Jurisprudence and Government (book)

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===Examining the Scope of Privacy based on Political Jurisprudence===

Referring to the theological foundations of Shia, including the opposition to al-ja'a and its incompatibility with duty, [[Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]] talked about the conflict of rulings such as elementary [[jihad]] and [[apostasy]] with the theological perspective of Shia. At the same time, it was clarified that the jurists pay attention to the theological foundations in issuing fatwas and they do not oppose the al-ja'a (p. 122-124). He has also pointed out the contradiction of the mentioned principle with the third stage of commanding good and forbidding evil, that is, practical enjoining and forbidding. (p. 125)

Referring to the theological foundations of Shia, including the opposition to al-ja'a and its incompatibility with duty, Mohammad Soroush Mahallati talked about the conflict of rulings such as elementary [[jihad]] and [[apostasy]] with the theological perspective of Shia. At the same time, it was clarified that the jurists pay attention to the theological foundations in issuing fatwas and they do not oppose the al-ja'a (p. 122-124). He has also pointed out the contradiction of the mentioned principle with the third stage of commanding good and forbidding evil, that is, practical enjoining and forbidding. (p. 125)

Soroush Mahallati then expressed the opinions of [[Imam Khomeini]] and Ali Ahmadi Mianeji, and arued the possibility that [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] language may be a form of violation of the dignity of individuals and therefore an invasion of privacy. (p. 128). Thus, he believes that if [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] requires harm, there is no obstacle to doing it, but if we doubt about this, we cannot enjoin or forbid (p. 143).

Soroush Mahallati then expressed the opinions of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] and Ali Ahmadi Mianeji, and arued the possibility that [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] language may be a form of violation of the dignity of individuals and therefore an invasion of privacy. (p. 128). Thus, he believes that if [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] requires harm, there is no obstacle to doing it, but if we doubt about this, we cannot enjoin or forbid (p. 143).

===Civil Obedience in Shia Jurisprudence===

~~[[Sayyid Javad Varai|~~Seyyed Javad Varaei]] first presented the definition of [[civil disobedience]] and its difference with civil resistance, which disobedience has a positive aspect and resistance has a negative aspect; Thus, [[civil disobedience]] has three conditions:

Seyyed Javad Varaei first presented the definition of [[civil disobedience]] and its difference with civil resistance, which disobedience has a positive aspect and resistance has a negative aspect; Thus, civil disobedience has three conditions:

# Objection and defiance should be obvious;

# Before the obvious opposition, it has been pursued through legal means and no result has been achieved; and

# Maintaining social order (pp. 171-172).

After that, the difference between [[civil disobedience]] and subversion or insurrection is stated, based on which, the goal in subversion or insurrection is to overthrow the political system. While in [[civil disobedience]], social order is maintained and disobedience must be accompanied by the acceptance of the political system. Therefore, disobedience is different from war because in [[Moharebeh]], social security is threatened in armed form. (pp. 172-173)

After that, the difference between civil disobedience and subversion or insurrection is stated, based on which, the goal in subversion or insurrection is to overthrow the political system. While in civil disobedience, social order is maintained and disobedience must be accompanied by the acceptance of the political system. Therefore, disobedience is different from war because in [[Moharebeh]], social security is threatened in armed form. (pp. 172-173)

Varaei has clarified that disobedience, protest, resistance and [[civil disobedience]] against the law, decision and policy adopted and implemented by the Prophet or the [[the Fourteen Infallibles|infallible Imam]] is illegitimate and prohibited (p. 174). Relying on the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the ~~[[the Fourteen Infallibles|~~infallible Imams]] it can be said that during the time of [[The Occultation|occultation]], people have the right to disobey in three cases:

Varaei has clarified that disobedience, protest, resistance and civil disobedience against the law, decision and policy adopted and implemented by the Prophet or the [[the Fourteen Infallibles|infallible Imam]] is illegitimate and prohibited (p. 174). Relying on the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the infallible Imams it can be said that during the time of [[The Occultation|occultation]], people have the right to disobey in three cases:

# Laws and decisions of the government that are against [[Sharia]];

# Laws and decisions of the government that are against Sharia;

# The rulings and regulations and decisions are wrong and incorrect; and

# The government does not fulfil its duties towards the people (pp. 182-177).

===Jurisprudential Investigation of ~~Baghi~~ (rebels) and its Relationship with Civil Disobedience===

===Jurisprudential Investigation of Baghy (rebels) and its Relationship with Civil Disobedience===

In this article, Mahdi Pourhossein has first stated two meanings of [[Baghi]] (rebels) in the words of jurists. According to jurists including [[Shaykh Tusi|Sheikh Tousi]], [[Ibn Idris al-Hilli|Ibn Idris]] and [[Allamah al-Hilli|Allameh Helli]], a rebel is someone who revolts against the government. According to ~~[[Allamah al-Hilli|~~Allameh Helli]], the [[Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i al'Amili|Shahid Sani]] and the writer of [[Jawaher al-Kalam|Jawaher Al-Kalam]], "departing from obedience to the Imam" means a rebel, and thus [[civil disobedience]] to the view of these three jurists is a rebellion, because [[civil disobedience]] is the same as leaving the Imam's obedience. (p. 193).

In this article, Mahdi Pourhossein has first stated two meanings of [[Baghi|Baghy]] (rebels) in the words of jurists. According to jurists including [[Shaykh Tusi|Sheikh Tousi]], [[Ibn Idris al-Hilli|Ibn Idris]] and [[Allamah al-Hilli|Allameh Helli]], a rebel is someone who revolts against the government. According to Allameh Helli, the [[Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i al'Amili|Shahid Sani]] and the writer of [[Jawaher al-Kalam|Jawaher Al-Kalam]], "departing from obedience to the Imam" means a rebel, and thus [[civil disobedience]] to the view of these three jurists is a rebellion, because [[civil disobedience]] is the same as leaving the Imam's obedience. (p. 193).

However, Pourhossein has clarified that even the jurists who consider [[civil disobedience]] as rebellion have set three conditions for it:

# Rebels must have a numerical plurality (according to this, [[Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam|Abd al-Rahman bin Muljam]] is not a rebel).

# The rebels must have left the government's authority and the government should not have control over them.

# They should have political justification.

Pourhossein finally concluded that [[civil disobedience]], non-violent acts and even rebellion, if not with the intention of overthrowing the government, are not considered rebellion (p. 196-194). Against the rebels, peaceful ways should be used at first, and in case of failure, the Muslim ruler does not have the right to start the war and the rebels must start the war (p. 204) and, in addition, the rule of the [[Baghi]] (rebels) is to fight not to kill (p. 201).

Pourhossein finally concluded that [[civil disobedience]], non-violent acts and even rebellion, if not with the intention of overthrowing the government, are not considered rebellion (p. 196-194). Against the rebels, peaceful ways should be used at first, and in case of failure, the Muslim ruler does not have the right to start the war and the rebels must start the war (p. 204) and, in addition, the rule of the [[Baghi|Baghy]] (rebels) is to fight not to kill (p. 201).

==The Place of the People in the Islamic Government==

Three of the lectures mentioned in the book are about the place of the people, the majority and their votes in the [[Islamic government]], which were presented by [[Kazem Qazizadeh]], Abdullah Hajisadeqi and Mohsen Ghoravyan.

Three of the lectures mentioned in the book are about the place of the people, the majority and their votes in the Islamic government, which were presented by Kazem Qazizadeh, Abdullah Hajisadeqi and Mohsen Ghoravyan.

===Discussing the Position of the Majority in the Legitimacy of the Islamic Government===

Abdullah Hajisadeqi believes that although the people do not have a role in the [[legitimacy]] of the [[Islamic government]], they do have a role in accepting, participating and monitoring it (p. 35). Additionally, if the society does not have a desire for a provincial system, it will not be possible to realize the [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]] (p. 41). Also, according to Hajisadeqi, a non-[[faqih]] cannot be a ruler. (p. 42)

Abdullah Hajisadeqi believes that although the people do not have a role in the [[legitimacy]] of the Islamic government, they do have a role in accepting, participating and monitoring it (p. 35). Additionally, if the society does not have a desire for a provincial system, it will not be possible to realize the [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]] (p. 41). Also, according to Hajisadeqi, a non-faqih cannot be a ruler. (p. 42)

[[Mohammad Javad Arasta]] emphasized that if the people do not accept the jurist Jame al-Sharaiti, whose accepted example is [[Umar ibn Hanzalah|Umar bin Hanzala]]: “For I have made him a ruler over you ", however, he called the people guilty of sin in this regard (p. 43). He has also expressed a question about the methods of securing acceptance, based on which, what percentage of people's acceptance is necessary for the validity of the [[Islamic government]]? Half plus one? two-thirds? Or is there another criterion? (p. 44) Aristotle is of the opinion that if the general acceptance is lost during the government, the continuation of the acts of guardianship will not be allowed. (p. 46).

[[Mohammad Javad Arasta]] emphasized that if the people do not accept the jurist Jame al-Sharaiti, whose accepted example is [[Umar ibn Hanzalah|Umar bin Hanzala]]: “For I have made him a ruler over you ", however, he called the people guilty of sin in this regard (p. 43). He has also expressed a question about the methods of securing acceptance, based on which, what percentage of people's acceptance is necessary for the validity of the Islamic government? Half plus one? two-thirds? Or is there another criterion? (p. 44) Aristotle is of the opinion that if the general acceptance is lost during the government, the continuation of the acts of guardianship will not be allowed. (p. 46).

===Discussing the Place of People's Vote in Islamic Government===

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===The Place of People's Vote in Islamic Government===

[[Kazem Qazizadeh]] has stated with a historical perspective that the Shiites first considered all jurists to be authorized to act as guardians. Then, in order to solve the problem of conflict between jurists, [[Imam Khomeini]] believed in the velayat of the faqih, which according to Qazizadeh, is the first stage of the beginning of the theory of the [[guardianship of the jurist]]. After the formation of the [[Islamic government]] and the need to manage the society and the government, it led to the formation of the next stage in the theory of ~~[[guardianship of the jurist|~~velayat-e-faqih]], which is the ~~[[guardianship of the jurist|~~velayat-e-faqih]] of the most learned. He considered the next stages to be the appropriate jurisprudence, and after that, the elected jurisprudence, which is both correct and elected by the people. (pp. 90-91).

[[Kazem Qazizadeh]] has stated with a historical perspective that the Shiites first considered all jurists to be authorized to act as guardians. Then, in order to solve the problem of conflict between jurists, [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] believed in the velayat of the faqih, which according to Qazizadeh, is the first stage of the beginning of the theory of the [[guardianship of the jurist]]. After the formation of the Islamic government and the need to manage the society and the government, it led to the formation of the next stage in the theory of velayat-e-faqih, which is the velayat-e-faqih of the most learned. He considered the next stages to be the appropriate jurisprudence, and after that, the elected jurisprudence, which is both correct and elected by the people. (pp. 90-91).

Qazizadeh then expressed three views about the position of people's vote:

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===The Relationship between the Media and Government===

[[Mohammad Javad Fakhkhar Tousi]] first proposed different theories about the relationship between the media and government

Mohammad Javad Fakhkhar Tousi first proposed different theories about the relationship between the media and government

# The media under the supervision of the Muslim Leader: This theory was proposed in the book of [[Hossein-Ali Montazeri]]'s studies based on two reasons: First, the Governor is responsible for managing the society and , second, all institutions are tools of the Governor for managing the society. (pp. 315-316)

Line 148:

# National media and private media should be monitored, as well (p. 325). According to Fakhkhar Tousi, there is no fulfilment of the conditions of the prohibition of evil against the Muslim commander because the occurrence of negativity must be evident. Therefore, when we assume that someone has an excuse based on [[ijtihad]] or [[taqlid]], it is not permissible to prohibit negativity, and the Imam of Muslims has these conditions, and such a possibility is always given. Even if we are sure of the occurrence of negativity such a supposition leads to the fall of the Imam from the condition of command, it is not an example of [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]]. (pp. 336-334)

Accordingly, he believes that the narrations indicating the permissibility of criticism refer to private criticism and the narrations regarding the sanctity of criticism refer to its public and public design. (p. 341) Fakhkhar Tousi also stated in response to a documented question about the life of ~~[[Imam Ali (AS)|~~Imam Ali (PBUH)]] in dealing with critics that we cannot necessarily follow the example of imams since maybe the Imam was in the position of teaching or had another direction. (p. 346)

Accordingly, he believes that the narrations indicating the permissibility of criticism refer to private criticism and the narrations regarding the sanctity of criticism refer to its public and public design. (p. 341) Fakhkhar Tousi also stated in response to a documented question about the life of Imam Ali (PBUH) in dealing with critics that we cannot necessarily follow the example of imams since maybe the Imam was in the position of teaching or had another direction. (p. 346)

==Footnotes==

==References==

* Research School of Jurisprudence and Law, the website of the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, visit date: 26 January 2021.

* Hojjatul Islam Seyyed Javad Varaei, Ijtihad Network, visit date: 26 January 2021.

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[[fa:فقه و دولت (کتاب)]]

[[category: book review]]

[[Category:Books published by ~~Feyham~~ Cultural Research Institute]]

[[Category:Books published by Fahim Cultural Research Institute]]

[[category: Articles by hassan ejraei]]

@@ Line 95: / Line 95: @@
 ===Examining the Scope of Privacy based on Political Jurisprudence===
-Referring to the theological foundations of Shia, including the opposition to al-ja'a and its incompatibility with duty, [[Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]] talked about the conflict of rulings such as elementary [[jihad]] and [[apostasy]] with the theological perspective of Shia. At the same time, it was clarified that the jurists pay attention to the theological foundations in issuing fatwas and they do not oppose the al-ja'a (p. 122-124). He has also pointed out the contradiction of the mentioned principle with the third stage of commanding good and forbidding evil, that is, practical enjoining and forbidding. (p. 125)
+Referring to the theological foundations of Shia, including the opposition to al-ja'a and its incompatibility with duty, Mohammad Soroush Mahallati talked about the conflict of rulings such as elementary [[jihad]] and [[apostasy]] with the theological perspective of Shia. At the same time, it was clarified that the jurists pay attention to the theological foundations in issuing fatwas and they do not oppose the al-ja'a (p. 122-124). He has also pointed out the contradiction of the mentioned principle with the third stage of commanding good and forbidding evil, that is, practical enjoining and forbidding. (p. 125)
-Soroush Mahallati then expressed the opinions of [[Imam Khomeini]] and Ali Ahmadi Mianeji, and arued the possibility that [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] language may be a form of violation of the dignity of individuals and therefore an invasion of privacy. (p. 128). Thus, he believes that if [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] requires harm, there is no obstacle to doing it, but if we doubt about this, we cannot enjoin or forbid (p. 143).
+Soroush Mahallati then expressed the opinions of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] and Ali Ahmadi Mianeji, and arued the possibility that [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] language may be a form of violation of the dignity of individuals and therefore an invasion of privacy. (p. 128). Thus, he believes that if [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]] requires harm, there is no obstacle to doing it, but if we doubt about this, we cannot enjoin or forbid (p. 143).
 ===Civil Obedience in Shia Jurisprudence===
-[[Sayyid Javad Varai|Seyyed Javad Varaei]] first presented the definition of [[civil disobedience]] and its difference with civil resistance, which disobedience has a positive aspect and resistance has a negative aspect; Thus, [[civil disobedience]] has three conditions:
+Seyyed Javad Varaei first presented the definition of [[civil disobedience]] and its difference with civil resistance, which disobedience has a positive aspect and resistance has a negative aspect; Thus, civil disobedience has three conditions:
 # Objection and defiance should be obvious;
 # Before the obvious opposition, it has been pursued through legal means and no result has been achieved; and
 # Maintaining social order (pp. 171-172).
-After that, the difference between [[civil disobedience]] and subversion or insurrection is stated, based on which, the goal in subversion or insurrection is to overthrow the political system. While in [[civil disobedience]], social order is maintained and disobedience must be accompanied by the acceptance of the political system. Therefore, disobedience is different from war because in [[Moharebeh]], social security is threatened in armed form. (pp. 172-173)
+After that, the difference between civil disobedience and subversion or insurrection is stated, based on which, the goal in subversion or insurrection is to overthrow the political system. While in civil disobedience, social order is maintained and disobedience must be accompanied by the acceptance of the political system. Therefore, disobedience is different from war because in [[Moharebeh]], social security is threatened in armed form. (pp. 172-173)
-Varaei has clarified that disobedience, protest, resistance and [[civil disobedience]] against the law, decision and policy adopted and implemented by the Prophet or the [[the Fourteen Infallibles|infallible Imam]] is illegitimate and prohibited (p. 174). Relying on the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the [[the Fourteen Infallibles|infallible Imams]] it can be said that during the time of [[The Occultation|occultation]], people have the right to disobey in three cases:
+Varaei has clarified that disobedience, protest, resistance and civil disobedience against the law, decision and policy adopted and implemented by the Prophet or the [[the Fourteen Infallibles|infallible Imam]] is illegitimate and prohibited (p. 174). Relying on the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the infallible Imams it can be said that during the time of [[The Occultation|occultation]], people have the right to disobey in three cases:
-# Laws and decisions of the government that are against [[Sharia]];
+# Laws and decisions of the government that are against Sharia;
 # The rulings and regulations and decisions are wrong and incorrect; and
 # The government does not fulfil its duties towards the people (pp. 182-177).
-===Jurisprudential Investigation of Baghi (rebels) and its Relationship with Civil Disobedience===
+===Jurisprudential Investigation of Baghy (rebels) and its Relationship with Civil Disobedience===
-In this article, Mahdi Pourhossein has first stated two meanings of [[Baghi]] (rebels) in the words of jurists. According to jurists including [[Shaykh Tusi|Sheikh Tousi]], [[Ibn Idris al-Hilli|Ibn Idris]] and [[Allamah al-Hilli|Allameh Helli]], a rebel is someone who revolts against the government. According to [[Allamah al-Hilli|Allameh Helli]], the [[Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i al'Amili|Shahid Sani]] and the writer of [[Jawaher al-Kalam|Jawaher Al-Kalam]], "departing from obedience to the Imam" means a rebel, and thus [[civil disobedience]] to the view of these three jurists is a rebellion, because [[civil disobedience]] is the same as leaving the Imam's obedience. (p. 193).
+In this article, Mahdi Pourhossein has first stated two meanings of [[Baghi|Baghy]] (rebels) in the words of jurists. According to jurists including [[Shaykh Tusi|Sheikh Tousi]], [[Ibn Idris al-Hilli|Ibn Idris]] and [[Allamah al-Hilli|Allameh Helli]], a rebel is someone who revolts against the government. According to Allameh Helli, the [[Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i al'Amili|Shahid Sani]] and the writer of [[Jawaher al-Kalam|Jawaher Al-Kalam]], "departing from obedience to the Imam" means a rebel, and thus [[civil disobedience]] to the view of these three jurists is a rebellion, because [[civil disobedience]] is the same as leaving the Imam's obedience. (p. 193).
 However, Pourhossein has clarified that even the jurists who consider [[civil disobedience]] as rebellion have set three conditions for it:
 # Rebels must have a numerical plurality (according to this, [[Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam|Abd al-Rahman bin Muljam]] is not a rebel).
 # The rebels must have left the government's authority and the government should not have control over them.
 # They should have political justification.
-Pourhossein finally concluded that [[civil disobedience]], non-violent acts and even rebellion, if not with the intention of overthrowing the government, are not considered rebellion (p. 196-194). Against the rebels, peaceful ways should be used at first, and in case of failure, the Muslim ruler does not have the right to start the war and the rebels must start the war (p. 204) and, in addition, the rule of the [[Baghi]] (rebels) is to fight not to kill (p. 201).
+Pourhossein finally concluded that [[civil disobedience]], non-violent acts and even rebellion, if not with the intention of overthrowing the government, are not considered rebellion (p. 196-194). Against the rebels, peaceful ways should be used at first, and in case of failure, the Muslim ruler does not have the right to start the war and the rebels must start the war (p. 204) and, in addition, the rule of the [[Baghi|Baghy]] (rebels) is to fight not to kill (p. 201).
 ==The Place of the People in the Islamic Government==
-Three of the lectures mentioned in the book are about the place of the people, the majority and their votes in the [[Islamic government]], which were presented by [[Kazem Qazizadeh]], Abdullah Hajisadeqi and Mohsen Ghoravyan.
+Three of the lectures mentioned in the book are about the place of the people, the majority and their votes in the Islamic government, which were presented by Kazem Qazizadeh, Abdullah Hajisadeqi and Mohsen Ghoravyan.
 ===Discussing the Position of the Majority in the Legitimacy of the Islamic Government===
-Abdullah Hajisadeqi believes that although the people do not have a role in the [[legitimacy]] of the [[Islamic government]], they do have a role in accepting, participating and monitoring it (p. 35). Additionally, if the society does not have a desire for a provincial system, it will not be possible to realize the [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]] (p. 41). Also, according to Hajisadeqi, a non-[[faqih]] cannot be a ruler. (p. 42)
+Abdullah Hajisadeqi believes that although the people do not have a role in the [[legitimacy]] of the Islamic government, they do have a role in accepting, participating and monitoring it (p. 35). Additionally, if the society does not have a desire for a provincial system, it will not be possible to realize the [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]] (p. 41). Also, according to Hajisadeqi, a non-faqih cannot be a ruler. (p. 42)
-[[Mohammad Javad Arasta]] emphasized that if the people do not accept the jurist Jame al-Sharaiti, whose accepted example is [[Umar ibn Hanzalah|Umar bin Hanzala]]: “For I have made him a ruler over you ", however, he called the people guilty of sin in this regard (p. 43). He has also expressed a question about the methods of securing acceptance, based on which, what percentage of people's acceptance is necessary for the validity of the [[Islamic government]]? Half plus one? two-thirds? Or is there another criterion? (p. 44) Aristotle is of the opinion that if the general acceptance is lost during the government, the continuation of the acts of guardianship will not be allowed. (p. 46).
+[[Mohammad Javad Arasta]] emphasized that if the people do not accept the jurist Jame al-Sharaiti, whose accepted example is [[Umar ibn Hanzalah|Umar bin Hanzala]]: “For I have made him a ruler over you ", however, he called the people guilty of sin in this regard (p. 43). He has also expressed a question about the methods of securing acceptance, based on which, what percentage of people's acceptance is necessary for the validity of the Islamic government? Half plus one? two-thirds? Or is there another criterion? (p. 44) Aristotle is of the opinion that if the general acceptance is lost during the government, the continuation of the acts of guardianship will not be allowed. (p. 46).
 ===Discussing the Place of People's Vote in Islamic Government===
@@ Line 129: / Line 129: @@
 ===The Place of People's Vote in Islamic Government===
-[[Kazem Qazizadeh]] has stated with a historical perspective that the Shiites first considered all jurists to be authorized to act as guardians. Then, in order to solve the problem of conflict between jurists, [[Imam Khomeini]] believed in the velayat of the faqih, which according to Qazizadeh, is the first stage of the beginning of the theory of the [[guardianship of the jurist]]. After the formation of the [[Islamic government]] and the need to manage the society and the government, it led to the formation of the next stage in the theory of [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]], which is the [[guardianship of the jurist|velayat-e-faqih]] of the most learned. He considered the next stages to be the appropriate jurisprudence, and after that, the elected jurisprudence, which is both correct and elected by the people. (pp. 90-91).
+[[Kazem Qazizadeh]] has stated with a historical perspective that the Shiites first considered all jurists to be authorized to act as guardians. Then, in order to solve the problem of conflict between jurists, [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] believed in the velayat of the faqih, which according to Qazizadeh, is the first stage of the beginning of the theory of the [[guardianship of the jurist]]. After the formation of the Islamic government and the need to manage the society and the government, it led to the formation of the next stage in the theory of velayat-e-faqih, which is the velayat-e-faqih of the most learned. He considered the next stages to be the appropriate jurisprudence, and after that, the elected jurisprudence, which is both correct and elected by the people. (pp. 90-91).
 Qazizadeh then expressed three views about the position of people's vote:
 {{column|2}}
@@ Line 141: / Line 141: @@
 ===The Relationship between the Media and Government===
-[[Mohammad Javad Fakhkhar Tousi]] first proposed different theories about the relationship between the media and government
+Mohammad Javad Fakhkhar Tousi first proposed different theories about the relationship between the media and government
 {{column|2}}
 # The media under the supervision of the Muslim Leader: This theory was proposed in the book of [[Hossein-Ali Montazeri]]'s studies based on two reasons: First, the Governor is responsible for managing the society and , second, all institutions are tools of the Governor for managing the society. (pp. 315-316)
@@ Line 148: / Line 148: @@
 # National media and private media should be monitored, as well (p. 325). According to Fakhkhar Tousi, there is no fulfilment of the conditions of the prohibition of evil against the Muslim commander because the occurrence of negativity must be evident. Therefore, when we assume that someone has an excuse based on [[ijtihad]] or [[taqlid]], it is not permissible to prohibit negativity, and the Imam of Muslims has these conditions, and such a possibility is always given. Even if we are sure of the occurrence of negativity such a supposition leads to the fall of the Imam from the condition of command, it is not an example of [[enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil|enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong]]. (pp. 336-334)
 {{end}}
-Accordingly, he believes that the narrations indicating the permissibility of criticism refer to private criticism and the narrations regarding the sanctity of criticism refer to its public and public design. (p. 341) Fakhkhar Tousi also stated in response to a documented question about the life of [[Imam Ali (AS)|Imam Ali (PBUH)]] in dealing with critics that we cannot necessarily follow the example of imams since maybe the Imam was in the position of teaching or had another direction. (p. 346)
+Accordingly, he believes that the narrations indicating the permissibility of criticism refer to private criticism and the narrations regarding the sanctity of criticism refer to its public and public design. (p. 341) Fakhkhar Tousi also stated in response to a documented question about the life of Imam Ali (PBUH) in dealing with critics that we cannot necessarily follow the example of imams since maybe the Imam was in the position of teaching or had another direction. (p. 346)
 ==Footnotes==
+{{Footnotes}}
 <references />
 ==References==
+{{References}}
 * Research School of Jurisprudence and Law, the website of the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, visit date: 26 January 2021.
 * Hojjatul Islam Seyyed Javad Varaei, Ijtihad Network, visit date: 26 January 2021.
@@ Line 163: / Line 165: @@
 [[fa:فقه و دولت (کتاب)]]
 [[category: book review]]
-[[Category:Books published by Feyham Cultural Research Institute]]
+[[Category:Books published by Fahim Cultural Research Institute]]
 [[category: Articles by hassan ejraei]]

Jurisprudence and Government (book): Difference between revisions