 24–26). Reason is not only a tool for understanding religion and one of the bases for deriving rulings, but it is also considered a factor for knowing the time, and in its light, a human being is protected from the downfall caused by oppression or ignorance (Vol. 1, pp. 28–29; Vol. 2, p. 26). He expresses the promise of reason's liberation from carnal desires in the era of the reappearance of Hazrat Mahdi (a.j.) and, in the words of the Commander of the Faithful (a), depicts the era when people will be quenched from the spring of knowledge (Vol. 1, p. 37).

== Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence and Beyond Politicization ==
In examining the growth of Islamic civilization in the era of the prophetic mission (Risalah), Motahhari considers the main factor of this flourishing to be the dynamism of jurisprudence and the avoidance of rigidity and blind imitation (Taqlid). Contrary to some Western theories that count the growth of Muslims merely as the result of eliminating racial privileges, he believes that Islam, instead of superficiality and politicking, commits itself to justice and humanity (Vol. 1, p. 42). He views politicization and surrender to political pressures as a bane to the jurisprudential system and, pointing to the principled stance of Imam Ali (a) against Mu'awiyah and the uprising of Imam Hussein (a) against Yazid, introduces these cases as evidence of the Infallibles' jurisprudential independence from political compromises (Vol. 1, pp. 44–46).

== Pathology of Jurisprudence; From Extremes and Negligence to Rigidity and Distortion ==
Motahhari warns against the danger of extremes and negligence (Ifrat wa Tafrit) in jurisprudence and the neglect of the requirements of time, and relying on the principle of moderation in the Islamic Ummah, considers historical deviations to be caused by ignorance or intellectual rigidity (Vol. 1, p. 47). Among these instances, he points to the alteration of the call to prayer (Adhan) during the time of the second Caliph under the pretext of war requirements, interference in the rulings of fasting, pork, and the language of worship (Vol. 1, pp. 48–61).

By critiquing tendencies such as Abu Hanifa's inclination toward analogy (Qiyas), the Akhbari movement, and sects like the Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, and Kharijites, he introduces them as symbols of deviation in understanding *Ijtihad* and religion (Vol. 1, pp. 63–73, 87–93). Motahhari emphasizes that intellectual rigidity—even if presented in the guise of preserving the appearance of religion—is as perilous as the blatant distortion (Tahrif) of religion (Vol. 1, p. 54).

In explaining jurisprudential rigidity in history, Motahhari gives examples from the Kharijites to the opposition to the Constitutional Movement (Mashrutah) in the contemporary era. By comparing the Kharijite movement, which considered voting in the caliphate an innovation (Bid'ah), with the Akhbari movement, he examines their similarity in confronting reason and *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, p. 95). He then points to the oppositions that occurred against [[legislation]] during the Constitutional era and regards them as examples of jurisprudential rigidity in the contemporary era (Vol. 1, pp. 96–102).

He explains that the Noble Prophet (PBUH) possessed three statuses: prophethood, judgment, and governance, of which the latter two—judgment and governance—are transferable subject to specific conditions and criteria. Islam, by introducing general criteria, has provided the ground for the realization of an [[Islamic government]] based on *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, pp. 103–109).

== Continuous Ijtihad; The Engine of Adapting Religion to Temporal Developments ==
Motahhari does not consider *Ijtihad* merely a scientific technique, but rather introduces it as the "driving force of Islam"; a vital force that keeps religion alive and dynamic in the face of historical and social developments (Vol. 1, p. 140). In his view, in a world whose requirements are constantly transforming, *Ijtihad* must also always remain active and cognizant of the times. Pointing to the views of Avicenna, Muhammad Iqbal, and reflection on Quranic verses, he emphasizes the necessity of the continuation of *Ijtihad* in all eras (Vol. 1, p. 141).

To clarify this viewpoint, Motahhari points to examples of jurisprudence observing the time; including the noble verse "[[Verse 60 of Surah al-Anfal|And prepare against them whatever you are able of power]]" (Anfal, 60), which emphasizes combat readiness, but military equipment and facilities differ according to the requirements of each era and cannot be limited to archery or horseback riding (Vol. 1, p. 143). Also, he points to Imam Ali's (a) answer regarding dyeing white hair, considering it a matter subordinate to the psychological and social conditions of the era, not a fixed religious principle (Vol. 1, p. 144).

In expressing the jurisprudential conduct (Sirah) of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) in encountering historical requirements and practical examples of adapting jurisprudence to time, Motahhari points to the change in Imam al-Sadiq's (a) attire and the peace treaty of Imam al-Hasan (a); decisions that, although seemingly breaking tradition, were in fact made based on a deep understanding of the conditions of the time (Vol. 1, pp. 133–136). He also considers the personality of Imam Ali (a) as the embodiment of reason, jurisprudence, and cognizance of the times, serving as a transhistorical model for all eras (Vol. 1, pp. 153–162).

Continuing on this same path, Motahhari also expresses Fayz Kashani's jurisprudential encounter with the rigidity of the Akhbari movement; including his opposition to the obligation of the Sunnah of *Taht al-Hanak* (passing a portion of the turban under the chin), because this ruling was not original, but a measure against the signs of the polytheists. Kashani even considered the use of new clothing such as suits or fedora hats permissible, provided that they bore no sign of affiliation with an opposing religion (Vol. 1, pp. 145–146).

== The Role of Ijtihad in the Continuation of Jurisprudence After the Finality of Prophethood ==
Given the principle of the finality (Khatamiyyah) of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), Motahhari explains that the continuation of religion, in the absence of a new prophet, is possible only by relying on the tool of *Ijtihad*. By examining the concept of abrogation (Naskh) in Islam, he shows that from the moment of the finality of prophethood, the responsibility for the mutability and adaptation of jurisprudence to emergent conditions is placed upon the reason and *Ijtihad* of fully qualified jurists (Vol. 1, pp. 213–232).

Motahhari then, by raising the discussion of "Correctness and Error" (Taswib wa Takhti'ah) regarding the relationship between jurisprudential derivation and external reality (Vol. 2, p. 49), analyzes the question "Is Ijtihad relative?". His answer is that changes in *Ijtihad* and fatwas in different periods are not due to an alteration in reality or the principles of derivation, but are the result of changing conditions of the era; therefore, *Ijtihad* is not considered relative (Vol. 2, pp. 50–51).

In his view, this issue means "changing the law by the dictate of the law" (Vol. 2, p. 59) and has a direct connection with the fixed and varying needs of humanity, as well as the fixed and varying Islamic rulings. Thus, continuous *Ijtihad* plays a fundamental role in the dynamism of jurisprudence and the continuity of the Sharia's capability to respond to social developments. Motahhari desires jurisprudence not just for the individual, but for society and civilization. He believes that jurisprudence must be present in the public sphere and play a role in macro-social structures. This perspective elevates jurisprudence from the individual domain to the civilizational arena (Vol. 2, p. 53).

== Sources for Purifying Ijtihad; The Quran and Reason in Confronting Distortions ==
In explaining the mechanism for preserving the authenticity of religion, Motahhari introduces reason and the Quran as two fundamental pillars for purifying the jurisprudential system from historical contaminations. Relying on the famous prophetic Hadith, he believes that if a Hadith contradicts the Quran, it must be rejected (Vol. 1, p. 81). From Motahhari's perspective, the forgery of Hadiths—especially by groups such as the Jews—is considered among the key factors for the necessity of purification in religious understanding (Vol. 1, pp. 82–86).

Motahhari believes that the Akhbari movement, by setting aside reason and invalidating the apparent understanding (Zahir) of the Quran for the general public, moved on the path of intellectual fossilization (Tahajjur). In this regard, he quotes the viewpoint of Ayatollah Borujerdi, who believed that Akhbarism is the product of the influence of Western empiricist philosophy during the Safavid era (Vol. 1, pp. 92–93).

== Dynamic Jurisprudence; Distinguishing Between Fixed and Varying Rulings ==
One of the central concepts in Motahhari's jurisprudential thought is the distinction between fixed (Thabit) and varying (Mutaghayyir) rulings in Islamic jurisprudence; a concept that he has repeatedly addressed in various parts of his book. Motahhari believes that Islamic rulings are built upon two fundamental bases: fixed principles and varying rules. Fixed rulings are that category of Sharia laws rooted in the innate (Fitri) and eternal needs of humans; principles such as justice, preservation of [[human dignity]], prohibition of oppression, and observance of trustworthiness. These principles, due to their direct connection with the human soul and the macro-objectives of religion, do not undergo change throughout history.

In contrast, another part of jurisprudence is dedicated to varying rulings; rulings that have the capability of change and reinterpretation based on temporal, spatial, and social conditions. This category of rulings is often formulated based on varying expediencies and corruptions (Masalih wa Mafasid) or the specific custom and social conditions of each era. In this context, the role of dynamic and time-conscious *Ijtihad* becomes prominent, because the jurist must possess the ability to recognize and reproduce varying rulings proportionate to the developments of time while preserving the fixed principles (Vol. 1, pp. 117–128, 171–179; Vol. 2, pp. 9–11, 53).

To further explain this distinction, Motahhari introduces Islamic rulings as being of the type of "real propositions" (Qadhaya Haqiqiyyah); meaning general and universal rulings established based on the nature of things, not specific and external propositions (Qadhaya Kharijiyyah). Accordingly, a jurisprudential ruling might be lawful (Halal) from one aspect and forbidden (Haram) from another. Therefore, the method of derivation in real propositions differs fundamentally from external propositions (Vol. 2, pp. 13–16, 33). He emphasizes that the structure of Islamic rulings is based on the model of a real proposition, in which the philosophy of the rulings and the consideration of real expediencies and corruptions are taken into account; this very attitude provides the possibility of *Ijtihad* and the issuance of diverse fatwas proportionate to different temporal and spatial conditions (Vol. 2, p. 21).

== Expediency-Oriented Jurisprudence; From the Rule of Concomitance and Overlapping Duties to the Guardianship of the Jurist ==
Continuing the discussions on adaptive jurisprudence, Motahhari addresses the principle of "the concomitance of the ruling of Sharia and reason" (Mulazamah Hukm al-Shar' wa al-'Aql) and considers it one of the foundational principles in the connection between reason and Sharia; a principle stating that whatever reason judges to be good or bad, the Sharia will also align with it (Vol. 1, p. 147; Vol. 2, pp. 22 and 29). Under this rule, he addresses important topics such as the [[Guardianship of the Jurist]] (Wilayah al-Faqih) (Vol. 1, p. 148), the law of the more important and the important (Ahamm wa Muhimm) (Vol. 1, p. 149), and the issue of dissecting a body in medical sciences; a topic that, despite its violent appearance, is justifiable in specific conditions and relying on scientific necessity (Vol. 1, p. 151). In cases such as changing the form of prayer for a sick person and a traveler, Motahhari also shows how Islamic jurisprudence acts flexibly in the face of individual and social situations (Vol. 1, pp. 153–154). He views the blending of fixed principles with reason-oriented pragmatism (Maslahat-Gara'i) as an art that only comes from successful and up-to-date *Ijtihad*.

Motahhari also mentions the rule of overlapping duties (Qa'idah al-Tazahum) as a solution for many dilemmas in derivation and determining religious duty. Based on this rule, a ruling can be permissible in certain conditions and prohibited in others; such as the overlap between the prohibition of touching the body of a non-Mahram and saving them from drowning, where priority lies with preserving life. Thus, the Mujtahid, taking into account the new conditions, can issue a fatwa (Vol. 2, pp. 16–17).

Among other instances of Islam's flexibility in the face of the requirements of the era are the extensive authorities of the religious ruler (Hakim al-Shar'), which were transferred from the Prophet (PBUH) to the infallible Imams and then to the religious ruler of the Islamic society (Vol. 2, pp. 44, 62, and 63). These authorities provide intra-religious capacities for encountering emergent conditions.

== Expediencies and Corruptions in the Process of Ijtihad; The Basis for Adapting Rulings to Time ==
Motahhari emphasizes the role of expediency (Maslahat) and corruption (Mafsada) in deriving rulings. He believes that jurisprudence cannot be indifferent to the social and ethical consequences of rulings. Evaluating expediency is the jurist's tool for moving past superficiality and reaching the spirit of the Sharia. The Prophet and the Imams also considered the expediency of society when issuing rulings. Motahhari sees expediency not in opposition to the text (Nass), but within the framework of the text and reason. He emphasizes that the jurist must pay attention to social realities alongside the text. From this perspective, a jurisprudence that is indifferent to expediency cannot be efficient and effective in today's society. He also points to the overlap between the expediency of the individual and society and says: Although in Islam all individuals are equal, in times of conflict between individual and collective expediency, individual expediency is sacrificed for public expediency. An example of this issue is the permissibility of [[dissecting a Muslim's corpse]] under specific educational and scientific conditions, which Motahhari has explained (Vol. 2, pp. 17 and 19).

Based on this, Motahhari, in addition to explaining the position of reason in *Ijtihad* and referring to the rule of concomitance of reason and Sharia, points out that if the Quran and Sunnah do not have a ruling on a subject and reason discovers a binding expediency or corruption, given the spirit of Islam which does not overlook important expediencies and corruptions, one can arrive at the Sharia's ruling with the help of reason's ruling and issue a fatwa based on it (Vol. 2, p. 27).

Motahhari also points to the role of supervisory and controlling rules in Islamic jurisprudence, viewing them as tools for adapting to the needs of time. Especially the rules of "[[No-Harm rule|no-harm]]" (La Darar) and "[[No-Hardship rule|no-hardship]]" (La Haraj) which, in the words of Sheikh al-Ansari, take precedence over other Islamic laws in the position of "governance" (Hukumah) and play a veto role in the rulings of worship and transactions (Vol. 2, pp. 59–61).

== The Relationship Between Jurisprudence and Ethics; Rejecting Relativity in Human Values ==
In response to the theory of ethical relativity, Motahhari believes that since human instincts and the structure of human psychology have not changed throughout history, ethical principles must also be fixed and common (Vol. 1, pp. 167–168). He considers manners (Adab) the product of culture and social conditions, which can undergo transformation, but introduces ethics (Akhlaq) as being of the essence of innate nature (Fitrah) (Vol. 1, pp. 168–169). By raising issues such as rational good and evil (Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli), the constancy of conscience, and rejecting conventional ethics, he emphasizes that the ethical jurisprudence of Islam, relying on human innate nature, is capable of presenting fixed principles for all humans in all times (Vol. 1, pp. 206–208, 233–243, and Vol. 2, pp. 157–175).

== Jurisprudential Justice and the Negation of Historical Determinism and Relativity in Justice ==
In Motahhari's view, justice is not only an ethical principle but a criterion for assessing the validity of jurisprudential rulings. In critiquing theories that introduce justice as a relative matter or subordinate to historical determinism, he first defines the relationship between "right" (Haqq) and "duty" (Taklif) based on human servitude to God, and then asserts that if right is separated from the Creator, it will lose its philosophical origin (Vol. 1, pp. 192–196).

In analyzing the position of the individual and society, Motahhari emphasizes the balance and simultaneous authenticity of both, and contrary to absolute individualism or collectivism, builds the Islamic structure on the mutual connection and influence of the individual and society (Vol. 1, pp. 198–199). From his perspective, justice arises from the real and innate rights of humanity; hence, it is neither relative nor historical, but rather transhistorical and universal (Vol. 1, p. 202).

He introduces the root of this kind of attitude towards justice as being in the divine school and explains that only belief in the Creator and the purposiveness of existence can present a defensible basis for the real rights of humans (Vol. 1, pp. 201–202). In other parts of the book, especially in the second volume, by critiquing viewpoints such as Marxism's economic determinism and analyzing the Quran's view on history, Motahhari views human free will and volition as the fundamental factor of historical change (Vol. 2, pp. 143–156, 265).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Morteza Motahhari Books]]
[[Category:Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence Books]]
[[fa:اسلام و نیازهای زمان (کتاب)]]

File:Islam and the Needs of Time.jpeg

2026-04-01T12:48:44Z

Enadmin:

Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)

2026-04-01T12:47:56Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mehdi Khosravi Sereshki | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{other_books | author_category = Morteza Motahhari Books | study_sources = | subject_books_category = }} {{infobox book | title = Islam and the Needs of Time (Book) | image = Islam and the Needs of Time.jpeg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Morteza Motahhari | date_of_writing = | subject = Foundations of..."

{{author
| author = Mehdi Khosravi Sereshki
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{other_books
| author_category = Morteza Motahhari Books
| study_sources =
| subject_books_category =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)
| image = Islam and the Needs of Time.jpeg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = [[Morteza Motahhari]]
| date_of_writing =
| subject = [[Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence]]
| style = Argumentative
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes = 2
| number_of_pages = 456 (total of two volumes)
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Sadra Publications
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2002 (1381 SH)
| edition =
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}

*'''Abstract'''

'''Islam and the Needs of Time''' (اسلام و نیازهای زمان), is a two-volume book by [[Morteza Motahhari]] that examines the application of Islamic teachings to the changing needs of time. In this work, Motahhari addresses the issue of independent reasoning (*Ijtihad*) and its necessity in understanding religion and adapting it to the changing conditions of various eras, believing that Islam, through *Ijtihad*, can answer the diverse needs of different periods. He has pointed out temporal differences and social changes, as well as how Islam adapts to these developments.

In this book, issues such as the relativity of ethics, the relativity of justice, historical determinism, human need for religion, the abrogation (*Naskh*) of rulings, the finality of the Prophet (*Khatamiyyah*), and relativity in *Ijtihad* are examined, along with the principial (*Usuli*) method of Islam in responding to the challenges of the modern world based on the Quran, reason (*'Aql*), and deep understanding (*Tafaqquh*) in religion. He also analyzes certain intellectual and political currents in the history of Islam and Iran; currents that suffered from a kind of rigidity (*Jumud*) or ignorance in encountering Islam and the requirements of time; including the Kharijites, Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites, Akhbaris, as well as certain currents during the Constitutional (*Mashrutah*) period.

== Brief Overview and Structure ==
The book "Islam and the Needs of Time," which was known as "Islam and the Requirements of Time" (*Islam wa Muqtadhayat-e Zaman*) until its eighteenth printing (Introduction to the nineteenth printing: May 2002), is a collection of 26 lectures by Morteza Motahhari during the month of Ramadan in 1966 (1345 SH), which addresses the adaptation of Islam to the developments of the era with an analytical approach. The structure of the book is organized based on the titles of the lectures; titles that reflect the subject of discussion and their internal logic.

In the first volume, Motahhari addresses the necessity of transformation in religious thought with the changing conditions of the era and distinguishes two types of temporal changes from each other. He considers reason as the tool for moderate movement on the path of social growth and, by analyzing currents such as the Kharijites and Akhbarism, demands intellectual purification in Islam. Examining the threefold roles of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH)—prophethood (*Risalah*), judgment (*Qadhawah*), and governance (*Hukumah*)—in adaptation to temporal requirements, emphasizing dynamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh-e Puya*), the rule of concomitance (*Qa'idah Mulazamah*), the position of reason, and modeling after Imam Ali (a), are among the important axes of this volume. Critiquing relativistic theories in justice, ethics, and worship, defending the constant human needs such as worship, and analyzing the issue of abrogation and finality (*Khatamiyyah*) in connection with justice also form the final section of this volume.

The second volume addresses the philosophy of *Ijtihad*, the foundations of rulings, and the role of reason in the process of derivation (*Istinbat*). By answering common doubts, Motahhari introduces *Ijtihad* as a living mechanism, time-bound, and subordinate to conditions. The theory of historical determinism, including economic determinism, is critiqued, and with a Quran-centric interpretation, the role of human will in historical transformations is highlighted. At the end, the discussion of absolute or relative ethics is examined with a profound and comparative view, and Islamic ethics is elucidated against relativistic viewpoints.

== Jurisprudence at the Intersection of Tradition and the Era; The Meaning of Adapting Religion to Time ==
Motahhari considers the main concern of his era to be the challenge between Islam and the requirements of the new age. In his belief, enlightened Muslims bear a twofold duty: first, a correct and precise understanding of true Islam as an intellectual, social, divine, and felicitous school of thought; and second, a profound understanding of the conditions of the time, along with distinguishing between scientific and technical achievements and the current of corruption and intellectual deviation (Vol. 1, p. 11).

He views "adapting religion to time" not as changing principles and rulings to harmonize with the varying tastes and desires of people, but as a deeper understanding of religion in the context of the developments and requirements of time. From his perspective, Islam is a dynamic and living religion that has come to answer the perpetual needs of human beings. This responsiveness is only possible through correct *Ijtihad* and a precise understanding of the requirements of time. Islamic jurisprudence, despite the stability of its principles, possesses a high capacity to confront new issues due to the dynamism of the *Ijtihad* method. He considers attributing rigidity and stagnation to Islam a fallacy resulting from an incorrect understanding of time and religion; because the fixed principles are that very straight path that extends from the beginning to the end of human life (Vol. 1, pp. 13-15).

== Reason and Ijtihad; The Synergy of Rationality and Sharia ==
Relying on [[Verse 72 of Surah al-Ahzab]], Motahhari highlights the role of reason and free will in understanding the religious responsibility of a human being. Reason has the ability to comprehend the conditions of time, and only a human being, by utilizing it, is capable of choosing between the path of felicity and wretchedness (Vol. 1, pp. 22, 24–26). Reason is not only a tool for understanding religion and one of the bases for deriving rulings, but it is also considered a factor for knowing the time, and in its light, a human being is protected from the downfall caused by oppression or ignorance (Vol. 1, pp. 28–29; Vol. 2, p. 26). He expresses the promise of reason's liberation from carnal desires in the era of the reappearance of Hazrat Mahdi (a.j.) and, in the words of the Commander of the Faithful (a), depicts the era when people will be quenched from the spring of knowledge (Vol. 1, p. 37).

== Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence and Beyond Politicization ==
In examining the growth of Islamic civilization in the era of the prophetic mission (*Risalah*), Motahhari considers the main factor of this flourishing to be the dynamism of jurisprudence and the avoidance of rigidity and blind imitation (*Taqlid*). Contrary to some Western theories that count the growth of Muslims merely as the result of eliminating racial privileges, he believes that Islam, instead of superficiality and politicking, commits itself to justice and humanity (Vol. 1, p. 42). He views politicization and surrender to political pressures as a bane to the jurisprudential system and, pointing to the principled stance of Imam Ali (a) against Mu'awiyah and the uprising of Imam Hussein (a) against Yazid, introduces these cases as evidence of the Infallibles' jurisprudential independence from political compromises (Vol. 1, pp. 44–46).

== Pathology of Jurisprudence; From Extremes and Negligence to Rigidity and Distortion ==
Motahhari warns against the danger of extremes and negligence (*Ifrat wa Tafrit*) in jurisprudence and the neglect of the requirements of time, and relying on the principle of moderation in the Islamic Ummah, considers historical deviations to be caused by ignorance or intellectual rigidity (Vol. 1, p. 47). Among these instances, he points to the alteration of the call to prayer (*Adhan*) during the time of the second Caliph under the pretext of war requirements, interference in the rulings of fasting, pork, and the language of worship (Vol. 1, pp. 48–61).

By critiquing tendencies such as Abu Hanifa's inclination toward analogy (*Qiyas*), the Akhbari movement, and sects like the Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, and Kharijites, he introduces them as symbols of deviation in understanding *Ijtihad* and religion (Vol. 1, pp. 63–73, 87–93). Motahhari emphasizes that intellectual rigidity—even if presented in the guise of preserving the appearance of religion—is as perilous as the blatant distortion (*Tahrif*) of religion (Vol. 1, p. 54).

In explaining jurisprudential rigidity in history, Motahhari gives examples from the Kharijites to the opposition to the Constitutional Movement (*Mashrutah*) in the contemporary era. By comparing the Kharijite movement, which considered voting in the caliphate an innovation (*Bid'ah*), with the Akhbari movement, he examines their similarity in confronting reason and *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, p. 95). He then points to the oppositions that occurred against [[legislation]] during the Constitutional era and regards them as examples of jurisprudential rigidity in the contemporary era (Vol. 1, pp. 96–102).

He explains that the Noble Prophet (PBUH) possessed three statuses: prophethood, judgment, and governance, of which the latter two—judgment and governance—are transferable subject to specific conditions and criteria. Islam, by introducing general criteria, has provided the ground for the realization of an [[Islamic government]] based on *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, pp. 103–109).

== Continuous Ijtihad; The Engine of Adapting Religion to Temporal Developments ==
Motahhari does not consider *Ijtihad* merely a scientific technique, but rather introduces it as the "driving force of Islam"; a vital force that keeps religion alive and dynamic in the face of historical and social developments (Vol. 1, p. 140). In his view, in a world whose requirements are constantly transforming, *Ijtihad* must also always remain active and cognizant of the times. Pointing to the views of Avicenna, Muhammad Iqbal, and reflection on Quranic verses, he emphasizes the necessity of the continuation of *Ijtihad* in all eras (Vol. 1, p. 141).

To clarify this viewpoint, Motahhari points to examples of jurisprudence observing the time; including the noble verse "[[Verse 60 of Surah al-Anfal|And prepare against them whatever you are able of power]]" (Anfal, 60), which emphasizes combat readiness, but military equipment and facilities differ according to the requirements of each era and cannot be limited to archery or horseback riding (Vol. 1, p. 143). Also, he points to Imam Ali's (a) answer regarding dyeing white hair, considering it a matter subordinate to the psychological and social conditions of the era, not a fixed religious principle (Vol. 1, p. 144).

In expressing the jurisprudential conduct (*Sirah*) of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) in encountering historical requirements and practical examples of adapting jurisprudence to time, Motahhari points to the change in Imam al-Sadiq's (a) attire and the peace treaty of Imam al-Hasan (a); decisions that, although seemingly breaking tradition, were in fact made based on a deep understanding of the conditions of the time (Vol. 1, pp. 133–136). He also considers the personality of Imam Ali (a) as the embodiment of reason, jurisprudence, and cognizance of the times, serving as a transhistorical model for all eras (Vol. 1, pp. 153–162).

Continuing on this same path, Motahhari also expresses Fayz Kashani's jurisprudential encounter with the rigidity of the Akhbari movement; including his opposition to the obligation of the Sunnah of *Taht al-Hanak* (passing a portion of the turban under the chin), because this ruling was not original, but a measure against the signs of the polytheists. Kashani even considered the use of new clothing such as suits or fedora hats permissible, provided that they bore no sign of affiliation with an opposing religion (Vol. 1, pp. 145–146).

== The Role of Ijtihad in the Continuation of Jurisprudence After the Finality of Prophethood ==
Given the principle of the finality (*Khatamiyyah*) of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), Motahhari explains that the continuation of religion, in the absence of a new prophet, is possible only by relying on the tool of *Ijtihad*. By examining the concept of abrogation (*Naskh*) in Islam, he shows that from the moment of the finality of prophethood, the responsibility for the mutability and adaptation of jurisprudence to emergent conditions is placed upon the reason and *Ijtihad* of fully qualified jurists (Vol. 1, pp. 213–232).

Motahhari then, by raising the discussion of "Correctness and Error" (*Taswib wa Takhti'ah*) regarding the relationship between jurisprudential derivation and external reality (Vol. 2, p. 49), analyzes the question "Is Ijtihad relative?". His answer is that changes in *Ijtihad* and fatwas in different periods are not due to an alteration in reality or the principles of derivation, but are the result of changing conditions of the era; therefore, *Ijtihad* is not considered relative (Vol. 2, pp. 50–51).

In his view, this issue means "changing the law by the dictate of the law" (Vol. 2, p. 59) and has a direct connection with the fixed and varying needs of humanity, as well as the fixed and varying Islamic rulings. Thus, continuous *Ijtihad* plays a fundamental role in the dynamism of jurisprudence and the continuity of the Sharia's capability to respond to social developments. Motahhari desires jurisprudence not just for the individual, but for society and civilization. He believes that jurisprudence must be present in the public sphere and play a role in macro-social structures. This perspective elevates jurisprudence from the individual domain to the civilizational arena (Vol. 2, p. 53).

== Sources for Purifying Ijtihad; The Quran and Reason in Confronting Distortions ==
In explaining the mechanism for preserving the authenticity of religion, Motahhari introduces reason and the Quran as two fundamental pillars for purifying the jurisprudential system from historical contaminations. Relying on the famous prophetic Hadith, he believes that if a Hadith contradicts the Quran, it must be rejected (Vol. 1, p. 81). From Motahhari's perspective, the forgery of Hadiths—especially by groups such as the Jews—is considered among the key factors for the necessity of purification in religious understanding (Vol. 1, pp. 82–86).

Motahhari believes that the Akhbari movement, by setting aside reason and invalidating the apparent understanding (*Zahir*) of the Quran for the general public, moved on the path of intellectual fossilization (*Tahajjur*). In this regard, he quotes the viewpoint of Ayatollah Borujerdi, who believed that Akhbarism is the product of the influence of Western empiricist philosophy during the Safavid era (Vol. 1, pp. 92–93).

== Dynamic Jurisprudence; Distinguishing Between Fixed and Varying Rulings ==
One of the central concepts in Motahhari's jurisprudential thought is the distinction between fixed (*Thabit*) and varying (*Mutaghayyir*) rulings in Islamic jurisprudence; a concept that he has repeatedly addressed in various parts of his book. Motahhari believes that Islamic rulings are built upon two fundamental bases: fixed principles and varying rules. Fixed rulings are that category of Sharia laws rooted in the innate (*Fitri*) and eternal needs of humans; principles such as justice, preservation of [[human dignity]], prohibition of oppression, and observance of trustworthiness. These principles, due to their direct connection with the human soul and the macro-objectives of religion, do not undergo change throughout history.

In contrast, another part of jurisprudence is dedicated to varying rulings; rulings that have the capability of change and reinterpretation based on temporal, spatial, and social conditions. This category of rulings is often formulated based on varying expediencies and corruptions (*Masalih wa Mafasid*) or the specific custom and social conditions of each era. In this context, the role of dynamic and time-conscious *Ijtihad* becomes prominent, because the jurist must possess the ability to recognize and reproduce varying rulings proportionate to the developments of time while preserving the fixed principles (Vol. 1, pp. 117–128, 171–179; Vol. 2, pp. 9–11, 53).

To further explain this distinction, Motahhari introduces Islamic rulings as being of the type of "real propositions" (*Qadhaya Haqiqiyyah*); meaning general and universal rulings established based on the nature of things, not specific and external propositions (*Qadhaya Kharijiyyah*). Accordingly, a jurisprudential ruling might be lawful (*Halal*) from one aspect and forbidden (*Haram*) from another. Therefore, the method of derivation in real propositions differs fundamentally from external propositions (Vol. 2, pp. 13–16, 33). He emphasizes that the structure of Islamic rulings is based on the model of a real proposition, in which the philosophy of the rulings and the consideration of real expediencies and corruptions are taken into account; this very attitude provides the possibility of *Ijtihad* and the issuance of diverse fatwas proportionate to different temporal and spatial conditions (Vol. 2, p. 21).

== Expediency-Oriented Jurisprudence; From the Rule of Concomitance and Overlapping Duties to the Guardianship of the Jurist ==
Continuing the discussions on adaptive jurisprudence, Motahhari addresses the principle of "the concomitance of the ruling of Sharia and reason" (*Mulazamah Hukm al-Shar' wa al-'Aql*) and considers it one of the foundational principles in the connection between reason and Sharia; a principle stating that whatever reason judges to be good or bad, the Sharia will also align with it (Vol. 1, p. 147; Vol. 2, pp. 22 and 29). Under this rule, he addresses important topics such as the [[Guardianship of the Jurist]] (*Wilayah al-Faqih*) (Vol. 1, p. 148), the law of the more important and the important (*Ahamm wa Muhimm*) (Vol. 1, p. 149), and the issue of dissecting a body in medical sciences; a topic that, despite its violent appearance, is justifiable in specific conditions and relying on scientific necessity (Vol. 1, p. 151). In cases such as changing the form of prayer for a sick person and a traveler, Motahhari also shows how Islamic jurisprudence acts flexibly in the face of individual and social situations (Vol. 1, pp. 153–154). He views the blending of fixed principles with reason-oriented pragmatism (*Maslahat-Gara'i*) as an art that only comes from successful and up-to-date *Ijtihad*.

Motahhari also mentions the rule of overlapping duties (*Qa'idah al-Tazahum*) as a solution for many dilemmas in derivation and determining religious duty. Based on this rule, a ruling can be permissible in certain conditions and prohibited in others; such as the overlap between the prohibition of touching the body of a non-Mahram and saving them from drowning, where priority lies with preserving life. Thus, the Mujtahid, taking into account the new conditions, can issue a fatwa (Vol. 2, pp. 16–17).

Among other instances of Islam's flexibility in the face of the requirements of the era are the extensive authorities of the religious ruler (*Hakim al-Shar'*), which were transferred from the Prophet (PBUH) to the infallible Imams and then to the religious ruler of the Islamic society (Vol. 2, pp. 44, 62, and 63). These authorities provide intra-religious capacities for encountering emergent conditions.

== Expediencies and Corruptions in the Process of Ijtihad; The Basis for Adapting Rulings to Time ==
Motahhari emphasizes the role of expediency (*Maslahat*) and corruption (*Mafsada*) in deriving rulings. He believes that jurisprudence cannot be indifferent to the social and ethical consequences of rulings. Evaluating expediency is the jurist's tool for moving past superficiality and reaching the spirit of the Sharia. The Prophet and the Imams also considered the expediency of society when issuing rulings. Motahhari sees expediency not in opposition to the text (*Nass*), but within the framework of the text and reason. He emphasizes that the jurist must pay attention to social realities alongside the text. From this perspective, a jurisprudence that is indifferent to expediency cannot be efficient and effective in today's society. He also points to the overlap between the expediency of the individual and society and says: Although in Islam all individuals are equal, in times of conflict between individual and collective expediency, individual expediency is sacrificed for public expediency. An example of this issue is the permissibility of [[dissecting a Muslim's corpse]] under specific educational and scientific conditions, which Motahhari has explained (Vol. 2, pp. 17 and 19).

Based on this, Motahhari, in addition to explaining the position of reason in *Ijtihad* and referring to the rule of concomitance of reason and Sharia, points out that if the Quran and Sunnah do not have a ruling on a subject and reason discovers a binding expediency or corruption, given the spirit of Islam which does not overlook important expediencies and corruptions, one can arrive at the Sharia's ruling with the help of reason's ruling and issue a fatwa based on it (Vol. 2, p. 27).

Motahhari also points to the role of supervisory and controlling rules in Islamic jurisprudence, viewing them as tools for adapting to the needs of time. Especially the rules of "[[No-Harm rule|no-harm]]" (*La Darar*) and "[[No-Hardship rule|no-hardship]]" (*La Haraj*) which, in the words of Sheikh al-Ansari, take precedence over other Islamic laws in the position of "governance" (*Hukumah*) and play a veto role in the rulings of worship and transactions (Vol. 2, pp. 59–61).

== The Relationship Between Jurisprudence and Ethics; Rejecting Relativity in Human Values ==
In response to the theory of ethical relativity, Motahhari believes that since human instincts and the structure of human psychology have not changed throughout history, ethical principles must also be fixed and common (Vol. 1, pp. 167–168). He considers manners (*Adab*) the product of culture and social conditions, which can undergo transformation, but introduces ethics (*Akhlaq*) as being of the essence of innate nature (*Fitrah*) (Vol. 1, pp. 168–169). By raising issues such as rational good and evil (*Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli*), the constancy of conscience, and rejecting conventional ethics, he emphasizes that the ethical jurisprudence of Islam, relying on human innate nature, is capable of presenting fixed principles for all humans in all times (Vol. 1, pp. 206–208, 233–243, and Vol. 2, pp. 157–175).

== Jurisprudential Justice and the Negation of Historical Determinism and Relativity in Justice ==
In Motahhari's view, justice is not only an ethical principle but a criterion for assessing the validity of jurisprudential rulings. In critiquing theories that introduce justice as a relative matter or subordinate to historical determinism, he first defines the relationship between "right" (*Haqq*) and "duty" (*Taklif*) based on human servitude to God, and then asserts that if right is separated from the Creator, it will lose its philosophical origin (Vol. 1, pp. 192–196).

In analyzing the position of the individual and society, Motahhari emphasizes the balance and simultaneous authenticity of both, and contrary to absolute individualism or collectivism, builds the Islamic structure on the mutual connection and influence of the individual and society (Vol. 1, pp. 198–199). From his perspective, justice arises from the real and innate rights of humanity; hence, it is neither relative nor historical, but rather transhistorical and universal (Vol. 1, p. 202).

He introduces the root of this kind of attitude towards justice as being in the divine school and explains that only belief in the Creator and the purposiveness of existence can present a defensible basis for the real rights of humans (Vol. 1, pp. 201–202). In other parts of the book, especially in the second volume, by critiquing viewpoints such as Marxism's economic determinism and analyzing the Quran's view on history, Motahhari views human free will and volition as the fundamental factor of historical change (Vol. 2, pp. 143–156, 265).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Morteza Motahhari Books]]
[[Category:Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence Books]]
[[fa:اسلام و نیازهای زمان (کتاب)]]

File:Islam and the Human Right to Life.jpg

2026-04-01T12:35:54Z

Enadmin:

Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book)

2026-04-01T12:35:13Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Mehdi Khosravi Sereshki | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book) | image = Islam_and_the_Human_Right_to_Life.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | original_title = | author = Hamidreza Nouri | date_of_writing = 2022 (1401 SH) | subject = | style = | language = Persian | original_language = | editor = Sayyid Sadeq Heydari |..."

{{author
| author = Mehdi Khosravi Sereshki
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}

{{infobox book
| title = Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book)
| image = Islam_and_the_Human_Right_to_Life.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| original_title =
| author = Hamidreza Nouri
| date_of_writing = 2022 (1401 SH)
| subject =
| style =
| language = Persian
| original_language =
| editor = Sayyid Sadeq Heydari
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| compiled_by =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 352
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Islamic Research Foundation of Astan Quds Razavi
| place_of_publication = Mashhad
| publication_date = 2022 (1401 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
| other_volumes =
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Islam and the Human Right to Life''' (اسلام و حق حیات انسان) is a Persian book written by Hamidreza Nouri, authored with the aim of answering ambiguities regarding the deprivation of the right to life in rulings such as [[retaliation|retaliation]] (Qisas), [[waging war against God and society|waging war against God and society]] (Muharabah), [[apostasy]] (Irtidad), and [[offensive jihad]] (Jihad Ibtida'i). The author believes that although depriving the right to life is abhorrent (Qabih), depriving the material right to life of certain individuals who are the cause of depriving the spiritual right to life of others is justified.

Relying on the Quran, the author enumerates ranks for human beings; however, he states that the right to life exists for all human beings, even disbelievers, except in exceptional cases mentioned in the Quran. He then addresses the ambiguities regarding the rulings that lead to the deprivation of human life and answers them. By mentioning ten solutions proposed by Muslim intellectuals to justify or alter the penal rulings of Islam, Hamidreza Nouri rejects them and asserts that methodical independent reasoning (Ijtihad Rawishmand) based on secondary rulings (Ahkam Thanawiyyah), jurisprudential rules such as the [[No-Harm rule]] (Qa'idah La Darar), and attention to strategies from within Islamic jurisprudence, including customary expediency (Maslahat 'Urfiyyah), [[governmental ruling|governmental]] (Hukm Hakumati) and state rulings (Ahkam Wila'i), as well as converting certain punishments into discretionary punishments (Ta'zir), can resolve the ambiguities regarding the conflict between Islamic rulings and human rights.

The author then addresses the cases that are excepted from the general ruling prohibiting the deprivation of life in the Quran and answers the ambiguities; in explaining the ruling of *Qisas*, he calls it a rational ruling (Hukm 'Aqli) based on retaliation in kind, established to prevent widespread bloodshed, and considers it a preventive measure and a source of life for human beings. Regarding *Muharabah*, by mentioning that executing the *Muharib* (one who wages war) is for the protection of citizens' lives, the author believes that the punishment for *Muharabah* is not death, and the *Muharib* is sentenced to death only if he commits murder.

In examining the deprivation of life resulting from apostasy, Hamidreza Nouri, although critiquing and rejecting four reasons stated against the death penalty for the apostate (Murtadd), nevertheless believes that one can doubt the absolute temporal application and inclusiveness of the ruling on the apostate; because, in his view, there is a possibility that it is a state ruling (Hukm Wila'i) and exclusive to the ruler (the Prophet of Islam). Furthermore, he asserts that to prevent the execution ruling of the apostate from becoming an objective reality, without denying the principle of the death penalty ruling, the conditions for its realization can be severely restricted.

Finally, regarding the deprivation of the right to life through [[offensive jihad]], the author believes that only the initial verses of Surah al-Tawbah refer to offensive war, and this command is neither general nor permanent. On the other hand, it cannot be considered as meaning the deprivation of the right to life; because the target of this ruling is not the general public, but rather the seditionists (Fitnah-garan).

== Structure of the Book ==
The book "Islam and the Human Right to Life", written by Hamidreza Nouri, was published in 2022 (1401 SH) by the Islamic Research Foundation and commissioned by the Ma'aref Islamic University. The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Islamic Studies at K. N. Toosi University of Technology. In the preface, while examining the research background including books and articles (pp. 13-24), he considers the motive for writing the book to be answering the claims arising from the modern era, which sees a conflict between reason and religion, science and religion, and law and religion, and considers it contradictory to religious duty-centeredness (p. 11).

This book is organized into four main sections:
;Preface (pp. 11-24): The research background relying on mystical, social, theological, and jurisprudential exegeses, based on various verses of the Quran, as well as non-exegetical works of Shia and Sunni scholars concerning human rights and the human right to life.
;Section One: Concepts and Foundations (pp. 25-75): Examination of the three concepts of right (Haqq), life (Hayat), and human being (Insan), with an emphasis that although depriving the right to life is abhorrent and incorrect, depriving the material right to life of some human beings, because they are the cause of depriving the spiritual right to life of others, is justified.
;Section Two: The Human Right to Life from the Perspective of the Quran (pp. 77-110): A study of the identity and position of the human being, human ranks, and the right to life of religious and non-religious people based on Quranic verses.
;Section Three: Permissible Cases of Depriving Life in the Quran (pp. 111-185): Analysis of the rulings related to intentional murder, *Muharabah*, and apostasy from a Quranic perspective.
;Section Four: Critique of Doubts (pp. 187-330): Examination of the contexts in which doubts are raised (such as human rights issues), the reactions of intellectuals (such as the [[objectives of Sharia]] or *Maqasid al-Shari'ah), and the analysis of doubts on the subjects of *Qisas*, apostasy, offensive jihad, and the difference between the right to life of men and women.

== Jurisprudential and Legal Foundations of the Human Right to Life ==
The author first examines the concept of right (Haqq) from a lexical, Quranic, and philosophical perspective, and then introduces it in jurisprudential terminology as a conventional matter (Amr I'tibari) from the Lawgiver (Shari'), which arises from the dominion of individuals over affairs and necessitates the respect of others (p. 30).

Subsequently, he addresses the foundations of the human right to life, examining it from a theological (p. 55), mystical (p. 61), jurisprudential (p. 67), and legal (p. 73) perspective. In the author's view, the jurisprudential foundation of this right is the preservation of life (Hifdh al-Nafs), and he introduces Islamic rulings as the guarantor of the continuation of life (p. 69). To confirm this jurisprudential foundation, he proposes two principles:

# The prohibition of homicide in all divine religions (p. 70)
# The preservation of life as an objective of the Sharia (p. 71).

Furthermore, the author believes that certain jurisprudential rules such as causing damage (Itlaf), the removal of physical punishments due to doubts (Raf' al-Hudud bi al-Shubuhat), the [[Rule of Negation of Harm|rule of no harm and no inflicting of harm]] (Qa'idah La Darar wa La Dirar), and dissimulation (Taqiyyah), have been applied throughout jurisprudence and are the guarantors of the preservation of life (p. 72). In the legal domain, he proposes two fundamental axes for the right to life: 1. The legal and objective right of the human being (p. 73), and the personal right and privilege based on human dignity and inviolability (p. 74).

== Human Identity and Distinction in the Quran ==
=== Human Identity ===
To examine human identity from the perspective of the Quran, the author analyzes the verses in three categories:
* Identifying identity by reflecting on the verses of the creation of the first human: These verses emphasize the two elements of intellect ('Aql) and free will (Ikhtiyar) in humans and show that humanity depends on the power of reasoning (pp. 83-84).
* Identifying identity by reflecting on the stages of human creation: The stages of creation are presented in seven categories; from the time when the human was not yet a significant thing until the breathing of the spirit (Ruh) into him. Based on these verses, although the material dimension of the human is weaker compared to the spiritual dimension, it has high importance due to its association with the spirit (pp. 85-86).
* Identifying identity by reflecting on human values in the Quran: The author, based on Quranic verses, divides human values into two categories: principal and accidental. Principal characteristics, which are attributed to God, include innate nature (Fitrah), knowledge ('Ilm), moral conscience, and being two-dimensional (matter and meaning). Accidental characteristics, without attribution to God, include dignity (Karamah), responsibility, the blessings created for humans, and the revelation of truths after death. Also, accidental characteristics with attribution to God include vicegerency (Khilafah), being chosen, and being a trustee (pp. 87-88).

=== Four Distinctive Characteristics of the Human Being ===
The author considers the human being's possession of two dimensions, material and spiritual, to be the most fundamental human characteristic, and points out the effects of these two dimensions according to the Quran (p. 88). Ultimately, he enumerates four factors distinguishing humans from other creatures:

# Possessing the rank of soul (Nafs)
# Being independent and having will
# Possessing a knowledge that does not exist in angels and other material beings
# The enduring nature of human existence (pp. 89-90).

=== Ranks of the Human Being and Their Connection with the Right to Life ===
In line with determining the human right to life, the author presents a method for discovering human ranks from the perspective of the Quran, to ultimately find out whether a minimum right to life exists for all human beings at every rank or not (p. 93). The author's intended method is: 1. Enumerating the secondary titles and designations of the human being in the Quran, and 2. Words that express the human rank and have the capability of being categorized (p. 95).

Then, pointing to seven indicators of difference in rank among human beings based on Quranic verses, he lists the ranks of the human being: 1. Human versus non-human, 2. Prophet (Nabi) versus non-prophet, 3. Prophet of resolve (Ulu al-'Azm) versus prophet not of resolve, 4. Non-prophet human who observes human principles versus a non-prophet human who does not observe human principles, 5. Religious person (Mutadayyin) versus disbeliever (Kafir), 6. Muslim versus [[People of the Book]] (Ahl al-Kitab), and 7. Muslim who observes human principles and religious rulings versus a Muslim and non-Muslim not adhering to human principles and religious rulings.

In conclusion, the author emphasizes that the criterion for ascertaining the rank is the degree of proximity to the True God (Haqq), and every difference does not necessarily create a rank. On the other hand, God has provided the opportunity for elevation until the final moments of life for all human beings, and the possibility of crossing from the current rank to a higher rank exists. Therefore, superior or inferior human differences do not affect the principle of the attachment of the right to life, and the right to life is established for all human beings until the point of natural consumption (Istihlak Tabi'i), except for the exceptional cases that the Quran has briefly alluded to (p. 99).

=== The Right to Life of the Religious ===
From the perspective of the Quran, the author introduces three indicators to define religiosity: faith in God, faith in the Day of Judgment, and following religious and human teachings under the title of righteous deed ('Amal Salih) (p. 100). He then presents six Quranic pieces of evidence for the increased value of human life:
# Believers not being afflicted by divine punishment: The Quran, while reporting the destruction of disbelievers by heavenly and earthly punishments, speaks of the salvation of the followers of divine prophets (p. 102).
# Saving the lives of believers through miracles: Such as preventing the massacre of believers in the story of the Children of Israel and Prophet Salih (p. 103).
# Saving the life of a believer at the cost of the death of a disbeliever: Such as the story of Khidr and Moses and the killing of the disbelieving child by Prophet Khidr, who would kill his believing parents in the future (p. 103).
# The blood money of a believer on the battlefield, which God undertakes, and that is Paradise (p. 104).
# Taking a covenant with the aim of avoiding the killing of co-religionists (p. 104).
# Unseen assistance for preserving the lives of believers: Such as saving the lives of prophets like Abraham and Moses and sending angels to the battlefield to preserve the lives of believers (pp. 104-105).

=== The Right to Life of the Irreligious ===
The author explains two Quranic principles that consider the right to life valid for all human beings, regardless of their religion:
# The principle of the right to life for all human beings: In the Quran and in the view of God, the life and soul of the general public, regardless of faith and disbelief, are respected. Verses related to wishing death or the command to kill (Qatiluhum) regarding groups of non-Muslims like hypocrites (Munafiqin) or the People of the Book, due to their denial of prophets, oppressive behaviors, and polytheistic beliefs, although indicating the intensity of aversion and the worthlessness of their lives in those contexts, are never a basis for justifying the killing of human beings (p. 107).
# The right to the continuation of life for disbelievers: The principle in Islam is the universality of the right to life and its continuation. The Quran has explicitly stated the right to life of disbelievers in numerous instances or, while expressing the absolute right to life, has considered it valid for all human beings. The author points to four groups of these verses (p. 109).

== Permissible Cases of Depriving the Right to Life and Answering Its Ambiguities ==
The author has examined ten solutions proposed by Muslim intellectuals to justify or alter the penal rulings of Islam, and at the end, he has presented his own analysis. According to what the author has mentioned, the solutions of the intellectuals are: 1. Differentiating religious rulings based on their [[essential and accidental rulings|essential and accidental nature]] (p. 207), 2. The impact of likes and dislikes for the revision of divine rulings by jurists (p. 208), 3. Attention to the [[objectives of Sharia]] (Maqasid al-Shari'ah) (p. 209), 4. The difference between spiritual Islam and historical Islam (pp. 209-210), 5. The difference between devotional rulings and legal and social rulings (p. 210), 6. The difference between the era of establishment and the era of the consolidation of religion (p. 210), 7. The execution of physical punishments (Hudud) with the endorsement of the procedure and custom of society (p. 211), 8. The authority of custom ('Urf) in religious and legal rulings (p. 212), 9. The necessity of aligning legal rulings with the culture of society (p. 212), 10. The alteration of rational conduct (Sirah 'Uqala'iyyah) and the endorsement of rational rulings (p. 214).

He further, by generally critiquing and rejecting these solutions, considers methodical independent reasoning (Ijtihad) as the alternative to such solutions and asserts that attention to secondary rulings (Ahkam Thanawiyyah) and rules such as no-harm (La Darar) and [[rule of necessity|necessity]] (Idhtirar) can assist jurists in achieving the rights and duties of the obligated (Mukallafin) in every era. In this path, attention to customary expediency, [[governmental ruling|governmental]] and state rulings, as well as converting certain punishments into discretionary punishments (Ta'zir) and removing them from the state of [[religious limits|religious physical punishments]] (Hudud Shar'i), are solutions that both draw nourishment from within religion and resolve discussions related to [[human rights]] (pp. 218-220).

=== Retaliation (Qisas): The Philosophy of Qisas and Critique of Doubts ===
The author explains [[retaliation|Qisas]] in the third section of the book and answers some doubts regarding it in the fourth section. He first examines Qisas from the perspective of reason (p. 117) and then the Quran (p. 122), and subsequently, he analyzes seven verses related to murder and the ruling of Qisas for life (Qisas al-Nafs) under subheadings (pp. 124-134). Also, he points to the preference of forgiveness in the position of retaliation from the perspective of the Quran; because in all the verses related to Qisas, forgiveness, pardon, and patience are immediately spoken of, and human beings are encouraged and persuaded toward it (p. 135).

The author considers the legitimacy of Qisas to belong to the pre-Islamic era and introduces it as a rational ruling (Hukm 'Aqli). From the perspective of the Quran and Islam, Qisas merely emphasizes retaliation in kind and equality to prevent ignorant (Jahili) traditions and widespread bloodshed. Qisas is more of a preventive measure and a source of life for human beings than a harsh penal ruling. Also, since Qisas is considered a right of the people (Haqq al-Nas), in the event of the consent of the victim's heir (Wali al-Dam) or forgiveness in exchange for receiving blood money (Diyah), the murderer's life continues (pp. 135-136).

In this book, ten critiques regarding the ruling of Qisas are then addressed and answered:
# Contradiction with humanitarian sentiment
# Creating a sense of revenge and promoting it
# Conflict with the religion of mercy
# Conflict with the contemporary culture and morals of humanity
# Doubt regarding its deterrent effect
# Occurrence of a mistake in identifying the criminal
# The possibility of Qisas not being just
# The inherent nature of the murderer's right to life
# Qisas being a reaction to the effect (rather than the cause)
# The disproportion of the murderer's crime with the death penalty (pp. 230-247).

=== Waging War (Muharabah): Instances and Variety of Punishment ===
After examining the connection of *Muharabah* with the title of [[corruption on earth|corruption on earth]] (Ifsad fi al-Ardh) (p. 137) and the lexical meaning of *Muharabah* (p. 140), the author concludes from the jurisprudential meaning of *Muharabah* that the jurisprudential term *Muharib* encompasses a spectrum of human beings, each having a punishment proportionate to themselves (pp. 143-145).

The concept and instance of *Muharabah* are examined through two ways: the [[Verse of Muharabah]] (Verse 33 of Surah al-Ma'idah) and its occasion of revelation (Sha'n al-Nuzul). In the section on the verse of *Muharabah*, the author states the semantic possibilities of the verse (pp. 145-148), and based on the premise that the meaning of this verse is *Muharabah* with Muslims and is not restricted to the era of the Prophet of Islam, he introduces five instances for *Muharabah* (pp. 148-149). Then, considering other contextual clues, such as the following verse which is about the repentance of the *Muharibs*, he critiques and examines the primary assumptions and instances, and considers certain cases outside the scope of the verse (pp. 149-150). In the section on the occasion of the revelation of the verse, the author enumerates six instances (p. 156) and expresses the concept of *Muharabah* based on the meaning of the key concept "corruption on earth" (pp. 157, 160).

The author defines three instances for the *Muharib*, in all three of which "striving for corruption on earth" exists: *Muharabah* with God (God's servants), *Muharabah* with the Messenger of God (PBUH), and *Muharabah* with God (God's servants) and the Messenger of God (PBUH). Also, based on the apparent meaning of the verse of *Muharabah*, the ruling of *Muharabah* includes non-Muslims as well (p. 160) and is not exclusive to Islamic territories (p. 161). Of course, there is one exception, and that is highway robbery for retaliation and reclaiming a lost right when there was no other choice; such as the Muslims' night attack on the trade caravan of the Quraysh in the first year of the Hijra (p. 161).

The punishment for *Muharabah* is among the few punishments whose ruling is mentioned in the Quran (p. 162), and since in *Muharabah* the violation of two types of rights occurs, namely the right of God (Haqq-Allah) and the right of the people (Haqq al-Nas), the punishments must be proportionate and compensatory for the damages (p. 163). Based on the author's conclusion regarding the punishment for *Muharabah*, the death sentence is not definitively mandated for the *Muharib*, and only in the event that the *Muharib* commits murder is he sentenced to death, which cannot be pardoned or converted to blood money (Diyah). Also, the philosophy of executing the *Muharib* is the protection of citizens' lives and, more importantly, the financial, physical, and psychological security of all members of society, which the Lawgiver does not compromise on and is not exclusive to Muslims. On the other hand, the variety in the punishment of the *Muharib*, meaning execution, crucifixion (Salb), amputation of the right hand and left foot in case of taking property, and banishment (Nafi Balad), allows the religious ruler and executor of the punishment to determine a punishment proportionate to the *Muharabah* and the reflection of the execution of the punishment in society (p. 165).

=== Apostasy and the Human Right to Life ===
The author believes that the claim of those who consider [[apostasy]] (Irtidad) as one of the exceptional cases to the human right to life in the Quran lacks validity and credibility (p. 166). To prove this claim, he first examines the lexical meaning of apostasy (p. 167) and then its jurisprudential meaning (p. 168), and explains two instances of terminological apostasy in Imami jurisprudence:
# Theoretical denial of Islam and choosing disbelief (Kafir-Kishi) through speech and expression of opinion, whether as an innate apostate (Murtadd Fitri) or a national apostate (Murtadd Milli) (p. 169)
# Practical denial of Islamic rulings, including considering some lawful things (Halal) of Islam as forbidden (Haram) or considering some divine forbidden things as lawful (p. 170).

Then, apostasy is examined from the perspective of the Quran, and the author, after mentioning the nine causes of apostasy in the Quran (p. 172), states the conditions for the realization of the effects of apostasy in the Quran: 1. Death in a state of disbelief, 2. Belief in the truthfulness of Islam, 3. Free will in choosing alternative thinking and the absence of coercion (Ikrah) (pp. 175-177). In the end, verses related to the otherworldly and worldly punishment of the apostate are examined, and the derivation of the death penalty ruling is critiqued (pp. 177-185).

The author believes that the worldly punishment for apostasy contradicts the personal rights of the human being from two aspects and creates doubt: the violation of the right to life, and the violation of the right to freedom of belief (p. 248). He has divided the strategies for resolving this doubt into two types, explaining and critiquing various solutions in each case. In this regard, he points to four reasons against the worldly punishment for apostasy, three of which relate to the fact that the evidence for depriving the life of an apostate is based on solitary reports (Khabar Wahid). The author has provided answers to each of the reasons:
# The lack of [[authority of a solitary report|authority of a solitary report]] (Hujjiyyah Khabar al-Wahid) in grave matters, such as the deprivation of the right to life (p. 250): The author asserts that the evidence for the worldly punishment of the apostate is not merely a solitary report, and there are other narrations in this regard; although there might be flaws in them as well (pp. 250-251).
# The absence of rational conduct (Sirah 'Uqala'iyyah) regarding the worldly punishment of the apostate; referring to the fact that rational conduct is the main reason for accepting the authority of a solitary report (p. 251): The author asserts that from the view of great Shia scholars, the most important reason for the authority of a solitary report is consensus (Ijma') which indicates the view of the Infallible, not rational conduct; and it is for this reason that the narrations regarding the ruling on the apostate, which are mostly solitary reports, have been accepted by Shia jurists.
# The impossibility of abrogating (Naskh) the Quran with a solitary report and the fact that the Quran has not mentioned a worldly punishment for the apostate (p. 252): The author asserts that expressing a ruling that is not mentioned in the Quran cannot be called the abrogation of the Quran; because abrogation means that a ruling which was not legitimate becomes legitimate at another time.
# The conflict between the punishment of the apostate and the [[Let there be no compulsion in religion (Verse)|verse "There is no compulsion in religion"]] (La ikraha fi al-din) (p. 253): The author asserts that although the aforementioned verse means "freedom of belief", it does not mean "freedom of expression", and if a false belief causes the intellectual deviation of others, the worldly punishment of the apostate does not contradict the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" (pp. 256-257).

The author then addresses the reasons presented regarding the doubt about the absolute temporal application and inclusiveness of the ruling on the apostate, and critiques them. The author does not accept the historical nature of the ruling on the apostate and its restriction to the establishment era of Islam, but accepts the possibility of its being a state ruling (Hukm Wila'i) and exclusive to the ruler (the Prophet of Islam), presenting evidence in this regard, and finally stating that this justification is compatible with the sanctity of human blood (pp. 257-270). In this same regard, and to prevent the ruling on the apostate from becoming an objective reality, the author believes that through a restrictive method, without denying the principle of the death penalty ruling, but by imposing various constraints and conditions derived from history, conduct (Sirah), and Hadith, the scope of the ruling on the apostate can be limited to such an extent that practically, the realization of this ruling can only be imagined in very rare cases (pp. 270-274).

=== Offensive Jihad ===
The author, while stating the doubt that legitimizing and sanctifying [[offensive jihad|offensive war]] in Islam violates the right to life of non-Muslims (p. 276), first addresses the underlying factors that gave rise to this ambiguity, listing: 1. The reaction of Muslims to the violence of the polytheists, 2. The necessities of the consolidation era, 3. The exaggeration and magnification of Islamic wars by biographers (Sirah-Nivisan), 4. The Islamic conquests during the era of the Caliphs, and 5. The weakness of the opponents' front and the influence of Islam (pp. 278-282), and then enumerates the motives for the occurrence of Muslim wars; including: 1. Preventing the enemy's aggression, 2. Rescuing the oppressed, defense, and 4. Destroying the rebels (Bughat) (pp. 282-286).

The author then, by examining the verses of jihad in the Quran, enumerates six categories of verses referring to jihad, and finally, referring to the verses containing the command for offensive jihad (including Verse 5 of Surah al-Tawbah: "And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush"), answers the doubt regarding the necessary connection between offensive jihad and the deprivation of the right to life (pp. 294-303).

To resolve the doubt, the author first presents a picture of the historical atmosphere of the revelation of Surah Bara'ah (p. 304) and posits offensive jihad as a return to defensive jihad (p. 307), concluding that only the initial verses of Surah al-Tawbah refer to offensive war, and this command is neither general nor permanent. Based on this, in Islam, only one type of offensive war is officially recognized, which is the jihad to remove obstacles to guidance and confront seditionists who prevent the message of guidance from reaching the people. According to the author, this concept returns to defensive jihad, and therefore, offensive jihad does not mean the deprivation of life, and its target is the seditionists, not the general public. In addition, the legitimacy of offensive jihad was limited to the early period of Islam, and if there is an insistence on its continuation to convert disbelievers to Islam, it will only be during the era of the government of Imam al-Mahdi (a) (pp. 310-311).

=== The Difference Between the Right to Life of Men and Women in Islam ===
The difference between the right to life of men and women is among the ambiguities related to Qisas, but the author, due to the prominence of this subject, preferred to examine it independently and in the section on doubts (p. 312). He has considered two axes for examining this doubt:

::1. Gender Discrimination in Bearing the [[Blood Money]] (Diyah)

::According to Islamic jurisprudence, if a Muslim man murders a Muslim woman, the retaliation (Qisas) against the man is conditioned upon the payment of half of a man's blood money by the victim's heirs. The author, while emphasizing that this ruling is among the indisputable tenets of Shia jurisprudence, nevertheless points to a group of Sunni scholars, as well as [[Yousef Saanei]], one of the Shia sources of emulation (Maraji' Taqlid), who do not see a difference between a man and a woman in the execution of Qisas (pp. 317-318). He also asserts that this jurisprudential ruling, at the time of its issuance, was considered a defense of the woman's right to life and does not imply that the intentional murder of women is permissible (p. 318), and the payment of half the blood money of the male murderer is an assistance to his family's livelihood after the execution of Qisas (p. 319).

::2. Gender Discrimination in the Attachment of Blood Money for a Fetus

::In Shia jurisprudence, the blood money for the [[abortion]] of a female fetus in the stage after the ensoulment (Wuluj al-Ruh), unlike a male fetus, is considered half the full blood money for a life. The author, in response to this doubt, points to the proportionality of the blood money ruling with the important life responsibilities of a male fetus in the event of continued life, and calls it a guarantee for potential loss (Dhaman Khasarat Sha'ni) (p. 325).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Mehdi Khosravi Sarashki Articles]]
[[fa:اسلام و حق حیات انسان (کتاب)]]

The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law (Book)

2026-04-01T12:23:48Z

Enadmin: /* The Independence of the Lawyer from the Perspective of Jurisprudence */

{{author
| author = Hadi Sadeqi
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law
| image = The_Independence_of_Lawyers_in_the_Mirror_of_Jurisprudence_Iranian_Law_and_English_Law.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Ali Mirlohi
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| style =
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 147
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Tafakkor-e Ayandeh-Saz
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2022 (1401 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}
*'''Abstract'''
'''The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law''' (استقلال وکلا در آینه فقه، حقوق ایران و حقوق انگلستان), written by Sayyid Ali Mirlohi, is a 147-page work that examines the various dimensions of the independence of a lawyer in the legal systems of Iran and England, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence. Although the major part of the book is dedicated to the analysis of legal discussions, the author has attempted to elucidate the necessity of the lawyer's independence from a jurisprudential perspective as well, by referring to rules such as the [[No-Harm rule|no-harm]] (La Darar), [[No-Hardship rule|no-hardship]] (La Haraj), the negation of corruption (Nafi-e Fasad), the principle of freedom (Asl al-Hurriyyah), the [[Rule of Justice|principle of justice]] (Asl al-'Adalah), and the necessity of the judge's impartiality.

== Brief Overview ==
The book '''The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law''', written by Sayyid Ali Mirlohi, is a work about the various dimensions of the lawyer's independence in the legal systems of Iran and England, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence. Tafakkor-e Ayandeh-Saz Publications published this book for the first time in 2022 (1401 SH) in 147 pages.

== Structure of the Book ==
The work does not have a specific chapter division, and most of its discussions are about the legal dimensions of the lawyer's independence in the legal systems of Iran and England. A small section in the middle of the book is dedicated to analyzing this subject from a jurisprudential perspective, which has been the focus in this report. The book also contains numerous typographical and editorial errors and requires serious rewriting.

== Independence of the Lawyer ==
The author clarifies at the beginning of the book that his intention by "the lawyer's independence" is not the lawyer's lack of accountability, but rather his ability to pursue the rights of society without being influenced by political and governmental pressures. In his view, the lawyer's independence is the fundamental prerequisite for the realization of justice (p. 8).

Mirlohi believes that the lawyer's independence is realized when the bar association is independent of other branches of government and the lawyer can act within the framework of the law to protect his client's rights against any person, without worrying about negative consequences (p. 46). He also interprets the lawyer's independence as the non-interference of state authorities or society in the lawyer's work (p. 50).

=== The Independence of the Lawyer from the Perspective of Jurisprudence ===
To prove the necessity of the lawyer's independence in jurisprudence, the author relies on a set of principial rules (Qawa'id Usuliyyah) and rational standards (Mawazin 'Aqliyyah), the most important of which are:

* '''The No-Harm Rule (Qa'idah La Darar):''' Based on this rule, a person who does not have the ability to defend himself is exposed to harm; because effective expression and proper defense influence the judge. The realization of this defense is not possible except with the lawyer's independence and freedom (pp. 60-61).
* '''The No-Hardship Rule (Qa'idah La Haraj):''' A non-legal person must endure immense hardship to understand complex procedural issues; therefore, according to the no-hardship rule, the existence of an independent lawyer is necessary (pp. 61-62).
* '''The Negation of Corruption Rule (Qa'idah Nafi al-Fasad):''' The author believes that the lack of the lawyer's independence is inherently corruptive and must be prevented by the dictate of reason (Hukm al-'Aql); thus, this rule also indicates the lawyer's independence (pp. 62-64).
* '''The Principle of Freedom (Asl al-Hurriyyah):''' This principle respects the freedom of the parties to choose a lawyer and the freedom of the lawyer in defense. The realization of this principle depends on the lawyer's independence (pp. 64-65).
* '''The Principle of Justice (Asl al-'Adalah):''' In the author's view, the most important jurisprudential reason for the lawyer's independence is the principle of justice. Justice is established when the institution of defense and legal representation is separate from the institution of power and sovereignty and operates independently (pp. 65-66).
* '''The Rule of Rational Good and Evil (Qa'idah Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli):''' The independence of the institution of legal representation is a commendable matter from the perspective of reason; because it facilitates rights and prevents oppression (p. 66).
* '''The Necessity of the Judiciary's Impartiality:''' Islam's emphasis on the judge's impartiality is considered a jurisprudential backing for the necessity of the lawyer's independence (pp. 67-68).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Judicial Jurisprudence Books]]
[[Category:Sayyid Ali Mirlohi Books]]
[[fa:استقلال وکلا در آینه فقه، حقوق ایران و حقوق انگلستان (کتاب)]]

File:The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence Iranian Law and English Law.jpg

2026-04-01T12:21:51Z

Enadmin:

The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law (Book)

2026-04-01T12:21:20Z

Enadmin: Created page with "{{author | author = Hadi Sadeqi | author2 = | author3 = | compilation = | editor1 = | editor2 = | editor3 = }} {{infobox book | title = The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law | image = The_Independence_of_Lawyers_in_the_Mirror_of_Jurisprudence_Iranian_Law_and_English_Law.jpg | image_size = | image_caption = | other_names = | author = Sayyid Ali Mirlohi | date_of_writing = | subject = | style = | language = Per..."

{{author
| author = Hadi Sadeqi
| author2 =
| author3 =
| compilation =
| editor1 =
| editor2 =
| editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| title = The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law
| image = The_Independence_of_Lawyers_in_the_Mirror_of_Jurisprudence_Iranian_Law_and_English_Law.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| other_names =
| author = Sayyid Ali Mirlohi
| date_of_writing =
| subject =
| style =
| language = Persian
| editor =
| corrected_by =
| by_the_effort_of =
| illustrator =
| cover_designer =
| number_of_volumes =
| number_of_pages = 147
| format =
| collection =
| translated_to_other_languages =
| publisher = Tafakkor-e Ayandeh-Saz
| place_of_publication = Tehran
| publication_date = 2022 (1401 SH)
| edition = First
| print_run =
| isbn =
| media_type =
| publisher_website =
| book_name = 
| translator = 
| publication_details = 
| electronic_version =
}}
*'''Abstract'''
'''The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law''' (استقلال وکلا در آینه فقه، حقوق ایران و حقوق انگلستان), written by Sayyid Ali Mirlohi, is a 147-page work that examines the various dimensions of the independence of a lawyer in the legal systems of Iran and England, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence. Although the major part of the book is dedicated to the analysis of legal discussions, the author has attempted to elucidate the necessity of the lawyer's independence from a jurisprudential perspective as well, by referring to rules such as the [[No-Harm rule|no-harm]] (La Darar), [[No-Hardship rule|no-hardship]] (La Haraj), the negation of corruption (Nafi-e Fasad), the principle of freedom (Asl al-Hurriyyah), the [[Rule of Justice|principle of justice]] (Asl al-'Adalah), and the necessity of the judge's impartiality.

== Brief Overview ==
The book '''The Independence of Lawyers in the Mirror of Jurisprudence, Iranian Law, and English Law''', written by Sayyid Ali Mirlohi, is a work about the various dimensions of the lawyer's independence in the legal systems of Iran and England, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence. Tafakkor-e Ayandeh-Saz Publications published this book for the first time in 2022 (1401 SH) in 147 pages.

== Structure of the Book ==
The work does not have a specific chapter division, and most of its discussions are about the legal dimensions of the lawyer's independence in the legal systems of Iran and England. A small section in the middle of the book is dedicated to analyzing this subject from a jurisprudential perspective, which has been the focus in this report. The book also contains numerous typographical and editorial errors and requires serious rewriting.

== Independence of the Lawyer ==
The author clarifies at the beginning of the book that his intention by "the lawyer's independence" is not the lawyer's lack of accountability, but rather his ability to pursue the rights of society without being influenced by political and governmental pressures. In his view, the lawyer's independence is the fundamental prerequisite for the realization of justice (p. 8).

Mirlohi believes that the lawyer's independence is realized when the bar association is independent of other branches of government and the lawyer can act within the framework of the law to protect his client's rights against any person, without worrying about negative consequences (p. 46). He also interprets the lawyer's independence as the non-interference of state authorities or society in the lawyer's work (p. 50).

=== The Independence of the Lawyer from the Perspective of Jurisprudence ===
To prove the necessity of the lawyer's independence in jurisprudence, the author relies on a set of principial rules (Qawa'id Usuliyyah) and rational standards (Mawazin 'Aqliyyah), the most important of which are:

'''_ The No-Harm Rule (Qa'idah La Darar):''' Based on this rule, a person who does not have the ability to defend himself is exposed to harm; because effective expression and proper defense influence the judge. The realization of this defense is not possible except with the lawyer's independence and freedom (pp. 60-61).

'''_ The No-Hardship Rule (Qa'idah La Haraj):''' A non-legal person must endure immense hardship to understand complex procedural issues; therefore, according to the no-hardship rule, the existence of an independent lawyer is necessary (pp. 61-62).

'''_ The Negation of Corruption Rule (Qa'idah Nafi al-Fasad):''' The author believes that the lack of the lawyer's independence is inherently corruptive and must be prevented by the dictate of reason (Hukm al-'Aql); thus, this rule also indicates the lawyer's independence (pp. 62-64).

'''_ The Principle of Freedom (Asl al-Hurriyyah):''' This principle respects the freedom of the parties to choose a lawyer and the freedom of the lawyer in defense. The realization of this principle depends on the lawyer's independence (pp. 64-65).

'''_ The Principle of Justice (Asl al-'Adalah):''' In the author's view, the most important jurisprudential reason for the lawyer's independence is the principle of justice. Justice is established when the institution of defense and legal representation is separate from the institution of power and sovereignty and operates independently (pp. 65-66).

'''_ The Rule of Rational Good and Evil (Qa'idah Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli):''' The independence of the institution of legal representation is a commendable matter from the perspective of reason; because it facilitates rights and prevents oppression (p. 66).

'''_ The Necessity of the Judiciary's Impartiality:''' Islam's emphasis on the judge's impartiality is considered a jurisprudential backing for the necessity of the lawyer's independence (pp. 67-68).

[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[Category:Judicial Jurisprudence Books]]
[[Category:Sayyid Ali Mirlohi Books]]
[[fa:استقلال وکلا در آینه فقه، حقوق ایران و حقوق انگلستان (کتاب)]]

Category:Articles by Hadi Sadeqi

2026-04-01T12:16:58Z

Enadmin: Created blank page

Category:Bibliography Articles

2026-04-01T12:16:45Z

Enadmin: Created blank page

File:The Use of Deceased's Germ Cells.jpg

2026-04-01T12:15:21Z

Enadmin: