Women Fiqh: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
|||
| (5 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
*'''Abstract''' | *'''Abstract''' | ||
'''Women | '''Women Fiqh''' (in Persian: [[:fa:فقه_زنان|فقه زنان]]) is a sub-branch of Fiqh (Fiqh al-Mudaf) and a newly emerged branch in Fiqh that examines the rights and rulings related to women in various chapters of Fiqh taking a social, problem-oriented, and critical approach. Although the roots of Women Fiqh go back to traditional Shia Fiqh, its contemporary formulation is basically different from the traditional versions. In the past, issues of women were mainly concerned in terms of compiling their specific edicts with the aim of facilitating the education of religious duties. Despite their historical importance, these works have no analytical approach to the reasons of distinctions between men and women, their social consequences, and the relation between these rulings and the developments in the times. | ||
The fundamental transformation of Women | The fundamental transformation of Women Fiqh in the contemporary period has occurred in the context of Fiqh's encounter with modernity and profound social changes. In this period, Fiqhi distinctions between men and women have turned into a social issue with legal, cultural, and political effects, whereas it was previously just a question without notable consequences. Rulings related to women became problematic due to several key factors: first, the reduced persuasive power of some traditional Fiqhi answers for the new generation and their inconsistency with the lived experience of women in the new world; second, to bring up newly emerged issues in areas such as modern medicine, reproductive technologies, and economic developments; and third, the role of media and the public sphere in highlighting these issues and turning them into a social concern. | ||
Although Women | Although Women Fiqh is closely linked to [[Family Fiqh]], it focuses on different aspect. Based on a holistic view, Family Fiqh deals with the family institution as a whole and its goal is preservation and strengthening of this institution, whereas Women Fiqh, with a micro-level approach, regards women as independent individuals having rights, and mostly engages in reviewing famous rulings about women. The scope of women's issues has been redefined in [[Contemporary Fiqh]] and so it covers some other areas, in addition to traditional discussions, such as family law (e.g. [[Women Inheritance|Inheritance]], [[Divorce]], [[Custody]], [[Qawwamiyyah|taking care of women]]), women's social and political participation (e.g. [[Women judgeship|Judgeship]], [[Emulating a woman|Religious Authority]], [[Women's political positions|Government positions]], [[Women's blood money|Blood money]], and [[Women's testimony in court|Testimony]]), some worship rulings with social functions, and the absolutely emerged issues such as [[Artificial Insemination]], [[Surrogacy]], [[Abortion|Therapeutic Abortion]], and [[Gender Reassignment]]. | ||
Fiqhi approaches to women | Fiqhi approaches to issues of women can be categorized into a five-level spectrum. First approach, at the one end of the spectrum, is "devotional acceptance of the distinctions," which solely takes the appearances of jurisprudential evidence without addressing the reason of the rulings. Next level is "justification of the distinctions," which attempts to explain the wisdom and rationality of these differences through theological and philosophical analyses while it accepts and maintains the famous Fatwas. The third approach also does not change fatwas but believes in "modifying the effects of distinctions in the execution stage" through legislation and government measures. In contrast, the fourth approach directly leads to changes in the fatwa and achieves similar rulings for men and women by "rethinking Fiqhi evidence." Finally, the fifth approach, by "revising Usuli rules and methodological foundations of Ijtihad," calls for a deeper transformation in the process of inferring rulings. | ||
== Nature == | == Nature == | ||
Women | Women Fiqh is a sub-branch of Fiqh that deals with the explanation of rights and rulings related to women in various chapters of Islamic jurisprudence with a social and problem-oriented approach. Attention to women's issues has a long history in Shia Fiqh. In addition to discussing issues related to women in Fiqhi books, some works have been written independently by ancient jurists with the aim of compiling women's religious rulings; such as the book "Ahkam al-Nisa" (Rulings of Women) authored by Sheikh Mufid (d. 413 AH/1022 CE), which was compiled with the aim of gathering a brief collection to facilitate women's access to their special rulings.<ref>Mufid, ''Ahkam al-Nisa'', pp. 14-15.</ref> Afterward, this authorship tradition continued to works such as "Aqd al-Kisa fi Fiqh al-Nisa" by Ali b. Hussein Karbala'i (d. 1136 AH/1723 CE), who wrote it at the command of the king of the time.<ref>Karbala'i, ''Aqd al-Kisa fi Fiqh al-Nisa'', pp. 26-27.</ref> These works usually had common characteristics: their subject was the specific rulings of women, their goal was to facilitate the learning of these rulings, they did not address the philosophy and reasons for the distinctions, and they did not examine these rulings as social challenges. | ||
In the contemporary era and under the influence of Fiqh's encounter with modernity, this | In the contemporary era and under the influence of Fiqh's encounter with modernity, this area has fallen under "social Fiqh" and is no longer simply an "individual Fiqhi area." Fiqhi distinctions between men and women, which have always been "questions" since the time of The Legislator,<ref>Hurr al-Amili, ''Wasa'il al-Shia'', Vol. 26, pp. 93-96.</ref> have now turned into "problem."<ref>Zarei et al., "Fiqh and the Formation of Women's Issues in the Modern Context; A Conceptual Formulation of Emerging Women's Issues in Inquiries", p. 318.</ref> The difference between these two concepts is crucial. A "question" is a personal and simple inquiry regarding an unknown matter, the end of which is transforming ignorance into knowledge. But a "problem" is a social, complex matter; namely "an event or a situation which will lead to damage if it is ignored and will lead to benefits it is paid attention to."<ref>Dashti, ''Strategy-Oriented Problem-Based Research Method'', p. 49.</ref> A problem is arised in the context of social life, and failure to address it will have extensive consequences. | ||
This substantive transformation | This substantive transformation from individual nature to the social sphere was due to multiple factors: | ||
First, the | * First, the failure of traditional Fiqhi answers to rationally convince the new generation and their inconsistency with the "lived" situations of activists in the modern world;<ref>Zarei et al., "Fiqh and the Formation of Women's Issues in the Modern Context; A Conceptual Formulation of Emerging Women's Issues in Inquiries", p. 318 & 324.</ref> | ||
Second, the emergence of new issues in medical, social, and economic fields;<ref>Zarei et al., "Fiqh and the Formation of Women's Issues in the Modern Context; A Conceptual Formulation of Emerging Women's Issues in Inquiries", pp. 343-349.</ref> | * Second, the emergence of new issues in medical, social, and economic fields;<ref>Zarei et al., "Fiqh and the Formation of Women's Issues in the Modern Context; A Conceptual Formulation of Emerging Women's Issues in Inquiries", pp. 343-349.</ref> | ||
Third, the role of media and modern technologies in highlighting these issues and turning them into a social concern.<ref>Shajarian, "New Technologies and the Expansion of Gender Justice Demands; Challenges and Solutions", pp. 7-10.</ref> | * Third, the role of media and modern technologies in highlighting these issues and turning them into a social concern.<ref>Shajarian, "New Technologies and the Expansion of Gender Justice Demands; Challenges and Solutions", pp. 7-10.</ref> | ||
=== Difference between Family Fiqh and Women | === Difference between Family Fiqh and Women Fiqh === | ||
Women | Women Fiqh and Family Fiqh are two close yet distinct categories. The main distinction between the two leis in their focus. Based on a holistic view, Family Fiqh considers the "family institution" as a single system and its ultimate goal is the stability of this institution. In contrast, Women Fiqh, with a micro-level approach, regards "women" as independent individuals and, based on critical and rethinking approach, seeks to discover and explain their individual and social rights and to revise famous rulings.<ref>Mehrizi, "The Dominance of Tradition over the Atmosphere of Women's Religious Studies", p. 81.</ref> | ||
== Scope and Main Issues of Contemporary Women | == Scope and Main Issues of Contemporary Women Fiqh == | ||
In the traditional approach, | In the traditional approach, issues related to women are discussed in a numerous chapters of Fiqh, such as chapters of purity (Taharah), menstruation (Hayd), and Lochia (Nifas), as well as chapters of marriage (Nikah), divorce (Talaq), retaliation (Qisas), and blood money (Diyat). However, [[Contemporary Fiqh]] mainly focuses on topics have become social challenges as well as newly emerged issues that have not raised in the past, while it still pays attention to the traditional issues. Therefore the scope of Women Fiqh is redefined and the most important areas include: | ||
=== Family Rights === | === Family Rights === | ||
The rights and duties | The topic of women’s rights and duties in the family is one of the most widely discussed topics in contemporary Women Fiqh. Issues such as [[Unequal inheritance]], [[Right to Custody|right to custody of children]] after divorce, unilateral right to divorce for men, the concepts of Nushuz (disobedience) and Tamkin (submission) and their limits, [[Qawamiyyah|men's maintenance of the family]] (Qawamiyyah), and [[Women's Departure of Marital House|permissibility or impermissibility for women to leave the house without their husband's permission]] are all central topics in contemporary Fiqhi research regarding women's issues. | ||
=== Social and Political Issues === | === Social and Political Issues === | ||
Women’s widespread presence in public spheres and taking up socio-political jobs is one of the most important challenges to contemporary Fiqh. While traditional Fiqh mostly emphasized women's role in housekeeping, contemporary Fiqh faces the question of what the limits and boundaries of women's social and political participation are. Issues such as [[equality of blood money for men and women]], [[Women Testimony|women's testimony in court]], [[Emulating a Woman|Permissibility or impermissibility for a woman to be a religious authority]], [[Women's judgeship|taking up the position of judgeship]], [[Women's political positions|possibility of presidency and other high government positions]], and even more minor issues such as women attending sport games in stadiums and their motorcycle and bicycle riding in public passages are among the topics that have received attention in contemporary Fiqhi research. | |||
=== Acts of Worship === | === Acts of Worship === | ||
Although some | Although some scholars think the worship rulings in Women Fiqh does not require as much discussion as other topics,<ref>Alavitabar, "Religious Intellectualism and Women's Fiqh", p. 36.</ref> this does not mean this area is absolutely ignored. For instance, the worship rulings with social functions that have been challenged in the contemporary world are addressed in Women Fiqh. For example, a number of researchers critique the traditional claims on desirability of women avoiding presence in gatherings and subsequently in collective worship, arguing that these acts of worship have important social, cultural, and political functions in the contemporary world, and therefore it might be a "double deprivation" for women deproved of this capacity. They also challenge the prohibition of women's Imamate for men and, citing the opinion of some contemporary jurists such as [[Ayatollah Montazeri]],<ref>Montazeri, ''Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah'', Vol. 1, p. 361.</ref> claim that there is no valid evidence based on hadiths for this prohibition.<ref>Shafiei et al., "Critical Reading of the Traditional Fiqh Approach to Women's Rights (Foundations and Challenges)", pp. 139-140.</ref> | ||
=== | === Emerged Issues === | ||
Significant scientific and technological advancements have placed completely new issues before Women | Significant scientific and technological advancements have placed completely new issues before Women Fiqh, for which no precedent is found in previous Fiqhi texts. Topics such as modern reproductive technologies like [[Artificial Insemination|In vitro fertilization]], [[Surrogacy]], [[Egg Donation|egg donation]], and [[Embryo donation|Embryo]], the permissibility or impermissibility of [[Abortion]] during treatment in cases of hardship or incurable diseases of the fetus, rulings related to [[gender reassignment]] and [[Cosmetic surgery|Cosmetic surgeries]] constitute an important and growing part of research in contemporary Women Fiqh.<ref>Zarei et al., "Fiqh and the Formation of Women's Issues in the Modern Context; A Conceptual Formulation of Emerging Women's Issues in Inquiries", p. 343 & 349.</ref> | ||
== Fiqhi Approaches to Women's Issues == | == Fiqhi Approaches to Women's Issues == | ||
There are different approaches to Fiqhi issues related to women Fiqhi. Generally these approaches are divided into two categories: traditional and revisionist. Apart from the traditional approach, which emphasizes inferring and implementing the famous rulings that are different for men and women, there is a rival intellectual approach which believes that many Fiqhi differences between men and women are not religiously permanent and intrinsic and emphasizes the necessity of reviewing the evidence and even the foundations of Ijtihad to reach different results appropriate for the times. Instead of defending the famous opinions, this approach focuses on "reviewing the religious sources" in order to "change the famous opinions."<ref>Mehrizi, "The Dominance of Tradition over the Atmosphere of Women Religious Studies", p. 81.</ref> The most important representatives of this current include jurists such as [[Yousef Saanei]], [[Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi]], and [[Mohammad Mahdi Shams al-Din]].<ref>Mehrizi, "Women Fiqh; First Discourse: Legal Typology of Women", pp. 704-707.</ref> | |||
In more details, these approaches are explained more precisely. In practice, Fiqhi efforts of contemporary jurists and thinkers in the field of women's issues can be categorized into a five-level spectrum of methods and approaches. This five-level model shows the wide range of this field, and mentioning a person in one approach does not mean that he/she solely adheres to that approach, because someone may adopt an integrated approach in their way of Fiqhi macro-thinking.<ref>Shajarian, "Gender Justice and the Desirable Fiqhi Approach in the Realm of Governance", pp. 101-129.</ref> The approaches and the figures who comment in accordance with each approach in the field of women's issues are as follows: | |||
=== Devotional Acceptance of Distinctions === | === Devotional Acceptance of Distinctions === | ||
This approach, which is | This approach, which is the majority opinion of traditional jurists, takes the appearance of evidence and issues fatwas based on common distinctions between men and women, without any discussion of the why and wherefores of the rulings. For them, the different rulings for men and women is not problematic per se, rather the problem is an accurate understanding of the indication of evidence based on the common methodology of Fiqh. The jurist is not obligated to understand the "cause" (Illah) of these distinctions and only seeks the "reason" (Dalil), and when the evidence guides to distinct rulings, they will issue fatwas on it devotionally (Ta'abbudi).<ref>Mehrpour, ''Discussions on Women's Rights'', p. 303.</ref> | ||
[[Nasser Makarem Shirazi]], | [[Nasser Makarem Shirazi]], a Shia Marja, explains the specific edict of 'Iddah (period of waiting) for women expressly on this idea. He believes that one cannot certainly understand the wisdom of divine rulings, and what is said in this regard is merely to facilitate reasonable acceptance. The fundamental point, in his opinion, is that the All-Wise God with absolute knowledge and wisdom have issued these commends, hence these are to be accepted "devotionally" without question and it must be believed that they are the most complete commands could be issued.<ref>Makarem Shirazi, "Philosophy of Divorce and Death 'Iddah", contained in Ayatollah Makarem's website.</ref> | ||
Fariba Alasvand, a researcher in Women | Fariba Alasvand, a researcher in Women Fiqh, also considers the main solution in facing women's Fiqhi rulings to be strengthening the foundations of theology and "the devotion principle." According to her, since many rulings have been found in hadiths and sira of the Ahl al-Bayt without mentioning any cause or wisdom, the right way is to strengthen the belief in the All-Knowing, All-Wise, and Omnibenevolent God. She likens this approach to the trust of the Prophet's (PBUH) companions in his trustworthiness and believes that just as they were certain of the truthfulness of his speech, believers must also trust the source of the revelation and submit to the unseen news that has been notified as rulings and they should not torment themselves with trivial matters.<ref>Alasvand, "A Cursory Look at Foundations and Differences in Women Fiqh", pp. 20-21.</ref> | ||
=== Effort to Justify Distinctions === | === Effort to Justify Distinctions === | ||
Accepting all famous fatwas, this approach goes a step further and makes a theological and philosophical effort to reasonably justify distinctions and persuade public opinion, considering itself obliged to provide a rational and wisdom-based support for Fiqhi rulings. This approach is followed by of some scholars such as [[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai|Allameh Tabatabai]], [[Morteza Motahhari|Motahhari]], [[Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi|Misbah Yazdi]], and [[Abdullah Javadi Amoli|Javadi Amoli]]. In this approach, jurists followed this approach accept and adhere to famous Fiqhi rulings, but try to explain the wisdom and basis of these legal distinctions using rational and theological foundations and answer the doubts and criticisms raised in the modern world. | |||
For example, Morteza Motahhari | For example, Morteza Motahhari by analyzing the concept of [[Men's maintenance of the family|Qawwamiyyah]] in the [[Quran 4:34]], Morteza Motahhari offers an interpretation of this verse to demonstrate that man's guardianship is not due to his absolute superiority, but it refers to the sum of the man's relative advantages in the family structure. In his belief, the expression "bima faddala Allahu ba'dahum ala ba'd" (with [the bounties] God has given to some more than others) indicates that each man and woman has their own specific advantages and superiority is mutual.<ref>Motahhari, ''Collection of Works'', Vol. 29, p. 447.</ref> In justifying [[Equality of blood money for men and women|inequality of blood money]], Abdullah Javadi Amoli is of the opinion that this ruling has nothing to do with anyone’s spiritual, intellectual, or practical worth, but rather looks at the economic consequences of murder and men's economic role in the family, and just as, he emphasizes, the blood money of a scientist and an illiterate person is the same, this difference is not mean the women’s status is lower than men.<ref>Javadi, ''Woman in the Mirror of Glory and Beauty'', pp. 354-355.</ref> Also, Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi considers the wisdom of the difference in accepting [[Women's testimony in court|women's testimony]] to be related to preserving the rights of individuals. Men, due to difference in creation, are more alert in recording events precisely, and since they are less dominated by emotions, their testimony is less influenced by feelings. The Legislator recognizes women's testimony in principle but, as a precautionary measure, considers the testimony of another woman necessary to complete and confirm the testimony of the first one.<ref>Misbah Yazdi, ''Questions and Answers'', Vol. 5, pp. 296-298.</ref> | ||
=== Reducing Distinctions in the Execution | === Reducing Distinctions in the Execution Phase of Sharia Rulings === | ||
In this approach, the jurist does not | In this approach, the jurist, when inferring edicts and issuing fatwas, does not offer an opinion contrary to the famous one, but, in certain social circumstances, considers expediency in implementing some of these rulings and uses executive modifications via governmental and legal means. This approach is based on the separation between "Fatwa" and "Law."<ref>Rida, ''Tafsir al-Quran al-Hakim famous as Tafsir al-Manar'', Vol. 4, pp. 349-350; Tabatabai, ''Al-Mizan'', Vol. 4, pp. 190-194.</ref> A clear example of this approach is the note to Article 551 of the [[Islamic Penal Code of Iran]], according to which the difference of women's blood money has to be paid by the Fund for Bodily Damages and so this distinction practically disappears while the law still adheres to the famous fatwa on inequality of blood money. Also, while [[Nasser Katouzian]] accepts the Sharia ruling of difference in [[Women's Inheritance|women's inheritance]] as an unalterable edict, according to which they do not inherit from land, considers its execution in nowadays society "unjust" because of social changes. From his perspective, taking into account factors such as families becoming less populated, the significant increase in property value, and women's economic role in modern society, this distinction has oppressive consequences. However, he believes that the Shari'a ruling cannot be set aside due to this perception. His proposed solution is not a change in fatwa, but the use of "executive and legal measures" to reduce the effects of this distinction. To apply this proposal into practice, the lawgiver, for example, can encourage men to use the right of bequeathing up to one-third of their property to compensate for their wives' small share.<ref>Katouzian, "The Value of Tradition and the Attraction of Justice in Spousal Inheritance", pp. 44-49.</ref> | ||
According to Hassanali Ali-Akbariyan, in addition to implementing Sharia, the Islamic ruler is also obliged to establish justice, and a conflict occurs between these two duties when the observant believers generally perceived the execution of a Sharia ruling as "tyrannical". For example, the wisdom of the difference in inheritance between men and women is tied to rulings such as the obligation of men to pay dower (Mahr) and alimony (Nafaqah) and the exemption for women from Jihad. Therefore, if these supporting rulings are not properly implemented and lose their function in the general culture of society, the execution of the ruling of difference in inheritance can be regarded as an "oppressive situation" by the observant believers. The primary fatwa remains unchanged due to Sharia evidence, however in such situations, and to ensure justice, the lawmaker is obliged to establish a secondary ruling that differs from the primary fatwa. This action should be taken solely in an executive and [[Legislation|legislative]] capacity, rather than through the inference of a new fatwa.<ref>Ali Akbariyan, "The Role of Justice in Legislation in Islamic Government", pp. 26-35.</ref> | |||
=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Fiqhi Evidence === | === Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Fiqhi Evidence === | ||
Unlike the three previous approaches, this one directly intervenes in the issuing fatwa phase and achieves similar fatwas for men and women by critical reviewing of the evidence, namely objections to the indication of hadith (Dalalah) or chain of narratives (Sanad). Along this line [[Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi]] says: "Holding the position of judgeship by a woman, provided she has the conditions, is not impeded. Also, holding other positions such as social, political, scientific, cultural, artistic, managerial positions, presidencies, etc. is permissible for women provided they have the capability to perform them and maintain Sharia standards regarding covering and otherwise."<ref>Jannati, Selected Fatwas, contained in the information website of Ayatollah Jannati.</ref> This approach is committed to common usuli methods among jurists and holds that new opinions could be derived from the same common methods by rethinking the evidence. | |||
The usuli rule of "priority of Quran over hadiths in case of conflict" was also cited by [[Yousef Saanei]] in the issue of unequal retaliation (Qisas) of a man against a woman. He believes that some Quranic verses explicitly implies [[Equality of retaliation for men and women|equality of retaliation for men and women]]. Consequently, it is difficult to act upon hadiths that rule on inequality and make the retaliation of a woman against a man contingent upon paying half the man's blood money to his next of kin, because this is explicitly opposite to the Quran.<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Retaliation'', p. 43.</ref> Regarding the inequality of blood money for men and women, he examines, in detail, three categories of hadiths that are the basis of the famous fatwa on this ruling and objects to the indication or chain of narratives of all these hadiths and tries to reject the validity of these hadiths using the same accepted Fiqhi rules. Finally, citing absolute and general verses of Quranic, he issues a fatwa on [[Equality of blood money for men and women|equality of blood money for men and women]].<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Blood Money'', pp. 36-59.</ref> | |||
=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Usuli Rules === | === Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Usuli Rules === | ||
This approach seeks transformation in the process of inference by rethinking the foundations and methodological principles of Fiqh. | This approach seeks transformation in the process of inference by rethinking the foundations and methodological principles of Fiqh. According to this attitude, some common principles may not be efficient for meeting the needs of our time. Citing new foundations such as the [[Authority of presumptive reason]] (Hujjiyyah of Aql-e Zanni) alongside verbal religious evidence, or revising the authority of the hadith narrated by a single trustworthy person only (Khabar Wahid) are examples of this efforts that can lead to completely different results in women's issues.<ref>Fanaei, ''Ethics of Religious Study'', pp. 72-73; Shajarian, "The authority of reasonableness in jurisprudential deduction", pp. 75-93; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref> | ||
In this context, [[Muhammad Sadeqi Tehrani]] does not consider Tradition (Sunnah) to be even a presumptive evidence due to problems such as objections in the chain of narratives the (Rijal), lack of Tawatur (abundant transmission), contradiction and conflict of them, possibility of fabrication, possibility of Taqiyyah (prudence and dissimulation), quotation of the content of words, and possibility of fragmentation. He believes that the Quran, i.e. its appearances and explicitly texts, is the main reference for inferring rulings, and it is at the highest level because it does not have the problems mentioned.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref> For example, in the [[Nature of blood money|issue of blood money]], based on strong opposition to the famous hadith of Aban<ref>Hurr al-Amili, ''Wasa'il al-Shia'', Vol. 20, p. 352.</ref> he cites the absoluteness of two verses "So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you" ([[Verse 194 of Surah Al-Baqarah|Quran 2:134]]) and "an equal wound for a wound" ([[Verse 45 of Surah Al-Ma'idah|Quran 5:45]]) and attempts to prove the excess of blood money for 4 fingers of a woman over her 3 fingers, in opposition to the mentioned hadith and the famous opinion.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Rights of Ladies in Islam'', pp. 30-31; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''New Clarification of Questions'', p. 448.</ref> | |||
== Footnotes == | == Footnotes == | ||
{{Footnotes}} | {{Footnotes}} | ||
| Line 119: | Line 120: | ||
Shajarian, Mahdi, "[https://fh.smhi.ir/article_192705_ab76ddef249db1a0b8bc0b804f0d0852.pdf Gender Justice and the Desirable Fiqhi Approach in the Realm of Governance]", ''Fiqh-e Hukumati'', No. 13, 1401 SH. | Shajarian, Mahdi, "[https://fh.smhi.ir/article_192705_ab76ddef249db1a0b8bc0b804f0d0852.pdf Gender Justice and the Desirable Fiqhi Approach in the Realm of Governance]", ''Fiqh-e Hukumati'', No. 13, 1401 SH. | ||
Shajarian, Mahdi, "[https://religion.mofidu.ac.ir/article_720252_a7bfb81e1c49b5049a584e47c8199597.pdf | Shajarian, Mahdi, "[https://religion.mofidu.ac.ir/article_720252_a7bfb81e1c49b5049a584e47c8199597.pdf The authority of reasonableness in jurisprudential deduction]", ''Religion and Contemporary World Biannual'', No. 20, 1403 SH. | ||
Shafiei, Ali and Mohammad Reza Kazemi Galvardi and Mansour Amirzadeh, "[https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_40303_8ed0a72b50d9916ee77bfb29f503821b.pdf Critical Reading of the Traditional Fiqh Approach to Women's Rights (Foundations and Challenges)]", ''Fiqh and Usul'', No. 133, 1402 SH. | Shafiei, Ali and Mohammad Reza Kazemi Galvardi and Mansour Amirzadeh, "[https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_40303_8ed0a72b50d9916ee77bfb29f503821b.pdf Critical Reading of the Traditional Fiqh Approach to Women's Rights (Foundations and Challenges)]", ''Fiqh and Usul'', No. 133, 1402 SH. | ||