Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence - User contributions [en]

User:Sarfipour

2026-04-21T09:07:05Z

Mkhaghanif: /* اعلام */

== اعلام ==
* [[Mohammad Ishaq Fayyaz]]
* [[Sayyid Abolqassem Musavi Khoei]]
* [[Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Rohani]]
* [[Mohaqqeq Karaki]]
* [[Sayyid Taqi Tabatabaei Qomi]]
* [[Mirza Javad Tabrizi]]
* [[Sayyid Mousa Shubairi Zanjani]]
* [[Mohammad Javad Fazel Lankarani]]
* [[Abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri]]
* [[Maliki school]]
* [[Shafi'i school]]
* [[Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani]]
* [[Misbah al-Fiqahah]]
* [[Abulqasem Alidoost]]

===نام‌ها===
* محمد
* حسین
* حسن
* صادق
* موسی
*
===نام‌های خانوادگی===
* شبیری
* زنجانی
* فاضل

== اصطلاحات ==
* [[disliked (makruh)]]
* no necessary connection : ملازمه منجزی
* sayyid
* contemporary scholars of Usul al-fiqh : فقهای اصولی

== الگوهای دانشنامه ==
* This category is created for articles related to [Name of the Person].

Main Page

2026-04-12T07:45:52Z

Mkhaghanif:

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[[FA:main page]]

Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking (Book)

2026-04-09T12:49:06Z

Mkhaghanif: /* Exchange Contracts */

{{author
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| title = Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking
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| author = Fatemeh Moghimi'an
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* '''Abstract'''
'''Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking''' (in Persian: [[:fa:اعطای_تسهیلات_در_بانکداری_اسلامی_(کتاب)|اعطای تسهیلات در بانکداری اسلامی]]) is a Persian book in the field of [[economic jurisprudence]] (Fiqh al-Iqtisadi). According to [[Fatemeh Moghimi'an]], the author of the book, the main characteristic of [[participatory contracts]] (Uqud Musharakati) is the prohibition of determining a definitive profit before the completion of the economic activity. In a [[sleeping partnership contract]] ('Aqd al-Mudharabah), the loss resulting from trade will be borne by both parties, and unfortunately, bank operators are aware of the fictitious nature of the Mudharabah but pay no attention to its validity and [[religious compliance]] (Shar'i).

In the author's belief, in a [[partnership contract]] ('Aqd al-Shirkah), the [[partnership share]] (Sahm al-Shirkah) must be joint (Musha'). In [[exchange contracts]] (Uqud Mubadala'i), the profit rate can be determined as definitive and fixed. She states that in [[lease-to-own]] (Ijarah bi-Shart al-Tamlik), banks have placed the determination of the lessee's violations upon the banks themselves, which does not seem logical and fair. She calls [[reward contracts]] (Ju'alah) the "Mother of Contracts" (Umm al-'Uqud) and states that the legal relations in a Ju'alah contract are very complex; she also considers installment sales as identical to [[credit sales]] (Bay' Nasi'ah). According to the author, the maximum service fee rate in loan facilities is 4 percent, but some banks charge a fee of up to 26 percent. Taking [[late payment penalties]] (Jarimah Ta'khir Ta'diyah), which is a [[discretionary punishment]] (Ta'zir) for capable debtors, is considered among other flaws of loan facilities.

== Introduction and Structure of the Book ==
The book "Granting Facilities in Islamic Banking" is the result of research by Fatemeh Moghimi'an, published in Persian by [[Khorsandi Publications]] in 2020 (1399 SH). Moghimi'an holds a master's degree in Islamic jurisprudence and law.

This book is organized into three chapters. The first chapter examines participatory contracts in the granted facilities under the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law (p. 19). In the second chapter, the exchange contracts existing in the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law regarding the granting of facilities are examined (p. 59), and the third chapter is dedicated to the [[loan contract]] ('Aqd al-Qardh) through which banks grant facilities to applicants (p. 119).

== Participatory Contracts ==
In [[examining participatory contracts]] (Uqud Musharakati), the author emphasizes that in these types of contracts, the bank provides the necessary capital to launch an economic activity and shares the resulting profit with the customer. The main characteristic of these contracts is the prohibition of determining a definitive profit before the end of the activity, and only determining the profit ratio between the parties is permissible.

=== The Mudharabah Contract ===
In the discussion of sleeping partnership (Mudharabah), the author considers it a [[revocable contract]] (Aqd Ja'iz) in which the capital is from one side and the labor from the other, and the potential profit is divided between them. Mudharabah in banking operations is implemented in such a way that the bank is the investor and the customer is the agent (Amil); the agent receives the capital, buys goods, and after selling, pays the agreed-upon profit to the bank (pp. 23–27). Among the characteristics of Mudharabah is its commutative (Mu'awwad) nature; meaning the agent provides a service, and in case of realizing a profit, the owner also has a share. However, this profit is not definitive, and in the absence of profit, the agent does not receive a substitute ('Iwadh). Also, the condition of determining a specific profit or absolving the owner from liability for loss is incompatible with the essence of the Mudharabah contract (pp. 24–26).

=== Critique of Banking Mudharabah Transactions ===
The flaws related to banking transactions in the field of granting facilities based on Mudharabah have several parts, and an attempt is made to address the most important of these flaws.

* The fictitious nature of the transactions: In the author's view, the first flaw in banking Mudharabahs is the fictitious (Suri) nature of many of these contracts; meaning their signing is not done based on the real intention (Qasd) of the parties. In most cases, the recipients of the facilities act merely to supply temporary financial needs and not to execute a real Mudharabah. Bank operators are also sometimes aware of this intention but overlook it. This is while the religious validity of the contract depends on the true intention of the parties (p. 31). If the borrower, without the intention of Mudharabah, acts merely to receive funds and repay them with an added amount, this act is considered [[usury]] (Riba); because the legitimacy of Mudharabah depends on its actual realization and not just the apparent signing of the contract (p. 31).

* Determining definitive profit: The author considers one of the important flaws in the execution of banking Mudharabahs to be the determination of a definitive profit. According to the directive, the bank must insert the minimum and maximum expected profit into the contract according to the resolution of the Money and Credit Council, whereas the real estimation of profit must be done based on multiple factors such as the customer's experience, the type and price of goods, the duration of the sale, and the amount of capital. However, in practice, banks at the time of settlement only suffice with the minimum determined profit (p. 34). Also, although the predicted profit varies within a range, determining a specific percentage as the bank's minimum share in the contract can cause the Mudharabah to distance itself from its real and religious form (pp. 33-35).

* Imposing loss on the customer: Banks, contrary to the principle of sharing in profit and loss in the Mudharabah contract, take a commitment from the agent to compensate for all the loss and receive heavy collaterals to guarantee it. This unilateral condition is incompatible with the participatory nature of Mudharabah. Although it is not problematic in the case of the agent's real consent, borrowers usually have no choice but to accept this condition (p. 36).

* Imposing insurance costs on the recipients of facilities: While according to the executive directive of Mudharabah, the insurance cost is upon the bank, the lack of initial investigation into the readiness of the conditions for concluding the contract, and the inexactness of the real duration required in the Mudharabah contract, are among other flaws directed at the usury-free banking system (pp. 32-38).

=== Partnership Contracts ===
Based on this research, "[[partnership]]" (Shirkah) in jurisprudence means the joint (Musha') ownership of several people in a property. In the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law as well, "[[civil partnership]]" refers to the combination of cash or non-cash partnership shares of natural or legal persons to gain profit based on a contract. In this type of partnership, the bank can enter into a transaction with one or more partners, and the partnership share must be joint; meaning none of the partners owns a specific part of the property, rather all of them are partners in the whole of it (pp. 40–44).

=== Critique of Banking Participatory Transactions ===
Some believe that the partnership contract (Aqd al-Musharakah) should be removed from the system of granting facilities. In their view, this type of contract requires precise religious and economic supervision, which is not realized in practice. Either the bank, seemingly and without real supervision, seeks a specific profit, which is incompatible with the nature of partnership; or it must employ expert appraisers for each project, which is beyond the capacity of commercial banks. Also, risks such as a lack of profitability or the provision of unrealistic reports by the customer might cause a loss to the bank (pp. 47–48).

In contrast, another group emphasizes the high importance of participatory contracts and even considers them a suitable alternative to other contracts. Pointing to the flexibility and high capacity of civil partnership, this group believes this contract can have positive performance in banks regarding return and profitability. From their perspective, inserting the "minimum expected profit" in civil partnership can act as an alternative to the "interest rate" in usurious banking and give high maneuvering power to banks (p. 49).

== Exchange Contracts ==
[[Exchange contracts]] (Uqud Mubadala'i) are a category of contracts in which a fixed profit rate can be determined, meaning that in exchange contracts, the bank, in return for paying a financial grant, can deduct a fixed and definitive percentage of its profit regularly from the customer's account.

=== Lease-to-Own Contract ===
Based on the author's viewpoint, one of the most important contracts used by banks for granting facilities is the [[lease-to-own contract]] (Aqd Ijarah bi-Shart al-Tamlik or Leasing). In this contract, it is stipulated that the lessee becomes the owner of the leased object at the end of the lease period and upon adherence to the provisions of the contract. Although the main goal of this contract is the development of service, agricultural, industrial, and mining activities, banks often apply it in the housing sector. The [[determination of the rent]] (Mal al-Ijarah) is also based on the cost price, the bank's expected profit, and the duration of the lease, and the duration of the lease must not exceed the useful life of the leased object (pp. 68-72).

'''Critique of Banking Lease-to-Own Transactions:''' According to the researcher, there is little inclination among applicants to receive facilities in the form of a lease-to-own contract. The main reason for this reluctance is the imbalance in the bargaining power of the parties; because the bank, as a capitalist institution, tries to gain the most profit with the least risk, while the other party, namely the customer, due to financial inability, is forced to accept the bank's conditions. This situation has caused unfair conditions to be imposed in the contracts (p. 74):

* The determination of the lessee's violation is placed upon the bank, and the lessee has no right to object.
* The responsibility for any loss, without transgression or negligence (Ta'addi wa Tafrit), is upon the lessee, and the bank determines the amount of the loss.
* The [[right of cancellation]] (Haqq al-Faskh) is stripped from the lessee and reserved unilaterally for the bank.
* In case of not paying even one installment, the contract is cancelled and the leased object is taken back.
* All costs of insurance, registration, and the [[attorney fee]] (Haqq al-Wikalah) for cancellation are also imposed on the lessee (pp. 75-77).

==== The Nature of the Lease-to-Own Contract ====
As quoted by Moghimi'an, one of the most important challenges and criticisms raised regarding the execution of the lease-to-own contract in the banking system is the disagreement over the nature of this contract. Some believe that in the event of a dispute or problem during the execution of the contract, there are no specific rulings and solutions to resolve it. From the perspective of this group, only two clear effects can be identified in this contract: one is the "initial transfer of [[ownership of the benefit]]" (Tamlik Ibtida'i Manfa'at) and the other is the "final transfer of ownership of the entity" (Tamlik Naha'i 'Ayn), and its other legal effects are ambiguous and unclear (p. 82). Regarding the nature of this contract, three viewpoints have also been raised. Some consider it merely a lease contract (Aqd al-Ijarah) in which the parties have stipulated that the transfer of ownership of the entity will take place in the future. Another group believes this contract is, in truth, a kind of sale (Bay'), and the lease is merely a cover for paying the transaction price in installments. The third viewpoint considers this contract a kind of independent and specific contract that is not a combination of lease and sale. Nevertheless, Moghimi'an considers the correct view to be that very first assumption and believes the main nature of this contract is a lease (p. 84).

=== Reward Contract (Ju'alah) ===
Based on the author's findings, [[reward]] (Ju'alah) is one of the deep-rooted institutions in Islamic jurisprudence and civil law, by virtue of which the rewarder (Ja'il or employer) commits to paying a specific amount (Ju'l) in exchange for the performance of a specific act. Banks in the usury-free banking system can, in the form of a Ju'alah, provide the necessary economic facilities as the agent (Amil) or, when necessary ('Ind al-Iqtida'), as the rewarder (pp. 85 and 90). Ju'alah, due to its applicability in all economic sectors, can be a complement or alternative to Mudharabah, which is exclusively applied in the field of trade. The breadth of subjects that can be encompassed and the ease of the conditions of this contract have caused some to refer to it as the "Mother of Contracts" (Umm al-'Uqud); because any act that is considered valuable from the perspective of rational people ('Uqala) can be the subject of a Ju'alah contract (p. 85).

'''Critique of Banking Ju'alah Transactions:''' Relying on the author's discussions, the granting of facilities in the form of Ju'alah by banks faces numerous flaws and shortcomings, some of the most important of which are mentioned in this section. First, the legal relations existing in the Ju'alah contract are very complex and intertwined, such that even for individuals familiar with legal concepts, a correct understanding of these relations is not easily possible; while the general public, who often constitute the applicants for these facilities, lack the necessary awareness to precisely understand these relations. Since the realization of the intention (Qasd) and will (Iradah) of the parties is a condition for the validity of any contract, and this matter depends on being aware of the provisions and subject of the contract, it is clear that in such a complex structure, the realization of the [[creative intention]] (Qasd Insha'i) is difficult and, consequently, the possibility of the contract being void (Batil) also exists (p. 95).

Another flaw is that based on jurisprudential and legal rules, the determination of the reward amount is upon the rewarder (employer); but in the current banking system, the bank appears in the position of the agent while at the same time determining the reward amount itself, which is incompatible with the legal structure of Ju'alah (p. 99). Also, the method of banks gaining profit through the difference between two Ju'alah contracts—one in the position of the agent in the primary contract and the other in the position of the rewarder in the secondary contract—is based on the difference in the reward price between these two contracts. This method of gaining profit, from a jurisprudential and ethical perspective, is not considered a proper method for securing banking interests (p. 96).

=== Installment Sale Contract ===
In the author's belief, installment sale is a new phrase for an old transaction, because it is a type of credit sale (Bay' Nasi'ah) where the sold object (Mabi') is sold now and all or a portion of the price (Thaman) is paid later in known installments and over a specified period. It is clear that the price of a credit-sold object is higher than a sold object that is sold in cash; this contract is considered one of the most widely used facilities in the banking facility granting system (pp. 102-106).

'''Critique of Installment Sale Transactions in the Banking System:''' From the perspective of this research, the rate of installment sale (credit) could, due to two characteristics—the profit being known and its being definitive—be introduced as the best alternative to the interest rate. However, determining the installment sale rate in practice based on the interest rate has seriously challenged this optimism (p. 109). According to the executive directive for housing installment sales, banks are obligated to receive an amount as a down payment in cash before the contract, whereas before the contract, an advance receipt will have no relation to a transaction that will be carried out later (p. 110).

=== Forward Sale (Bay' Salaf) ===
The researcher introduces [[forward sale]] (Bay' Salaf or Salam) as the opposite of credit sale (Nasi'ah), and in this regard says, a forward sale is buying a fungible entity (Kulli) with a term, in exchange for a cash price, contrary to credit sale, and the subject of the forward sale transaction consists of the cash advance purchase of products from production units in the industrial, mining, or agricultural sectors (pp. 112 and 114).

'''The Problem with Salaf Transactions in the Banking System:''' Despite the positive effects that the Salaf contract has on the economy and in aiding producers, in practice, banks do not greatly welcome concluding this contract for various reasons. Among these reasons are: paying the entire price of the sold object before receiving the sold object might not be economically viable, the market for the goods might not be in the bank's favor in the future, there is a possibility that the goods are perishable, and banks must pay costs such as warehousing and insurance (p. 117).

=== Loan Contract (Aqd al-Qardh) ===
According to the author's statements, stipulating a benefit (Naf') in a loan (Qardh) is considered usury (Riba), and the condition of excess, whether mentioned in the contract or stated implicitly within it, is usury and forbidden (Haram), and it makes no difference whether the excess is an entity ('Ayn), a benefit (Manfa'at), or an attribute (Sifah); in any case, it is usury and forbidden. The distinguishing point in this contract is that the capital in a loan is always circulating and, through this contract, is placed in the hands of someone who needs it (pp. 124 and 120).

'''Critique of Loan Transactions in the Banking System:''' A considerable volume of the author's material is dedicated to critiquing the performance of banks in [[granting interest-free loan]] (Qardh al-Hasanah) facilities. The author believes that in many cases, the service fees received by banks exceed the real cost of the services; while according to the Usury-Free Banking Operations Law, costs must be calculated precisely and separately. Also, despite the determination of a customary fee rate between 2 to 4 percent by the Money and Credit Council, some banks receive up to 26 percent; an issue that some jurists consider an instance of usury (pp. 132 and 133).

The author also criticizes the lack of transparency in announcing the amount of the service fee and writes that in many cases, banks do not announce the exact amount of the fee before concluding the contract. This matter, since there is a possibility of the applicant withdrawing if informed of a high fee, conflicts with the principle of the parties' consent and leads to a [[contract involving risk/uncertainty]] (Aqd-e Gharari) (p. 133). Receiving a late payment penalty is also lacking a religious foundation in the author's view; because this penalty is considered a kind of discretionary punishment (Ta'zir), the determination of which is solely at the discretion of the [[religious ruler]] (Hakim al-Shar'), and its funds must be allocated to the public treasury (Bayt al-Mal), not deposited into the banks' accounts (p. 133).

Subsequently, the author points to other flaws such as the incomplete allocation of interest-free loan resources, the condition of opening an account and blocking a part of the deposit, deceptive advertisements with prizes, and strictness in granting loans to needy strata, and considers them contrary to the spirit of usury-free banking (pp. 131–136).

[[Category:Fatemeh Moghimi'an Books]]
[[Category:Books about Bank Facilities]]
[[fa:اعطای تسهیلات در بانکداری اسلامی (کتاب)]]
[[Category:Book review]]

Category:Biographical Articles

2026-04-08T11:03:56Z

Mkhaghanif:

__HIDDENCAT__

Category:Bibliography Articles

2026-04-05T15:18:07Z

Mkhaghanif:

__HIDDENCAT__

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi

2026-03-18T11:40:19Z

Mkhaghanif: /* Life, Education, and Ijtihad */

{{Author
|author = Mohammad Mahdi Emadi
|compiler =
}}

{{infobox person
| reputation = Ayatollah Jannati Shahroudi
| name = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi
| birth = 1311 SH (c. 1932 CE)
| demise = 1424 SH (2026 CE)
| image = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi.jpeg
| image size =
| caption =
| position = Jurist (*Faqih*)
| denomination = Shia
| nationality = Iranian
| speciality =
| works in contemporary jurisprudence =
| opinions = Intrinsic purity of humans, opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned, permissibility of sculpture
| professors =
| students =
| website = http://www.jannaati.com/far/index.php
}}

'''Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi''' (in persian: [[:fa:محمدابراهیم_جناتی_شاهرودی|محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]) (1311-1404 SH) is an innovative jurist who organizes his jurisprudential deduction by relying on the examination of the criteria (malakat) of rulings in social and governmental issues. Based on this, he has issued unconventional and minority fatwas, including the intrinsic purity of humans and the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge. The books [[General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists (Book)|General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists]] and [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]] are among his works and express his jurisprudential and principled thoughts. Jannati has theorized on topics such as desirable ijtihad, the age of puberty for girls, music, hijab, the status of women from the perspective of jurisprudential principles, and also apostasy.

Jannati has also conducted studies and research in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has participated in international seminars and congresses, publishing his theories on dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, and the ability of Islam to solve crises in Persian and Arabic journals, including Sawt al-Islam and the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Bi-monthly|Keyhan-e Andisheh]].

==Position and Importance==
With an approach different from traditional jurists, Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati seeks to make Shia jurisprudence responsive to contemporary challenges. In this endeavor, in addition to adhering to established and well-known rules of jurisprudence and ijtihad, he emphasizes several principles: giving importance to the Quran in jurisprudential and legal deductions, paying attention to the realities of life, re-examining sources and references, distinguishing between temporary and permanent rulings, and discovering the purposes and causes of rulings in non-worship matters.<ref>Mehrizi, [http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf "Religious Approaches to Women in Contemporary Iranian History"], pp. 21-22.</ref>

Jannati has also expressed his views on comparative jurisprudence by participating in international seminars and congresses. In addition, interviews with him have been published in various magazines and publications, including those in Iran, Pakistan, India, France, England, and the United States. In this context, he participated in the seminar on the "Place of Reason in Holy Texts" at the University of Birmingham, the seminar on "Understanding Shi'ism in the Past and Present" at Istanbul University, the seminar on "Comparative Fiqh and Methods of Ijtihad" at Damascus University, and also the "Islamic Discussions" seminar in Qamatiyeh, Lebanon, where he delivered speeches and read papers.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Life, Education, and Ijtihad==
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati was born in 1311 SH in Semnan. After a period of study in Mashhad, he went to Qom and attended the advanced jurisprudence (kharij) class of [[Sayyid Hossein Tabatabaei Borujerdi]], the head of the Qom seminary, and the advanced principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) class of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini]]. Jannati then went to Najaf and for 25 years participated in the classes of [[Sayyid Abd al-Hadi al-Shirazi]], [[Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim]], [[Sheikh Hussein al-Hilli]], [[Sayyid Baqir al-Zanjani]], [[Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi]], and [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]].<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> In addition to his religious studies, he taught advanced seminary courses for eleven years and also, in his last years in Najaf, established an advanced principles of jurisprudence class at the Grand Madrasa of Akhund Khurasani.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati received permission for ijtihad from Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi (d. 1353 SH). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1357 SH, Jannati returned to Iran, settled in Qom, and continues to teach and write books and academic articles.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> He was currently a Shia jurist and Marja' al-Taqlid (source of emulation) and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

==Works==
The written works of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati fall into two areas: book authoring and journalistic activities.

===Writings===
In his authored works, Jannati pays special attention to the topic of desirable ijtihad and emphasizes the role of temporal, spatial, and customary changes on the evolution of ijtihad.<ref>Arezumandi, "A Look at the Book Fiqh and Time...", pp. 213-214.</ref> The books "General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists," "Al-Nafahat al-'Ilmiyyah fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Imamiyyah," and [[The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time (Book)|The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time]] are his works on the principles of jurisprudence. He has also dealt with the periods and developments of the science of jurisprudence and its principles in the two books "Periods of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought" and "Periods of Fiqh and Its Manner of Expression."<ref>["Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati"](https://db.ketab.ir/BookList.aspx?Type=Authorid&Code=26792), Khaneye Ketab website.</ref>

Also, the book [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]], which includes the articles "The Age of Puberty for Girls," "Music," "Hijab," "The Status of Women from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Principles," [[Desirable Ijtihad (Book)|Desirable Ijtihad]], [[Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought (Book)|Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought]], "Purity of the Slaughtered Animals of the People of the Book," and [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans (Book)|Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's works. He has conducted studies in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has comparatively examined jurisprudence, its principles, hadith sciences, and Quranic sciences from the perspective of 22 schools of thought,<ref>Imamiyyah, Hanafiyyah, Malikiyyah, Shafi'iyyah, Hanbaliyyah, Zaydiyyah, Ibadiyyah, Zahiriyyah, Awza'iyyah, Thawriyyah, Laythiyyah, Rahwiyyah, Nakha'iyyah, Tamimiyyah, Tabariyyah, Jabiriyyah, Kalbiyyah, Shubrumiyyah, Ibn Abi Layla, Zuhriyyah, 'Uyayniyyah, and Jurayhiyyah.</ref> and some of his works on this topic have been published, including the books Sources of Ijtihad, Periods of Ijtihad, and Periods of Fiqh.

===Journalistic Activities===
The journalistic writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are mostly focused on the theory of dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, as well as proving the capability of Islam in solving crises and the relationship between Islamic nations and states. Jannati has had connections with many Iranian and non-Iranian publications, and hundreds of Persian and Arabic articles by him have been published. Some of the journals in which his works have been published include: Al-'Adl, Sawt al-Islam, Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, Al-Fikr al-Islami, Al-Tawhid, and Risalat al-Taqrib.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Among these, the article "Azmat al-Ihtiyat fi al-Fatawa al-Diniyyah" was published in the journal Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, which examines the precautionary method in issuing fatwas.

His articles have also been published in Iranian publications such as Jahan-e Islam, Zanan, and Soroush.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> The article "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad" was published in the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Magazine]] and explains the period of the perfection of ijtihad, from the era of Wahid Behbahani to Sheikh Ansari.<ref>See: Jannati, "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.</ref>

==Jurisprudential Opinions==
Several fatwas by Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are among the minority and unconventional opinions and fatwas among Shia jurists; including the [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge, and opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned.

===Intrinsic Purity of Humans===
Jannati has issued a fatwa on the intrinsic purity of humans, and consequently, the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book. In "The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad," he interprets impurity as a spiritual and value-based impurity, not a physical one, and on this basis, he considers the disbeliever to be pure.<ref>Jannati, ["The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, the majority of Shia jurists have ruled on the [[Purity of the People of the Book|impurity of the People of the Book]], let alone non-People of the Book.<ref>Navvab, "Critique and Review of the Textual Evidence for the Purity and Impurity of the People of the Book," p. 49.</ref>

The permissibility of a Muslim marrying a disbelieving woman and the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book are other fatwas by Jannati in this regard, which stand in opposition to the consensus or majority fatwas of other jurists on the prohibition of marriage with a disbelieving woman<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 30, p. 27.</ref> and the prohibition of the slaughtered animal of a disbeliever.<ref>*Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 745.</ref>

===Permissibility of Women Holding the Position of a Judge===
The permissibility of women holding the position of a judge is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's opinions, which has opponents such as al-Halabi and Ibn Idris among the early jurists, and [[Sheikh Ansari]] and [[Mirza Qomi]] among the later ones.<ref>Soroush Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judicature," pp. 54, 64.</ref> Also, the author of Jawahir has claimed a consensus on the condition of masculinity for a judge.<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 40, pp. 12, 14.</ref>

Jannati has also permitted women to hold the position of a Marja' (source of emulation), which is a controversial opinion.<ref>Amin, ["Gender and Marja'iyyat"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/112053/), *Hawra' Magazine*.</ref>

===Opposition to the Necessity of Emulating the Most Learned===
Jannati has opposed the necessity of emulating the most learned; whereas [[Muhaqqiq al-Karaki]] has claimed a consensus on emulating the most learned.<ref>Borujerdi, *Nihayat al-Afkar*, vol. 4, p. 248.</ref> He does not consider "most learned" (a'lamiyyat)—in the sense of being more capable of deriving God's ruling—to be conceivable either at the apparent and evidentiary level or at the level of reality and fact. Jannati also considers "most learned" in another sense, i.e., "making fewer mistakes in tracing back subsidiary issues and new problems to basic principles," to be conceivable, but finds it very difficult to determine which of two mujtahids makes fewer mistakes in the process of derivation.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

===Permissibility of Sculpture===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati considers sculpture to be one of the valuable arts and is of the opinion that today, criteria such as reprehensible and polytheistic motives and the intention to imitate the Creator do not exist in sculpture, so it is considered a permissible act.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Such an opinion has been issued while Sheikh Ansari has claimed a consensus on the prohibition of sculpting living beings, although [[Hossein-Ali Montazeri]] has rejected the existence of a consensus on this matter.<ref>Montazeri, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, vol. 2, p. 548.</ref>

===Age Not Being the Criterion for Puberty in Girls===
Jannati considers menstruation to be the main criterion for the [[puberty of girls]] and has not accepted the role of age in its determination. He believes that the mention of different ages in the narrations is due to the difference in living environments, geographical conditions, and genetic and physical factors, and that menstruation in girls is equivalent to semen in boys, and the criterion for a girl's puberty is her monthly period, not reaching the age of nine.<ref>Jannati, "Puberty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh," p. 42.</ref> Contrary to Jannati, the majority of Imami jurists have considered age, alongside menstruation and other signs, as a sign of puberty for girls, to the extent that Ibn Idris has claimed a consensus on age being a criterion.<ref>Shahid al-Thani, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah*, vol. 1, pp. 155-156; Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 1, p. 528.</ref>

===The Definition of Ghina in Music Not Being Based on Custom===
In Jannati's view, a specific meaning of ghina (singing, often associated with forbidden music) cannot be reached through custom ('urf), because ghina is discussed in a specific custom and always varies with changing conditions of time and place, geography, culture, society, and human states. This has caused jurists to differ on the concept of ghina; therefore, a comprehensive and exclusive definition of ghina cannot be obtained through custom.<ref>Jannati, ["Art and Beauty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh Principles"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105806/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> On this issue, however, the majority of jurists consider custom to be the criterion for distinguishing forbidden music from permissible music.<ref>Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at*, vol. 2, q. 659; Safi Golpayegani, *Jami' al-Ahkam*, vol. 1, q. 994, 1018, 1020; Tabrizi, *Istifta'at*, q. 1077, 1050, 1059; Fazel Lankarani, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, vol. 1, q. 996; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, q. 1154, 1127; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, issue 20; Nouri Hamedani, *Istifta'at*, vol. 1, q. 1008; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, issue 17.</ref>

===Virgin's Marriage Not Being Conditional on the Guardian's Permission===
Like the majority of Shia jurists,<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 29, p. 175.</ref> Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati does not consider the guardian's permission to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin. He specifies that the father's permission is not a condition for the marriage of a girl who understands her own interests and harms and is not influenced by emotions, and the choice is her own.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> However, many contemporary jurists, contrary to him and the majority of early jurists, consider the permission of the father or paternal grandfather to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin.<ref>Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 5, p. 615; *Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 387, issue 2376.</ref>

===Permissibility of Contraception by a Woman===
Jannati holds that a woman can use contraception without her husband's consent; a fatwa that has both supporters<ref>Khoei, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, p. 284; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 318, issue 1378; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 116, issue 385.</ref> and opponents<ref>Khomeini, *Istifta'at*, vol. 3, p. 283, q. 7; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, p. 300, q. 1259; Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, p. 609.</ref> among Shia jurists.

In addition to the cases mentioned, the attribution of a child to the sperm donor in the case of fertilization with a non-husband's sperm, the permissibility of women dancing for women and men for men in joyous gatherings, and the invalidity of the pro-forma marriage contract of a young girl in its common modern form are other jurisprudential opinions of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Intellectual Foundations==
A modern approach to ijtihad, the belief in the inadequacy of conventional ijtihad in solving problems and responding to new issues, and the emphasis on understanding the elements of time and place are considered the intellectual characteristics of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 399.</ref> In Jannati's view, through the evolution of ijtihad, the problem of applying a fixed Sharia to the variable of time and its conditions can be solved, and as long as such ijtihad is not applied to the sources and elements of deduction, it can never be responsive to the various events of material and spiritual life.<ref>Jannati, *Sources of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought*, vol. 1, introduction, p. 19.</ref>

===Extraction of Criteria===
Attention to subject identification (mawdu'-shinasi), discovering instances, and achieving the criteria (malakat) of rulings in the process of ijtihad are among Jannati's jurisprudential foundations. He considers achieving the criteria of rulings to be possible and, in the difference between the basis (manat) and the cause ('illah), believes that the cause of a ruling pertains to the level of reality and fact, but the basis of a ruling pertains to the level of proof and appearance from the evidence. Based on this, Jannati does not consider the cause of a ruling, which is the real benefit and harm, to be achievable, but he believes that the basis of a ruling is achievable because we have access to the level of appearance from the evidence.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 409.</ref> For this reason, in order to expand the criteria of rulings, he has also issued a fatwa on the obligation of zakat on items other than the nine specified ones, citing the determination of zakat on horses by Imam Ali (a).<ref>Jannati, ["The Role of Time and Place in Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102607/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref>

===Attention to the Spirit of the Sharia===
In his jurisprudential thought, Jannati considers qualities such as having a broad worldview and being aware of current politics to be among the necessary qualities for a mujtahid and believes that a mujtahid must understand the general spirit of the Sharia, which is based on tolerance and ease.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 406.</ref>

===Avoidance of Precautionary Fatwas===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati rejects the method of issuing precautionary fatwas in jurisprudence and considers it impossible to solve society's problems with this method, believing that clarity must be used in issuing fatwas. Citing that Islamic jurisprudence has definitive evidence and also citing verses indicating ease and leniency, such as "Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship,"<ref>Quran 2:185.</ref> he considers the precautionary method to be incompatible with the spirit of the Sharia and believes it will have undesirable reactions in society<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 104-106, 108.</ref> and will fail to respond to many issues, including in the fields of medicine, art, modern currencies, and prescribed punishments (hudud) and retribution (qisas).<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, p. 93.</ref>

===Disregard for the Fame of a Fatwa===
According to Jannati's views, although the efforts of past jurists and scholars must be appreciated, the necessity of obeying well-known opinions and fatwas and not deviating from the views and theories of predecessors is considered a failure to understand the spirit of the Sharia and is in contradiction with the legislation of the principle of ijtihad itself.<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 51-52.</ref>

==Critique==
The jurisprudential-principled foundations of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, while being innovative and attentive to the principle of evolution in ijtihad, suffer from a lack of fundamental theorization. Accordingly, among the works and writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, a fundamental theory with such characteristics cannot be found. On the other hand, Jannati speaks of the necessity of breaking the barrier of emulation in ijtihadi discussions and new issues and emphasizes the necessity of ijtihad in all subjects, including issues related to banking, currency, interest, and partnership (mudarabah).<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, in the arena of economic and social theorization, no scholarly work from this jurist is seen.

As Jannati specifies, if a jurist accepts Islam as a system and feels responsible, he must prepare a manual in accordance with new phenomena in the legal, economic, judicial, penal, political, governmental, and international relations dimensions.<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> But in practice, he has not done so himself and has not theorized in these areas.

==Footnotes==
{{footnotes}}

==References==
{{References}}
* The Holy Quran
* Arezumandi, Abolqasem, "Negahi be Ketab-e Fiqh va Zaman-e Ayatollah Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," no. 49, Autumn 2006.
* Amin, Mehdi, "Jensiyat va Marja'iyyat," *Hawra'*, no. 34, 2009.
* Borujerdi, Mohammad-Taqi, *Nihayat al-Afkar: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Aqa Diya' al-Din 'Iraqi*, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islami, 1417 AH.
* Tabrizi, Jawad, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, Qom: Surur, 3rd ed., 2006.
* *Tawdih al-Masa'il-e Maraji'*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 2013.
* Jannati Shahroudi, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Fiqh va Zaman*, Qom: Nashr-e Ehyagaran, 2006.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["'Asr-e Takamol-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102204/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Bulugh az Didgah-e Fiqh-e Ijtihadi"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105431/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 61, 1995.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Te'ori-ye Taharat-e Dhati-ye Motlaq-e Insan dar Rastay-e Manabe'-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 23, 1989.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Zarurat-e Tahavvol-e Ijtihad dar 'Arseh-ye Istinbat," *Majmu'eh-ye Asar-e Kongereh-ye Barrasi-ye Mabani-ye Fiqhi-ye Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (s): Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad*, vol. 1.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 50.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Honar va Ziba'i az Negah-e Mabani-ye Fiqh-e Ijtihadi," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 68, 1996.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Manabe'-e Ijtihad: Az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Islami*, Tehran: Mu'asseseh-ye Keyhan, 1991.
* Jannati Shahroudi, "Fiqh-e Ijtihadi va Eslah-e Howzeh-ha az Didgah-e Imam Khomeini," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 29.
* Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, *Risalah-ye Ajwibat al-Istifta'at (Farsi)*, Tehran: Sherkat-e Chap va Nashr-e Beyn al-Melal, 2009.
* Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi, *Tawdih al-Masa'il (Muhashsha)*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 8th ed., 1424 AH.
* Khoei, Sayyid Abul-Qasem, *Istifta'at (Farsi)*, reported by Sayyid Mahmud Madadi Musavi, vol. 1, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Khu'i al-Islamiyyah, 2002.
* "Zendeginameh," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Soroush Mahallati, Mohammad, "Daramadi bar Barrasi-ye Qezavat-e Zanan," *Faslnameh-ye Fiqh-e Moqaran*, no. 2, 2013.
* Sistani, Sayyid Ali, *Minhaj al-Salihin al-Mu'amalat*, Qom: Maktab Ayatollah al-'Uzma al-Sayyid al-Sistani, 1415 AH.
* Shahid al-Thani, Zayn al-Din ibn 'Ali al-'Amili, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah al-Dimashqiyyah*, commentary by Sultan al-'Ulama, Qom: Daftar-e Tablighat-e Islami-ye Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyyeh-ye Qom, 1412 AH.
* Tabataba'i Yazdi, Sayyid Mohammad-Kazem, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa fima Ta'ummu bihi al-Balwa (al-Muhashsha)*, researched by Ahmad Mohseni Sabzevari, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 1419 AH.
* Fazel Movahedi Lankarani, Mohammad, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, Qom: Amir, 11th ed., 2004.
* "Fatava-ye Montakhab," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* "Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," Khaneye Ketab website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Makarem Shirazi, Naser, *Istifta'at Jadid*, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (a), 2nd ed., 1427 AH.
* Montazeri, Hossein-Ali, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, Qom: Nashr-e Tafakkur, 1415 AH.
* Mehrizi, Mehdi, ["Ruykardha-ye Mazhabi dar Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran be Zan"](http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf), *Majalla-ye Ayeneh-ye Pazhuhesh*, no. 91.
* Najafi, Mohammad-Hasan, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1404 AH.
* Navvab, Sayyid Abul-Hasan, "Naqd va Barrasi-ye Adelleh-ye Naqli-ye Taharat va Nejasat-e Ahl-e Ketab," *Pazhuheshha-ye Fiqhi*, no. 4, Winter 2014.
* Vahid Khorasani, Hossein, *Minhaj al-Salihin: Al-Mu'amalat*, vol. 3, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam Baqir al-'Ulum (a), 2007.
{{End}}

[[Category:Articles by Mohammad Mahdi Emadi]]
[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi

2026-03-18T11:36:22Z

Mkhaghanif:

{{Author
|author = Mohammad Mahdi Emadi
|compiler =
}}

{{infobox person
| reputation = Ayatollah Jannati Shahroudi
| name = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi
| birth = 1311 SH (c. 1932 CE)
| demise = 1424 SH (2026 CE)
| image = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi.jpeg
| image size =
| caption =
| position = Jurist (*Faqih*)
| denomination = Shia
| nationality = Iranian
| speciality =
| works in contemporary jurisprudence =
| opinions = Intrinsic purity of humans, opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned, permissibility of sculpture
| professors =
| students =
| website = http://www.jannaati.com/far/index.php
}}

'''Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi''' (in persian: [[:fa:محمدابراهیم_جناتی_شاهرودی|محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]) (1311-1404 SH) is an innovative jurist who organizes his jurisprudential deduction by relying on the examination of the criteria (malakat) of rulings in social and governmental issues. Based on this, he has issued unconventional and minority fatwas, including the intrinsic purity of humans and the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge. The books [[General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists (Book)|General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists]] and [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]] are among his works and express his jurisprudential and principled thoughts. Jannati has theorized on topics such as desirable ijtihad, the age of puberty for girls, music, hijab, the status of women from the perspective of jurisprudential principles, and also apostasy.

Jannati has also conducted studies and research in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has participated in international seminars and congresses, publishing his theories on dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, and the ability of Islam to solve crises in Persian and Arabic journals, including Sawt al-Islam and the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Bi-monthly|Keyhan-e Andisheh]].

==Position and Importance==
With an approach different from traditional jurists, Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati seeks to make Shia jurisprudence responsive to contemporary challenges. In this endeavor, in addition to adhering to established and well-known rules of jurisprudence and ijtihad, he emphasizes several principles: giving importance to the Quran in jurisprudential and legal deductions, paying attention to the realities of life, re-examining sources and references, distinguishing between temporary and permanent rulings, and discovering the purposes and causes of rulings in non-worship matters.<ref>Mehrizi, [http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf "Religious Approaches to Women in Contemporary Iranian History"], pp. 21-22.</ref>

Jannati has also expressed his views on comparative jurisprudence by participating in international seminars and congresses. In addition, interviews with him have been published in various magazines and publications, including those in Iran, Pakistan, India, France, England, and the United States. In this context, he participated in the seminar on the "Place of Reason in Holy Texts" at the University of Birmingham, the seminar on "Understanding Shi'ism in the Past and Present" at Istanbul University, the seminar on "Comparative Fiqh and Methods of Ijtihad" at Damascus University, and also the "Islamic Discussions" seminar in Qamatiyeh, Lebanon, where he delivered speeches and read papers.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Life, Education, and Ijtihad==
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati was born in 1311 SH in Semnan. After a period of study in Mashhad, he went to Qom and attended the advanced jurisprudence (kharij) class of [[Sayyid Hossein Tabatabaei Borujerdi]], the head of the Qom seminary, and the advanced principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) class of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini]]. Jannati then went to Najaf and for 25 years participated in the classes of [[Sayyid Abd al-Hadi al-Shirazi]], [[Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim]], [[Sheikh Hussein al-Hilli]], [[Sayyid Baqir al-Zanjani]], [[Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi]], and [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]].<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> In addition to his religious studies, he taught advanced seminary courses for eleven years and also, in his last years in Najaf, established an advanced principles of jurisprudence class at the Grand Madrasa of Akhund Khurasani.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati received permission for ijtihad from Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi (d. 1353 SH). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1357 SH, Jannati returned to Iran, settled in Qom, and continues to teach and write books and academic articles.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> He is currently a Shia jurist and Marja' al-Taqlid (source of emulation) and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

==Works==
The written works of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati fall into two areas: book authoring and journalistic activities.

===Writings===
In his authored works, Jannati pays special attention to the topic of desirable ijtihad and emphasizes the role of temporal, spatial, and customary changes on the evolution of ijtihad.<ref>Arezumandi, "A Look at the Book Fiqh and Time...", pp. 213-214.</ref> The books "General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists," "Al-Nafahat al-'Ilmiyyah fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Imamiyyah," and [[The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time (Book)|The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time]] are his works on the principles of jurisprudence. He has also dealt with the periods and developments of the science of jurisprudence and its principles in the two books "Periods of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought" and "Periods of Fiqh and Its Manner of Expression."<ref>["Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati"](https://db.ketab.ir/BookList.aspx?Type=Authorid&Code=26792), Khaneye Ketab website.</ref>

Also, the book [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]], which includes the articles "The Age of Puberty for Girls," "Music," "Hijab," "The Status of Women from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Principles," [[Desirable Ijtihad (Book)|Desirable Ijtihad]], [[Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought (Book)|Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought]], "Purity of the Slaughtered Animals of the People of the Book," and [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans (Book)|Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's works. He has conducted studies in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has comparatively examined jurisprudence, its principles, hadith sciences, and Quranic sciences from the perspective of 22 schools of thought,<ref>Imamiyyah, Hanafiyyah, Malikiyyah, Shafi'iyyah, Hanbaliyyah, Zaydiyyah, Ibadiyyah, Zahiriyyah, Awza'iyyah, Thawriyyah, Laythiyyah, Rahwiyyah, Nakha'iyyah, Tamimiyyah, Tabariyyah, Jabiriyyah, Kalbiyyah, Shubrumiyyah, Ibn Abi Layla, Zuhriyyah, 'Uyayniyyah, and Jurayhiyyah.</ref> and some of his works on this topic have been published, including the books Sources of Ijtihad, Periods of Ijtihad, and Periods of Fiqh.

===Journalistic Activities===
The journalistic writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are mostly focused on the theory of dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, as well as proving the capability of Islam in solving crises and the relationship between Islamic nations and states. Jannati has had connections with many Iranian and non-Iranian publications, and hundreds of Persian and Arabic articles by him have been published. Some of the journals in which his works have been published include: Al-'Adl, Sawt al-Islam, Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, Al-Fikr al-Islami, Al-Tawhid, and Risalat al-Taqrib.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Among these, the article "Azmat al-Ihtiyat fi al-Fatawa al-Diniyyah" was published in the journal Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, which examines the precautionary method in issuing fatwas.

His articles have also been published in Iranian publications such as Jahan-e Islam, Zanan, and Soroush.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> The article "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad" was published in the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Magazine]] and explains the period of the perfection of ijtihad, from the era of Wahid Behbahani to Sheikh Ansari.<ref>See: Jannati, "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.</ref>

==Jurisprudential Opinions==
Several fatwas by Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are among the minority and unconventional opinions and fatwas among Shia jurists; including the [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge, and opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned.

===Intrinsic Purity of Humans===
Jannati has issued a fatwa on the intrinsic purity of humans, and consequently, the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book. In "The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad," he interprets impurity as a spiritual and value-based impurity, not a physical one, and on this basis, he considers the disbeliever to be pure.<ref>Jannati, ["The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, the majority of Shia jurists have ruled on the [[Purity of the People of the Book|impurity of the People of the Book]], let alone non-People of the Book.<ref>Navvab, "Critique and Review of the Textual Evidence for the Purity and Impurity of the People of the Book," p. 49.</ref>

The permissibility of a Muslim marrying a disbelieving woman and the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book are other fatwas by Jannati in this regard, which stand in opposition to the consensus or majority fatwas of other jurists on the prohibition of marriage with a disbelieving woman<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 30, p. 27.</ref> and the prohibition of the slaughtered animal of a disbeliever.<ref>*Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 745.</ref>

===Permissibility of Women Holding the Position of a Judge===
The permissibility of women holding the position of a judge is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's opinions, which has opponents such as al-Halabi and Ibn Idris among the early jurists, and [[Sheikh Ansari]] and [[Mirza Qomi]] among the later ones.<ref>Soroush Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judicature," pp. 54, 64.</ref> Also, the author of Jawahir has claimed a consensus on the condition of masculinity for a judge.<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 40, pp. 12, 14.</ref>

Jannati has also permitted women to hold the position of a Marja' (source of emulation), which is a controversial opinion.<ref>Amin, ["Gender and Marja'iyyat"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/112053/), *Hawra' Magazine*.</ref>

===Opposition to the Necessity of Emulating the Most Learned===
Jannati has opposed the necessity of emulating the most learned; whereas [[Muhaqqiq al-Karaki]] has claimed a consensus on emulating the most learned.<ref>Borujerdi, *Nihayat al-Afkar*, vol. 4, p. 248.</ref> He does not consider "most learned" (a'lamiyyat)—in the sense of being more capable of deriving God's ruling—to be conceivable either at the apparent and evidentiary level or at the level of reality and fact. Jannati also considers "most learned" in another sense, i.e., "making fewer mistakes in tracing back subsidiary issues and new problems to basic principles," to be conceivable, but finds it very difficult to determine which of two mujtahids makes fewer mistakes in the process of derivation.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

===Permissibility of Sculpture===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati considers sculpture to be one of the valuable arts and is of the opinion that today, criteria such as reprehensible and polytheistic motives and the intention to imitate the Creator do not exist in sculpture, so it is considered a permissible act.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Such an opinion has been issued while Sheikh Ansari has claimed a consensus on the prohibition of sculpting living beings, although [[Hossein-Ali Montazeri]] has rejected the existence of a consensus on this matter.<ref>Montazeri, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, vol. 2, p. 548.</ref>

===Age Not Being the Criterion for Puberty in Girls===
Jannati considers menstruation to be the main criterion for the [[puberty of girls]] and has not accepted the role of age in its determination. He believes that the mention of different ages in the narrations is due to the difference in living environments, geographical conditions, and genetic and physical factors, and that menstruation in girls is equivalent to semen in boys, and the criterion for a girl's puberty is her monthly period, not reaching the age of nine.<ref>Jannati, "Puberty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh," p. 42.</ref> Contrary to Jannati, the majority of Imami jurists have considered age, alongside menstruation and other signs, as a sign of puberty for girls, to the extent that Ibn Idris has claimed a consensus on age being a criterion.<ref>Shahid al-Thani, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah*, vol. 1, pp. 155-156; Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 1, p. 528.</ref>

===The Definition of Ghina in Music Not Being Based on Custom===
In Jannati's view, a specific meaning of ghina (singing, often associated with forbidden music) cannot be reached through custom ('urf), because ghina is discussed in a specific custom and always varies with changing conditions of time and place, geography, culture, society, and human states. This has caused jurists to differ on the concept of ghina; therefore, a comprehensive and exclusive definition of ghina cannot be obtained through custom.<ref>Jannati, ["Art and Beauty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh Principles"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105806/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> On this issue, however, the majority of jurists consider custom to be the criterion for distinguishing forbidden music from permissible music.<ref>Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at*, vol. 2, q. 659; Safi Golpayegani, *Jami' al-Ahkam*, vol. 1, q. 994, 1018, 1020; Tabrizi, *Istifta'at*, q. 1077, 1050, 1059; Fazel Lankarani, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, vol. 1, q. 996; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, q. 1154, 1127; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, issue 20; Nouri Hamedani, *Istifta'at*, vol. 1, q. 1008; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, issue 17.</ref>

===Virgin's Marriage Not Being Conditional on the Guardian's Permission===
Like the majority of Shia jurists,<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 29, p. 175.</ref> Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati does not consider the guardian's permission to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin. He specifies that the father's permission is not a condition for the marriage of a girl who understands her own interests and harms and is not influenced by emotions, and the choice is her own.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> However, many contemporary jurists, contrary to him and the majority of early jurists, consider the permission of the father or paternal grandfather to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin.<ref>Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 5, p. 615; *Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 387, issue 2376.</ref>

===Permissibility of Contraception by a Woman===
Jannati holds that a woman can use contraception without her husband's consent; a fatwa that has both supporters<ref>Khoei, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, p. 284; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 318, issue 1378; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 116, issue 385.</ref> and opponents<ref>Khomeini, *Istifta'at*, vol. 3, p. 283, q. 7; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, p. 300, q. 1259; Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, p. 609.</ref> among Shia jurists.

In addition to the cases mentioned, the attribution of a child to the sperm donor in the case of fertilization with a non-husband's sperm, the permissibility of women dancing for women and men for men in joyous gatherings, and the invalidity of the pro-forma marriage contract of a young girl in its common modern form are other jurisprudential opinions of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Intellectual Foundations==
A modern approach to ijtihad, the belief in the inadequacy of conventional ijtihad in solving problems and responding to new issues, and the emphasis on understanding the elements of time and place are considered the intellectual characteristics of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 399.</ref> In Jannati's view, through the evolution of ijtihad, the problem of applying a fixed Sharia to the variable of time and its conditions can be solved, and as long as such ijtihad is not applied to the sources and elements of deduction, it can never be responsive to the various events of material and spiritual life.<ref>Jannati, *Sources of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought*, vol. 1, introduction, p. 19.</ref>

===Extraction of Criteria===
Attention to subject identification (mawdu'-shinasi), discovering instances, and achieving the criteria (malakat) of rulings in the process of ijtihad are among Jannati's jurisprudential foundations. He considers achieving the criteria of rulings to be possible and, in the difference between the basis (manat) and the cause ('illah), believes that the cause of a ruling pertains to the level of reality and fact, but the basis of a ruling pertains to the level of proof and appearance from the evidence. Based on this, Jannati does not consider the cause of a ruling, which is the real benefit and harm, to be achievable, but he believes that the basis of a ruling is achievable because we have access to the level of appearance from the evidence.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 409.</ref> For this reason, in order to expand the criteria of rulings, he has also issued a fatwa on the obligation of zakat on items other than the nine specified ones, citing the determination of zakat on horses by Imam Ali (a).<ref>Jannati, ["The Role of Time and Place in Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102607/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref>

===Attention to the Spirit of the Sharia===
In his jurisprudential thought, Jannati considers qualities such as having a broad worldview and being aware of current politics to be among the necessary qualities for a mujtahid and believes that a mujtahid must understand the general spirit of the Sharia, which is based on tolerance and ease.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 406.</ref>

===Avoidance of Precautionary Fatwas===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati rejects the method of issuing precautionary fatwas in jurisprudence and considers it impossible to solve society's problems with this method, believing that clarity must be used in issuing fatwas. Citing that Islamic jurisprudence has definitive evidence and also citing verses indicating ease and leniency, such as "Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship,"<ref>Quran 2:185.</ref> he considers the precautionary method to be incompatible with the spirit of the Sharia and believes it will have undesirable reactions in society<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 104-106, 108.</ref> and will fail to respond to many issues, including in the fields of medicine, art, modern currencies, and prescribed punishments (hudud) and retribution (qisas).<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, p. 93.</ref>

===Disregard for the Fame of a Fatwa===
According to Jannati's views, although the efforts of past jurists and scholars must be appreciated, the necessity of obeying well-known opinions and fatwas and not deviating from the views and theories of predecessors is considered a failure to understand the spirit of the Sharia and is in contradiction with the legislation of the principle of ijtihad itself.<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 51-52.</ref>

==Critique==
The jurisprudential-principled foundations of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, while being innovative and attentive to the principle of evolution in ijtihad, suffer from a lack of fundamental theorization. Accordingly, among the works and writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, a fundamental theory with such characteristics cannot be found. On the other hand, Jannati speaks of the necessity of breaking the barrier of emulation in ijtihadi discussions and new issues and emphasizes the necessity of ijtihad in all subjects, including issues related to banking, currency, interest, and partnership (mudarabah).<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, in the arena of economic and social theorization, no scholarly work from this jurist is seen.

As Jannati specifies, if a jurist accepts Islam as a system and feels responsible, he must prepare a manual in accordance with new phenomena in the legal, economic, judicial, penal, political, governmental, and international relations dimensions.<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> But in practice, he has not done so himself and has not theorized in these areas.

==Footnotes==
{{footnotes}}

==References==
{{References}}
* The Holy Quran
* Arezumandi, Abolqasem, "Negahi be Ketab-e Fiqh va Zaman-e Ayatollah Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," no. 49, Autumn 2006.
* Amin, Mehdi, "Jensiyat va Marja'iyyat," *Hawra'*, no. 34, 2009.
* Borujerdi, Mohammad-Taqi, *Nihayat al-Afkar: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Aqa Diya' al-Din 'Iraqi*, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islami, 1417 AH.
* Tabrizi, Jawad, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, Qom: Surur, 3rd ed., 2006.
* *Tawdih al-Masa'il-e Maraji'*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 2013.
* Jannati Shahroudi, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Fiqh va Zaman*, Qom: Nashr-e Ehyagaran, 2006.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["'Asr-e Takamol-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102204/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Bulugh az Didgah-e Fiqh-e Ijtihadi"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105431/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 61, 1995.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Te'ori-ye Taharat-e Dhati-ye Motlaq-e Insan dar Rastay-e Manabe'-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 23, 1989.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Zarurat-e Tahavvol-e Ijtihad dar 'Arseh-ye Istinbat," *Majmu'eh-ye Asar-e Kongereh-ye Barrasi-ye Mabani-ye Fiqhi-ye Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (s): Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad*, vol. 1.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 50.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Honar va Ziba'i az Negah-e Mabani-ye Fiqh-e Ijtihadi," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 68, 1996.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Manabe'-e Ijtihad: Az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Islami*, Tehran: Mu'asseseh-ye Keyhan, 1991.
* Jannati Shahroudi, "Fiqh-e Ijtihadi va Eslah-e Howzeh-ha az Didgah-e Imam Khomeini," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 29.
* Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, *Risalah-ye Ajwibat al-Istifta'at (Farsi)*, Tehran: Sherkat-e Chap va Nashr-e Beyn al-Melal, 2009.
* Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi, *Tawdih al-Masa'il (Muhashsha)*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 8th ed., 1424 AH.
* Khoei, Sayyid Abul-Qasem, *Istifta'at (Farsi)*, reported by Sayyid Mahmud Madadi Musavi, vol. 1, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Khu'i al-Islamiyyah, 2002.
* "Zendeginameh," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Soroush Mahallati, Mohammad, "Daramadi bar Barrasi-ye Qezavat-e Zanan," *Faslnameh-ye Fiqh-e Moqaran*, no. 2, 2013.
* Sistani, Sayyid Ali, *Minhaj al-Salihin al-Mu'amalat*, Qom: Maktab Ayatollah al-'Uzma al-Sayyid al-Sistani, 1415 AH.
* Shahid al-Thani, Zayn al-Din ibn 'Ali al-'Amili, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah al-Dimashqiyyah*, commentary by Sultan al-'Ulama, Qom: Daftar-e Tablighat-e Islami-ye Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyyeh-ye Qom, 1412 AH.
* Tabataba'i Yazdi, Sayyid Mohammad-Kazem, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa fima Ta'ummu bihi al-Balwa (al-Muhashsha)*, researched by Ahmad Mohseni Sabzevari, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 1419 AH.
* Fazel Movahedi Lankarani, Mohammad, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, Qom: Amir, 11th ed., 2004.
* "Fatava-ye Montakhab," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* "Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," Khaneye Ketab website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Makarem Shirazi, Naser, *Istifta'at Jadid*, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (a), 2nd ed., 1427 AH.
* Montazeri, Hossein-Ali, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, Qom: Nashr-e Tafakkur, 1415 AH.
* Mehrizi, Mehdi, ["Ruykardha-ye Mazhabi dar Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran be Zan"](http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf), *Majalla-ye Ayeneh-ye Pazhuhesh*, no. 91.
* Najafi, Mohammad-Hasan, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1404 AH.
* Navvab, Sayyid Abul-Hasan, "Naqd va Barrasi-ye Adelleh-ye Naqli-ye Taharat va Nejasat-e Ahl-e Ketab," *Pazhuheshha-ye Fiqhi*, no. 4, Winter 2014.
* Vahid Khorasani, Hossein, *Minhaj al-Salihin: Al-Mu'amalat*, vol. 3, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam Baqir al-'Ulum (a), 2007.
{{End}}

[[Category:Articles by Mohammad Mahdi Emadi]]
[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi

2026-03-18T11:35:01Z

Mkhaghanif:

{{Author
|author = Mohammad Mahdi Emadi
|compiler =
}}

{{infobox person
| reputation = Ayatollah Jannati Shahroudi
| name = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi
| birth = 1311 SH (c. 1932 CE)
| demise = 1424 SH (2026 CE)
| image = Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi.jpeg
| image size =
| caption =
| position = Jurist (*Faqih*)
| denomination = Shia
| nationality = Iranian
| speciality =
| works in contemporary jurisprudence =
| opinions = Intrinsic purity of humans, opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned, permissibility of sculpture
| professors =
| students =
| website = http://www.jannaati.com/far/index.php
}}

'''Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi''' (in persian: [[:fa:محمدابراهیم_جناتی_شاهرودی|محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]) (born 1311 SH) is an innovative jurist who organizes his jurisprudential deduction by relying on the examination of the criteria (malakat) of rulings in social and governmental issues. Based on this, he has issued unconventional and minority fatwas, including the intrinsic purity of humans and the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge. The books [[General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists (Book)|General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists]] and [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]] are among his works and express his jurisprudential and principled thoughts. Jannati has theorized on topics such as desirable ijtihad, the age of puberty for girls, music, hijab, the status of women from the perspective of jurisprudential principles, and also apostasy.

Jannati has also conducted studies and research in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has participated in international seminars and congresses, publishing his theories on dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, and the ability of Islam to solve crises in Persian and Arabic journals, including Sawt al-Islam and the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Bi-monthly|Keyhan-e Andisheh]].

==Position and Importance==
With an approach different from traditional jurists, Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati seeks to make Shia jurisprudence responsive to contemporary challenges. In this endeavor, in addition to adhering to established and well-known rules of jurisprudence and ijtihad, he emphasizes several principles: giving importance to the Quran in jurisprudential and legal deductions, paying attention to the realities of life, re-examining sources and references, distinguishing between temporary and permanent rulings, and discovering the purposes and causes of rulings in non-worship matters.<ref>Mehrizi, [http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf "Religious Approaches to Women in Contemporary Iranian History"], pp. 21-22.</ref>

Jannati has also expressed his views on comparative jurisprudence by participating in international seminars and congresses. In addition, interviews with him have been published in various magazines and publications, including those in Iran, Pakistan, India, France, England, and the United States. In this context, he participated in the seminar on the "Place of Reason in Holy Texts" at the University of Birmingham, the seminar on "Understanding Shi'ism in the Past and Present" at Istanbul University, the seminar on "Comparative Fiqh and Methods of Ijtihad" at Damascus University, and also the "Islamic Discussions" seminar in Qamatiyeh, Lebanon, where he delivered speeches and read papers.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Life, Education, and Ijtihad==
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati was born in 1311 SH in Semnan. After a period of study in Mashhad, he went to Qom and attended the advanced jurisprudence (kharij) class of [[Sayyid Hossein Tabatabaei Borujerdi]], the head of the Qom seminary, and the advanced principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) class of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini]]. Jannati then went to Najaf and for 25 years participated in the classes of [[Sayyid Abd al-Hadi al-Shirazi]], [[Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim]], [[Sheikh Hussein al-Hilli]], [[Sayyid Baqir al-Zanjani]], [[Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi]], and [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]].<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> In addition to his religious studies, he taught advanced seminary courses for eleven years and also, in his last years in Najaf, established an advanced principles of jurisprudence class at the Grand Madrasa of Akhund Khurasani.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati received permission for ijtihad from Sayyid Mahmud al-Shahrudi (d. 1353 SH). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1357 SH, Jannati returned to Iran, settled in Qom, and continues to teach and write books and academic articles.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> He is currently a Shia jurist and Marja' al-Taqlid (source of emulation) and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

==Works==
The written works of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati fall into two areas: book authoring and journalistic activities.

===Writings===
In his authored works, Jannati pays special attention to the topic of desirable ijtihad and emphasizes the role of temporal, spatial, and customary changes on the evolution of ijtihad.<ref>Arezumandi, "A Look at the Book Fiqh and Time...", pp. 213-214.</ref> The books "General Methods of Deduction in Fiqh from the Perspective of Islamic Jurists," "Al-Nafahat al-'Ilmiyyah fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Imamiyyah," and [[The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time (Book)|The Developmental Course of Ijtihadi Fiqh in the Context of Time]] are his works on the principles of jurisprudence. He has also dealt with the periods and developments of the science of jurisprudence and its principles in the two books "Periods of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought" and "Periods of Fiqh and Its Manner of Expression."<ref>["Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati"](https://db.ketab.ir/BookList.aspx?Type=Authorid&Code=26792), Khaneye Ketab website.</ref>

Also, the book [[Fiqh and Time (Book)|Fiqh and Time]], which includes the articles "The Age of Puberty for Girls," "Music," "Hijab," "The Status of Women from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Principles," [[Desirable Ijtihad (Book)|Desirable Ijtihad]], [[Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought (Book)|Apostasy from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought]], "Purity of the Slaughtered Animals of the People of the Book," and [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans (Book)|Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's works. He has conducted studies in the field of comparative jurisprudence and has comparatively examined jurisprudence, its principles, hadith sciences, and Quranic sciences from the perspective of 22 schools of thought,<ref>Imamiyyah, Hanafiyyah, Malikiyyah, Shafi'iyyah, Hanbaliyyah, Zaydiyyah, Ibadiyyah, Zahiriyyah, Awza'iyyah, Thawriyyah, Laythiyyah, Rahwiyyah, Nakha'iyyah, Tamimiyyah, Tabariyyah, Jabiriyyah, Kalbiyyah, Shubrumiyyah, Ibn Abi Layla, Zuhriyyah, 'Uyayniyyah, and Jurayhiyyah.</ref> and some of his works on this topic have been published, including the books Sources of Ijtihad, Periods of Ijtihad, and Periods of Fiqh.

===Journalistic Activities===
The journalistic writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are mostly focused on the theory of dynamic ijtihad, the method of deduction, as well as proving the capability of Islam in solving crises and the relationship between Islamic nations and states. Jannati has had connections with many Iranian and non-Iranian publications, and hundreds of Persian and Arabic articles by him have been published. Some of the journals in which his works have been published include: Al-'Adl, Sawt al-Islam, Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, Al-Fikr al-Islami, Al-Tawhid, and Risalat al-Taqrib.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Among these, the article "Azmat al-Ihtiyat fi al-Fatawa al-Diniyyah" was published in the journal Al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, which examines the precautionary method in issuing fatwas.

His articles have also been published in Iranian publications such as Jahan-e Islam, Zanan, and Soroush.<ref>["Biography"](http://jannaati.com/far/?page=1), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> The article "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad" was published in the [[Keyhan-e Andisheh Magazine]] and explains the period of the perfection of ijtihad, from the era of Wahid Behbahani to Sheikh Ansari.<ref>See: Jannati, "The Era of the Perfection of Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.</ref>

==Jurisprudential Opinions==
Several fatwas by Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati are among the minority and unconventional opinions and fatwas among Shia jurists; including the [[Intrinsic Purity of Humans]], the permissibility of women holding the position of a judge, and opposition to the necessity of emulating the most learned.

===Intrinsic Purity of Humans===
Jannati has issued a fatwa on the intrinsic purity of humans, and consequently, the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book. In "The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad," he interprets impurity as a spiritual and value-based impurity, not a physical one, and on this basis, he considers the disbeliever to be pure.<ref>Jannati, ["The Theory of the Absolute Intrinsic Purity of Humans in Line with the Sources of Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, the majority of Shia jurists have ruled on the [[Purity of the People of the Book|impurity of the People of the Book]], let alone non-People of the Book.<ref>Navvab, "Critique and Review of the Textual Evidence for the Purity and Impurity of the People of the Book," p. 49.</ref>

The permissibility of a Muslim marrying a disbelieving woman and the lawfulness of the slaughtered animals of the People of the Book are other fatwas by Jannati in this regard, which stand in opposition to the consensus or majority fatwas of other jurists on the prohibition of marriage with a disbelieving woman<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 30, p. 27.</ref> and the prohibition of the slaughtered animal of a disbeliever.<ref>*Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 745.</ref>

===Permissibility of Women Holding the Position of a Judge===
The permissibility of women holding the position of a judge is another of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati's opinions, which has opponents such as al-Halabi and Ibn Idris among the early jurists, and [[Sheikh Ansari]] and [[Mirza Qomi]] among the later ones.<ref>Soroush Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judicature," pp. 54, 64.</ref> Also, the author of Jawahir has claimed a consensus on the condition of masculinity for a judge.<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 40, pp. 12, 14.</ref>

Jannati has also permitted women to hold the position of a Marja' (source of emulation), which is a controversial opinion.<ref>Amin, ["Gender and Marja'iyyat"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/112053/), *Hawra' Magazine*.</ref>

===Opposition to the Necessity of Emulating the Most Learned===
Jannati has opposed the necessity of emulating the most learned; whereas [[Muhaqqiq al-Karaki]] has claimed a consensus on emulating the most learned.<ref>Borujerdi, *Nihayat al-Afkar*, vol. 4, p. 248.</ref> He does not consider "most learned" (a'lamiyyat)—in the sense of being more capable of deriving God's ruling—to be conceivable either at the apparent and evidentiary level or at the level of reality and fact. Jannati also considers "most learned" in another sense, i.e., "making fewer mistakes in tracing back subsidiary issues and new problems to basic principles," to be conceivable, but finds it very difficult to determine which of two mujtahids makes fewer mistakes in the process of derivation.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

===Permissibility of Sculpture===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati considers sculpture to be one of the valuable arts and is of the opinion that today, criteria such as reprehensible and polytheistic motives and the intention to imitate the Creator do not exist in sculpture, so it is considered a permissible act.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> Such an opinion has been issued while Sheikh Ansari has claimed a consensus on the prohibition of sculpting living beings, although [[Hossein-Ali Montazeri]] has rejected the existence of a consensus on this matter.<ref>Montazeri, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, vol. 2, p. 548.</ref>

===Age Not Being the Criterion for Puberty in Girls===
Jannati considers menstruation to be the main criterion for the [[puberty of girls]] and has not accepted the role of age in its determination. He believes that the mention of different ages in the narrations is due to the difference in living environments, geographical conditions, and genetic and physical factors, and that menstruation in girls is equivalent to semen in boys, and the criterion for a girl's puberty is her monthly period, not reaching the age of nine.<ref>Jannati, "Puberty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh," p. 42.</ref> Contrary to Jannati, the majority of Imami jurists have considered age, alongside menstruation and other signs, as a sign of puberty for girls, to the extent that Ibn Idris has claimed a consensus on age being a criterion.<ref>Shahid al-Thani, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah*, vol. 1, pp. 155-156; Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 1, p. 528.</ref>

===The Definition of Ghina in Music Not Being Based on Custom===
In Jannati's view, a specific meaning of ghina (singing, often associated with forbidden music) cannot be reached through custom ('urf), because ghina is discussed in a specific custom and always varies with changing conditions of time and place, geography, culture, society, and human states. This has caused jurists to differ on the concept of ghina; therefore, a comprehensive and exclusive definition of ghina cannot be obtained through custom.<ref>Jannati, ["Art and Beauty from the Perspective of Ijtihadi Fiqh Principles"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105806/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> On this issue, however, the majority of jurists consider custom to be the criterion for distinguishing forbidden music from permissible music.<ref>Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at*, vol. 2, q. 659; Safi Golpayegani, *Jami' al-Ahkam*, vol. 1, q. 994, 1018, 1020; Tabrizi, *Istifta'at*, q. 1077, 1050, 1059; Fazel Lankarani, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, vol. 1, q. 996; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, q. 1154, 1127; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, issue 20; Nouri Hamedani, *Istifta'at*, vol. 1, q. 1008; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, issue 17.</ref>

===Virgin's Marriage Not Being Conditional on the Guardian's Permission===
Like the majority of Shia jurists,<ref>Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 29, p. 175.</ref> Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati does not consider the guardian's permission to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin. He specifies that the father's permission is not a condition for the marriage of a girl who understands her own interests and harms and is not influenced by emotions, and the choice is her own.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref> However, many contemporary jurists, contrary to him and the majority of early jurists, consider the permission of the father or paternal grandfather to be a condition for the marriage of a mature virgin.<ref>Tabataba'i Yazdi, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, vol. 5, p. 615; *Tawdih al-Masa'il of the Maraji'*, vol. 2, p. 387, issue 2376.</ref>

===Permissibility of Contraception by a Woman===
Jannati holds that a woman can use contraception without her husband's consent; a fatwa that has both supporters<ref>Khoei, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 2, p. 284; Vahid Khorasani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 318, issue 1378; Sistani, *Minhaj al-Salihin*, vol. 3, p. 116, issue 385.</ref> and opponents<ref>Khomeini, *Istifta'at*, vol. 3, p. 283, q. 7; Khamenei, *Ajwibat al-Istifta'at*, p. 300, q. 1259; Makarem Shirazi, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, p. 609.</ref> among Shia jurists.

In addition to the cases mentioned, the attribution of a child to the sperm donor in the case of fertilization with a non-husband's sperm, the permissibility of women dancing for women and men for men in joyous gatherings, and the invalidity of the pro-forma marriage contract of a young girl in its common modern form are other jurisprudential opinions of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>["Selected Fatwas"](http://jannaati.com/far/index.php?page=6), Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website.</ref>

==Intellectual Foundations==
A modern approach to ijtihad, the belief in the inadequacy of conventional ijtihad in solving problems and responding to new issues, and the emphasis on understanding the elements of time and place are considered the intellectual characteristics of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 399.</ref> In Jannati's view, through the evolution of ijtihad, the problem of applying a fixed Sharia to the variable of time and its conditions can be solved, and as long as such ijtihad is not applied to the sources and elements of deduction, it can never be responsive to the various events of material and spiritual life.<ref>Jannati, *Sources of Ijtihad from the Viewpoint of Islamic Schools of Thought*, vol. 1, introduction, p. 19.</ref>

===Extraction of Criteria===
Attention to subject identification (mawdu'-shinasi), discovering instances, and achieving the criteria (malakat) of rulings in the process of ijtihad are among Jannati's jurisprudential foundations. He considers achieving the criteria of rulings to be possible and, in the difference between the basis (manat) and the cause ('illah), believes that the cause of a ruling pertains to the level of reality and fact, but the basis of a ruling pertains to the level of proof and appearance from the evidence. Based on this, Jannati does not consider the cause of a ruling, which is the real benefit and harm, to be achievable, but he believes that the basis of a ruling is achievable because we have access to the level of appearance from the evidence.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 409.</ref> For this reason, in order to expand the criteria of rulings, he has also issued a fatwa on the obligation of zakat on items other than the nine specified ones, citing the determination of zakat on horses by Imam Ali (a).<ref>Jannati, ["The Role of Time and Place in Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102607/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref>

===Attention to the Spirit of the Sharia===
In his jurisprudential thought, Jannati considers qualities such as having a broad worldview and being aware of current politics to be among the necessary qualities for a mujtahid and believes that a mujtahid must understand the general spirit of the Sharia, which is based on tolerance and ease.<ref>Jannati, "The Necessity of Evolution in Ijtihad in the Arena of Deduction," vol. 1, p. 406.</ref>

===Avoidance of Precautionary Fatwas===
Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati rejects the method of issuing precautionary fatwas in jurisprudence and considers it impossible to solve society's problems with this method, believing that clarity must be used in issuing fatwas. Citing that Islamic jurisprudence has definitive evidence and also citing verses indicating ease and leniency, such as "Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship,"<ref>Quran 2:185.</ref> he considers the precautionary method to be incompatible with the spirit of the Sharia and believes it will have undesirable reactions in society<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 104-106, 108.</ref> and will fail to respond to many issues, including in the fields of medicine, art, modern currencies, and prescribed punishments (hudud) and retribution (qisas).<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, p. 93.</ref>

===Disregard for the Fame of a Fatwa===
According to Jannati's views, although the efforts of past jurists and scholars must be appreciated, the necessity of obeying well-known opinions and fatwas and not deviating from the views and theories of predecessors is considered a failure to understand the spirit of the Sharia and is in contradiction with the legislation of the principle of ijtihad itself.<ref>Jannati, *Fiqh and Time*, pp. 51-52.</ref>

==Critique==
The jurisprudential-principled foundations of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, while being innovative and attentive to the principle of evolution in ijtihad, suffer from a lack of fundamental theorization. Accordingly, among the works and writings of Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati, a fundamental theory with such characteristics cannot be found. On the other hand, Jannati speaks of the necessity of breaking the barrier of emulation in ijtihadi discussions and new issues and emphasizes the necessity of ijtihad in all subjects, including issues related to banking, currency, interest, and partnership (mudarabah).<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> However, in the arena of economic and social theorization, no scholarly work from this jurist is seen.

As Jannati specifies, if a jurist accepts Islam as a system and feels responsible, he must prepare a manual in accordance with new phenomena in the legal, economic, judicial, penal, political, governmental, and international relations dimensions.<ref>Jannati, ["Ijtihadi Fiqh and the Reform of Seminaries from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/100567/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*.</ref> But in practice, he has not done so himself and has not theorized in these areas.

==Footnotes==
{{footnotes}}

==References==
{{References}}
* The Holy Quran
* Arezumandi, Abolqasem, "Negahi be Ketab-e Fiqh va Zaman-e Ayatollah Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," no. 49, Autumn 2006.
* Amin, Mehdi, "Jensiyat va Marja'iyyat," *Hawra'*, no. 34, 2009.
* Borujerdi, Mohammad-Taqi, *Nihayat al-Afkar: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Aqa Diya' al-Din 'Iraqi*, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islami, 1417 AH.
* Tabrizi, Jawad, *Istifta'at Jadid*, vol. 2, Qom: Surur, 3rd ed., 2006.
* *Tawdih al-Masa'il-e Maraji'*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 2013.
* Jannati Shahroudi, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Fiqh va Zaman*, Qom: Nashr-e Ehyagaran, 2006.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["'Asr-e Takamol-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/102204/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 47, 1992.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Bulugh az Didgah-e Fiqh-e Ijtihadi"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/105431/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 61, 1995.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, ["Te'ori-ye Taharat-e Dhati-ye Motlaq-e Insan dar Rastay-e Manabe'-e Ijtihad"](http://ensani.ir/fa/article/99655/), *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 23, 1989.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Zarurat-e Tahavvol-e Ijtihad dar 'Arseh-ye Istinbat," *Majmu'eh-ye Asar-e Kongereh-ye Barrasi-ye Mabani-ye Fiqhi-ye Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (s): Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad*, vol. 1.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ijtihad," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 50.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, "Honar va Ziba'i az Negah-e Mabani-ye Fiqh-e Ijtihadi," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 68, 1996.
* Jannati, Mohammad-Ebrahim, *Manabe'-e Ijtihad: Az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Islami*, Tehran: Mu'asseseh-ye Keyhan, 1991.
* Jannati Shahroudi, "Fiqh-e Ijtihadi va Eslah-e Howzeh-ha az Didgah-e Imam Khomeini," *Keyhan-e Andisheh*, no. 29.
* Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, *Risalah-ye Ajwibat al-Istifta'at (Farsi)*, Tehran: Sherkat-e Chap va Nashr-e Beyn al-Melal, 2009.
* Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi, *Tawdih al-Masa'il (Muhashsha)*, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 8th ed., 1424 AH.
* Khoei, Sayyid Abul-Qasem, *Istifta'at (Farsi)*, reported by Sayyid Mahmud Madadi Musavi, vol. 1, Qom: Mu'assasat al-Khu'i al-Islamiyyah, 2002.
* "Zendeginameh," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Soroush Mahallati, Mohammad, "Daramadi bar Barrasi-ye Qezavat-e Zanan," *Faslnameh-ye Fiqh-e Moqaran*, no. 2, 2013.
* Sistani, Sayyid Ali, *Minhaj al-Salihin al-Mu'amalat*, Qom: Maktab Ayatollah al-'Uzma al-Sayyid al-Sistani, 1415 AH.
* Shahid al-Thani, Zayn al-Din ibn 'Ali al-'Amili, *Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah al-Dimashqiyyah*, commentary by Sultan al-'Ulama, Qom: Daftar-e Tablighat-e Islami-ye Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyyeh-ye Qom, 1412 AH.
* Tabataba'i Yazdi, Sayyid Mohammad-Kazem, *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa fima Ta'ummu bihi al-Balwa (al-Muhashsha)*, researched by Ahmad Mohseni Sabzevari, Qom: Daftar-e Intisharat-e Islami, 1419 AH.
* Fazel Movahedi Lankarani, Mohammad, *Jami' al-Masa'il*, Qom: Amir, 11th ed., 2004.
* "Fatava-ye Montakhab," Ayatollah Jannati's Information Website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* "Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati," Khaneye Ketab website, accessed: February 16, 2022.
* Makarem Shirazi, Naser, *Istifta'at Jadid*, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (a), 2nd ed., 1427 AH.
* Montazeri, Hossein-Ali, *Dirasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah*, Qom: Nashr-e Tafakkur, 1415 AH.
* Mehrizi, Mehdi, ["Ruykardha-ye Mazhabi dar Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran be Zan"](http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/20120413182552-5176-2.pdf), *Majalla-ye Ayeneh-ye Pazhuhesh*, no. 91.
* Najafi, Mohammad-Hasan, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1404 AH.
* Navvab, Sayyid Abul-Hasan, "Naqd va Barrasi-ye Adelleh-ye Naqli-ye Taharat va Nejasat-e Ahl-e Ketab," *Pazhuheshha-ye Fiqhi*, no. 4, Winter 2014.
* Vahid Khorasani, Hossein, *Minhaj al-Salihin: Al-Mu'amalat*, vol. 3, Qom: Madrasat al-Imam Baqir al-'Ulum (a), 2007.
{{End}}

[[Category:Articles by Mohammad Mahdi Emadi]]
[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:محمدابراهیم جناتی شاهرودی]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]

Women's Judgeship

2026-03-18T10:34:52Z

Mkhaghanif:

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* '''Abstract'''

'''Women's Judgeship''' (Judgement by women) is one of the challenging discussions in Islamic [[Fiqh]], especially in the contemporary era, which has been re-examined due to the expansion of women's social presence. In Imami Fiqh, the famous view (Mashhur) is that judgeship is conditional upon "maleness" (dhukurat), and women lack the competence to assume this position; however, contrary to this opinion, a non-famous view has emerged which, by critiquing the arguments of the famous view, considers women's judgeship permissible. The present article explains the arguments and reasoning of the two main perspectives regarding the issue of women's judgeship. The current examination shows that the difference of opinion on this issue is rooted in differences in the interpretation of religious texts (the Book and Sunnah) as well as differences in Usuli foundations.

In Fiqh texts, conditions such as [[Puberty]], sanity, faith, justice (adalah), ijtihad, and being male are mentioned for a judge. Historical examination indicates that the condition of maleness was raised in Sunni Fiqh from the beginning, but in Imami Fiqh, during the early periods, it was not explicitly stated, and the emphasis was mostly on ijtihad and jurisprudence (faqahat). Sheikh Tusi is considered the first Imami jurist to explicitly raise the condition of being male, and after him, many jurists accepted this condition and even claimed consensus (Ijma) on it. However, in some early Fiqh works such as those of Abu al-Salah Halabi and Ibn Idris, the condition of maleness is not mentioned, and this very fact has provided grounds for doubting the realization of consensus.

The famous view, which restricts judgeship to men, has built its argument on a foundation of transmitted (naqli) proofs. This view, by citing verses such as the [[Verse of Qawwamun]] (Nisa: 34), the [[Verse of Degree]] (Baqarah: 228), and the [[Verse of Tabarruj]] (Ahzab: 33), attempts to depict a broad scope for men's guardianship (wilayah) and management of social affairs, viewing women's presence in positions like judgeship as conflicting with these verses. Alongside the Quran, narrations such as the [[Sahih of Abu Khadijah]], in which the word "man" (rajul) is used for a judge, narrations denying prosperity to a nation governed by a woman, and narrations regarding the deficiency of women's intellects are considered other argumentative examples of this view. Invoking the historical practice (Seerah) of Muslims regarding the non-appointment of women to judgeship and the claim of [[Consensus (Ijma)|Consensus]] among later jurists complete the argumentative structure of the famous opinion.

In contrast, the non-famous view, by offering a different reading of the same texts, has reached an opposing conclusion. This view challenges the arguments of the famous opinion primarily on two levels: the chain of transmission (sanad) and the signification (dalalah). Regarding signification, it is argued that the cited verses, such as the Verse of Qawwamun and the Verse of Degree, are specific to family relationships and cannot be generalized to the realm of judgeship and social management. Also, the mention of the word "man" (rajul) in narrations like the Sahih of Abu Khadijah is considered to be due to prevalence (ghalaba) and expressing the common instance in that era, not stating a devotional (ta'abbudi) condition. From the perspective of the chain of transmission, narrations such as the Prophet's (PBUH) will to Imam Ali (AS) and the narration "A people will never prosper..." are considered weak or lacking sufficient validity. Furthermore, the claim of consensus is also questioned due to the existence of opponents among early and later jurists, as well as its nature as a documented consensus (Ijma Madraki). After critiquing the arguments for prohibition, this group concludes the permissibility of women's judgeship by invoking the "Principle of Permissibility" (Asalah al-Ibahah) as well as the generality of evidence that limits the judge's conditions to justice and ijtihad without restricting it to gender.

==Explication of the Issue==
The impermissibility of women assuming the position of judgeship is one of the discussions that has been reviewed in the contemporary era due to social developments and the increasing presence of women in various fields. In the famous Fiqh view, conditions such as [[Puberty]], sanity, faith, justice, ijtihad, and maleness are mentioned for a judge; however, the condition of "maleness" has been criticized in contemporary views. This reporting article, with a descriptive approach, explains the various Fiqh views in this field, the arguments of the proponents of each view, and the critiques leveled against them.

Judgeship has been defined as judging between people to resolve disputes among them under certain conditions,<ref>Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasilah, Vol. 2, p. 404.</ref> which is granted to a person possessing the competence to issue fatwas in the details of Sharia laws for the purpose of proving rights and fully delivering them to the rightful owner.<ref>Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, Vol. 40, p. 8.</ref> It has been claimed that the condition of being male for a judge was raised from the beginning in Sunni Fiqh alongside conditions such as puberty, sanity, and knowledge; but in Imami Fiqh, in the early periods, due to access to the Infallible (AS) and their deputies, this condition was not explicitly raised, and the focus was on conditions such as ijtihad and jurisprudence. Sheikh Tusi is known as the first Shia jurist to address the condition of maleness.<ref>Soroosh Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judgeship", pp. 53-54.</ref> In the book "Al-Khilaf", he considered the condition of being male necessary for a judge,<ref>Tusi, Al-Khilaf, Vol. 6, p. 213.</ref> and in the book "Al-Mabsut", he considered the stipulation of masculinity (rajuliyyah) to be the more correct view.<ref>Tusi, Al-Mabsut, Vol. 8, p. 101.</ref> After Sheikh Tusi, numerous jurists mentioned the condition of maleness in their books, and some also considered it a matter of consensus.<ref>Soroosh Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judgeship", p. 57.</ref> For example, Shahid Thani considered this condition a "point of agreement",<ref>Amili, Masalik al-Afham, Vol. 13, p. 326.</ref> and Sahib Jawahir counted it as "without dispute";<ref>Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, Vol. 40, p. 12.</ref>

Despite the claim of consensus on the condition of maleness in judgeship, in some early Fiqh texts such as "Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh" by Abu al-Salah Halabi and "Al-Sara'ir" by Ibn Idris, this condition is not listed among the judge's conditions.<ref>Soroosh Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judgeship", p. 60.</ref> [[Mohammad Soroosh Mahallati]] has inferred from these texts that although they used expressions such as the delegation of judgeship to jurists in the occultation era<ref>Ibn Idris, Al-Sara'ir al-Hawi li-Tahrir al-Fatawi, Vol. 2, p. 25.</ref> and invoked the narration "Look to a man...",<ref>Halabi, Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, p. 424.</ref> there is no trace of the condition of masculinity in their works.<ref>Soroosh Mahallati, "An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judgeship", pp. 54 & 64.</ref> Jurists such as Muqaddas Ardabili have also considered the general prohibition of women's judgeship to be problematic.<ref>Ardabili, Majma' al-Fa'idah wa al-Burhan, Vol. 12, p. 15.</ref> Mirza-ye Qomi, in his objection to this condition, believes that the reasons mentioned for the condition of maleness, such as women's inability to appear and be visible in society or the lack of attainment of discernment and precision in them, are not common to all women.<ref>Mirza-ye Qomi, Rasa'il al-Mirza al-Qomi, Vol. 2, pp. 598-599.</ref>

In any case, the examination of the history of this ruling in Shia Fiqh indicates the formation of two views within it: the famous view which considers judgeship conditional upon being male, and the non-famous view which does not accept this condition and deems women's judgeship permissible.

==Impermissibility of Women's Judgeship==
The famous Imami jurists who advocate the impermissibility of women's judgeship have invoked arguments from the Quran, Sunnah, Consensus, and rational proof.

=== Quranic Verses ===

Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa (Verse of Qawwamun)
A number of exegetes and jurists believe that [[Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa]] indicates the [[Guardianship of Men over Women|guardianship]] (qaymumiyyah) and general authority (wilayah) of men over women, which includes positions such as government and judgeship. The author of Majma' al-Bayan considers this guardianship in an absolute sense to mean men's dominance over women in management, discipline, and education, which stems from men's superiority in knowledge, intellect, and judgment, as well as the duty of providing financial support.<ref>Tabarsi, Majma' al-Bayan, Vol. 3, pp. 69-70.</ref> According to [[Allameh Tabatabai]], "Qawwam" means guardian/maintainer, and according to this verse, attending to women's affairs is the responsibility of men. The reason for this status (qawwamiyyah) is that men are superior to women in matters such as reasoning power and the ability to endure hardships, whereas women's life is an emotional life based on tenderness of heart and delicacy. In Allameh's view, this reason generalizes men's guardianship from the family environment to other areas of social life as well; consequently, the gender of men acts as the guardian and maintainer of women not only in the home environment and marital life but this guardianship is also evident in macro-social arenas, and for this reason, men are prioritized over women in the matter of governance and judgeship.<ref>Tabatabai, Al-Mizan, Vol. 4, p. 343.</ref>

Verse 228 of Surah Al-Baqarah (Verse of Degree)
It has been argued regarding [[Verse 228 of Surah Al-Baqarah]] that the allocation of a degree of superiority of men over women is solely because they possess a greater share of intellect, judgment, and management compared to women. For this reason, the matter of disciplining and divorcing the wife has been placed in the man's authority. Consequently, the verse implies that men possess a higher degree of intellect and perfection valid for assuming judgeship and government, while women lack it.<ref>Sayfi Mazandarani, Dalil Tahrir al-Wasilah - Wilayat al-Faqih, p. 149.</ref>

Verse 33 of Surah Al-Ahzab (Verse of Tabarruj)
A group of jurists have inferred from [[Verse 33 of Surah Al-Ahzab]] that since assuming the office of judgment necessitates leaving the house and being present in public gatherings, and the verse commands women to stay in their homes, therefore women's judgeship is not permissible.<ref>Mousavi Golpaygani, Kitab al-Qada, Vol. 1, p. 47.</ref>

=== Narrations (Riwayat) ===

Sahih of Abu Khadijah: Some jurists, citing the [[Sahih of Abu Khadijah]] ("Look to a man among you..."),<ref>Kulayni, Al-Kafi, Vol. 7, p. 412.</ref> which was issued in describing the characteristics of a judge, have argued that the Imam's (AS) explicit use of the word "man" (rajul) in this narration indicates the condition of being male for a judge.<ref>Hosseini Haeri, Asas al-Hukumat al-Islamiyyah, p. 169.</ref>

The Prophet's (PBUH) advice to Imam Ali (AS): Sheikh Sadooq narrates a hadith in which the Prophet (PBUH), addressing Imam Ali (AS), enumerates matters that are not obligatory for women, and at the end of it says: "She shall not assume judgeship."<ref>Sheikh Sadooq, Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih, Vol. 4, p. 364.</ref> This sentence has been interpreted as an explicit prohibition of women's judgeship.<ref>Shushtari, Al-Naj'ah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah, Vol. 6, p. 308.</ref>

The narration "A people will never prosper...": Some jurists, citing this narration from the Prophet (PBUH) ("A people who entrust their affairs to a woman will never prosper"),<ref>Tusi, Al-Khilaf, Vol. 6, p. 213.</ref> have argued for the negation of women's guardianship (wilayah) and government, and consequently their judgeship.<ref>Rohani, Fiqh al-Sadiq (AS), Vol. 25, p. 22; See: Khansari, Jami' al-Madarik fi Sharh Mukhtasar al-Nafi', Vol. 6, p. 7.</ref>

Narrations regarding the deficiency of intellect and prohibition of consulting women: In some narrations, including a sermon by Imam Ali (AS) after the Battle of Jamal, reference is made to the deficiency of women's intellect, faith, and share (inheritance).<ref>Sharif Razi, Nahj al-Balagha, p. 105.</ref> Or in other narrations, consulting with women is forbidden.<ref>Kulayni, Al-Kafi, Vol. 5, p. 338.</ref> In the margin of these narrations, it is said that the reasoning in them includes all women, and women with these descriptions will not have the competence for government and judgeship.<ref>Fazel Hindi, Kashf al-Litham wa al-Ibham 'an Qawa'id al-Ahkam, Vol. 10, p. 17.</ref> It is also argued that when women's opinion is considered weak in consultation, a fortiori they do not have the competence to be delegated the position of judgeship; because judgeship requires strong and correct judgment.<ref>Montazeri, Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah, Vol. 1, p. 356.</ref>

=== The Seerah (Practice) of Muslims ===
Among the arguments raised for the impermissibility of women's judgeship is the practical Seerah of Muslims from the time of the Prophet (PBUH) until now. Based on this argument, it is stated that despite the existence of learned and wise women throughout Islamic history, a woman has never been appointed to the position of government or judgeship. This non-appointment was not accidental, but rather based on the method of the Prophet (PBUH) and indicative of the incompatibility of this matter with the spirit of Islam.<ref>Hosseini Tehrani, Risaleh Badi'ah, pp. 133-135.</ref>

=== Principle of Non-Wilayah ===
Some jurists have invoked the [[Principle of Non-Wilayah]] (Absence of Guardianship) for the impermissibility of women's judgeship. Based on this premise, judgeship is one of the functions of Wilayah and assuming it requires specific permission from the Infallible (AS), and since the word "man" (rajul) is used in the narrations of appointing a judge, therefore in the case of women where there is doubt, reference is made to the principle of Non-Wilayah, and the permissibility of judgeship is not established for them.<ref>Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, Vol. 40, pp. 14-15; Mousavi Ardebili, Fiqh al-Qada, Vol. 1, p. 98.</ref>

=== Consensus (Ijma) ===
It has been stated that the most major argument advanced by later jurists for the impermissibility of women's judgeship is [[Consensus (Ijma)|Consensus]].<ref>Qolipour, "A Fiqhi Reflection on the Arguments for Prohibiting Women's Judgeship", p. 77.</ref> Sheikh Ansari also believes that if the consensus is undermined, the condition of being male will be negated.<ref>Sheikh Ansari, Al-Qada wa al-Shahadat, p. 229.</ref>

==Permissibility of Women's Judgeship==
In contrast to the famous Shia jurists who advocate the impermissibility of women's judgeship, a number of jurists have criticized the famous arguments with a different approach. The main arguments of the second view are negative in nature and have been entered as a critique of the arguments of the first view in order to pave the way for the application of the Principle of Permissibility (Asalah al-Ibahah) regarding women's judgeship. For example, it is stated that based on the Principle of Permissibility, as long as there is no decisive proof for the prohibition of a matter, the principle is its permissibility and lawfulness. Among them, [[Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi]] uses this rule to prove the permissibility of women's judgeship. After examining the verses, narrations, and consensus that have been raised as evidence for the condition of the judge's maleness and objecting to them, he says: "Since there is no acceptable proof for the prohibition of judgeship for ladies, by the rule of the Principle of Permissibility (Asalah al-Jawaz), which is applicable in all affairs, it must be said: Ladies who possess the conditions of judgment exceeding men or equal to them can assume the position of judgment, and the ruling they issue will be legitimate and binding."<ref>Salehi Najafabadi, "Women's Judgeship in Islamic Fiqh along with several other articles", p. 47.</ref>

In the following, we state some of these negative arguments which are in the position of critiquing the arguments of the first view.

=== Critique of the Argument Based on the Verse "Men are the Protectors and Maintainers of Women" ===
Regarding Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa, it is stated that the context of the verse and the rulings mentioned after the phrase "Men are Qawwamun", such as [[Nushuz]] (recalcitrance) and spending (maintenance), clearly show that the subject of the verse is family relationships and the man's guardianship in the institution of the family, and it does not generalize to man's superiority and sovereignty over women in social relations.<ref>Mousavi Ardebili, Fiqh al-Qada, Vol. 1, p. 91.</ref> According to [[Morteza Motahhari]], the reason for man's guardianship over woman is not the superiority of man over woman, otherwise the verse would have said: "Allah has preferred men over women"; rather, from the expression present in the noble verse, this point is inferred that the superiority between man and woman is reciprocal, and due to the superiorities that the man collectively has over the woman, guardianship specifically in the family environment has been entrusted to him.<ref>Motahhari, Collection of Works, Vol. 29, p. 447.</ref> Motahhari emphasizes that considering the two reasons mentioned in the verse; namely, the superiority of some over others and the financial spending that men undertake in the home environment (bima anfaqu min amwalihim), consequently the verse is specific to family issues and does not generalize to other than that, and one cannot infer from it the lack of woman's guardianship in political and social issues and the issue of judgeship, nor believe that in absolute affairs of life, women do not have the right of guardianship over men and rising to their affairs.<ref>Motahhari, Collection of Works, Vol. 15, p. 832.</ref>

=== Critique of the Argument Based on the Verse "Men Have a Degree Over Them" ===
Regarding Verse 228 of Surah Al-Baqarah, it is also stated that this verse is about [[Revocable Divorce]], and the "degree" and superiority of the man refers to his right of return (ruju') in divorce and cannot be a proof for the prohibition of women's judgeship in courts.<ref>Karimi & Mozaffari, "A New Attitude towards the Arguments Regarding Women's Judgeship in Imami Fiqh and the Practical Procedure of Iranian Statutory Law", p. 30.</ref> In the belief of some jurists, the content of the verse is also a particular affirmative proposition (mujiba juz'iyya), and its truth is realized with the existence of men's superiority in specific cases, such as inheritance, divorce, jihad, and similar cases. This superiority is not dependent on women's deprivation from judgeship. Therefore, invoking this verse to ban women from judgeship is invoking evidence in a case of doubtful applicability (shubha misdaqiyya).<ref>Sobhani, Nizam al-Qada wa al-Shahadat fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra', Vol. 1, p. 60.</ref>

=== Critique of the Implication of the Verse "Stay in Your Houses" ===
Regarding Verse 33 of Surah Al-Ahzab, some jurists believe that firstly, this verse is addressed to the wives of the Prophet (PBUH) because of the affiliation they had with his holiness. Secondly, conversation between a man and a woman, if it is with the observance of interests and Sharia rulings, has no religious problem. Thirdly, if this argument is accepted, women must be confined in the house and their assumption of any social affair must be considered forbidden, and such a thing is unlikely, nay impossible. Fourthly, this matter is contrary to the common Seerah in the era of the Infallibles, in which women had social occupations such as trade or presence in the battlefield for medical treatment and the like.<ref>Mousavi Ardebili, Fiqh al-Qada, Vol. 1, pp. 92-93.</ref>

=== Critique of the Argument Based on the Sahih of Abu Khadijah ===
In critiquing the citation of the narration of Abu Khadijah for the impermissibility of women's judgeship, in which the word "man" (rajul) is used, it is said: Firstly, this word is not in the position of stating the gender of the judge; rather, the main subject is the prohibition of referring to tyrant judges (Taghut).<ref>Khoei, Al-Tanqih fi Sharh al-Urwah al-Wuthqa; Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 225; Mousavi Ardebili, Fiqh al-Qada, Vol. 1, p. 91.</ref> Secondly, the mention of the word "man" is due to prevalence (ghalaba), because in that time men predominantly undertook these affairs and this word does not have independent thematic validity (mawdhu'iyyah).<ref>Ansari, Al-Qada wa al-Shahadat, p. 229.</ref> Thirdly, the word "man" (rajul) in the Arabic language is sometimes used to mean "person/figure", and fourthly, the Concept of Title (Mafhum al-Laqab) is not a proof according to the majority of Usulis.<ref>Karimi & Mozaffari, "A New Attitude towards the Arguments Regarding Women's Judgeship in Imami Fiqh and the Practical Procedure of Iranian Statutory Law", p. 31.</ref>

=== Critique of the Argument Based on the Prophet's (PBUH) Advice ===
Regarding the Prophet's (PBUH) advice to Imam Ali (AS), objections have been raised: Firstly, the chain of the narration is weak due to the existence of unknown individuals. Secondly, the phrase "Lay'sa 'ala al-nisa" (It is not upon women) means the lack of obligation, not the lack of permissibility or lack of validity. Just as Friday prayer and congregational prayer are not obligatory for women; but if they participate, it is valid. Therefore, this narration indicates the non-obligation of assuming judgeship for women, not its prohibition.<ref>Mousavi Ardebili, Fiqh al-Qada, Vol. 1, p. 94; Qolipour, "A Fiqhi Reflection on the Arguments for Prohibiting Women's Judgeship", pp. 75-76.</ref>

=== Critique of the Implication of the Narration "A People Will Never Prosper..." ===
The narration "A people who entrust their affairs to a woman will never prosper" has also been criticized in terms of the chain of transmission; because it has not been narrated in authentic Shia books. Furthermore, assuming its authenticity, "lack of prosperity" (adam falah) does not entail "impermissibility".<ref>Karimi & Mozaffari, "A New Attitude towards the Arguments Regarding Women's Judgeship in Imami Fiqh and the Practical Procedure of Iranian Statutory Law", pp. 32-33.</ref>

=== Critique of the Implication of Narrations Regarding the Deficiency of Women's Intellects ===
Regarding the narrations of deficiency of intellect, it is stated that these narrations do not align with the general principles of Sharia and the Quran's view regarding the personality of woman. Also, these narrations are regarding family relationships and should not be generalized to the whole society.<ref>Karimi & Mozaffari, "A New Attitude towards the Arguments Regarding Women's Judgeship in Imami Fiqh and the Practical Procedure of Iranian Statutory Law", pp. 34-35.</ref> [[Abdullah Javadi Amoli]] believes that no decisive demonstration has been presented for the condition of being male, and the argument based on narrations of deficiency of intellect is also flawed.<ref>Javadi Amoli, Zan dar Aine-ye Jalal va Jamal, pp. 348-349.</ref>

=== Critique of Consensus ===
Finally, the claim of consensus has also been criticized. Mirza-ye Qomi has doubted the existence of a valid consensus on this issue.<ref>Mirza-ye Qomi, Rasa'il al-Mirza al-Qomi, Vol. 2, p. 599.</ref> In the belief of some jurists, this consensus is a "Documented Consensus" (Ijma Madraki); meaning it is based on the very verses and narrations under discussion, and such a consensus does not have independent validity from the Usuli perspective. This consensus has been claimed by jurists in a subsidiary issue of inferred Fiqh issues, and in such cases, one must refer to their documentation.<ref>Montazeri, Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, pp. 339-341.</ref>

==Footnotes==
{{Footnotes}}
==References==
{{References}}

Ibn Athir Jazari, Mubarak, Al-Nihayah fi Gharib al-Hadith wa al-Athar, Qom, Ismailiyan Press Institute, 1988.

Ibn Babawayh (Sheikh Sadooq), Muhammad ibn Ali, Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1413 AH.

Ardabili, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, Majma' al-Fa'idah wa al-Burhan fi Sharh Irshad al-Adhhan, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1403 AH.

Javadi Amoli, Abdullah, Zan dar Aine-ye Jalal va Jamal (Woman in the Mirror of Glory and Beauty), Qom, Isra, 1999.

Hosseini Haeri, Sayyid Kazem, Asas al-Hukumat al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, Matba'at al-Nil, 1399 AH.

Hosseini Tehrani, Muhammad Hossein, Translation of Risaleh Badi'ah, Tehran, n.p., n.d.

Halabi, Abu al-Salah, Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, Isfahan, Public Library of Imam Amir al-Mu'minin (AS), 1403 AH.

Hilli (Ibn Idris), Al-Sara'ir al-Hawi li-Tahrir al-Fatawi, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1410 AH.

Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Mousavi, Tahrir al-Wasilah, Qom, Dar al-Ilm Press Institute, n.d.

Khansari, Sayyid Ahmad, Jami' al-Madarik fi Sharh Mukhtasar al-Nafi', Qom, Ismailiyan Institute, 1405 AH.

Khoei, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Mousavi, Al-Tanqih fi Sharh al-Urwah al-Wuthqa, Qom, under the supervision of Mr. Lotfi, 1418 AH.

Rohani, Sayyid Sadiq, Fiqh al-Sadiq (AS), Qom, Dar al-Kitab - Imam Sadiq (AS) School, 1412 AH.

Sobhani, Ja'far, Nizam al-Qada wa al-Shahadat fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra', Qom, Imam Sadiq (AS) Institute, 1418 AH.

Soroosh Mahallati, Mohammad, "[https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article%207305%20588da7a73a2e919a23cb9a419c4c6d44.pdf An Introduction to the Study of Women's Judgeship]", Fiqh-e Muqaran, No. 2, 2013.

Sayfi Mazandarani, Ali Akbar, Dalil Tahrir al-Wasilah - Wilayat al-Faqih, Tehran, Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 1428 AH.

Sharif Razi, Muhammad ibn Hussein, Nahj al-Balagha (Subhi Saleh), Qom, Hijrat, 1414 AH.

Shushtari, Muhammad Taqi, Al-Naj'ah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah, Tehran, Sadooq Bookstore, 1406 AH.

Sheikh Ansari, Morteza, Al-Qada wa al-Shahadat, Qom, World Congress Commemorating Sheikh Azam Ansari, 1415 AH.

Salehi Najafabadi, Nematollah, Qazavat-e Zan dar Fiqh-e Eslami Hamrah ba Chand Maqaleh Digar (Women's Judgeship in Islamic Fiqh along with several other articles), Tehran, Omid-e Farda, 2009.

Tabatabai, Sayyid Muhammad Hossein, Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran, Qom, Society of Seminary Teachers, 1417 AH.

Tabarsi, Fadl ibn Hasan, Majma' al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Quran, Tehran, Nasser Khosrow, 1993.

Tusi, Abu Ja'far, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Al-Mabsut fi Fiqh al-Imamiyyah, Tehran, Al-Maktabah al-Murtadawiyyah li-Ihya al-Athar al-Ja'fariyyah, 1387 AH.

Tusi, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Al-Khilaf, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1407 AH.

Amili (Shahid Thani), Zain al-Din ibn Ali, Masalik al-Afham ila Tanqih Shara'i' al-Islam, Qom, Mu'assasat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyyah, 1413 AH.

Fazel Hindi, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Kashf al-Litham wa al-Ibham 'an Qawa'id al-Ahkam, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1416 AH.

Qolipour, Hasan, "[https://journals.iau.ir/article%20529939%20facae26295c0cd9a45b82ce3a31c6dca.pdf A Fiqhi Reflection on the Arguments for Prohibiting Women's Judgeship]", Quarterly Journal of Islamic Fiqh and Law Research, No. 32, 2013.

Karimi, Abbas; Mozaffari, Mostafa, "[https://jwdp.ut.ac.ir/article%2027408%208a95773a1d7973e6562c7d7e82dd4bc6.pdf A New Attitude towards the Arguments Regarding Women's Judgeship in Imami Fiqh and the Practical Procedure of Iranian Statutory Law]", Women's Research, Year 6, No. 2, 2008.

Kulayni, Abu Ja'far, Muhammad ibn Ya'qub, Al-Kafi, Tehran, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, 1407 AH.

Motahhari, Morteza, Collection of Works, Vol. 15 (Philosophy of History), Tehran, Sadra, 2003.

Motahhari, Morteza, Collection of Works, Vol. 29 (Woman and Judicial and Political Issues), Tehran, Sadra, 1999.

Montazeri, Hussein-Ali, Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah, Qom, Nashr-e Tafakkur, 1409 AH.

Mousavi Golpaygani, Sayyid Mohammad Reza, Kitab al-Qada, Qom, Dar al-Quran al-Karim, 1413 AH.

Mirza-ye Qomi, Abu al-Qasim, Rasa'il al-Mirza al-Qomi, Qom, Islamic Propagation Office, 1427 AH.

Najafi, Sahib al-Jawahir, Muhammad Hasan, Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shara'i' al-Islam, Beirut, Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, Beirut, 1404 AH.
{{End}}
[[fa:قضاوت زنان]]

Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei

2026-03-17T10:55:42Z

Mkhaghanif: Mkhaghanif moved page Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei to Yousef Saanei

#REDIRECT [[Yousef Saanei]]

Yousef Saanei

2026-03-17T10:55:42Z

Mkhaghanif: Mkhaghanif moved page Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei to Yousef Saanei

{{author
|author = Mahdi Shajarian
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compilation =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
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{{Infobox person
| fame = Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei
| name = Yousef Saanei
| birth = 1316 SH
| death = 1399 SH
| image = Yousef_Saanei.jpg
| image_size =
| image_caption =
| position = Shia Marja' al-Taqlid
| madhhab =
| nationality = Iran
| field_of_specialization = Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh
| works_in_contemporary_jurisprudence = Fiqh and Life Series
| opinions =
| teachers =
| students =
| website = https://saanei.xyz
}}

*'''Abstract'''
'''Yousef Saanei''' (1316–1399 SH), was a Shia Faqih who held fatwas differing from the consensus of jurists, particularly in areas such as [[Fiqh of Women]] and the [[Rights of Non-Muslim Minorities]] in Islamic society. These views faced numerous reactions from traditional jurists, and examining them can contribute to a better understanding of the developments in [[Contemporary Jurisprudence]]. It has been said that his approach represents an effort toward the dynamism of Shia Fiqh and responding to new issues while maintaining inferential frameworks.

Relying on five key principles—the [[Principle of Justice (Qa'idat al-Adl)]], the priority of the Quran over narrations, the revision of evidence based on contemporary needs, the [[Principle of No-Hardship (Nafi al-Haraj)]], and non-commitment to consensus (Ijma') and popularity (Shuhrat)—Sa'anei proceeded to derive rulings that differed from popular jurisprudential fatwas in cases such as the [[Equality of Blood Money for Men and Women|equality of Diya (blood money)]] and [[Equality of Retribution for Men and Women|Qisas (retribution)]] between men and women, the permissibility of [[Women's Judgeship|judgeship]] and [[Women's Marja'iyyah|religious authority (Marja'iyyah) for women]], the [[Puberty of Girls|attainment of puberty for girls]] at age 13, the [[Equality of Testimony for Men and Women|equality of testimony between men and women]], and the [[Mahramiyyah of the Adopted Child|Mahramiyyah of adopted children]].

According to Sa'anei's fatwas, the permissibility of [[Polygyny|polygyny]] is conditional upon the acceptance and consent of the first wife; he even considers marriage without consent that involves the harassment of the first wife as impermissible and void (batil). He also considers the legitimacy of [[Temporary Marriage (Nikah al-Mut'ah)|temporary marriage]] to be limited only to emergency and exceptional cases, such as long wars. Sa'anei considered "conventional justice" (al-adl al-urfi) to be the basis for many rulings and believed that the Legislator (Shari') has delegated the identification of instances of justice to convention (Urf).

== Academic and Political Biography ==
Yousef Saanei was an Iranian Shia Mujtahid known for fatwas that differed from the consensus of the Shia jurists of his era. He was born in 1316 SH in Isfahan and passed away in 1399 SH in the city of Qom. He began his studies at the Isfahan Seminary (1325 SH) and completed them at the Qom Seminary (from 1330 SH). In Qom, he benefited from masters such as [[Sayyid Husayn Tabataba'i Borujerdi|Sayyid Husayn Borujerdi]], [[Sayyid Muhammad Muhaqqiq Damad]], and [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]], and he began teaching Kharij al-Fiqh in 1354 SH. Some of his jurisprudential works include: Resalah Tawdih al-Masa'il, Manasik al-Hajj, Majma' al-Masa'il, Muntakhab al-Ahkam, Medical Istifta'at, Misbah al-Muqallidin, Ahkam al-Banuan (Rulings for Women), and Kitab al-Talaq.<ref>A group of students, The Innovative Faqih; Narrative of the life of the Faqih of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS), Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei, pp. 53-55.</ref>

Sa'anei's revolutionary activities prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution involved efforts in cultural and promotional dimensions, such as issuing political declarations and statements.<ref>A group of students, The Innovative Faqih; Narrative of the life of the Faqih of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS), Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei, p. 93.</ref> Following the Islamic Revolution, his record includes membership in the Guardian Council, the Prosecutor General's office, membership in the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, membership in the Assembly of Experts, and the [[Expediency Discernment Council]].<ref>A group of students, The Innovative Faqih; Narrative of the life of the Faqih of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS), Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei, pp. 114-126.</ref>

== Specific Jurisprudential Fatwas ==
Certain jurisprudential foundations and specific opinions of Yousef Saanei have always been subjects of discussion and controversy; including the [[Puberty of Girls|puberty of girls]] at age 13, the [[Women Leaving the House Without the Husband's Permission|permissibility of a woman leaving the house without the husband's permission]], the [[Equality of Retribution|equality of Qisas]] and [[Equality of Blood Money for Men and Women|Diya between men and women]], the possibility of [[Women's Judgeship|women's judgeship]], the lack of the male-gender requirement in [[Women's Marja'iyyah|Marja'iyyah]] and [[Women's Guardianship (Wilayah)|Wilayah]], the [[Guardianship of the Mother|natural guardianship of the mother over the child after the father]], the restriction of the prohibition of music and singing (Ghina) to its [[Content-based Prohibition of Ghina|content-based prohibition]], the [[Purity of Non-Belligerent Infidels|ritual purity (taharah) of non-belligerent kafirs]], the restriction of the prohibition of Riba (usury) to consumptive Riba rather than [[Productive Riba|productive Riba]], [[Retribution of a Muslim for a Kafir|Qisas of a Muslim for a Kafir]], the possibility of [[Inheritance of a Non-Muslim from a Muslim|inheritance of a non-Muslim from a Muslim]], and the [[Mahramiyyah of the Adopted Child|Mahramiyyah of adopted children]].

Sa'anei prioritized conventional justice over many Islamic rulings and believed in the [[Human Dignity|inherent dignity of every human being]], regardless of their beliefs. A series of booklets by Sa'anei has been published under the title [[Fiqh and Life (Book)|Fiqh and Life]], in each of which he explains the reasons for his fatwas.

In Sa'anei's view, the permissibility of polygyny is conditional upon the requirement that the second marriage does not cause harm to the first wife and is not conventionally considered reprehensible or offensive, but rather meets her acceptance and consent. Relying on the verse [[Surah An-Nisa, Verse 19|“And live with them honorably”]] (Nisa, 19), Sa'anei argues that a second marriage without the consent of the first wife and which causes her distress is not permissible (taklifan) and is void (wadh'an/batil).<ref>[https://saanei.xyz/?view=01,02,48,378,0 “Interview with Ayatollah Sa'anei regarding the Family Protection Bill”], Information Portal of Ayatollah Sa'anei.</ref> Also, in his view, the legitimacy of temporary marriage is limited only to emergency and exceptional cases such as long wars, and promoting it as a solution alongside permanent marriage not only does not prevent corruption but, by endangering the family unit and promoting licentiousness, leads society toward collapse. Sa'anei's primary solution for addressing the challenges of the youth is the removal of economic and cultural barriers and the facilitation of permanent marriage, rather than resorting to temporary marriage.<ref>[https://saanei.xyz/?view=01,05,13,309,0 “Temporary Marriage and its Conditions and Limits”], Information Portal of Ayatollah Sa'anei.</ref>

== Jurisprudential Principles and Rules ==
The principles and rules by which Sa'anei's jurisprudential fatwas were derived consist of five influential principles: the [[Principle of Justice (Qa'idat al-Adl)]], special attention to the Quran, revision of evidence based on contemporary requirements, the [[Principle of No-Hardship (Qa'idat al-La Haraj)]], and opposition to consensus (Ijma') and popularity (Shuhrat). Sa'anei's fatwas, although innovative, do not fall outside the framework of jurisprudential inferences, even if they present some relatively new principles.

=== Principle of Justice (Qa'idat al-Adl) ===
The Principle of Justice is one of the important and influential rules in Sa'anei's practice of Fiqh.<ref>Sa'anei, An Approach to Women's Rights, pp. 166-167.</ref> According to this rule, a ruling that contradicts justice is not issued by the Sacred Legislator, and religious sources such as the Quran and Sunnah serve to express the general criteria and standards of justice and oppression, while delegating the determination of instances and details to convention (Urf) and social reason (Aql). The Legislator places convention in the position of judgment and is itself committed to the judgment of convention, except in cases where there is an explicit religious text (Nass) to the contrary. The jurist and Mujtahid, in the position of inference, must adapt religious criteria to the convention of their time and, in issuing a fatwa, take the judgment of convention as the criterion. If the rational convention of society considers something to be oppression, the jurist cannot present it as justice, and vice versa; unless a definitive religious text exists.<ref>Qabil (Jami), The Principle of Justice and the Negation of Oppression, 147-174.</ref>

Citing verses such as [[Surah An-Nahl, Verse 90|“Indeed, Allah orders justice”]] (Nahl, 90) and other verses ([[Surah Al-An'am, Verse 115|An'am, 115]], [[Surah Fussilat, Verse 46|Fussilat, 46]], and [[Surah An-Nisa, Verse 40|Nisa, 40]], [[Surah Ghafir, Verse 31|Ghafir, 31]]), Sa'anei believes that the system of God's commands is organized within the framework of justice and that the standard of every religious command is justice. Therefore, if the conventional understanding of justice is incompatible with the generalities or absolutes of narrations or with the text of a narration of non-definitive origin (Zanni al-Sudur), then according to the aforementioned verses and the priority of the Quran over narrations and the command to discard narrations contrary to the Quran,<ref>Kulayni, Al-Kafi, vol. 1, pp. 69-70.</ref> the conventional understanding takes precedence, and narrations containing an unjust ruling (from the perspective of Urf) are discarded or interpreted (Ta'wil).<ref>Sa'anei, An Approach to Women's Rights, pp. 166-167; Ali-Akbarian, The Principle of Justice in Imami Fiqh, pp. 260-274.</ref>

Sa'anei utilized this rule in his fatwas; for example, he does not accept the absolute nature of evidence regarding the man's right to divorce and considers cases such as divorce without reason by the man or the man's refusal to divorce in Khul' divorce (when the woman is averse and has gifted or returned the dowry) as oppressive from the conventional perspective. This is because, conventionally, depriving the woman of choice and granting absolute choice to the man based solely on gender is unjust; therefore, one must abandon the absolute application of the narration "Divorce is in the hand of the one who takes the leg,"<ref>Sa'anei, An Approach to Women's Rights, pp. 552-553.</ref> noting that some early scholars such as Ibn Zuhrah al-Halabi<ref>Ibn Zuhrah al-Halabi, Ghunyat al-Nuzu' ila Ilmay al-Usul wa al-Furu', p. 375.</ref> and Shaykh al-Tusi<ref>Tusi, Al-Nihayah fi Mujarrad al-Fiqh wa al-Fatawa, p. 529.</ref> also considered divorce in Khul' to be obligatory for the man.

Another example is the rejection of the blood money (Diya) of a woman being half; Sa'anei considers this ruling unjust from a conventional perspective given the equality of men and women in human identity and social and economic rights (confirmed by reason, the Book, and the Sunnah), and believes that narrations indicating the halving of a woman's Diya are discarded due to their contradiction with justice (the Quranic standard for rulings).<ref>Sa'anei, Equality of Diya, pp. 62-64.</ref>

=== Special Attention to the Holy Quran ===
One of Sa'anei's primary foundations is the prioritization of the Quran. He utilizes the foundational rule of the precedence of the Quranic texts of definitive origin (Qat'i al-Sudur) over the narrations of non-definitive origin (Zanni al-Sudur)<ref>Na'ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 505.</ref> in the issue of Qisas. He cites two verses: [[Surah Al-Ma'idah, Verse 45|“And We ordained for them therein a life for a life...”]] (Ma'idah, 45) and [[Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 178|“Prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered - the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female”]] (Baqarah, 178) and considers their indication of equal Qisas for men and women to be clear and explicit (Nass). Therefore, he considers acting upon narrations that make the Qisas of a woman for a man conditional on the payment of half the man's Diya to be problematic due to their explicit contradiction with the Quran.<ref>Sa'anei, Equality of Qisas, p. 43; cf. Mehrpour, Issues in Women's Rights, pp. 248-249.</ref>

Regarding [[Women's Testimony]], Sa'anei focuses on the verse [[Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 282|“And if there are not two men [available], then a man and two women... so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her”]] (Baqarah: 282). Drawing an inference from the verse, he concludes that the ruling of two women's testimony being equivalent to one man's is, firstly, restricted to financial matters (debt) and, secondly, is not permanent and inclusive of all women. This is because, according to scholars of Usul, if a cause (Illah) is mentioned alongside a ruling and a matter appears as the cause, the ruling revolves around that cause.<ref>Allamah al-Hilli, Nihayat al-Wusul ila Ilm al-Usul, vol. 2, p. 201; Najmabadi, Al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 508.</ref> In his view, the cause in this verse is "the forgetfulness of one woman and the need for the other to remind her," which related to the social conditions of women at the time of revelation (lack of social presence and weakness in financial calculations). Since women today have a prominent presence in social fields and are precise in financial calculations, their testimony in court is equal to that of men because the problem of forgetfulness has been negated.<ref>Sa'anei, Women's Testimony in Islam, pp. 57-59.</ref>

=== Revision of Evidence Based on Modern Conditions ===
According to Sa'anei, the dynamism of Fiqh is tied to the "revision of evidence"; this revision does not mean changing or discarding evidence or imposing external beliefs upon it, but rather presenting new questions to the texts and interrogating them for answers suited to these questions. This process is committed to the standard rules of Usul al-Fiqh and does not necessarily lead to Ijtihad in Usul; rather, using the same common methodology, it places the branches (Furu') into a new inferential process and arrives at different fatwas. For example, in the issue of the [[Puberty of Girls]], the revision of evidence led him to maintain 13 years of age as an independent criterion for puberty.

Sa'anei divides the narrations indicating the puberty of girls at 9 years into three categories: 1. Absolute narrations referring to 9 years, 2. Narrations paired with other signs such as menstruation, and 3. Narrations explicitly specifying 9 years due to menstruation: "Because when a girl reaches nine years, she menstruates."<ref>Kulayni, Al-Kafi, vol. 7, p. 69.</ref> Sa'anei infers from this set that 9 years is a "pointing title" (unwan mushir) and lacks inherent subject-matter significance; because the first category of narrations is restricted by the second and third categories, and based on the third category, menstruation is the cause and subject of puberty. Therefore, if a 9-year-old girl does not menstruate, she is not considered mature (baligh). Relying on a reliable (muwaththaq) narration, he considers 13 years as another independent criterion for puberty.<ref>Sa'anei, Puberty of Girls, pp. 11-43.</ref>

In support of this view, some contemporary writers also believe that the narrations of puberty (with different ages of 9, 10, and 13) were issued from the Infallible's capacity of branch-derivation (tafri')—explaining specific instances of a general rule—rather than the capacity of legislation (tashri'); since the main criterion is menstruation and the specific age (like 9 years) was an instance suited to the conditions of the time of issuance and is not absolutely binding in Fiqh.<ref>Ziya'ifar, Philosophy of the Science of Fiqh, vol. 1, pp. 392-394.</ref>

=== Opposition to Consensus and Popularity ===
Yousef Saanei is among the jurists who, relying on evidence, issue fatwas without fear of contradicting consensus (Ijma') or popular opinion (Shuhrat). His specific fatwas, including the permissibility of [[Women's Marja'iyyah|Women's Marja'iyyah]] and [[Women's Judgeship|Judgeship]], [[Equality of Blood Money for Men and Women|Equality of Diya]], and [[Equality of Retribution for Men and Women|Equality of Qisas]], are examples of this approach. In the issue of women's religious authority, he relies on the [[Conduct of the Rational (Sirat al-Uqala)]] and the judgment of reason (the referral of the ignorant to the scholar without difference between man and woman) and, by ignoring the claimed consensus, does not consider being male a condition for Marja'iyyah, judgeship, or Wilayah.<ref>Sa'anei, An Approach to Women's Rights, pp. 258-259.</ref>

Sa'anei often considers consensuses to be "evidence-based" (madraki, i.e., based on existing proofs) and, by critiquing those proofs, considers consensus to lack independent validity. For example, regarding the [[Guardianship of the Mother]], after disputing the transmitted consensus, he states: "If we accept the consensus, it is most likely based on narrations and is an evidence-based consensus; thus it is not a proof (hujjah)."<ref>Sa'anei, Guardianship of the Mother, p. 62.</ref> This method removes the boundary between the inference of a ruling and the issuance of a fatwa; unlike jurists who consider consensus invalid in the position of inference but act with precaution (ihtiyat) in the position of fatwa (presenting their view to followers) and do not issue fatwas contrary to popular views.

=== Principle of No-Hardship (Nafi al-Haraj) ===
Another frequently used rule in Yousef Saanei's Fiqh is the [[Principle of No-Hardship (Nafi al-Haraj)]]. From his perspective, this rule is a definitive ruling, but its breadth or narrowness is decisive. The basis of Sharia is established on the negation of difficulty and hardship (usr wa haraj), and "hardship" (haraj) is a conventional concept that lacks an independent religious definition, with convention being the criterion for identifying its instances. The principle of ease and facilitation in religion is a governing criterion and can even be used as a preference (murajjih) in the conflict of narrations.<ref>Sa'anei, An Approach to Women's Rights, p. 205.</ref>

His fatwa on the [[Mahramiyyah of the Adopted Child]] is a clear example of this approach. In response to a question about making a child mahram who was taken from welfare services and whose age has passed the nursing (radha') period, he states: the customary religious ways (nursing or marriage contract) are not possible in these cases; however, given that caring for helpless children is a recommended and desirable act (birr and ihsan) leading to "otherworldly reward and happiness in both worlds," the hardship and difficulty resulting from being non-mahram after the child's puberty (such as the problem of informing the child about the real parents, the spiritual suffering from childlessness, and the disruption of normal life) removes the prohibition of looking (nazar). Citing the principle that "Islam is a religion of ease and facility," he considers such hardship a justification for removing the prohibitory ruling (hukm taklifi).<ref>Nur al-Thaqalayn Cultural and Artistic Institute, Mirror of Opinion: Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei from the Perspective of Others, pp. 166-168.</ref> Prior to him, no jurist had so explicitly removed the prohibition of looking based on hardship.

== Critics and Opponents ==
The specific jurisprudential fatwas of Yousef Saanei have drawn widespread criticism. The Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, following a question regarding his Marja'iyyah, wrote: "The Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, based on investigations conducted over the past year and after numerous meetings, has reached the conclusion that he lacks the necessary criteria for occupying the position of Marja'iyyah."<ref>[https://jameehmodarresin.org/1139/849/ “Opinion of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom regarding the Marja'iyyah of Mr. Hajj Shaykh Yousef Saanei”], Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.</ref> At the same time, the Farda website claimed it had inquired about the opinions of other Maraja' offices regarding Yousef Saanei's Marja'iyyah; in this regard, the office of the Supreme Leader reminded of the need to refer to one of the Maraja' without an explicit answer, while other Maraja' offices did not consider the issuance of this statement sufficient to disqualify him from Marja'iyyah.<ref>Opinions of the Maraja' Offices regarding the followers of Ayatollah Sa'anei, Khabar Online.</ref> The Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of the Qom Seminary also issued a statement expressing regret over this action.<ref>[http://majmaqom.ir/بیانیه-ها-و-اطلاعیه-ها/99 “Number 99: The Status of Marja'iyyah in the Seminaries”], Website of the Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of the Qom Seminary.</ref>

Books and articles have been written in criticism of Yousef Saanei's jurisprudential views, including:

"Guarding Jurisprudence; A Critique of Ayatollah Sa'anei's Jurisprudential Views," by Husayn Hashemian, Ali-Asghar Hematian Sadrollahi Damghani, and Mahmoud Moqaddami, Tehran, Vosough, 1387 SH.
"Rereading the Jurisprudential and Political Views of Ayatollah Sa'anei," by Omid Hosseini, Tehran, Center for Islamic Revolution Document Center, 1392 SH.
"Defense of Islamic Fiqh and Politics," by Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Hasheminia, Tehran, Vosough, 1386 SH.
"Examination and Critique of the Evidence for Ayatollah Sa'anei's Theory on the Equality of Diya for Muslim Men and Women," Contemporary Comparative Law Studies, by Muhammad Ibrahim-Nezhad, No. 7, 1395 SH.
"Critique and Review: Contemporary Jurisprudential Innovations according to Jurisprudential and Ijtihadi Standards," by Mahdi Nikouei, Tehran, Athar-e Amin, 1385 SH.
"Critique of Productive Riba," Ahl al-Bayt (AS) Fiqh Journal, by Reza Mohammadi Karaji, No. 58-59, 1388 SH.

Some of the criticisms of Sa'anei focus on his jurisprudential foundations and, in fact, reject them in terms of the major premise (kubra); such as the critiques aimed at the Principle of Justice.<ref>Ali-Akbarian, The Principle of Justice in Imami Fiqh, pp. 60-73.</ref> Other criticisms relate to the application of jurisprudential subjects to the aforementioned principles and are raised in terms of the minor premise (sughra); such as the criticism regarding the Mahramiyyah of adopted children, where the existence of hardship in this issue was not accepted.<ref>Shariati-Nasab, Mahramiyyah in Adoption, pp. 241-242.</ref>

Despite the critiques and opposition to Sa'anei's jurisprudential opinions, some of his critics maintain that his jurisprudential views cannot be called heresy (bid'ah); because not every innovation is bid'ah, and the condition for calling a view bid'ah is that, firstly, it must be presented as a part of religion, and secondly, no specific or general proof can be established for it from valid religious sources.<ref>Turayhi, Majma' al-Bahrayn, vol. 4, pp. 298-299; Raghib, Mufradat Alfadh al-Quran, p. 111.</ref>

== Footnotes ==
{{Footnotes}}
== References ==
{{References}}

Ibn Zuhrah al-Halabi, Hamzah ibn Ali Husayni, Ghunyat al-Nuzu' ila Ilmay al-Usul wa al-Furu', Qom, Imam Sadiq Institute (AS), 1417 AH.

Ardabili, Ahmad, Majma' al-Fa'idah wa al-Burhan fi Sharh Irshad al-Adh-han, Qom, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, 1403 AH.

[https://saanei.xyz/?view=01,05,13,309,0 “Temporary Marriage and its Conditions and Limits”], Information Portal of Ayatollah Sa'anei.

Tabrizi, Jawad, Minhaj al-Salihin, Qom, Majma' al-Imam al-Mahdi (AJ), 1426 AH.

A group of his students, The Innovative Faqih: Narrative of the life of the Faqih of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS): Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn Cultural-Artistic Institute, 1393 SH.

Husayni Firuzabadi, Murtadha, Inayat al-Usul fi Sharh Kifayat al-Usul, Qom, Firuzabadi Bookstore, 1400 AH.

Raghib Isfahani, Husayn, Mufradat Alfadh al-Quran, Beirut, Dar al-Qalam - al-Dar al-Shamiyyah, 1412 AH.

Sistani, Sayyid Ali, Minhaj al-Salihin, Qom, Office of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, 1417 AH.

Shariati-Nasab, Sadiq, Mahramiyyah in Adoption, Journal of Legal Research, No. 66, 1393 SH.

[http://majmaqom.ir/بیانیه-ها-و-اطلاعیه-ها/99 “Number 99: The Status of Marja'iyyah in the Seminaries”], Website of the Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of the Qom Seminary, January 9, 2011 (19 Dey 1389 SH).

Shaykh Ansari, Murtadha, Fara'id al-Usul, Qom, Islamic Publishing Institute, 1416 AH.

Shaykh Tusi, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Al-Nihayah fi Mujarrad al-Fiqh wa al-Fatawa, Beirut, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1400 AH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Equality of Diya, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn Publications, 1384 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Equality of Qisas, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1383 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Puberty of Girls, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1385 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Resalah Tawdih al-Masa'il, Qom, Meysam-e Tammar Publications, 1392 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, An Approach to Women's Rights, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn Publications, 1397 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Women's Testimony in Islam, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1388 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Guardianship of the Mother, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1384 SH.

Sa'anei, Yusuf, Majma' al-Masa'il Istifta'at, Qom, Meysam-e Tammar Publications, 1386 SH.

Ziya'ifar, Sa'id, Philosophy of the Science of Fiqh, Qom, Seminary and University Research Institute, 1397 SH.

Turayhi, Fakhruddin, Majma' al-Bahrayn, Tehran, Mortazavi, 1375 SH.

Allamah al-Hilli, Hasan ibn Yusuf, Nihayat al-Wusul ila Ilm al-Usul, Qom, Imam Sadiq Institute (AS), 1425 AH.

Ali-Akbarian, Hassan-Ali, The Principle of Justice in Imami Fiqh, Qom, Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, 1386 SH.

Qabil (Jami), Hadi, The Principle of Justice and the Negation of Oppression along with an Interview with Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1390 SH.

Kulayni, Muhammad ibn Ya'qub, Al-Kafi, Tehran, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyah, 1407 AH.

[https://saanei.xyz/?view=01,02,48,378,0 “Interview with Ayatollah Sa'anei regarding the Family Protection Bill”], Information Portal of Ayatollah Sa'anei.

Nur al-Thaqalayn Cultural and Artistic Institute, Mirror of Opinion: Grand Ayatollah Sa'anei from the Perspective of Others, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1394 SH.

Mehrpour, Husayn, Issues in Women's Rights, Tehran, Ettela'at, 1379 SH.

Na'ini, Muhammad Husayn, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, Qom, Matba'at al-Irfan, 1352 AH.

Najmabadi, Abolfazl, Al-Usul, Qom, Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi Institute for the Publication of Ahl al-Bayt Teachings, 1380 SH.

[https://jameehmodarresin.org/1139/849/ “Opinion of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom regarding the Marja'iyyah of Mr. Hajj Shaykh Yousef Saanei”], Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.

[https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/34457/ “Opinion of the Maraja' Offices regarding the followers of Ayatollah Sa'anei / The opinion of followers takes precedence over the opinion of the Society of Seminary Teachers”], Khabar Online Website, January 4, 2010 (14 Dey 1388 SH).
{{End}}

[[Category:Biographical Articles]]
[[fa:یوسف صانعی]]

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Category:Articles by Mahdi Sadeghi

2025-12-08T13:15:16Z

Mkhaghanif:

This category is for articles written by Mahdi Sadeghi.
__HIDDENCAT__

A Jurisprudential Inquiry into the Killer Humanoid Robot (book)

2025-12-08T13:14:39Z

Mkhaghanif:

{{Author
|author = Mahdi Sadeghi
|author2 =
|author3 =
|compiler =
|editor1 =
|editor2 =
|editor3 =
}}
{{infobox book
| name = A Jurisprudential Inquiry into the Killer Humanoid Robot
| image = A Jurisprudential Inquiry into the Killer Humanoid Robot (book).jpg
| caption =
| original_title = جستاری فقهی در ربات انسان‌نمای قاتل
| author = [[Hosseinali Bina]] and [[Amir Hossein Fahimi]]
| writing_date = 1401 SH
| topic = Criminal Jurisprudence
| language = Persian
| volumes = 1
| pages = 101
| publisher = Mirath-e Mandegar
| publication_place = Qom
| publication_date = 1401 SH (c. 2022 CE)
| edition = First
| publication_details = Qom, Mirath-e Mandegar, 1401 SH.
}}

* '''Abstract'''

'''A Jurisprudential Inquiry into the Killer Humanoid Robot''' (in Persian: [[:fa:جستاری_فقهی_در_ربات_انسان‌نمای_قاتل_(کتاب)|جستاری فقهی در ربات انسان‌نمای قاتل]]) is a book on [[Criminal Jurisprudence]] authored by Hosseinali Bina and Amir Hossein Fahimi, and published by Mirath-e Mandegar. The book is organized into five discourses and aims to provide a jurisprudential review of topics related to killer robots. However, the work is unedited and has a disjointed structure. The topics in its five discourses are presented independently without clarifying their connection to the main subject. Consequently, the book does not meet the reader's expectation for a comprehensive and analytical jurisprudential study of killer robots.

In the first discourse, the authors briefly outline the history of criminal law over two pages, analyzing it in three main stages: private revenge, private justice, and public justice. In the stage of private revenge, punishment was carried out by the victim or their family. In the stage of private justice, the state had limited oversight over the process of imposing punishment. But in the stage of public justice, the state took full responsibility for the administration of justice and punishment (pp. 11-12).

The second discourse is dedicated to introducing killer robots and their various dimensions. In this section, the authors have copied several pages of reports from news agencies such as IRNA and the Young Journalists Club. Notably, the content from these sources is cited not directly but through non-authoritative third-party websites. This discourse examines the rapid advancement of [[artificial intelligence]] as the main factor increasing the likelihood of the emergence of killer robots and its transformation into a serious threat (pp. 14-22).

In the third discourse, the authors explain fundamental concepts related to the research, such as robot, programming, free will, coercion, [[Muharabah|muḥārabah]], responsibility, and murder. Here too, content has been copied from books like ''Āyāt al-Aḥkām'' (written by [[Abbasali Amid Zanjani]]) and ''Aḥkām-i Ḥuqūqī-yi Islām'' (written by Nematollah Yousefian), without adequate explanation (pp. 25-45).

The fourth discourse presents a brief translation and interpretation of Quranic verses related to murder. It merely lists the relevant verses and offers a general interpretation, but the authors do not explain the connection of this exegetical content to the main topic of the book. Most of the exegetical material is also not from jurisprudential or authoritative sources (pp. 46-71).

In the final discourse, the authors examine important jurisprudential rules such as the rule of destruction (''qāʿidat al-itlāf''), the rule of dominion (''qāʿidat al-taslīṭ''), and the no-harm rule (''qāʿidat lā ḍarar''). This section also only explains the jurisprudential rules without specifying their relevance to the book's main topic. In addition to copying texts from jurisprudential books, in some cases, Arabic phrases have been added without any translation or explanation (pp. 72-101).

[[Category:Bibliographical Articles]]
[[category:book review]]
[[fa:جستاری فقهی در ربات انسان‌نمای قاتل (کتاب)]]
[[Category:Books on Judicial Fiqh in Persian]]
[[Category:Articles by Mehdi Sadeghi]]

Category:Articles by Mahdi Sadeghi

2025-12-08T13:12:27Z

Mkhaghanif:

This category is for articles written by Mahdi Sadeghi.

Category:Articles by Mahdi Sadeghi

2025-12-08T13:12:02Z

Mkhaghanif: Mkhaghanif moved page Category:Articles by Mehdi Sadeghi to Category:Articles by Mahdi Sadeghi without leaving a redirect

This category is for articles written by Mehdi Sadeghi.

Category:Articles by hassan ejraei

2025-12-08T09:54:11Z

Mkhaghanif:

__HIDDENCAT__

Dimensions of Child Labor from the Perspective of Law and Jurisprudence (Book)

2025-10-26T09:53:55Z

Mkhaghanif: /* Conditionality of the Permissibility of Child Labor on the Child's Best Interest */

{{Author
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| author = Mohammad Hossein Shahbazi and Fatemeh Abbasian Arani
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| subject = Family Jurisprudence
| style = Analytical
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| pages = 130
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Translated by AI

* '''Abstract'''
Dimensions of Child Labor from the Perspective of Law and Jurisprudence is a book in the field of family jurisprudence, co-authored by Mohammad Hossein Shahbazi and Fatemeh Abbasian Arani. In this work, the authors distinguish between the two concepts of "child labor" and "child worker" and examine them from legal and jurisprudential perspectives. They consider beneficial and educational child labor, performed with regard to the child's best interest, permissible under specific conditions and with the supervision of the guardian; however, they regard economic exploitation of the child (child worker) as an instance of public corruption and illegitimate. The role of the government and family in the formation of this phenomenon and its social consequences are other topics discussed in the book.

== Book Structure ==
Dimensions of Child Labor from the Perspective of Law and Jurisprudence, co-authored by Mohammad Hossein Shahbazi and Fatemeh Abbasian Arani, is in the field of family jurisprudence. The authors in this work examine two different but related categories, namely "child labor" and "child worker," from legal and jurisprudential viewpoints. The research method in this book is descriptive-analytical and based on the study of library sources. This work has been published in 130 pages by Jadouye Qalam Publications in 1402 AH.

This work begins with an introduction by the authors and a table of contents, and ends with a conclusion and a list of references. The main discussions of the book are organized into three chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to generalities and fundamental concepts. In the second chapter, the authors analyze the negative and positive dimensions of child labor from the perspectives of jurisprudence and law and attempt to clarify the difference between legitimate child employment and economic exploitation of the child. The third chapter is also devoted to examining the role of the government and family in the formation of the child worker phenomenon and its social consequences.

== Difference Between Child Labor and Child Work ==
The authors in the first chapter of the book examine the concept of "child" in jurisprudence and law. According to them, although in jurisprudence, a child refers to an immature individual, Iranian laws suffer from a kind of ambiguity and inconsistency in defining a child; in such a way that in some legal articles, the age of 18 is considered, and in others, religious maturity is the criterion for the end of childhood. In addition, in some laws, the age of 15 is regarded as the boundary of childhood, while others have set 13 for girls and 15 for boys as the criterion. These inconsistencies are even seen in whether the years are solar or lunar. Moreover, there are differences in this regard between criminal and civil domains (pp. 17-22).

Continuing, the authors address the Islamic jurisprudential view on child employment and report that the work of a child (minor) can be valid under specific conditions. From a religious perspective, child employment is defined within the framework of the duties of the compulsory guardian. If the compulsory guardian observes all the interests and rights of the child and also considers their physical and mental abilities, they can compel the child to engage in suitable occupations for education and vocational training. In some cases, especially when the guardian is unable to pay maintenance and their insolvency is proven, child employment for the purpose of earning income is considered permissible. According to the authors, this type of employment differs from the harmful concept of "child worker"; because it is not only non-exploitative but can also be in the child's favor and for their growth (p. 26).

Finally, the authors emphasize that the child's consent has no effect on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of economic exploitation of them, because from a jurisprudential viewpoint, the child lacks the ability to discern their own benefit and harm (p. 28).

== Impermissibility of Child Work ==
The authors in the second chapter examine in detail the negative dimensions of child labor from a legal perspective. They, by referring to a set of domestic and international laws, consider the child worker phenomenon prohibited in the legal dimension, showing that child labor is not acceptable within the accepted legal framework (pp. 36-69).

Continuing, with attention to the issue of custody, the authors emphasize that the compulsory guardian has no right to employ the child as a child worker or exploit them. From jurisprudential and legal perspectives, the principle is the financial provision of the child by the guardian, and any deviation from this duty, if it leads to physical, psychological, or developmental harm to the child, is considered a violation of the guardian's religious duty and an act lacking religious legitimacy (p. 70).

The authors regard the child worker phenomenon as one of the manifestations of public corruption; therefore, they believe that the Islamic government must combat this corruption by enacting appropriate and effective laws. They, by referring to the views of some jurists who consider the basis of the legitimacy of hudud and ta'zirat to be the prevention of corruption, suggest that proportionate ta'zirat be considered for combating various levels of the child worker phenomenon (pp. 70-71).

== Conditionality of the Permissibility of Child Labor on the Child's Best Interest ==
The authors in the continuation of the second chapter have examined the positive dimensions of child labor from a legal perspective. In their view, if the child's activity is compatible with their best interest, work can be used as a tool for empowering children and adolescents and nurturing their talents, and provided that the type of activity is proportionate to the child's physical and mental abilities, employment in various occupations is considered permissible (pp. 71-74).

On this basis, the authors believe that the compulsory guardian can also, while observing the child's best interest, compel them to employment and even income generation, provided that the chosen work is appropriate to the child's age and does not cause harm to them (p. 76). In their view, according to the opinion of the majority of jurists, the payment of maintenance to the child by the guardian is obligatory only if the child is poor and lacks the ability to employ and earn income (p. 77). They, by critiquing the view of the author of Riyad who does not consider compelling child employment permissible even if the child is capable of business, believe that a father who has guardianship over the marriage of a minor girl, a fortiori, has guardianship over compelling the child to employment compatible with their best interest and upbringing (p. 78).

At the end of the second chapter, the authors emphasize the positive and beneficial inherent nature of work. They consider work, as long as it does not conflict with the child's best interest, a good and positive matter and call it one of the positive aspects of child labor. In this regard, they also refer to a number of narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt (AS) that indicate the desirability and value of work in the religious view (pp. 82-84). In the third chapter, the role of the government and family in the formation of the child worker phenomenon is examined, and its social and individual consequences are analyzed, and the role of supportive and legislative structures in preventing or facilitating this phenomenon is discussed (pp. 86-113).

[[fa:ابعاد کار کودک از منظر قانون و فقه (کتاب)]]
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Hossein Shahbazi]]
[[Category:Books by Fatemeh Abbasian Arani]]
[[Category:Book review]]
[[Category:Books on Family Jurisprudence in Persian]]

Jurisprudence and reason (book)

2025-09-18T08:09:07Z

Mkhaghanif:

{{Author
|author = Alireza Dehqani
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| author = Abulqasem Alidoust
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| main language = persian
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| pages = 236
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* '''abstract'''
The book Jurisprudence and Reason (in persian: [https://ency.feqhemoaser.com/fa/view/%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87_%D9%88_%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%84_(%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8) فقه و عقل]) written by [[Abulqasem Alidoust]], in Persian language, has tried to develop the use of reason in deriving Sharia rulings by presenting the features of reason in understanding Islamic rulings. Unlike some contemporary Usulians, Alidoust has accepted the rule of interdependence between the rule of reason and the rule of Sharia.
According to Alidoust, a professor of Kharij Fiqh and Usul Fiqh in Qom seminary, the reason can recognize the meaning of Sharia rulings by observing the frameworks and rules of conventional seminary ijtihad and also discover the purposes of Sharia by using the Quran and Narration. As a result, it is possible to understand the rulings in a system and body whose components are coordinated with each other. The book seeks to expand the accountability of the Sharia to more diverse issues by promoting the independent position of reason in deriving rulings and rereading it in a coherent system.
According to the book of jurisprudence and reason, although the purposes of the Sharia have a strong role in deriving rulings, in this respect one should use reason in a systematic manner and do such a thing according to the texts expressing the purposes in the book and the Sunnah. In this regard, Alidoust believes that neglecting the purposes of the Sharia in deriving rulings causes fatwas to become illegal.
In the current book, Alidoust emphasizes the necessity of simultaneously paying attention to both independent and non-independent applications of reason in deriving rulings. He also disagrees with following all rulings based on real interests and corruptions, and states that sometimes the enactment of a ruling may not be due to expediency or expediency, and that legislation itself causes the creation of posterior expediency. He also explains in detail the rule reason and the rule of Sharia and points out the opposition of jurists such as Seyyyed [[Abulqasem Khoei]] and [[Sheikh Morteza Ansari]] to this principle. Furthermore, he points to cases of the use of reason in discovering the meaning of rulings by them to show that the mentioned jurists relied on it in practice while theoretically opposed to the inherent rule.
== The Author ==
Abulqasem Alidoust is one of the professors of the Kharij Fiqh (since 2003) and the Usul Fiqh (since 1375) in Qom seminary. Some of his books are as follows: [[Jurisprudence and common sense(book)|jurisprudence and common sense]], [[Jurisprudence and custom(book)|jurisprudence and custom]], [[Jurisprudence and expediency(book) |jurisprudence and expediency]], [[Jurisprudence and contract law(book)|jurisprudence and contract law]], [[General Qur'anic evidence(book)|general Qur'anic evidence]], [[Jurisprudence and contract law: general evidence of narration(book)|jurisprudence and contract law: general evidence of narration]] and Salsabil fi Usul al-Tajzyyah wa Irab(book).
The book of Jurisprudence and Expediency was recognized as the selected work of the Book of the Year Award of the Islamic Republic in 2009. Currently, he is a member of the faculty of the jurisprudence and Law Research Institute of the Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute, the president of the Qom Seminary Islamic Jurisprudence and Law Scientific Association, a member of the Qom Seminary Teachers' Society and the head of the Transfer Sciences Chair of the Secretariat for theorizing, criticizing and debating chairs.
Besides authoring works that show he pays attention to contemporary jurisprudence issues, Alidoust has been teaching political jurisprudence and judicial jurisprudence for about four years, which, despite the importance of both of them in contemporary jurisprudence, are rarely taught in the fields <ref>Biography of Ayatollah Alidoust", Abolqasem Alidoust website.</ref>.

== The Importance of the Book ==
Contrary to the common view among the jurists who practically leave aside the reason in jurisprudence and consider the Qur'an and the Sunnah to be sufficient, the book Jurisprudence and Reason has tried to revive the place of the reason in the contemporary jurisprudence of the Imamiyyah. The author of Jurisprudence and Reason states in his other works that reason, is the most important element in discovering the laws governing human sciences, in addition to being important in jurisprudential inference.
According to him, recognizing the concept and function of reason can help both in the understanding of religious texts and the production of Islamic humanities which is one of the concerns of today's researchers supported by the Islamic Republic <ref>Alidoust, "An approach for the production of Islamic humanities...".</ref>. Accordingly, Alidoust believes that due to we can talk about nuclear jurisprudence, art jurisprudence, security jurisprudence and the like to develop the tools of reason in inference. The current book was taught by one of Alidoust's students named Seyyed Mehdi Mousavi in 43 sessions <ref>Channel of reflections on jurisprudence methodology.</ref>.
== The Framework of the Book ==
In addition to the preface and the introduction, the book of jurisprudence and reason has four chapters and a conclusion, which are as follows:

1. The generalities of reason: In this chapter, the application of the concept of reason in religious sources (Qur'an and narrations) as well as its use in Islamic sciences (words, ethics, logic, philosophy and jurisprudence) are explained. Then the various divisions of reason, including theoretical and practical reason, have been explained. Then, the influence of reason in the understanding of goodness and ugliness have been examined.
2. The independent [[Use of reason in deriving the rulings of Sharia|use of reason in deriving the rulings of Sharia]]: In this chapter, the rule of connection between the ruling of reason and the ruling of Sharia is described in two chapters; In the first chapter, the generality and magnitude of the principle of the rule of law have been proven and the intended meaning of Alidoust has been clarified. On the other hand, in the second chapter, the smallness of the rule has been proposed from two perspectives: one from the perspective of the role of reason in the criteria of Sharia rules, and the second from the perspective of the role of reason in the rules of law and rules of Sharia.
3. Non-independent use of reason: In this chapter, the focus is on the instrumental and non-independent use of reason in three sections: 1. The instrumental use of reason in proving fundamental arguments, interpreting religious evidence, understanding the evidence, forming valid analogies, and examining the documents of narrations, 2. Explaining the application of the clearance and security of reason, and the explanation of the ruling of reason in events without a ruling and unknown events, while discussing the two theories of "Qubhe Iqabe Bela Bayan" and "Haq Al-Ta'a". 3. The uses of reasoning in inference and ijtihad.
4. Pathology and answers to doubts and questions: In this chapter, firstly, the harms of using reason in inference are investigated and then the ways to deal with these harms are stated. Then doubts have been expressed in order to question the validity of the perceptions of reason and rational judgments. After this, the relationship between the rule of reason and the building of reason has been discussed.

5. Conclusion: The mission of the trustees Inference: In this chapter, some points about the necessity of technical and comprehensive ijtihad in the age of absenteeism and avoiding harm have been stated.
== Principles and Assumptions ==

=== The need to pay attention to the red lines of conventional ijtihad ===
According to Alidoust, what is meant by the application of reason or the purposes of the Sharia is not that anyone puts his illusions in the name of the purposes of the Sharia next to the appearances of the book and the Sunnah and puts what he thinks is the spirit of the law and the purposes of the Sharia in the place of the text. Accordingly, the jurist should respect the Qur'anic and narrative texts, use the set of religion and Sharia in their understanding, and after considering the intellectual understanding, turn to infer the verdict (pp. 147-148).
=== Characteristics of appropriate inference ===
Based on the current book, as mentioned in the introduction of it, the appropriate and correct inference is an inference that is adorned with the originality of the sources, comprehensive and disciplined research while being free from harms such as mixing with praise and the material of the message. Also, paying attention to sources of jurisprudence and having consistent principles of ijtihad is a necessary condition for ijtihad (p. 18). Based on this fact, in deriving rulings, the collection of Sharia and its general goals should be considered (p. 158).
=== Application of Sharia collection and its purposes in inference ===
The Jurisprudence and Reason book deals with the application of reason in two separate parts which occupies more than half of the work, in order to specify the independent and non-independent uses of reason in order to develop the use of reason in inference and the ability to solve newly emerging jurisprudential issues.
In another article, Abulqasem Alidoust also valued the possible uses of reason and said that the best use of reason is to discover the meaning of rulings, and the other use is unruly and distasteful expedients, which are called Istislah in Sunnis. According him, although the importance of the purposes of the Sharia in deriving rulings is undeniable, in discovering the purposes of the Sharia and the meaning of the rulings, reason must be used systematically. That is, according to the texts showing the purposes in the books and the Sunnah, he achieved the purposes and evidence <ref>Alidoust, "Capacities of jurisprudence in facing the problems of the contemporary world".</ref>.
=== The Necessity to know the Purposes of Sharia ===
According to the book, it is necessary for the jurist to be familiar with the purposes of the Sharia. Furthermore, the jurist should not ignore the purposes and goals of the Sharia in deriving rulings from the evidence, and examine the evidence by neglecting it. Therefore, ijtihad requires, in addition to prerequisites such as familiarity with Arabic literature, Rijal and Usul, theological prerequisites such as recognizing the truth of man from the perspective of religion, expecting religion from mankind, knowledge of the essence and complex of religion, and awareness of the purpose of the Sharia, and neglecting these matters causes illegalization becomes a fatwa (p. 17).
=== The Results of Paying Attention to the Goals of Sharia ===
In the chapter on the independent use of reason in deriving the rulings of Sharia, the book has provided evidence from Quranic texts and narrations to make it clear how important it is to pay attention to the goals and purposes of Sharia. It includes the following issues.Orphans' property: Abulqasem Alidoust, referring to the revelation of verses 10 of Surah Nisa and 152 of Surah An'am in the prohibition of losing the property of orphans, pointed out the behavior of some Muslims who, after the revelation of these verses, were motivated to escape from the responsibility of taking care of orphans, their food separated from their lives. This caused the revelation of verse 220 of Surah Al-Baqarah, according to which God's will is placed on it to take care of orphans and their property in the best way. Based on this, although God deems it necessary to respect the interests of orphans, this caution should never lead to the weakening of the guardians' motivation. Therefore, the mentioned verses indicate that the Holy Quran has paid attention to both the spirit and the truth of the ruling, that is, the duty of guardianship of orphans, and the collection of Sharia and rulings. According to Alidoust, neglecting the simultaneous observance of the two mentioned aspects can lead to the issuance of strict and burdensome rulings.
=== Classification of Religious Texts ===
In the book, Alidoust has divided religious texts, i.e. the verses of the Qur'an and the traditions of the infallible, into two parts: Shari'a rulings, as well as purposes and wisdom.
Rulings: Texts that express the Shari'a and state the status or obligations.
The general purposes of the Sharia and the wisdom of rulings: texts that do not express the ruling and the law, but rather express the general purposes of the Sharia or the wisdom of rulings. <ref>Alidoust, "Jurisprudence and objectives of Sharia law".</ref>
== Claims and Evidence ==
=== The need to simultaneously pay attention to both applications of reason in inference ===

Based on what is stated in the book of Jurisprudence and Reason, in a general division, the use of reason in deriving the ruling can be divided into two independent and non-independent categories:

* Independent: In this application, reason is an independent source of the Quran and Narration. When reason finds it definitely expedient, it can be considered obligatory by religion, and on the other hand, by recognizing the definite corruption of reason, it can be declared unlawful by religion.

* Non-independent: In this application, the reason is at the service of other sources and is a tool that can be used to deduce the religious ruling from sources such as the Qur'an and Narration. For example, the jurist takes help from his reason when faced with the "leader of prayer" and obtains the sharia obligation of prayer from the appearance of the command form in the obligation and the evidence of appearances (p. 24-25).
*
=== Opposing the obedience of all the rulings of real interests and corruptions ===
According to him, examining the issue of following rulings from the real benefits and corruptions is not so difficult from the point of view of reason. Because the certain reason knows that religion and Sharia have sacred and real goals that can be seen in the form of expediency and corruption. However, before the judgment is assigned to a matter, it is not necessary that there be expediency or corruption in it, because it is possible only There should be an expedient ruling in the legislation (p. 106-107).
=== Reasons and evidence of the rule of compliance with real interests and corruptions ===
In his book Jurisprudence and Reason, Alidoust has stated some of the Qur'anic verses and the traditions of the innocents in the direction of following the rulings from the real interests and corruptions. He has also stated evidence against it. Among these, according to the Holy Qur'an, the law of prayer is based on a real expediency and in the direction of preventing them from doing ugly and obscene things, on the one hand. In the Holy Qur'an, the reason for banning certain foods on the Jews was to punish them for their obscene deeds, not because there has been corruption in eating those foods, on the other hand. He also referred to a tradition of Imam Sadiq (PBUH), according to which whatever God has forbidden or commanded has a divine test (p. 108-111).
=== Explaining the meaning of obeying the rules of benefits and corruptions ===
After mentioning some problems with the famous theory of justice about expediency and expediency, Abulqasem Alidoust states that the rule of following rulings from expediency and expediency is not a well-known and accepted rule among late Shia fundamentalists. According to what is stated in the book of jurisprudence and reason, it is difficult to accept the following of rulings from the interests and corruptions of the past, and as a result, it should be said that rulings are sometimes due to expediency and corruption existing in the ruling, and sometimes due to the expediency hidden in the legislation and its implementation and it is obligatory (p. 118).
=== The concept and arguments rule of correlation between reason and law ===
The present book considers the rule of correlation between reason and law to be provable by rational and narrative reasons. In the chapter related to the rule of correlation between reason and law, first of all, it defines the concept of this rule by explaining each of the terms, including ruling, rule of reason, and correlation between reason and law. Then, he examines the reasons that prove this rule. According to Alidoust, regarding the rule "All of us are ruled by the Sharia, the rule is by the reason" (whenever the Sharia rules on a subject, the reason also rules on it), it should be said that the reason is general, according to the understanding of the Sharia. He acknowledges the Shari’a rulings and issues judgments about them, but it is not the case that reason understands all the Shari’a rulings without paying attention to his words and rules accordingly (p. 119).
In order to strengthen his opinion, the book of jurisprudence and reason also states and answers the problems of the rule of correlation between reason and law. Among other things, by referring to the verse " And We will not punish until We send a messenger " (Isra', 15), he clarifies that contrary to the opinion of the claimants, this verse does not imply the negation of the rule. The claimants believe that the negation of punishment in the verse was stated after the sending of the prophets, and thus there is no room left for the understanding of reason. Alidoust believes that if a messenger was sent and used reason as a proof, and then someone opposed the verdict of reason, this the chastisement is after the sending of the messenger and therefore does not contradict the verse (p. 81).
=== Reasons and evidence ===
According to Alidoust, if we don't accept the rule of correlation between reason and law, the shari'a obligation of justice and the shari'a sanctity of injustice are not proven by understanding the goodness of justice and the ugliness of injustice by reason (p. 70). He also relies on the fact that "Alaf and Lam" in "Al-Aql" are "Alaf and Lam" of the genus, he believes that this rule includes the reason of everyone and it cannot be considered specific to the reason of some reasons or properties such as prophets and saints. (p. 71).
Abulqasem Alidoust then proved the rule of correlation between reason and law by relying on rational and narrative reasons. In the chapter on rational reason, he has stated that when the theoretical reason finds the connection between two matters such as the necessity of the preamble and the preamble to be correct and real, and finds an end to it, he considers the connection to be inevitable and believes that every wise legislator should distinguish between these two. (pp. 94-95)
In addition, according to the book, it is possible to use the reason of narration for the benefit of the rule of correlation between reason and law. Referring to religious texts and its incomplete induction leaves no doubt that the understanding of reason is proof. It is also proved by the implication of obligation, the connection between its understanding and the ruling of Shari’a. To strengthen his opinion, the book mentions three narrations as examples. Alidoust has also presented three narrations, based on which, the connection between the rule of reason and Sharia is proved by means of conformity and commitment (pp. 96-97).
=== Confusion in the words of opposing jurists ===
After explaining the major premise of the rule of correlation between reason and law, the book goes to the minor premise of rule of correlation between reason and law to clarify to what extent the reason can discover the meaning and reason of the rulings of Sharia. Alidoust mentions some examples of the fundamentalists who deny the principle of rule of correlation between reason and law to show that the opponents of the rule of rule of correlation between reason and law who believe that reason is absolutely unable to understand the meaning of rulings, have not fully adhered to this opinion. Finally, he concluded that the practice of jurists shows that, in short, reason is the source that they have made an inference. This means that the jurist has reached the criteria of the religious ruling with his reason and then derives the ruling (pp. 125-127); Some of these jurists are:
# In some cases, Seyyed Abulqasem Khoei considers it probable that the reason reaches the rulings and sometimes gives fatwas with trust in the reason. For example, regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of delaying the expiation of fasting, the delay is not permissible, unless he is sure that he will be able to perform it in the future. Then he considers reason as the only source of this ruling.
# Sheikh Ansari sometimes relied solely on reason in deriving the religious ruling. For example, when he wants to prove the permissibility of dealing with property that the owner did not allow, he considers small possessions of property belonging to others to be permissible as a definite ruling of reason.
== Pathology of inference using reason ==
In the fourth and last part of the book, together with the conclusion, it mentions the source of the harms in inference and then the harms of referring to reason and its application in the inference of Sharia rulings. It has been clarified that this process may cause abuse by the enemies of Sharia in the contemporary world and this illusion It showed that the Shari’a was limited to a certain time and place, and as a result, in the present era, the thoughts that fit the conditions of the new age should be replaced with the Sharia. In this regard, while paying attention to the origin of the harms related to the use of reason in inference, Alidoust has also listed examples of these harms.
=== The origin of harms in inference ===
The origin of the harm related to the use of reason in inference is divided into two categories; 1. unnecessary stagnation on words, and 2. Intellectualism and lack of devotion (pp. 226-227).
=== Harms of using reason in deriving rulings ===
In this context, the book mentions three harms that jurists should avoid:
Unreliable suspicion and Istihsan: The book of Jurisprudence and Reason considers approval to be the imposition of personal tastes in the name of reason and on the enemies of reason which should be avoided. For example, some researchers have been criticized for considering that the child is directly related to the mother and indirectly to the grandfather, and that the guardianship of the child after the death of the father is with the mother (p. 189).
Improper use of reason: To distinguish the subjects of rulings such as water and blood or instances of subjects such as absolute and added water, one must refer to custom, not reason (p. 190). Because there is a strong possibility that reason will make mistakes in recognizing things that are common in nature.
The mistake of the wisdom of the ruling with the subject of the ruling: According to Alidoust, every ruling has a subject on which the ruling is made, and it has a wisdom that is assigned to that subject because of that ruling. For example, prayer is the subject of the ruling on the obligation of prayer, and its wisdom is to prevent fornication and malevolence. Therefore, it is not possible to cancel the nature of the obligation of prayer and consider any act that prohibits fornication and malevolence as obligatory (pp. 191-192).
== refrences ==
# Alidoust, Abulqasem, "Jurisprudence capacities in a dream with contemporary world issues", Abolqasem Alidoust website, date of entry: August 7, 2016, visited date: December 2, 2021.
# Alidoust, Abulqasem, "An approach for the production of Islamic humanities in the context of the interaction of jurisprudence with customs, reason and expediency", Abolqasem Alidoust website, November 12, 2018, December 2, 2021.
# Alidoust, Abolqasem, juriprudence and reason, 9th edition, Tehran, Islamic Culture and Thought Research Organization, 2016
== footnotes ==
[[fa:فقه و عقل (کتاب)]]
[[category:Books on the Philosophy of IslamicJurisprudence]]
[[category:Books on the Foundations of Contemporary IslamicJurisprudence]]
[[category:books of Abulqasim Alidust]]
[[category:book review]]

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Category:Articles by authors

2025-06-24T05:08:44Z

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A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience (Book)

2025-06-24T05:07:52Z

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* abstract
The book titled '''"A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience," (in persian: بررسی فقهی فرمانبرداری و نافرمانی مدنی)''' written by Seyyed Javad Varaʿī, explores the topic of civil disobedience within the context of Islamic society over ten chapters. The author, while defining civil disobedience and resistance, attempts to clarify its distinction from rebellion, combat and corruption on earth. He acknowledges the right to civil disobedience in legitimate religious governments and insists that rulers must respect the rights of disobedient citizens. On the other hand, he establishes certain conditions and limitations for disobedience to clearly delineate it from rebellion, combat and corruption, ensuring that no citizens' rights are violated. He also considers civil disobedience permissible as long as it does not disrupt social order, harm others or weaken the Islamic government.
At times, the author interprets religious narratives broadly to support his claims. He also occasionally relies solely on the practices of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) or Imam Ali (AS) as evidence, which may be insufficient for substantiating his arguments. Nonetheless, this book is seen as a suitable step toward the development of Shia political jurisprudence, emphasizing citizens’ rights.
==Overview of the Book==
The book "A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience" by Seyyed Javad Varaʿī is categorized under political and social jurisprudence and is published in collaboration with Samt Publications and the Research Institute of Islamic Studies and University. The author's main aim is to clarify the boundaries of citizens' rights and rulers' rights, ensuring that rulers cannot punish critics under the pretexts of "rebellion”, "combat”, or "corruption," while critics also acknowledge their limits and do not disrupt social order with every protest.
===Structure of the Book===
The book has a research-oriented structure, organized into ten chapters aside from the introduction. In the introduction, the author outlines the main question and sub-questions, along with the methodology and background of the research. The first chapter addresses concepts and general themes, explaining terms such as obedience, civil disobedience, civil resistance, revolution, uprising, rebellion, combat, legitimate government, and illegitimate government. To clarify the research topic further, the author delves into the jurisprudential discussions of "rebellion" and "combat," and specifies the criteria for each. He also clarifies the meanings of legitimate and illegitimate governments at the chapter's conclusion.
In the subsequent chapters, the author discusses the foundations of obedience, the philosophy of the right to disobedience, the scope of obedience and disobedience, exceptions to the permissibility of disobedience, the duties of governments regarding civil disobedience, and the criteria for determining the legitimacy and illegitimacy of disobedience.
===About the Author===
Seyyed Javad Varaʿī, known as Seyyed Javad Varaʿī (born 1963), is a professor at the advanced levels and a researcher at the Qom Seminary. His focus is primarily on political and social jurisprudence. He has published numerous articles, several of which can be found on the Comprehensive Portal of Humanities and the Noor Specialized Journals website. His personal website also showcases his authored books.
Varaʿī served as the editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal "Islamic Government" for four years and has long been associated with the Qom Seminary page of the Islamic Republic newspaper. Many of his research works are in collaboration with the Research Institute of Islamic Studies and University, the Assembly of Experts Secretariat, and the Hajj Research Center. Titles of some of his books include "Rights and Duties of Citizens and Officials," "Imam Khomeini and the Revival of Religious Thought," "Research on Naini's Political Thought," and "Citizens' Rights in Islamic Thought."
===Published Critiques===
A critique and discussion session regarding the book "A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience" was held on December 2, 2016. A detailed report of this session, titled "A Look and Critique of the Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience," was published in the third issue of the "Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies" quarterly. You can read the report [here].
Additionally, in March 2017, a debate titled "The Right to Criticism in Islamic Government" took place at the Research Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies. In this session, Mohammad Hassan Ziaei Far and Ali Mohammadi Jorokouyeh spoke about the issue of criticism in Islamic government, particularly in relation to the book "A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience." Varaʿī responded to questions and criticisms raised. You can read the report of this session [here].
An article titled "Legitimate Rebellion," written by Mohammad Kazem Haqani Fazl, presents a critical perspective on this book and was published in the seventh issue of the "Book Critique on Jurisprudence and Law" quarterly. You can read the article [here].
==Content of the Book==
The book "A Jurisprudential Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience" is divided into an introduction and ten chapters. In the introduction, the author discusses background, methodology, sources and topics of discussion. The first chapter is dedicated to general concepts and definitions, while the tenth chapter summarizes and concludes the findings.
===Foundations of Obedience and Philosophy of the Right to Disobedience===
In the second chapter, titled "Foundations of Obedience," the author presents five views: social contract, public consent, general will, justice, and the will of the Creator of humanity as foundations for obedience. Since his preferred theory is the latter, he explains its rational and textual reasons. Chapter three, titled "Philosophy of the Right to Resist and Civil Disobedience," logically continues from the second chapter, where the author explains the right to disobedience of citizens based on each of the aforementioned foundations.
===Scope of Obedience and Civil Disobedience===
The scope of obedience and civil disobedience is the title of chapter four. The author defines crime and sin, proposing four hypotheses: the synonymy of crime and sin, the generality of sin over crime, the generality of crime over sin and the relation of generality and specificity between crime and sin, ultimately accepting the last hypothesis. He elaborates on this assumption by offering a comprehensive discussion of six jurisprudential theories regarding the necessity of punishment for the sinner, while presenting and critiquing five theories along with their reasons. He then seeks to answer the question: Is every crime a sin and subject to punishment? In this context, he first discusses three theories regarding the nature of governmental decrees and state laws, and in the following discussion, he critiques and evaluates these theories with supporting evidence. The three theories are drawn from the works of Imam Khomeini (d. 1989), Allameh Tabatabai (d. 1981), and Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani. In this argument, the author refers to four categories of Qur'anic verses and six categories of narrations, including the acceptance of Umar ibn Hanzalah and Imam Ali’s (AS) letter to Malik Ashtar.
===Resistance and Disobedience in Legitimate and Illegitimate Governments===
In chapters five and six, the author examines resistance and disobedience in both legitimate and illegitimate governments. Varaʿī points out that the legitimacy of governments can be assessed based on both governance methods and the character of the ruler. In this book, the criterion for classification pertains to the ruler's character. Illegitimate governance is further divided into just and unjust. The author questions the permissibility of civil disobedience against the just laws of an illegitimate government (p. 147), although in subsequent lines, he confirms the right to disobedience in efforts to dismantle illegitimate authority (p. 149). He then supports the justification for disobedience against unjust rulers' decisions with five categories of Qur'anic verses and the practices and traditions of the infallibles (AS) during periods of unjust rule. He cites instances of Ali ibn Abi Talib's (AS) opposition to the decisions of the caliphs, particularly the third caliph, as well as the objections from individuals such as Abu Dharr, Miqdad, Ammar, and Malik Ashtar, which were validated by the silence of the infallibles.
===The Duties of Governments, the Authority of Determination, and Exceptions to Disobedience===
In the seventh chapter of the book, the author discusses the question of what instances of disobedience are considered unjust. In the eighth chapter, the reactions of the government to civil disobedience are examined, outlining the government's responsibilities in the following order: investigating the claims of the disobedient, persuading them, moderation and exposure, referring to the arbitration of legal institutions, and finally, executing social sanctions commensurate with unjust disobediences. Finally, the ninth chapter of the book focuses on determining the authority to identify permissible acts of disobedience. The author explores two possibilities: first, the public, similar to cases of enjoining good and forbidding wrong, and second, independent institutions within the governance.
==Claims==
===Conceptualization and Delimitation with Other Related Concepts===
According to Varaʿī, civil disobedience is characterized by three features: non-violence, accountability and limitation (p. 10). It is defined as: "The refusal to comply with unjust laws, regulations, policies, or decisions of a government that contradict Sharia, with the aim of annulment or amendment, without violating the principle of sovereignty; provided that critique, criticism, and legal protests have not yielded results" (p. 10). The distinction between disobedience and civil resistance lies in the fact that civil resistance does not involve active steps, while disobedience involves action (p. 11).
The author argues that if the criterion for the realization of rebellion (baghi/ بغی) is solely overthrowing, rather than resorting to arms, then those who aim to overthrow through cultural tools such as media should also be considered "rebellious" (p. 19). However, the means for dealing with them should be confined to those same cultural tools.
The author claims that if the number of people intending to overthrow the government is not substantial enough to necessitate war and combat, these individuals are either brigands or equivalent to brigands (p. 19).
The writer excludes customary regulations of governments, such as municipal laws, from the discussion of civil disobedience (p. 130). However, it should be noted that many urban laws ultimately lead to the appropriation of people's property and lives, which are all condemned by religious rulings. The author overlooks this premise and merely emphasizes that if these laws lead to injustice, the subject of disobedience is also realized.
===The Relationship between Sin and Crime===
Varaʿī believes that not every sin qualifies as a crime in legal terms and does not entail punishment; nevertheless, some sins that do not fall under Sharia penalization may still deserve punishment due to their public nature (p. 64). On the other hand, obedience to a non-infallible ruler does not carry a religious ruling; therefore, disobeying their orders, although it may be a crime, is not necessarily a sin and does not incur punishment (p. 91). Thus, civil disobedience within the realm of customary laws is religiously permissible, but it is not allowed under Sharia laws.
===Disobedience under the Leadership of the Infallibles===
Disobedience in the government of the infallibles is not permitted. However, not all forms of disobedience necessarily carry the ruling of rebellion or armed conflict. Nonetheless, in the government of infallibles, the officials are not infallible and do not have the ruling of the infallible. Therefore, in cases of laws that contradict Sharia, those against public interest and justice, as well as when officials act contrary to the law, disobedience is permissible (p. 109).
===The Principle of Permissibility of Disobedience===
The principle holds that civil disobedience is permissible unless disobedience leads to one of three categories: disruption of social order, weakening the Islamic government, or causing harm to others. Consequently, in doubtful situations, the permissibility of disobedience remains unchanged (p. 199). However, civil disobedience is allowed only when all legal avenues for the enforcement of the rights of the disobedient and the annulment of laws that contradict Sharia and justice have been exhausted (p. 201).
In cases where there might be a dispute about the permissibility or otherwise of a specific act of disobedience, the author first suggests two options: the general public and independent institutions within the governance. However, he ultimately asserts that if legal institutions are unable to resolve the issue, the determination authority still lies with the general or specific customs, and it is up to the people themselves to decide whether the disobedience is permissible (p. 129).
==Foundations, Reasons and their Investigation==
===The Method of Usuli Ijtihad and Use of Rational and Transmitted Evidence===
The author's basis for accepting the right to civil disobedience is the will of the Creator of humanity. According to the author's accepted theory, if a government deviates from a specific divine framework, the right to civil disobedience is established for everyone (p. 39).
The most significant rational proof for the permissibility of disobedience is the precedence of God's command when there is a conflict between God's command and that of the ruler (p. 111). The most important transmitted evidence consists of a set of verses that consider obedience to beings other than God as secondary to obedience to God, as well as a collection of narrations with the common theme that "there is no obedience to a created being in disobeying the Creator." Additionally, the author refers to two groups of evidence to substantiate his claim: the evidence for the obligation to enjoin good and the evidence for the permissibility of violating the ruler's command (pp. 114-140).
The author's primary basis for the non-permissibility of disobedience in the government of the infallible is a collection of verses from the Qur'an and hadiths that explicitly state the necessity of obeying the Prophet (PBUH) and the prohibition of disobedience towards him (pp. 98-108).
In sections such as the necessity of convincing the protesters, the author's arguments primarily rely on the practical conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) and the Commander of the Faithful (AS). It seems that given the minimal implications of conduct, it is not possible to derive a binding conclusion for other rulers from the conduct of the Ahlul Bayt (AS). This is because we know that conduct, especially in cases where there is no repeated action, cannot establish a binding ruling. From the behavior of the infallible, at most, one can conclude the permissibility of an act, and proving the obligation or even the preferred nature of an act based solely on the conduct of the infallibles requires additional indicators, which the author does not provide in this section.
Proving permissibility is also based on the understanding that this behavior is not exclusive to the Prophet or the Imam. It appears the book's author has taken for granted that there is no difference between the governmental authorities of the infallible and other rulers, but this claim itself requires proof. Although even under this assumption, proving the ruler's obligation to persuade the protesters lacks evidence.
===Expansion of the Implications of the Qur'anic Verses===
The author's method in this section assumes that the qualities mentioned in the verses have a causal aspect for obedience, and as a result, he extracts a general ruling from them, determining that all mentioned verses include governmental rulings and social laws. On the other hand, he considers a contrary concept for the verses. Consequently, he infers from the expression "Follow the path of whoever turns back to Me" in Surah Luqman that if the ruler establishes a law contrary to Sharia or does not act according to Sharia, there is no obligation to obey (p. 118). The permissibility of disobedience in the first case is clear, but in the second case, where the ruler's behavior is merely contrary to Sharia, this verse cannot be cited as evidence. This is because the ruler's behavior is distinct from his commands and prohibitions.
In the section on transmitted evidence for the permissibility of disobedience, one of the verses cited by the author is verses 107-108 of Surah Al-Shu'ara (p. 117), which state: “Indeed, I am a trustworthy messenger for you. So fear Allah and obey me.” The author interprets obedience in this verse as obedience in social and governmental matters, and he considers trustworthiness to be a quality that makes obedience necessary. However, it is not clear that the obedience referred to in this verse is specifically about governmental matters. It can be argued that the Prophet in this verse is emphasizing his trustworthiness in receiving and preserving revelation, essentially stating that what he conveys is not from himself. It remains uncertain whether from trustworthiness in revelation, which is a specific subject, we can conclude that revelation is not essential and that trustworthiness in other matters is also a criterion for obedience. Extending a specific ruling to a general one requires clearer evidence.
The author concludes from verse 24 of Surah Al-Insan (“And be patient for the judgment of your Lord and do not obey the disbeliever or the sinner”) that non-obedience to a sinful and ungrateful person is relevant and unlikely to be specific to the Prophet. The question arises: if the opposing individuals were not sinful or ungrateful, could the Prophet have obeyed them? The main point of critique lies in the analytical method employed, which disregards all cues and the context of issuance or revelation, considering only the qualities mentioned in the text as conditions and then deriving implications from those conditions. This approach is not defensible. Furthermore, the interpretation of generality and absoluteness is based on preliminary assumptions that the author has not at least articulated.
===Broader Interpretations of Narrations===
From Imam Ali's (AS) letter to the people of Basra, it has been concluded that if a ruler issues a command contrary to Islamic law, the people have the right to remove him. The author's reference is that the Imam said to report to him so he could remove that ruler (p. 124). The question here is whether, if the Divine Law granted a right to the ruler, the people also possess that right. Additionally, if that ruler were infallible, would this right still extend to other rulers and, subsequently, to the general populace? In reality, the author has once again extrapolated a specific ruling, which could potentially be understood as particular, to a general case. For instance, he has applied the Sahihah of Safwan, which pertains to social relations among individuals, to relationships between rulers and the public (p. 127).
In a footnote, the author cites narrations indicating that some decisions made by infallible rulers are subject to error (pp. 107-108); however, he later reasons that, since there is no potential for error in the rulings of the infallibles, disobedience in these cases is also impermissible. The author does not seem to recognize that the narrated texts explicitly affirm the occurrence of errors; thus, the maximum that can be accepted is the possibility of lacking error in such cases.
Under the discussion of enjoining good and forbidding evil, the objective of forbidding evil has been defined as changing the behavior of culpable officials (p. 136). It appears that the goal of forbidding evil is not solely to change individuals but, primarily, to change unlawful laws and, at a higher level, to alter the practices of officials. If an individual is unwilling to change their practices, they should be dismissed.
===Lack of Discussion on Authenticity===
In referencing narrations, discussions regarding their authenticity are usually absent. While establishing the issuance of narrations is one of the cornerstones of citing them, the author neglects this discussion. For instance, this can be seen in the reference to the words of Amir al-Mu'minin (AS) on page 120.
The author has cited a number of Sunni narrations from Allameh Amini's book "Al-Ghadir," which is not defensible for a study of this level (p. 148). Hadith should be referenced from primary sources.
The author, at one point, attributes an objection to the third caliph regarding the consumption of game meat while in a state of ihram to Imam Ali (AS) (p. 160), and at another, he attributes it to Zubair (p. 162), citing each to a part of Allameh Amini's book "Al-Ghadir." However, this incident appears once in "Al-Ghadir," and it is narrated from Zubair.<ref>Amini, Al-Ghadir, Vol. 8, p. 270.</ref>
Furthermore, in critiquing the Sunni theory of obedience to the ruler, the author solely mentions the issue of fabricated hadiths and, through the citation of two hadiths, declares them fabricated without providing any supporting evidence. Meanwhile, there are also figures in Sunni Islam who advocate for the dismissal or separation from a ruler in the case of their corruption. Moreover, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni believes in rising up and armed conflict against a corrupt ruler.<ref> Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, Vol. 5, p. 245.</ref> On the other hand, individuals like Nawawi, the commentator of Sahih Muslim, attribute the non-permissibility of revolt to the occurrence of discord within society.<ref>See: Nawawi, Sharh Sahih al-Muslim, Vol. 12, pp. 229–231.</ref>
===With Viewing Legitimacy and Effectiveness===
The unwritten premise of the book is that in a legitimate government, as long as the government fulfills its religious duties, it will be effective and citizens will receive their rights. However, we know that scholars have different interpretations and understandings, and the implementation of each scholar's opinions, as law in society will yield different results. This raises the question: if rulers act according to their understanding of the Sharia, but in practice, the government is ineffective, what is the position regarding citizens' right to disobedience?
According to Sayyid Javad Vaei, an illegitimate government cannot have laws, regulations, policies or decisions that align with truth and justice. His reasoning is that such a government overlooks God's rights and the people's rights in determining their fate (p. 148). This argument is incomplete because an illegitimate ruler may have come to power with the support of the people, even if they are not authorized by God. Furthermore, there is no inherent connection between illegitimacy and ineffectiveness.
The author connects all applications of divinity in the verses of the Quran to divinity itself and categorizes any obedience to individuals under the title of sovereignty. From here, he relates the concept of divinity to the discussion of civil disobedience (pp. 149-152). Such an analysis of concepts is unconvincing, as it is not the case that every instance of lordship in the verses of the Quran and hadiths refers to political and social sovereignty. The fact that the People of the Book have made their rabbis and monks their lords, as the narration of Imam Sadiq (AS) also indicates (p. 151), does not necessarily align with political obedience and may include personal legal matters of prohibited and permitted.
===Ambiguity in Exceptions to the Right of Disobedience===
Disruption of the system is one of the cases that negates the right to disobedience. However, on the other hand, justice precedes the preservation of the system. For this reason, the author finds it necessary that sometimes the social order should be disrupted to achieve justice. He cites examples like the uprising of Imam Hussein (AS) to support this claim (p. 186). The ambiguous concept of system disruption complicates the author's assertion. It seems that the author has considered any kind of disorder as system disruption. However, it appears that system disruption is a more complex issue than mere disorder, and the event of Ashura or even the occurrence of war does not equate to system disruption. Perhaps the months of conflict leading to the victory of the Islamic Revolution could be an example of system disruption.
The author also fails to address the question of what should be done if protests and disobedience weaken sovereignty while the lack of protest solidifies tyranny. In fact, if maintaining sovereignty is accompanied by ongoing flaws and corruptions, which should take precedence?
===Strengthening the State's Position in Controlling Disobedience===
In Chapter Eight, the author assigns the responsibility of addressing disobedience claims to the state and overlooks civil institutions as well as international entities. It seems the author believes that either individuals must express their opinions or governmental institutions must do so, with no other assumption possible. The issue that complicates this section is the ambiguity in the concept of the state and the lack of clarity regarding the subject of hypothetical disobedience. It is not clear whether the state refers to the entire ruling system or just the government in the sense of the executive branch. Because if disobedience is against the executive branch, according to the theory of separation of powers, this duty could be assigned to other branches. However, if the intention is the entire sovereignty, it is unclear why the ruler should comment on the disobedient behavior of the people.
==refrences==
* Amini, Abdol Hossein, Al-Ghadir in Literature, Books, and Tradition, Qom, Al-Ghadir Center for Islamic Studies, 1416 AH.
* Taftazani, Sa'ad al-Din, Sharh al-Maqasid, edited by Abdul Rahman Amira, Beirut, Alim al-Kutub, 1409 AH.
* Nawawi, Yahya ibn Sharaf, Sharh Sahih al-Muslim, Dar al-Qalam, Beirut, n.d.
* Varaei, Sayyid Javad, A Juridical Study of Obedience and Civil Disobedience, Tehran, Samt Publications, 2015 SH
==footnotes==
[[fa:بررسی فقهی فرمانبرداری و نافرمانی مدنی (کتاب)]]
[[category: books on political jurisprudence]]
[[category: book review]]

Sculpture

2025-04-20T13:43:53Z

Mkhaghanif: /* FootnotesSmall text */

Author: Hamza Ahmadi
* '''digest'''
'''Sculpture''' has become a prominent topic in contemporary jurisprudence, gaining more attention due to the increasing use of sculptures and statues, leading to the emergence of new issues. Most Shi’a and Sunni jurists consensually consider the creation of sculptures depicting living beings, such as humans and animals, as prohibited (haram) based on narrations. However, the construction of sculptures depicting non-living entities has not received significant attention.
Some jurists, however, reject the absolute prohibition of crafting sculptures of living beings. They base their argument on criteria derived from narrations, deeming the prohibition applicable only to cases involving [practices] misleading from the path of God, idolatry, resembling the actions of the Creator, or imitating polytheists.
Exceptions to the prohibition of crafting sculptures of living beings include making incomplete or partial sculptures, as per the fatwa of S[[Ayyid Abolqasem Khoei|ayyid Abolqasem Khoei]], creating sculptures using machinery, according to the fatwa of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini]], and creating sculptures for medical education, as suggested by [[Naser Makarem Shirazi]]. In Shi’a jurisprudential works, there is no distinct section dedicated to sculpture, but relevant discussions are intertwined within chapters on prayer and trade. However, there are independent works dedicated to this subject.

== Exposition of the Issue ==
Sculpture is one of the significant and challenging contemporary jurisprudential issues<ref>1. Montazeri, Darasat Fi al-Makasib al-Muharammah, Vol. 2, p. 542.</ref>, alongside painting, and is addressed under the categories of “image,” “form,” and “statue” in Shi’a and Sunni narrative sources<ref>2. For example, see Hur Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, pp. 174-176; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad, Vol. 4, p. 65; Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 3, p. 136.</ref>. Some Shi’a jurists have emphasized the importance of sculpture in their works and have advocated for addressing its legal rulings. For instance, Makarem Shirazi highlights the use of sculpture in commemorating national<ref>Makarem Shirazi, Istifta’at -Jadid, Vol. 2, p. 239.</ref>, religious, and cultural figures in Islamic societies. Similarly, [[Mohammad Javad Fazel Lankarani]] sees sculpture as a tool for expressing truths and societal issues, which can be used to promote religious concepts and counter anti-religious propaganda. He also deems sculpture and related matters as necessities of human life<ref>Fazel Lankarani, Mouzu’at wa Melakat dar Fiqh Honar, p. 27.</ref>. Considering the circumstances of the time, the needs, and the necessities of the Islamic community, he sees it necessary for jurists to pay attention to these matters when deducing legal rulings<ref>Fazel Lankarani, Mouzu’at wa Melakat dar Fiqh Honar, p. 27.</ref>.
According to Makarem Shirazi, computerized robots and dolls also fall under the category of sculpture<ref>Makarem Shirazi, Istifta’at -Jadid, Vol. 3, p. 168.</ref>. [[Mohammad Eshaq Fayaz]] regards the creation of sculptures of humans and their body parts as a tool for educating medical students, replacing the need for human dissection<ref>Faiyyaz, Istifta’at al-Shar'iyah, Vol. 1, p. 109.</ref>.
According to [[Alireza A'rafi]], the discussion on the prohibition and legal rulings related to sculpture was first introduced by Sheikh Mufid in the discourse of the jurists<ref>Abidinzadeh,Mujassameh wa Naqqashi: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Ayatollah A’arafi, p. 24.</ref>. There is no independent section dedicated to sculpture in Shi’a jurisprudential sources; rather, its legal rulings are discussed within chapters on purity (rulings related to ritual ablution)<ref>Naraghi, Mustanad al-Shi'a, Vol. 2, p. 180.</ref>, prayer (clothing and location of prayer and rulings for mosques)<ref>Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, Vol. 8, p. 383.</ref>, and trade (impermissible trades)<ref>Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 218.</ref>. However, Sheikh Ansari, in his book “Kitab al-Makasib,” allocates a section to examining the juristic rulings of sculpture and the rulings related to earning income through it, under the general title “Inherently forbidden sources of income.”<ref>12. Sheikh Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, Vol. 1, p. 183.</ref> The discussion on the juristic rulings of sculpture has made its way into the discourse of contemporary jurists through the teaching of this book and the commentaries written on it<ref>13. For example, see Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fiqhaheh: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Ayatollah Khoei, Vol. 1, p. 353; Khomeini, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Vol. 1, p. 168; Montazeri, Darasat Fi al-Makasib al-Muharammah, Vol. 2, p. 541.</ref>.
=== Jurisprudential Discussions Focused on Sculptures of Living Beings ===
Jurists have separated the jurisprudential rulings on crafting sculptures of living beings from non-living ones and have primarily focused their discussion and jurisprudential examination on sculptures of living beings, while sidelining the issue of crafting sculptures of non-living beings. While most jurists have considered creating sculptures of non-living entities permissible, Sheikh Ansari believes that if the sculpture of non-living entities evokes admiration and impresses the viewer, creating such sculptures is problematic<ref>14. Sheikh Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, Vol. 1, p. 188.</ref>.
Additionally, Ja’far Sobhani asserts that the statements of Abul Salah Halabi<ref>15. Halabi, Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, p. 281.</ref> and Ibn Barraj<ref>16. Ibn Barraj, Al-Muhadhab, Vol. 1, p. 344.</ref>, regarding the impermissibility of creating sculptures apply even to sculptures of non-living beings<ref>17. Ya'qoubi Isfahani, Al-Mawahib fi Tahreer Maksab al-Muharramah, p. 377.</ref>.
== Fatwas and Reasons for Prohibition and its Exceptions ==
According to Sheikh Ansari, the prohibition of crafting sculptures of living beings is generally accepted among Shi’a jurists<ref>18. Sheikh Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, Vol. 14, p. 183.</ref>, a view also embraced by Sunni scholars, as stated by Sayyid Abolqasem Khoei<ref> Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fiqhaheh, Vol. 1, p. 353.</ref>. Among contemporaries, jurists such as Sayyid Abolqasem Khoei<ref>20. Khoei, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 262.</ref>, [[Sayyid Ali Sistani]]<ref>21. Sistani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 423.</ref>, Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini<ref>22. Khomeini, Tahreer al-Wasilah, Vol. 1, p. 472.</ref>, Mohammad Ishaq Fayaz<ref>23. Faiyyaz, Al-Istifta'at al-Shar'iyyah, Vol. 2, p. 13.</ref>, [[Sayyid Mousa Shobeiri Zanjani]]<ref>24. Shobeiri Zanjani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 80.</ref>, Naser Makarem Shirazi<ref>25. Makarem Shirazi, Istifta'at Jadid, Vol. 1, p. 158.</ref>, and Lutfullah Safi Golpayegani<ref>26. Safi Golpaygani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 409.</ref> have all deemed crafting sculptures of living beings, such as humans and animals, as prohibited.
=== Evidence of Prohibition ===
Those jurists who advocate for the prohibition of crafting sculptures of living beings have focused solely on the matters mentioned in the textual evidence (Qur’an, narrations, and traditions), considering them the subject of the ruling and regarding them as what God intended. Most jurists who approve of sculpture creation do not consider these matters as independent but rather take into consideration broader concepts like “[practices] misleading from the path of God,” and criteria such as “idolatry,” “mimicking the Creator,” or “imitating polytheists” and have permitted creation of sculptures in the absence of these specific concepts and criteria. Accordingly, jurists have relied on narrative reasoning, namely narrations, and rational reasoning, like consensus [among jurists], to deduce the legal ruling on sculpture.
==== Narrations ====
The most important reason that jurists have relied on to examine the ruling of sculpting is narrations<ref> Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, Vol. 22, p. 41.</ref>. Sayyid Abulqasim Khoei considers narrations from both Sunni and Shia sources regarding the prohibition of sculpture living beings as beneficial<ref>28. Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fuqaheh, Vol. 1, p. 359.</ref>, meanwhile Seyyed Mohammad Sadeq Rohani has categorized such narrations into four main groups:
1. Narrations indicating an absolute prohibition of images, whether sculptures or paintings, and whether representing living or non-living beings. For example, a narration by from Imam Sadiq (AS) narrated by Muhammad ibn Muslim explicitly forbids all forms of image-making (sculpture and painting)<ref>29. Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 218; Nuri, Mustadrak al-Wasail, Vol. 13, p. 210.</ref>.
2. Narrations specifically prohibiting the creation of sculptures, regardless of whether they represent living or non-living entities<ref> Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 218.</ref>.
3. Narrations only prohibiting the depiction of living beings, regardless of whether they are sculptures or not. For instance, a narration from Sheikh Saduq attributed to Imam Sadiq (AS) where the Prophet (PBUH) prohibited both sculpting and painting animals on rings<ref>Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 221; Hur Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 297.</ref>.
4. Narrations exclusively emphasizing the prohibition of crafting sculptures of living beings. An example is an authentic narration from Imam Sadiq (AS), allowing the creation of images or sculptures only for non-living entities like trees, the sun, the moon, and similar objects<ref>Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 221; Hur Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 296.</ref>.
In the same vein, Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini has enumerated another category of narrations. Given the necessity of observing the proportionality of the legal ruling to the subject, he asserts that prohibitions on sculptures or statues apply only to cases where they are used for worship<ref>33. Khomeini, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Vol. 1, p. 169.</ref>. For instance, narrations that label sculpting as one of the heinous acts, mention severe punishments for the perpetrator<ref>34. Nouri, Mustadrak al-Wasail, Vol. 13, p. 210.</ref>. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, the promised punishments in these narrations are so severe that they do not align with merely sculpting or painting. Sculpting, in terms of the intensity of its reprehensibility, is not higher than major sins such as unjust killing and sodomy These narrations, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, consider sculpture creation a heinous act deserving severe punishments, but the severity is not equivalent to major sins like unjust killing, homosexuality, etc. Therefore, he concludes that the prohibitions in this category of narrations specifically target sculptures used as idols for worship<ref>Khomeini, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Vol. 1, p. 169.</ref>.
==== Consensus Among Jurists and its Critique ====
There has not been a consensus among jurists regarding the prohibition of sculpture. However, according to Hossein Ali Montazeri, the first person to claim consensus on this issue was Muhaqqeq Karaki<ref>Muhaqqeq Karaki, Jame' al-Maqasid, Vol. 4, p. 23.</ref> and no previous jurists have claimed consensus on this matter. This purported consensus has been criticized by jurists such as Sayyid Taqi Tabatabai Qomi and Hossein Ali Montazeri. They argue that this consensus is not a clear or probable proof and believe that there are numerous narrations, transmitted through both Shia and Sunni sources, which may provide plausible evidence for the permissibility of sculpture creation. Hence, they contend that consensus is not an independent proof for this matter.
There is no consensus among jurists regarding the prohibition of sculpture. Seyyed Taqi Tabatabai Qomi and Hossein-Ali Montazeri criticized the alleged consensus, claiming it to be a consensus with known origins<ref>Ijma’ al Madraki is a type of consensus whose origins are currently available in other jurisprudential sources i.e. Qur'an and Prophetic narrations.</ref> or probable evidence and believe that there is a likelihood that the evidence for the jurists' verdict on the prohibition of sculpture comes from numerous narrations in both Shia and Sunni sources. Therefore, they believe that this consensus does not qualify as an independent proof for this matter<ref>Montazeri, Darasat Fi al-Makasib al-Muharammah, Vol. 2, p. 557.</ref>.
=== Exceptions to the Prohibition ===
Despite the widely accepted prohibition on creating sculptures of living beings, some jurists have made exceptions, including:
1. Naser Makarem Shirazi: Embossed patterns seen in plasterwork, carving, toreutics, and similar crafts, as well as dolls, and items considered toys, sculptures created for deceiving enemies and are a strategic necessity, and sculptures made from various pieces used in medical education are exceptions to the prohibition<ref>Montazeri, Darasat Fi al-Makasib al-Muharammah, Vol. 2, p. 569; Tabatabai Qomi, Umdat al-Matalib fi Taliq 'ala al-Makasib, Vol. 1, p. 167.</ref>.
2. Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini: If a sculpture is made using machinery, it is not considered prohibited because the evidence for the prohibition of sculpture only applies to cases where an individual manually creates sculptures<ref>Makarem Shirazi, Istifta'at Jadid, Vol. 3, p. 168.</ref>.
3. Sayyid Abolqasem Khoei, Lutfollah Safi Golpayegani, and Ja’far Sobhani: Creating incomplete or partial sculptures of humans and other animals is permissible. However, Safi Golpayegani deems crafting a sculpture that includes major parts such as the head, face, and chest as problematic, adding that crafting sculptures of hands, feet, or heads alone is not problematic<ref>Khomeini, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Vol. 2, p. 177.</ref>.
== Fatwas and Reasons for Permission ==
Many jurists who have issued fatwas permitting sculpture base the reason for its prohibition on criteria derived from narrations. They argue that if these criteria are not present, even crafting sculptures of living beings is considered permissible. Some of these viewpoints are as follows:
• According to Hussein Ali Montazeri, the prohibition of sculpture creation and similar acts in narrations is due to the fact that, at the time these narrations were issued, crafting sculptures was associated with worshipping beings other than God and associating partners to Him. Therefore, if sculpture does not serve this purpose and solely has artistic and cultural aspects, it is considered permissible<ref>Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fuqaheh, Vol. 1, p. 369; Safi Golpaygani, Jame' al-Ahkam, Vol. 1, p. 307; Ya'qoubi Isfahani, Al-Mawahib fi Tahreer Ahkam al-Makasib, p. 399.</ref>.
• Mohammad Ibrahim Jannati considers sculpture creation as one of the valuable arts and argues that, since sculpture in the Islamic Republic of Iran today does not have any impure motives or polytheistic inclinations, the act is permissible<ref>Safi Golpaygani, Jame' al-Ahkam, Vol. 1, p. 308.</ref>. However, he emphasizes that crafting sculptures for the purpose of worship, veneration, and imitating idolaters and polytheists is prohibited<ref> Montazeri, Risaleh Istifta'at, Vol. 2, p. 325.</ref>.
• Mohammad Javad Moghniyah believes that if sculpture making is not done for illegitimate purposes but serves intellectual goals, such as highlighting the grandeur and glory of civilizations and their history, it is not problematic<ref> Janati, Nazariyeh Ijtihadi Tafri’ei va Tatbighi, p. 38.</ref>. He also believes that the fatwas prohibiting sculpture lack evidence and are simply precautionary<ref>Janati, Nazariyeh Ijtihadi Tafri’ei va Tatbighi, p. 38; Hosseini, Jawaz Mujassameh-Sazi va Naqashi, p. 213.</ref>.
• According to the fatwa of Yousef Saanei, sculpture making itself is not prohibited, and if it is done for intellectual purposes, it is permissible<ref>Mughniyeh, Falsafat Islamiyah, p. 921.</ref>.
• Sheikh Javad Tabrizi believes that crafting sculptures of living and non-living beings is permissible, though it is recommended to avoid it<ref>Mughniyeh, Falsafat Islamiyah, p. 921.</ref>.
• Sayyid Ali Khamenei considers crafting sculptures of living beings as permissible and states that buying, selling, keeping, and even displaying them in exhibitions is not problematic<ref>"Mujassameh-sazi va Hunarhay Tajassumi," Website of Grand Ayatollah Sanei.</ref>.
== Issues Related to Sculpture ==
In addition to discussing the fundamental ruling on sculpture, jurists have also addressed related topics such as the “keeping, buying and selling of sculptures” and “destroying sculptures.”
=== Keeping, Buying, and Selling Sculptures: ===
Most jurists have considered buying, selling, and keeping sculptures, even those depicting living beings, as permissible<ref>Tabrizi, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 358.</ref>. According to Khoei, the available evidence only indicates the prohibition of sculpture making, and there is no evidence prohibiting its keeping, buying, and selling<ref>51. For example, see Khoei, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 356; Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fuqaheh, Vol. 1, p. 382; Sistani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 423; Khomeini, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 275; Vahid Khorasani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 582; Fazel Lankarani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 395; Shobeiri Zanjani, Tawzih al-Masa'il, p. 80.</ref>. Among contemporary jurists, figures like Lutfollah Safi Golpayegani and Naser Makarem Shirazi have deemed buying, selling, and owning sculptures of living beings, earning a living out of it and earning wages by making sculptures as prohibited<ref> Tohidi Tabrizi, Misbah al-Fuqaheh, Vol. 1, p. 240.</ref>. Sheikh Ansari considers keeping, buying, and selling sculptures of living beings as reprehensible<ref>Sheikh Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, Vol. 1, p. 197.</ref>.
=== Destroying Sculptures: ===
According to Alireza A’rafi, while explicit statements from early scholars regarding the prohibition to keep sculptures or the obligation to destroy them are not found, some jurists' statements can be interpreted to imply this obligation<ref>Abidinzadeh, Mujassameh wa Naqqashi: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Ayatollah A’arafi, p. 552.</ref>. The evidence that may indicate the obligation to destroy sculptures and the prohibition to keep them include:
• Just as creating a sculpture is considered reprehensible by God, its existence is also reprehensible<ref>Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 238.</ref>. Therefore, what implies the prohibition of sculpture-making also suggests the obligation to destroy it<ref>Sheikh Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib, Vol. 1, p. 193.</ref>. However, Sheikh Ansari believes that, based on narrations, only creating a sculpture is prohibited, but its existence is not reprehensible in the view of God to conclude that destroying it is obligatory. Similarly, Mohammad Fazel Lankarani believes that there is no explicit obligation between the prohibition of sculpture and the necessity to destroy it<ref>Fazel Lankarani, Tafsil al-Shari'ah: Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, p. 157-158.</ref>.
• There are narrations where breaking sculptures is commanded<ref>Kulayni, Al-Kafi, Vol. 13, p. 233.</ref>. However, scholars like Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani and Mohammad Fazel Lankarani argue that these narrations specifically refer to cases where sculptures are used as idols for worship and veneration<ref>Rouhani, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Vol. 14, p. 240; Fazel Lankarani, Tafsil al-Shari'ah: Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, p. 142.</ref>.
== Perspective of Sunni Schools ==
According to the four main Sunni schools of thought, namely Maleki, Shafe’i, Hanafi, and Hanbali, creating sculptures of living beings, such as humans and animals, is considered prohibited<ref>Jazayri, Kitab al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madahib al-Arba'ah, Vol. 2, p. 40-41.</ref>. Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad Jaziri, an Egyptian jurist and scholar, argues that if sculpture serves legitimate purposes such as education and training, it falls outside the realm of the prohibition<ref>Jazayri, Kitab al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madahib al-Arba'ah, Vol. 2, p. 40.</ref>. He mentions that some Sunni schools, like the Maliki school, consider the creation, buying, and selling of dolls for girls permissible, that they learn child-rearing through play<ref>Jazayri, Kitab al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madahib al-Arba'ah, Vol. 2, p. 40.</ref>.
== Study Resources ==
Original Article: Sculpture (Study Resources)
The topic of sculpture has been addressed in contemporary jurisprudential works in two ways:
1. Sculpture has been discussed alongside other jurisprudential topics in some works, including “Masbah al- Fiqaha" – jurisprudential lectures by Sayyid Abulqasim Khoei, “Al-Makasib al-Muharramah" – written by Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini, “Darasat fi al-Makasib al-Muharramah" – authored by Hussein Ali Montazeri, “Fiqh al-Sadiq" – composed by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani, “Al-Mawahib fi Tahrir Makasib al-Muharramah" – lectures of higher Islamic studies by Ja’far Sobhani.

2. Monographs: Independent works written specifically on the subject of sculpture, such as:
• Sculpture and Painting: Lectures of higher Islamic studies by Alireza A’rafi on the topic of sculpture and painting, transcribed by Alireza Abedinzadeh.
• Image and Sculpture in Shia Jurisprudence: A work by Sayyid Abbas Sayyid Karimi, written in Persian and spanning 224 pages, it explores the viewpoints of Shia jurists and their evidences regarding the legal rulings on images and sculpture.

=== References: ===
# Ibn Barraj, Abdul Aziz, Al-Muhadhab, Qom, Islamic Publishing Institute, 1406 AH.
# Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad, Beirut, Al-Risalah Institute, 1416 AH.
# Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Ismail, Sahih Bukhari, Damascus, Dar Tawq al-Najah, 1st edition, 1422 AH.
# Tabrizi, Mirza Javad, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Hijrat Publications, 1382 SH.
# Tohidi Tabrizi, Muhammad Ali, Misbah al-Fuqaheh: Taqrirat-e Dars-e Ayatollah Khoei, Qom, Davari Publications, 1st edition, 1377 SH.
# Jazayri, Abdul Rahman, Kitab al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madahib al-Arba'ah, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1424 AH.
# Janati, Muhammad Ibrahim, " Nazariyeh Ijtihadi Tafri’ei va Tatbighi," Political Science, No. 21, 1382 SH.
# Hur Ameli, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Qom, Moassaseh Al al-Bayt Alayh al-Salam le Ahya al-Turath, 3rd edition, 1416 AH.
# Hosseini, Ahmad, "Jawaz Mujassameh-sazi va Naqashi," Fiqh Magazine, No. 4 and 5, Summer and Autumn 1374 SH.
# Halabi, Abu Salah, Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, Isfahan, Maktabat al-Imam Amir al-Mu'minin Alayh al-Salam, 1st edition, 1403 AH.
# Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, Risaleh Ajwabat al-Istifta'at, Tehran, International Printing and Publishing Company, 1388 SH.
# Khomeini, Ruhollah, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Qom, Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 1st edition, 1415 AH.
# Khomeini, Ruhollah, Tahreer al-Wasilah, Tehran, Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 1379 SH.
# Khomeini, Ruhollah, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Tehran, Organization for Printing and Publishing the Works of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 9th edition, 1372 SH.
# Khoei, Sayyid Abul-Qasim, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Mehr Publications, 1412 AH.
# Rouhani, Mohammad Sadiq, Fiqh al-Sadiq, Qom, Imam Sadiq (AS) Seminary, 1412 AH.
# Sistani, Sayyid Ali, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Mehr Publications, 1415 AH.
# Shobeiri Zanjani, Musa, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Wila Research Institute, 1384 SH.
# Sheikh Ansari, Morteza, Kitab al-Makasib, Qom, Bagheri Publications, 1415 AH.
# Safi Golpaygani, Jame' al-Ahkam, Qom, Office for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Ayatollah Safi Golpaygani, 1385 SH.
# Safi Golpaygani, Lotfollah, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Mehr Publications, 1414 AH.
# Safi Golpaygani, Lotfollah, Hidayat al-‘Ibad, Qom, Dar al-Qur'an al-Karim, 1416 AH.
# Tabatabai Qomi, Sayyid Taqi, 'Umdat al-Matalib fi al-Ta'liq 'ala al-Makasib, Qom, Mahallati Publications, 1st edition, 1414 AH.
# Abedinzadeh, Ahmad, Mujassameh va Naqashi: Taqrirat Dars Kharij Alireza A'arafi, Qom, Eshraq va Erfan Institute, 1390 SH.
# Fazel Lankarani, Mohammad, Tafsil al-Shari'ah: al-Makasib al-Muharramah, Qom, Markaz Fiqhi Aimmah Athar (AS), 1st edition, 1385 SH.
# Fazel Lankarani, Mohammad, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Mehr Publications, 7th edition, 1374 SH.
# Fazel Lankarani, Mohammad Javad, " Mouzu’at wa Melakat dar Fiqh Honar," Elahiyat-e Honar Journal, No. 10, Autumn 1396 SH.
# Faiyyaz, Mohammad Is'haq, Al-Istifta'at al-Shar'iyyah, Al-Kalamat al-Tayyibah, 1st edition, 1434 AH.
# Kulayni, Muhammad ibn Ya'qub, Al-Kafi, Qom, Dar al-Hadith, 1st edition, 1387 SH.
# Mujassameh-sazi va Hunarhay Tajassumi, Website of Grand Ayatollah Sanei, Date of Access: 30 Shahrivar 1400 SH.
# Muhaqqeq Karaki, Ali ibn Hussein, Jame' al-Maqasid, Qom, Al al-Bayt Institute, 2nd edition, 1414 AH.
# Mughniyah, Muhammad Jawad, Falsafat Islamiyyah, Beirut, 6th edition, 1993 CE.
# Makarem Shirazi, Naser, Estifta'at Jadid, Qom, Madrasat al-Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS), 2nd edition, 1427 AH.
# Montazeri, Hossein Ali, Darasat Fi al-Makasib al-Muharammah, Qom, Tafakkor Publications, 1415 AH.
# Montazeri, Hossein Ali, Risalah-e Estifta'at, Tehran, Tafakkor Publications, 1373 SH.
# Najafi, Sheikh Muhammad Hasan, Jawahir al-Kalam, Beirut, Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, 7th edition, 1362 SH.
# Naraghi, Mullah Ahmad, Mustanad al-Shi'ah fi Ahkam al-Shari'ah, Qom, Al al-Bayt Institute, 1415 AH.
# Nouri, Hossein ibn Muhammad Taqi, Mustadrak al-Wasail, Qom, Al al-Bayt Institute, 1408 AH.
# Vahid Khorasani, Hossein, Tawzih al-Masa'il, Qom, Madreseh Baqer al-Ulum (AS), 1421 AH.
# Yaqoubi Isfahani, Sayfullah, Al-Mawahib fi Tahrir Ahkam al-Makasib, Qom, Imam Sadiq (AS) Institute, 1424 AH.
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