Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)

Author: Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki

Islam and the Needs of Time (Book)
Book Information
Author	Morteza Motahhari
Subject	Foundations of Contemporary Jurisprudence
Style	Argumentative
Language	Persian
Publication Information
Publisher	Sadra Publications

• Abstract

Islam and the Needs of Time (اسلام و نیازهای زمان), is a two-volume book by Morteza Motahhari that examines the application of Islamic teachings to the changing needs of time. In this work, Motahhari addresses the issue of independent reasoning (Ijtihad) and its necessity in understanding religion and adapting it to the changing conditions of various eras, believing that Islam, through *Ijtihad*, can answer the diverse needs of different periods. He has pointed out temporal differences and social changes, as well as how Islam adapts to these developments.

In this book, issues such as the relativity of ethics, the relativity of justice, historical determinism, human need for religion, the abrogation (Naskh) of rulings, the finality of the Prophet (Khatamiyyah), and relativity in *Ijtihad* are examined, along with the principial (Usuli) method of Islam in responding to the challenges of the modern world based on the Quran, reason ('Aql), and deep understanding (Tafaqquh) in religion. He also analyzes certain intellectual and political currents in the history of Islam and Iran; currents that suffered from a kind of rigidity (Jumud) or ignorance in encountering Islam and the requirements of time; including the Kharijites, Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites, Akhbaris, as well as certain currents during the Constitutional (Mashrutah) period.

Brief Overview and Structure

The book "Islam and the Needs of Time," which was known as "Islam and the Requirements of Time" (Islam wa Muqtadhayat-e Zaman) until its eighteenth printing (Introduction to the nineteenth printing: May 2002), is a collection of 26 lectures by Morteza Motahhari during the month of Ramadan in 1966 (1345 SH), which addresses the adaptation of Islam to the developments of the era with an analytical approach. The structure of the book is organized based on the titles of the lectures; titles that reflect the subject of discussion and their internal logic.

In the first volume, Motahhari addresses the necessity of transformation in religious thought with the changing conditions of the era and distinguishes two types of temporal changes from each other. He considers reason as the tool for moderate movement on the path of social growth and, by analyzing currents such as the Kharijites and Akhbarism, demands intellectual purification in Islam. Examining the threefold roles of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH)—prophethood (Risalah), judgment (Qadhawah), and governance (Hukumah)—in adaptation to temporal requirements, emphasizing dynamic jurisprudence (Fiqh-e Puya), the rule of concomitance (Qa'idah Mulazamah), the position of reason, and modeling after Imam Ali (a), are among the important axes of this volume. Critiquing relativistic theories in justice, ethics, and worship, defending the constant human needs such as worship, and analyzing the issue of abrogation and finality (Khatamiyyah) in connection with justice also form the final section of this volume.

The second volume addresses the philosophy of *Ijtihad*, the foundations of rulings, and the role of reason in the process of derivation (Istinbat). By answering common doubts, Motahhari introduces *Ijtihad* as a living mechanism, time-bound, and subordinate to conditions. The theory of historical determinism, including economic determinism, is critiqued, and with a Quran-centric interpretation, the role of human will in historical transformations is highlighted. At the end, the discussion of absolute or relative ethics is examined with a profound and comparative view, and Islamic ethics is elucidated against relativistic viewpoints.

Jurisprudence at the Intersection of Tradition and the Era; The Meaning of Adapting Religion to Time

Motahhari considers the main concern of his era to be the challenge between Islam and the requirements of the new age. In his belief, enlightened Muslims bear a twofold duty: first, a correct and precise understanding of true Islam as an intellectual, social, divine, and felicitous school of thought; and second, a profound understanding of the conditions of the time, along with distinguishing between scientific and technical achievements and the current of corruption and intellectual deviation (Vol. 1, p. 11).

He views "adapting religion to time" not as changing principles and rulings to harmonize with the varying tastes and desires of people, but as a deeper understanding of religion in the context of the developments and requirements of time. From his perspective, Islam is a dynamic and living religion that has come to answer the perpetual needs of human beings. This responsiveness is only possible through correct *Ijtihad* and a precise understanding of the requirements of time. Islamic jurisprudence, despite the stability of its principles, possesses a high capacity to confront new issues due to the dynamism of the *Ijtihad* method. He considers attributing rigidity and stagnation to Islam a fallacy resulting from an incorrect understanding of time and religion; because the fixed principles are that very straight path that extends from the beginning to the end of human life (Vol. 1, pp. 13-15).

Reason and Ijtihad; The Synergy of Rationality and Sharia

Relying on Verse 72 of Surah al-Ahzab, Motahhari highlights the role of reason and free will in understanding the religious responsibility of a human being. Reason has the ability to comprehend the conditions of time, and only a human being, by utilizing it, is capable of choosing between the path of felicity and wretchedness (Vol. 1, pp. 22, 24–26). Reason is not only a tool for understanding religion and one of the bases for deriving rulings, but it is also considered a factor for knowing the time, and in its light, a human being is protected from the downfall caused by oppression or ignorance (Vol. 1, pp. 28–29; Vol. 2, p. 26). He expresses the promise of reason's liberation from carnal desires in the era of the reappearance of Hazrat Mahdi (a.j.) and, in the words of the Commander of the Faithful (a), depicts the era when people will be quenched from the spring of knowledge (Vol. 1, p. 37).

Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence and Beyond Politicization

In examining the growth of Islamic civilization in the era of the prophetic mission (Risalah), Motahhari considers the main factor of this flourishing to be the dynamism of jurisprudence and the avoidance of rigidity and blind imitation (Taqlid). Contrary to some Western theories that count the growth of Muslims merely as the result of eliminating racial privileges, he believes that Islam, instead of superficiality and politicking, commits itself to justice and humanity (Vol. 1, p. 42). He views politicization and surrender to political pressures as a bane to the jurisprudential system and, pointing to the principled stance of Imam Ali (a) against Mu'awiyah and the uprising of Imam Hussein (a) against Yazid, introduces these cases as evidence of the Infallibles' jurisprudential independence from political compromises (Vol. 1, pp. 44–46).

Pathology of Jurisprudence; From Extremes and Negligence to Rigidity and Distortion

Motahhari warns against the danger of extremes and negligence (Ifrat wa Tafrit) in jurisprudence and the neglect of the requirements of time, and relying on the principle of moderation in the Islamic Ummah, considers historical deviations to be caused by ignorance or intellectual rigidity (Vol. 1, p. 47). Among these instances, he points to the alteration of the call to prayer (Adhan) during the time of the second Caliph under the pretext of war requirements, interference in the rulings of fasting, pork, and the language of worship (Vol. 1, pp. 48–61).

By critiquing tendencies such as Abu Hanifa's inclination toward analogy (Qiyas), the Akhbari movement, and sects like the Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, and Kharijites, he introduces them as symbols of deviation in understanding *Ijtihad* and religion (Vol. 1, pp. 63–73, 87–93). Motahhari emphasizes that intellectual rigidity—even if presented in the guise of preserving the appearance of religion—is as perilous as the blatant distortion (Tahrif) of religion (Vol. 1, p. 54).

In explaining jurisprudential rigidity in history, Motahhari gives examples from the Kharijites to the opposition to the Constitutional Movement (Mashrutah) in the contemporary era. By comparing the Kharijite movement, which considered voting in the caliphate an innovation (Bid'ah), with the Akhbari movement, he examines their similarity in confronting reason and *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, p. 95). He then points to the oppositions that occurred against legislation during the Constitutional era and regards them as examples of jurisprudential rigidity in the contemporary era (Vol. 1, pp. 96–102).

He explains that the Noble Prophet (PBUH) possessed three statuses: prophethood, judgment, and governance, of which the latter two—judgment and governance—are transferable subject to specific conditions and criteria. Islam, by introducing general criteria, has provided the ground for the realization of an Islamic government based on *Ijtihad* (Vol. 1, pp. 103–109).

Continuous Ijtihad; The Engine of Adapting Religion to Temporal Developments

Motahhari does not consider *Ijtihad* merely a scientific technique, but rather introduces it as the "driving force of Islam"; a vital force that keeps religion alive and dynamic in the face of historical and social developments (Vol. 1, p. 140). In his view, in a world whose requirements are constantly transforming, *Ijtihad* must also always remain active and cognizant of the times. Pointing to the views of Avicenna, Muhammad Iqbal, and reflection on Quranic verses, he emphasizes the necessity of the continuation of *Ijtihad* in all eras (Vol. 1, p. 141).

To clarify this viewpoint, Motahhari points to examples of jurisprudence observing the time; including the noble verse "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power" (Anfal, 60), which emphasizes combat readiness, but military equipment and facilities differ according to the requirements of each era and cannot be limited to archery or horseback riding (Vol. 1, p. 143). Also, he points to Imam Ali's (a) answer regarding dyeing white hair, considering it a matter subordinate to the psychological and social conditions of the era, not a fixed religious principle (Vol. 1, p. 144).

In expressing the jurisprudential conduct (Sirah) of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) in encountering historical requirements and practical examples of adapting jurisprudence to time, Motahhari points to the change in Imam al-Sadiq's (a) attire and the peace treaty of Imam al-Hasan (a); decisions that, although seemingly breaking tradition, were in fact made based on a deep understanding of the conditions of the time (Vol. 1, pp. 133–136). He also considers the personality of Imam Ali (a) as the embodiment of reason, jurisprudence, and cognizance of the times, serving as a transhistorical model for all eras (Vol. 1, pp. 153–162).

Continuing on this same path, Motahhari also expresses Fayz Kashani's jurisprudential encounter with the rigidity of the Akhbari movement; including his opposition to the obligation of the Sunnah of *Taht al-Hanak* (passing a portion of the turban under the chin), because this ruling was not original, but a measure against the signs of the polytheists. Kashani even considered the use of new clothing such as suits or fedora hats permissible, provided that they bore no sign of affiliation with an opposing religion (Vol. 1, pp. 145–146).

The Role of Ijtihad in the Continuation of Jurisprudence After the Finality of Prophethood

Given the principle of the finality (Khatamiyyah) of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), Motahhari explains that the continuation of religion, in the absence of a new prophet, is possible only by relying on the tool of *Ijtihad*. By examining the concept of abrogation (Naskh) in Islam, he shows that from the moment of the finality of prophethood, the responsibility for the mutability and adaptation of jurisprudence to emergent conditions is placed upon the reason and *Ijtihad* of fully qualified jurists (Vol. 1, pp. 213–232).

Motahhari then, by raising the discussion of "Correctness and Error" (Taswib wa Takhti'ah) regarding the relationship between jurisprudential derivation and external reality (Vol. 2, p. 49), analyzes the question "Is Ijtihad relative?". His answer is that changes in *Ijtihad* and fatwas in different periods are not due to an alteration in reality or the principles of derivation, but are the result of changing conditions of the era; therefore, *Ijtihad* is not considered relative (Vol. 2, pp. 50–51).

In his view, this issue means "changing the law by the dictate of the law" (Vol. 2, p. 59) and has a direct connection with the fixed and varying needs of humanity, as well as the fixed and varying Islamic rulings. Thus, continuous *Ijtihad* plays a fundamental role in the dynamism of jurisprudence and the continuity of the Sharia's capability to respond to social developments. Motahhari desires jurisprudence not just for the individual, but for society and civilization. He believes that jurisprudence must be present in the public sphere and play a role in macro-social structures. This perspective elevates jurisprudence from the individual domain to the civilizational arena (Vol. 2, p. 53).

Sources for Purifying Ijtihad; The Quran and Reason in Confronting Distortions

In explaining the mechanism for preserving the authenticity of religion, Motahhari introduces reason and the Quran as two fundamental pillars for purifying the jurisprudential system from historical contaminations. Relying on the famous prophetic Hadith, he believes that if a Hadith contradicts the Quran, it must be rejected (Vol. 1, p. 81). From Motahhari's perspective, the forgery of Hadiths—especially by groups such as the Jews—is considered among the key factors for the necessity of purification in religious understanding (Vol. 1, pp. 82–86).

Motahhari believes that the Akhbari movement, by setting aside reason and invalidating the apparent understanding (Zahir) of the Quran for the general public, moved on the path of intellectual fossilization (Tahajjur). In this regard, he quotes the viewpoint of Ayatollah Borujerdi, who believed that Akhbarism is the product of the influence of Western empiricist philosophy during the Safavid era (Vol. 1, pp. 92–93).

Dynamic Jurisprudence; Distinguishing Between Fixed and Varying Rulings

One of the central concepts in Motahhari's jurisprudential thought is the distinction between fixed (Thabit) and varying (Mutaghayyir) rulings in Islamic jurisprudence; a concept that he has repeatedly addressed in various parts of his book. Motahhari believes that Islamic rulings are built upon two fundamental bases: fixed principles and varying rules. Fixed rulings are that category of Sharia laws rooted in the innate (Fitri) and eternal needs of humans; principles such as justice, preservation of human dignity, prohibition of oppression, and observance of trustworthiness. These principles, due to their direct connection with the human soul and the macro-objectives of religion, do not undergo change throughout history.

In contrast, another part of jurisprudence is dedicated to varying rulings; rulings that have the capability of change and reinterpretation based on temporal, spatial, and social conditions. This category of rulings is often formulated based on varying expediencies and corruptions (Masalih wa Mafasid) or the specific custom and social conditions of each era. In this context, the role of dynamic and time-conscious *Ijtihad* becomes prominent, because the jurist must possess the ability to recognize and reproduce varying rulings proportionate to the developments of time while preserving the fixed principles (Vol. 1, pp. 117–128, 171–179; Vol. 2, pp. 9–11, 53).

To further explain this distinction, Motahhari introduces Islamic rulings as being of the type of "real propositions" (Qadhaya Haqiqiyyah); meaning general and universal rulings established based on the nature of things, not specific and external propositions (Qadhaya Kharijiyyah). Accordingly, a jurisprudential ruling might be lawful (Halal) from one aspect and forbidden (Haram) from another. Therefore, the method of derivation in real propositions differs fundamentally from external propositions (Vol. 2, pp. 13–16, 33). He emphasizes that the structure of Islamic rulings is based on the model of a real proposition, in which the philosophy of the rulings and the consideration of real expediencies and corruptions are taken into account; this very attitude provides the possibility of *Ijtihad* and the issuance of diverse fatwas proportionate to different temporal and spatial conditions (Vol. 2, p. 21).

Expediency-Oriented Jurisprudence; From the Rule of Concomitance and Overlapping Duties to the Guardianship of the Jurist

Continuing the discussions on adaptive jurisprudence, Motahhari addresses the principle of "the concomitance of the ruling of Sharia and reason" (Mulazamah Hukm al-Shar' wa al-'Aql) and considers it one of the foundational principles in the connection between reason and Sharia; a principle stating that whatever reason judges to be good or bad, the Sharia will also align with it (Vol. 1, p. 147; Vol. 2, pp. 22 and 29). Under this rule, he addresses important topics such as the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayah al-Faqih) (Vol. 1, p. 148), the law of the more important and the important (Ahamm wa Muhimm) (Vol. 1, p. 149), and the issue of dissecting a body in medical sciences; a topic that, despite its violent appearance, is justifiable in specific conditions and relying on scientific necessity (Vol. 1, p. 151). In cases such as changing the form of prayer for a sick person and a traveler, Motahhari also shows how Islamic jurisprudence acts flexibly in the face of individual and social situations (Vol. 1, pp. 153–154). He views the blending of fixed principles with reason-oriented pragmatism (Maslahat-Gara'i) as an art that only comes from successful and up-to-date *Ijtihad*.

Motahhari also mentions the rule of overlapping duties (Qa'idah al-Tazahum) as a solution for many dilemmas in derivation and determining religious duty. Based on this rule, a ruling can be permissible in certain conditions and prohibited in others; such as the overlap between the prohibition of touching the body of a non-Mahram and saving them from drowning, where priority lies with preserving life. Thus, the Mujtahid, taking into account the new conditions, can issue a fatwa (Vol. 2, pp. 16–17).

Among other instances of Islam's flexibility in the face of the requirements of the era are the extensive authorities of the religious ruler (Hakim al-Shar'), which were transferred from the Prophet (PBUH) to the infallible Imams and then to the religious ruler of the Islamic society (Vol. 2, pp. 44, 62, and 63). These authorities provide intra-religious capacities for encountering emergent conditions.

Expediencies and Corruptions in the Process of Ijtihad; The Basis for Adapting Rulings to Time

Motahhari emphasizes the role of expediency (Maslahat) and corruption (Mafsada) in deriving rulings. He believes that jurisprudence cannot be indifferent to the social and ethical consequences of rulings. Evaluating expediency is the jurist's tool for moving past superficiality and reaching the spirit of the Sharia. The Prophet and the Imams also considered the expediency of society when issuing rulings. Motahhari sees expediency not in opposition to the text (Nass), but within the framework of the text and reason. He emphasizes that the jurist must pay attention to social realities alongside the text. From this perspective, a jurisprudence that is indifferent to expediency cannot be efficient and effective in today's society. He also points to the overlap between the expediency of the individual and society and says: Although in Islam all individuals are equal, in times of conflict between individual and collective expediency, individual expediency is sacrificed for public expediency. An example of this issue is the permissibility of dissecting a Muslim's corpse under specific educational and scientific conditions, which Motahhari has explained (Vol. 2, pp. 17 and 19).

Based on this, Motahhari, in addition to explaining the position of reason in *Ijtihad* and referring to the rule of concomitance of reason and Sharia, points out that if the Quran and Sunnah do not have a ruling on a subject and reason discovers a binding expediency or corruption, given the spirit of Islam which does not overlook important expediencies and corruptions, one can arrive at the Sharia's ruling with the help of reason's ruling and issue a fatwa based on it (Vol. 2, p. 27).

Motahhari also points to the role of supervisory and controlling rules in Islamic jurisprudence, viewing them as tools for adapting to the needs of time. Especially the rules of "no-harm" (La Darar) and "no-hardship" (La Haraj) which, in the words of Sheikh al-Ansari, take precedence over other Islamic laws in the position of "governance" (Hukumah) and play a veto role in the rulings of worship and transactions (Vol. 2, pp. 59–61).

The Relationship Between Jurisprudence and Ethics; Rejecting Relativity in Human Values

In response to the theory of ethical relativity, Motahhari believes that since human instincts and the structure of human psychology have not changed throughout history, ethical principles must also be fixed and common (Vol. 1, pp. 167–168). He considers manners (Adab) the product of culture and social conditions, which can undergo transformation, but introduces ethics (Akhlaq) as being of the essence of innate nature (Fitrah) (Vol. 1, pp. 168–169). By raising issues such as rational good and evil (Husn wa Qubh 'Aqli), the constancy of conscience, and rejecting conventional ethics, he emphasizes that the ethical jurisprudence of Islam, relying on human innate nature, is capable of presenting fixed principles for all humans in all times (Vol. 1, pp. 206–208, 233–243, and Vol. 2, pp. 157–175).

Jurisprudential Justice and the Negation of Historical Determinism and Relativity in Justice

In Motahhari's view, justice is not only an ethical principle but a criterion for assessing the validity of jurisprudential rulings. In critiquing theories that introduce justice as a relative matter or subordinate to historical determinism, he first defines the relationship between "right" (Haqq) and "duty" (Taklif) based on human servitude to God, and then asserts that if right is separated from the Creator, it will lose its philosophical origin (Vol. 1, pp. 192–196).

In analyzing the position of the individual and society, Motahhari emphasizes the balance and simultaneous authenticity of both, and contrary to absolute individualism or collectivism, builds the Islamic structure on the mutual connection and influence of the individual and society (Vol. 1, pp. 198–199). From his perspective, justice arises from the real and innate rights of humanity; hence, it is neither relative nor historical, but rather transhistorical and universal (Vol. 1, p. 202).

He introduces the root of this kind of attitude towards justice as being in the divine school and explains that only belief in the Creator and the purposiveness of existence can present a defensible basis for the real rights of humans (Vol. 1, pp. 201–202). In other parts of the book, especially in the second volume, by critiquing viewpoints such as Marxism's economic determinism and analyzing the Quran's view on history, Motahhari views human free will and volition as the fundamental factor of historical change (Vol. 2, pp. 143–156, 265).