Compulsory hijab - Revision history

Sarfipour: /* Criticism */

2025-10-05T06:19:55Z

Criticism

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:19, 5 October 2025
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	In critique of the view that accepts hijab as part of privacy, the following have been said:		In critique of the view that accepts hijab as part of privacy, the following have been said:
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	# Clothing does not have only a personal aspect in covering the body; rather, it also possesses a social aspect. Therefore, the issue of mandating women’s social clothing is about social communications and contacts with non-mahram people in the society, not about private life.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 187</ref> According to [[Sayyid Ali Khamenei]], the Shia Marja’ (legal authority), what is done in streets and in the public is actually public activity and education, and creates a duty for the system that has emerged from Islam, and what is made forbidden by the Sharia should not be openly performed in the country.<ref>Statements of the Iranian Supreme Leader in the meeting with maddahs (panegyrists) on 8th March 2018</ref>		# Clothing does not have only a personal aspect in covering the body; rather, it also possesses a social aspect. Therefore, the issue of mandating women’s social clothing is about social communications and contacts with non-mahram people in the society, not about private life.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 187</ref> According to [[Sayyid Ali Khamenei]], the Shia Marja’ (legal authority), what is done in streets and in the public is actually public activity and education, and creates a duty for the system that has emerged from Islam, and what is made forbidden by the Sharia should not be openly performed in the country.<ref>Statements of the Iranian Supreme Leader in the meeting with maddahs (panegyrists) on 8th March 2018</ref>
	# It has been said that even if not wearing hijab is part of privacy, believing in something is different from expressing that belief, and not believing in hijab does not necessarily enable the person to act according to that belief. Clear examples of this are religious minorities who live in Islamic countries, but one of the compulsory rules for them and also for other citizens is not to openly perform what is prohibited in Islam.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>		# It has been said that even if not wearing hijab is part of privacy, believing in something is different from expressing that belief, and not believing in hijab does not necessarily enable the person to act according to that belief. Clear examples of this are religious minorities who live in Islamic countries, but one of the compulsory rules for them and also for other citizens is not to openly perform what is prohibited in Islam.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>

Sarfipour: /* Criticism */

2025-10-05T06:19:27Z

Criticism

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:19, 5 October 2025
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	Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following:		Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following:
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	# None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref>		# None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref>
	# According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref>		# According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref>

Sarfipour: /* Criticism */

2025-10-05T06:19:08Z

Criticism

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:19, 5 October 2025
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	====Criticism====		====Criticism====
	In critique of the view that accepts hijab as part of privacy, the following have been said:		In critique of the view that accepts hijab as part of privacy, the following have been said:
			{{column\|2}}
	# Clothing does not have only a personal aspect in covering the body; rather, it also possesses a social aspect. Therefore, the issue of mandating women’s social clothing is about social communications and contacts with non-mahram people in the society, not about private life.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 187</ref> According to [[Sayyid Ali Khamenei]], the Shia Marja’ (legal authority), what is done in streets and in the public is actually public activity and education, and creates a duty for the system that has emerged from Islam, and what is made forbidden by the Sharia should not be openly performed in the country.<ref>Statements of the Iranian Supreme Leader in the meeting with maddahs (panegyrists) on 8th March 2018</ref>		# Clothing does not have only a personal aspect in covering the body; rather, it also possesses a social aspect. Therefore, the issue of mandating women’s social clothing is about social communications and contacts with non-mahram people in the society, not about private life.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 187</ref> According to [[Sayyid Ali Khamenei]], the Shia Marja’ (legal authority), what is done in streets and in the public is actually public activity and education, and creates a duty for the system that has emerged from Islam, and what is made forbidden by the Sharia should not be openly performed in the country.<ref>Statements of the Iranian Supreme Leader in the meeting with maddahs (panegyrists) on 8th March 2018</ref>
	# It has been said that even if not wearing hijab is part of privacy, believing in something is different from expressing that belief, and not believing in hijab does not necessarily enable the person to act according to that belief. Clear examples of this are religious minorities who live in Islamic countries, but one of the compulsory rules for them and also for other citizens is not to openly perform what is prohibited in Islam.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>		# It has been said that even if not wearing hijab is part of privacy, believing in something is different from expressing that belief, and not believing in hijab does not necessarily enable the person to act according to that belief. Clear examples of this are religious minorities who live in Islamic countries, but one of the compulsory rules for them and also for other citizens is not to openly perform what is prohibited in Islam.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>
	# It has been said that on the premise of accepting the freedom of expression for everyone, it should be noted that if this right leads to corruption and has negative effects on the society, it conflicts with the right of others to benefit from a suitable religious atmosphere, which is one of the indices of the right to religion and religiosity, and when there is a conflict between individual rights and interests of the society, general interests take precedence over privacy.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>		# It has been said that on the premise of accepting the freedom of expression for everyone, it should be noted that if this right leads to corruption and has negative effects on the society, it conflicts with the right of others to benefit from a suitable religious atmosphere, which is one of the indices of the right to religion and religiosity, and when there is a conflict between individual rights and interests of the society, general interests take precedence over privacy.<ref>Malik Afḍalī Ardakānī, Taḥlīl va Naqd-i Adilli-yi Fardī Būdan-i Hijab, p. 186</ref>
	# It has been said that private matters do not necessarily fall outside the government's authority. For example, crimes such as [[zina]] (unlawful sexual intercourse) are punishable even if they are committed in privacy and with the consent of the parties. This issue is not exclusive to the Islamic society and ruler. Rather, in other societies, governments allow themselves to interfere with private matters, such as the use of drugs or psychoactive pills in the private aspect, as well as the use of safety equipment while working and wearing seat belts when driving.<ref>Ghulāmī, Mas’ali-yi Hijab dar Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Iran, p. 334</ref>		# It has been said that private matters do not necessarily fall outside the government's authority. For example, crimes such as [[zina]] (unlawful sexual intercourse) are punishable even if they are committed in privacy and with the consent of the parties. This issue is not exclusive to the Islamic society and ruler. Rather, in other societies, governments allow themselves to interfere with private matters, such as the use of drugs or psychoactive pills in the private aspect, as well as the use of safety equipment while working and wearing seat belts when driving.<ref>Ghulāmī, Mas’ali-yi Hijab dar Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Iran, p. 334</ref>
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	===Hijab does not have the capacity to be legally required===		===Hijab does not have the capacity to be legally required===

Sarfipour: /* Criticism */

2025-10-05T06:18:37Z

Criticism

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:18, 5 October 2025
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	====Criticism====		====Criticism====
	Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following:		Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following:
			{{column\|2}}
	# None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref>		# None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref>
	# According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref>		# According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref>
	# Forbidding the evil reasons depend on the realization of conditions such as effectiveness, or the person’s awareness of rules, and do not apply to all cases. Therefore, the scope of these reasons is different to legal coercion and they cannot be used to infer the legal obligation of hijab and the necessity of arraigning the one who does not wear hijab. This is because, obligation of a social act is associated with the necessity of punishing the violator and this punishment can be proven with the reasons for punishment, not for the prohibition of evil.		# Forbidding the evil reasons depend on the realization of conditions such as effectiveness, or the person’s awareness of rules, and do not apply to all cases. Therefore, the scope of these reasons is different to legal coercion and they cannot be used to infer the legal obligation of hijab and the necessity of arraigning the one who does not wear hijab. This is because, obligation of a social act is associated with the necessity of punishing the violator and this punishment can be proven with the reasons for punishment, not for the prohibition of evil.
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	===Hadiths on the obligation of punishment===		===Hadiths on the obligation of punishment===

Sarfipour: Created page with "{{Author |author = Muhammadmahdi Emadi |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} '''Compulsory hijab''' (in persian: [https://ency.feqhemoaser.com/fa/view/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C حجاب اجباری]), which means legally obliging women to wear hijab by the Islamic government, is of the challengeful topics in jurisprudence. The main questions in this discussion include: Can the government oblig..."

2025-09-18T07:11:57Z

Created page with "{{Author |author = Muhammadmahdi Emadi |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} '''Compulsory hijab''' (in persian: [https://ency.feqhemoaser.com/fa/view/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C حجاب اجباری]), which means legally obliging women to wear hijab by the Islamic government, is of the challengeful topics in jurisprudence. The main questions in this discussion include: Can the government oblig..."

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