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*'''Indirect Euthanasia:''' Lethal drugs are made available to an incurable patient to end their own life,<ref>Qasemi, *Danshnamah-i Fiqh-i Pizishki*, 2016, vol. 3, p. 323.</ref> or drugs are prescribed that have death as a consequence.<ref>Parsapour et al., "Euthanasia, Explanation and Ethical Analysis," p. 3.</ref>
*'''Indirect Euthanasia:''' Lethal drugs are made available to an incurable patient to end their own life,<ref>Qasemi, *Danshnamah-i Fiqh-i Pizishki*, 2016, vol. 3, p. 323.</ref> or drugs are prescribed that have death as a consequence.<ref>Parsapour et al., "Euthanasia, Explanation and Ethical Analysis," p. 3.</ref>


The jurisprudential discussion of euthanasia is separate from the topic of [[brain-dead]] patients. Thus, a jurist might permit disconnecting life support from a brain-dead patient or a patient in a coma with no hope of recovery, but the same jurist would consider passive euthanasia—withholding treatment out of compassion—to be forbidden (haram).<ref>For example, see Makarem Shirazi, Naser, *Istifta'at-i Jadid*, vol. 1, pp. 479-480; Khoei & Tabrizi, *Ahkam-i Jami'-i Masa'il-i Pizishki*, p. 280; Khoei, *Fiqh al-A'dhar al-Shar'iyya wa al-Masa'il al-Tibbiyya*, p. 198.</ref>
The jurisprudential discussion of euthanasia is separate from the topic of [[Brain Death]] patients. Thus, a jurist might permit disconnecting life support from a brain-dead patient or a patient in a coma with no hope of recovery, but the same jurist would consider passive euthanasia—withholding treatment out of compassion—to be forbidden (haram).<ref>For example, see Makarem Shirazi, Naser, *Istifta'at-i Jadid*, vol. 1, pp. 479-480; Khoei & Tabrizi, *Ahkam-i Jami'-i Masa'il-i Pizishki*, p. 280; Khoei, *Fiqh al-A'dhar al-Shar'iyya wa al-Masa'il al-Tibbiyya*, p. 198.</ref>


===History and Position===
===History and Position===
It is said that the term euthanasia was first introduced into medical culture by the 16th-century English philosopher Francis Bacon, in an essay titled "The Advancement of Learning," where he discussed a painless death.<ref>Vecchio and others, "Brief history of Euthanasia and the contribution of medical and surgical ethics to the cultural debate," p. 185.</ref> In the first half of the 20th century, Thomas More, an English lawyer and philosopher, in his book "Utopia," deemed this act legitimate for terminally ill patients suffering greatly, conditional on the permission of judges and priests.<ref>Vecchio and others, "Brief history of Euthanasia and the contribution of medical and surgical ethics to the cultural debate," p. 185.</ref> Since then, and especially after World War II, discussions and writings on this topic have intensified, and today it is one of the most important and controversial issues in the field of medical ethics and law.<ref>Afzali and Marzbandi, "Euthanasia in the History of Medicine," p. 67.</ref>
It is said that the term euthanasia was first introduced into medical culture by the 16th-century English philosopher Francis Bacon, in an essay titled "The Advancement of Learning," where he discussed a painless death.<ref>Vecchio and others, "Brief history of Euthanasia and the contribution of medical and surgical ethics to the cultural debate," p. 185.</ref> In the first half of the 20th century, Thomas More, an English lawyer and philosopher, in his book "Utopia," deemed this act legitimate for terminally ill patients suffering greatly, conditional on the permission of judges and priests.<ref>Vecchio and others, "Brief history of Euthanasia and the contribution of medical and surgical ethics to the cultural debate," p. 185.</ref> Since then, and especially after World War II, discussions and writings on this topic have intensified, and today it is one of the most important and controversial issues in the field of medical ethics and law.<ref>Afzali and Marzbandi, "Euthanasia in the History of Medicine," p. 67.</ref>


Although related topics have been addressed in past jurisprudential works in the chapters on retribution (qisas) and blood money (diyah), and within issues such as "the prohibition of killing a soul"<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 180.</ref> and "the impermissibility of killing someone who consents to it,"<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 185.</ref> and the issue of ijhaz{{Note|Delivering a coup de grâce to a wounded infidel enemy who has been captured by Muslims before the end of the war. (A group of authors, *Farhang-e Fiqh-e Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 284.)}} which is discussed in the chapter on jihad,<ref>A group of authors, *Farhang-e Fiqh-e Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 284.</ref> there has been no discussion on the rulings of euthanasia. This issue is an emergent one in the field of medical jurisprudence, which has now attracted the attention of contemporary jurists, who have addressed it in response to various inquiries.<ref>Al-'Ammari and Ben Hami, *Al-Qatl al-Rahim: Dirasa Muqarana bayn al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya wa al-Qanun al-Wad'i*, p. 9.</ref>
Although related topics have been addressed in past jurisprudential works in the chapters on retribution (qisas) and blood money (diyah), and within issues such as "the prohibition of killing a soul"<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 180.</ref> and "the impermissibility of killing someone who consents to it,"<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 185.</ref> and the issue of ijhaz which is discussed in the chapter on jihad,<ref>A group of authors, *Farhang-e Fiqh-e Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 284.</ref> there has been no discussion on the rulings of euthanasia. This issue is an emergent one in the field of medical jurisprudence, which has now attracted the attention of contemporary jurists, who have addressed it in response to various inquiries.<ref>Al-'Ammari and Ben Hami, *Al-Qatl al-Rahim: Dirasa Muqarana bayn al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya wa al-Qanun al-Wad'i*, p. 9.</ref>


==Prescriptive Ruling and Its Reasons==
==Prescriptive Ruling and Its Reasons==
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====Indirect Euthanasia====
====Indirect Euthanasia====
Regarding the declarative ruling of euthanasia, considering the patient's permission and consent to its performance or their lack thereof, there is a difference of opinion among jurists. One of the issues that has been discussed in Shia jurisprudence in the past and can be used in this context now is that if someone tells another, "Kill me, or I will kill you," can he kill him? And if he kills him, is retribution or blood money established for him?<ref>Ansari, "Mercy Killing," p. 133.</ref> There are two views on this issue:
Regarding the declarative ruling of euthanasia, considering the patient's permission and consent to its performance or their lack thereof, there is a difference of opinion among jurists. One of the issues that has been discussed in Shia jurisprudence in the past and can be used in this context now is that if someone tells another, "Kill me, or I will kill you," can he kill him? And if he kills him, is retribution or blood money established for him?<ref>Ansari, "Mercy Killing," p. 133.</ref> There are two views on this issue:
# '''Forfeiture of the Right to Retribution and Blood Money:''' According to jurists such as Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, Shahid al-Thani, the author of Jawahir, Sayyid Abd al-A'la Sabzevari, and [[Sayyid Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini|Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini]], since the victim consented to his own murder, he has forfeited the right to retribution and blood money.<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 185; Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 42, p. 54; Shahid al-Thani, *Masalik al-Afham*, vol. 15, p. 89; Sabzevari, *Muhadhdhab al-Ahkam*, vol. 28, p. 199; Khomeini, *Tahrir al-Wasilah*, vol. 2, p. 489.</ref>
# '''Forfeiture of the Right to Retribution and Blood Money:''' According to jurists such as Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, Shahid al-Thani, the author of Jawahir, Sayyid Abd al-A'la Sabzevari, and [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini]], since the victim consented to his own murder, he has forfeited the right to retribution and blood money.<ref>Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, *Shara'i' al-Islam*, vol. 4, p. 185; Najafi, *Jawahir al-Kalam*, vol. 42, p. 54; Shahid al-Thani, *Masalik al-Afham*, vol. 15, p. 89; Sabzevari, *Muhadhdhab al-Ahkam*, vol. 28, p. 199; Khomeini, *Tahrir al-Wasilah*, vol. 2, p. 489.</ref>
# '''Non-forfeiture of the Right to Retribution and Blood Money:''' According to jurists such as Sayyid Abulqasim Khoei, Mirza Jawad Tabrizi, and [[Ja'far Sobhani]], even with the victim's consent and permission for his own murder, the right to retribution and blood money is not forfeited.<ref>Khoei, *Mabani Takmilat al-Minhaj*, vol. 42, p. 18; Tabrizi, *Tanqih Mabani al-Ahkam*, pp. 47-48; Sobhani, *Ahkam al-Qisas fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra'*, p. 93.</ref> Because, unlike what applies to property, a person does not have authority over their own destruction, so their permission for their own destruction does not cause the forfeiture of liability. Therefore, the general applicability of the evidence for retribution includes this case as well.<ref>Khoei, *Mabani Takmilat al-Minhaj*, vol. 42, p. 18; Tabrizi, *Tanqih Mabani al-Ahkam*, pp. 47-48; Sobhani, *Ahkam al-Qisas fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra'*, p. 93.</ref> [[Sayyid Mohammad Sadiq Rouhani]], in criticizing this view, has said that a person is the owner of their own life, limbs, and actions, and therefore, with permission and consent to their own destruction and murder, the right to retribution and blood money is forfeited.<ref>Rouhani, *Fiqh al-Sadiq*, vol. 26, p. 34.</ref>
# '''Non-forfeiture of the Right to Retribution and Blood Money:''' According to jurists such as Sayyid Abulqasim Khoei, Mirza Jawad Tabrizi, and [[Ja'far Sobhani]], even with the victim's consent and permission for his own murder, the right to retribution and blood money is not forfeited.<ref>Khoei, *Mabani Takmilat al-Minhaj*, vol. 42, p. 18; Tabrizi, *Tanqih Mabani al-Ahkam*, pp. 47-48; Sobhani, *Ahkam al-Qisas fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra'*, p. 93.</ref> Because, unlike what applies to property, a person does not have authority over their own destruction, so their permission for their own destruction does not cause the forfeiture of liability. Therefore, the general applicability of the evidence for retribution includes this case as well.<ref>Khoei, *Mabani Takmilat al-Minhaj*, vol. 42, p. 18; Tabrizi, *Tanqih Mabani al-Ahkam*, pp. 47-48; Sobhani, *Ahkam al-Qisas fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Gharra'*, p. 93.</ref> [[Sayyid Mohammad Sadiq Rouhani]], in criticizing this view, has said that a person is the owner of their own life, limbs, and actions, and therefore, with permission and consent to their own destruction and murder, the right to retribution and blood money is forfeited.<ref>Rouhani, *Fiqh al-Sadiq*, vol. 26, p. 34.</ref>