Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad - Revision history

M.zandi: /* Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery */

2026-09-02T12:00:05Z

Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:00, 2 September 2026
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	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==
	~~In analyzing the~~ Fiqhi maxim "~~Eating wealth in vanity~~" (Akl al-mal bi-al-batil), ~~Mohaghegh Damad considers it dependent~~ on ~~custom (Urf) and~~ the customary nature of transactions; in such a way that any transaction considered unfair by custom, such as [[Pyramid Schemes]]~~, will be subject to this rule~~.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of ~~Wealth~~ in Islamic Law, pp. 21–28.</ref>		The Fiqhi maxim "illicit acquisition of property" (Akl al-mal bi-al-batil), in his opinion, is a customary matter and depends on the customary nature of transactions, in such a way that this rule applies to any transaction considered unfair by custom, such as [[Pyramid Schemes]].<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of property in Islamic Law, pp. 21–28.</ref>

	The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is ~~rooted in~~ the ~~ruling of reason; utilizing~~ religious texts as ~~corroboration~~, he considers this prohibition to extend beyond ~~the limited~~ four or six items and includes any commodity that causes loss to the people and ~~disruption~~ in social order.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 44–58.</ref>		The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is based on the reasonable analysis. citing to the religious texts as supportive evidence, he considers this prohibition to extend beyond four or six items mentioned in Fiqhi works and includes any commodity that causes loss to the people and trouble in social order.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 44–58.</ref>

	Regarding playing with gambling instruments such as chess and backgammon, Mohaghegh Damad states that if~~, due to social changes,~~ the ~~description of~~ gambling is removed from them, ~~the ruling of~~ their prohibition can be lifted and ~~innocence (Bara'ah) becomes possible~~.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 182–197.</ref>		Regarding playing with gambling instruments such as chess and backgammon, Mohaghegh Damad states that if the gambling feature is removed from them due to social changes, their prohibition can be lifted and may be regarded as permissible.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 182–197.</ref>

	In the discussion of Riba, the author considers the main goal of its prohibition to be the prevention of oppression, economic abuse, and steering people toward productive and useful activities, rather than merely the unregulated increase of capital. Distinguishing between the "cause" ('Illah) and the "wisdom" (Hikmah) of the prohibition of Riba, he argues that if oppression is the real cause of the prohibition, the practical principle of innocence can justify the legitimacy of some types of Riba, such as [[Production-oriented Riba]]. Also, by changing the subject or the object of the ruling, the possibility of legitimizing some ribawi transactions is provided.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 217–281.</ref>		In the discussion of Riba, the author considers the main goal of its prohibition to be the prevention of oppression, economic abuse, and steering people toward productive and useful activities, rather than merely the unregulated increase of capital. Distinguishing between the "cause" ('Illah) and the "wisdom" (Hikmah) of the prohibition of Riba, he argues that if oppression is the real cause of the prohibition, the practical principle of innocence can justify the legitimacy of some types of Riba, such as [[Production-oriented Riba]]. Also, by changing the subject or the object of the ruling, the possibility of legitimizing some ribawi transactions is provided.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 217–281.</ref>

M.zandi: /* Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery */

2026-09-01T13:48:07Z

Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:48, 1 September 2026
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	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==
	In analyzing the Fiqhi ~~rule of~~ "Eating wealth in vanity" (Akl al-mal bi-al-batil), Mohaghegh Damad considers it dependent on custom (Urf) and the customary nature of transactions; in such a way that any transaction considered unfair by custom, such as [[Pyramid Schemes]], will be subject to this rule.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 21–28.</ref>		In analyzing the Fiqhi maxim "Eating wealth in vanity" (Akl al-mal bi-al-batil), Mohaghegh Damad considers it dependent on custom (Urf) and the customary nature of transactions; in such a way that any transaction considered unfair by custom, such as [[Pyramid Schemes]], will be subject to this rule.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 21–28.</ref>

	The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is rooted in the ruling of reason; utilizing religious texts as corroboration, he considers this prohibition to extend beyond the limited four or six items and includes any commodity that causes loss to the people and disruption in social order.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 44–58.</ref>		The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is rooted in the ruling of reason; utilizing religious texts as corroboration, he considers this prohibition to extend beyond the limited four or six items and includes any commodity that causes loss to the people and disruption in social order.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 44–58.</ref>

M.zandi: /* Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair */

2026-07-22T11:34:29Z

Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:34, 22 July 2026
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	=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference ~~between man~~ and ~~woman~~. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an unalterable Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or its difference for men and women. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an unalterable Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==

M.zandi: /* Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair */

2026-07-22T11:33:26Z

Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:33, 22 July 2026
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	=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an ~~alterable~~ Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an unalterable Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==

M.zandi: /* Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair */

2026-07-22T11:32:55Z

Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:32, 22 July 2026
Line 135:		Line 135:

	=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "~~signed~~" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the ~~absolute nature~~ of the ~~Diyah~~ verse, the ~~variety of narrations~~, the diversity of Diyah criteria among ~~different peoples~~, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyah ~~payment~~ depend on social developments and its ruling is ~~judicial~~ and ~~governmental~~, not ~~a fixed Shari'ah~~ one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an alterable Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==

M.zandi: /* Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair */

2026-07-22T07:36:30Z

Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:36, 22 July 2026
Line 135:		Line 135:

	=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "~~signatory~~" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[~~Signatory~~ Rulings\|~~signatory~~ (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes~~; just~~ as ~~today,~~ payment of Diyah in ~~Rial~~ is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that ~~justifying~~ the half-Diyah ~~of a woman~~ by citing the economic status of ~~the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles~~. ~~Considering~~ the absolute nature of the Diyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signed" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings\|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absolute nature of the Diyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==

M.zandi at 07:06, 22 July 2026

2026-07-22T07:06:14Z

M.zandi: /* Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah */

2026-07-21T14:54:48Z

Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:54, 21 July 2026
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	Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that provides a legal power for retaliation on the positive side and prevents transgression and excesses on the negative side.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>		Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that provides a legal power for retaliation on the positive side and prevents transgression and excesses on the negative side.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>

	=== ~~Judicial and Governmental Nature of~~ Woman's ~~Diyyah~~ ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of ~~Diyyah~~ between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of ~~the Diyyah ruling and its transformability~~ in the Islamic ~~legal system~~. ~~In his view,~~ [[~~Surah An~~-Nisa~~, Verse 92~~]] ~~merely presents the principle of~~ paying blood money and ~~has~~ not ~~stated a ruling regarding~~ the amount of ~~Diyyah~~ or ~~the~~ difference between man and woman. Examination of ~~narrations~~ also shows that the Prophet ~~of Islam~~ (PBUH) determined ~~the Diyyah for~~ murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams~~; regulations~~ that are ~~considered~~ [[Signatory Rulings\|signatory (Imda'i)]] rather than "~~foundational~~" (Ta'sisi). This means that if they ~~were prevalent~~ in the ~~custom (Urf)~~ of the Prophet~~'s time,~~ they ~~were confirmed by Shari'ah and~~ are capable of change ~~with~~ the ~~transformation of~~ custom; just as today, payment of Diyyah in Rial is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that justifying the half-Diyyah of a woman by citing the economic status of the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles. Considering the absolute nature of the Diyyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[Signatory Rulings\|signatory (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes; just as today, payment of Diyyah in Rial is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that justifying the half-Diyyah of a woman by citing the economic status of the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles. Considering the absolute nature of the Diyyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==

M.zandi: /* Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation */

2026-07-21T13:29:17Z

Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:29, 21 July 2026
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	=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===		=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===
	Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that~~, in its positive aspect,~~ provides ~~the~~ legal power for retaliation ~~in kind,~~ and ~~in its negative aspect,~~ prevents transgression and ~~excess~~.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>		Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that provides a legal power for retaliation on the positive side and prevents transgression and excesses on the negative side.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>

	=== Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah ===		=== Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah ===

M.zandi: /* Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation */

2026-07-18T15:48:58Z

Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:48, 18 July 2026
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	=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===		=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===
	Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad ~~believes~~ that "Life" ~~in this verse~~ refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge~~; goals such as~~ controlling violence, ~~promoting~~ order and justice, and strengthening piety in the community ~~of believers~~.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding ~~duty~~." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran~~, by legislating~~ the ruling of Qisas~~, sought~~ to restrain tribal ~~blood-feuds~~ and revenge ~~outside the framework of the law~~. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that, in its positive aspect, provides the legal power for retaliation in kind, and in its negative aspect, prevents transgression and excess.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>		Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that, in its positive aspect, provides the legal power for retaliation in kind, and in its negative aspect, prevents transgression and excess.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref>

	=== Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah ===		=== Judicial and Governmental Nature of Woman's Diyyah ===

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:06, 22 July 2026
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	* Rational and humanistic study of severe punishments with a focus on the ruling of stoning (Rajm)		* Rational and humanistic study of severe punishments with a focus on the ruling of stoning (Rajm)
	* Fiqhi investigation into the possibility of Qisas (retaliation) of a man against a woman in criminal Fiqh		* Fiqhi investigation into the possibility of Qisas (retaliation) of a man against a woman in criminal Fiqh
	* Analysis of the governmental and judicial nature of a woman's ~~Diyyah~~ (blood money) in Fiqh		* Analysis of the governmental and judicial nature of a woman's Diyah (blood money) in Fiqh
	* Evaluation of the customary (Urfi) nature of pyramid schemes, chess, hoarding, Riba (usury), and bribery		* Evaluation of the customary (Urfi) nature of pyramid schemes, chess, hoarding, Riba (usury), and bribery
	* Emphasis on the principles of justice and human dignity as pre-Fiqhi ones in reviewing Fiqh		* Emphasis on the principles of justice and human dignity as pre-Fiqhi ones in reviewing Fiqh
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	== Fiqh of the Environment ==		== Fiqh of the Environment ==
	Mohaghegh Damad classifies environmental resources into three categories: [[Private Ownership\|privately owned]], [[State Ownership\|state-owned]], and [[Public Property\|public property]]. "Anfal," as public property, is at the disposal of the legitimate government and includes forests, seas, mountains, pastures, space, air, and other natural resources. These properties are neither subject to personal ownership nor alienation, rather, they must be used for public interests; because according to the explicit text of the Quran, Anfal belongs to God and the Prophet Muhammad, and according to Islamic jurists, it is at the disposal of the Infallible, if he is present, and of the religiously legitimate government during the Age of Occultation.		Mohaghegh Damad classifies environmental resources into three categories: [[Private Ownership\|privately owned]], [[State Ownership\|state-owned]], and [[Public Property\|public property]]. "Anfal," as public property, is at the disposal of the legitimate government and includes forests, seas, mountains, pastures, space, air, and other natural resources. These properties are neither subject to personal ownership nor alienation, rather, they must be used for public interests; because according to the explicit text of the Quran, Anfal belongs to God and the Prophet Muhammad, and according to Islamic jurists, it is at the disposal of the Infallible, when he is present, and of the religiously legitimate government during the Age of Occultation.

	In explaining the [[Dominium Rule]] (Qa'idat al-Tasallut), he considers the absolute discretion of the owner to be conditioned by other Fiqhi rules such as the "[[No-Harm Rule]]" (La Darar). In his view, any disposition that causes harm to others or damage to public resources is prohibited and results in Shari'ah liability (Daman). Within this framework, rules such as "No-Harm," "[[Rule of Destruction\|Destruction]]" (Itlaf), and "[[Rule of Causation\|Causation]]" (Tasbib) can serve as the basis for civil liability regarding environmental damages.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Theology of the Environment, pp. 182 and 230.</ref>		In explaining the [[Dominium Rule]] (Qa'idat al-Tasallut), he considers the absolute discretion of the owner to be conditioned by other Fiqhi rules such as the "[[No-Harm Rule]]" (La Darar). In his view, any disposition that causes harm to others or damage to public resources is prohibited and results in Shari'ah liability (Daman). Within this framework, rules such as "No-Harm," "[[Rule of Destruction\|Destruction]]" (Itlaf), and "[[Rule of Causation\|Causation]]" (Tasbib) can serve as the basis for civil liability regarding environmental damages.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Theology of the Environment, pp. 182 and 230.</ref>
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	=== Equality of Qisas for Men and Women ===		=== Equality of Qisas for Men and Women ===
	Among the important controversial issues is the [[Equality of Retribution for Men and Women\|Equality of Qisas for Men and Women]]. Based on Shi'ite Fiqh it is necessary to pay the difference between blood money (~~Diyyah~~) for men and women to enforce Qisas; whereas the Sunnis are of opinion that Qisas is carried out without the need to pay the difference in ~~Diyyah~~. Mohaghegh Damad believes that the principle of non-equality of ~~Diyyah~~ for men and women can be inferred from Quranic verses, but this interpretation does not conflict with the possibility of finding a way to equalize the ~~Diyyah~~. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that a man will never be retaliated for a woman unless the difference in blood money is paid.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, p. 42; Mohaghegh Damad and Khosravi, "Gender Equality in Qisas; Condition of Establishment or Implementation," pp. 107–123.</ref>		Among the important controversial issues is the [[Equality of Retribution for Men and Women\|Equality of Qisas for Men and Women]]. Based on Shi'ite Fiqh it is necessary to pay the difference between blood money (Diyah) for men and women to enforce Qisas; whereas the Sunnis are of opinion that Qisas is carried out without the need to pay the difference in Diyah. Mohaghegh Damad believes that the principle of non-equality of Diyah for men and women can be inferred from Quranic verses, but this interpretation does not conflict with the possibility of finding a way to equalize the Diyah. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that a man will never be retaliated for a woman unless the difference in blood money is paid.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, p. 42; Mohaghegh Damad and Khosravi, "Gender Equality in Qisas; Condition of Establishment or Implementation," pp. 107–123.</ref>

	=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===		=== Qisas, a Limited Right, Not a Binding Obligation ===
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	=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===		=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair ===
	In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[Signatory Rulings\|signatory (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes; just as today, payment of ~~Diyyah~~ in Rial is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that justifying the half-~~Diyyah~~ of a woman by citing the economic status of the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles. Considering the absolute nature of the ~~Diyyah~~ verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of ~~Diyyah~~ criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the ~~Diyyah~~ ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of ~~Diyyah~~ payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>		In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[Signatory Rulings\|signatory (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes; just as today, payment of Diyah in Rial is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that justifying the half-Diyah of a woman by citing the economic status of the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles. Considering the absolute nature of the Diyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref>

	== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==		== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery ==