Rights and Regulations of Conflicts in the Realm of Islamic jihad and International Islamic law (Book): Difference between revisions

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In the final chapter of the first part of the book, the author thoroughly examines methods to aid in the elimination of war discussing topics such as disarmament from an Islamic perspective, crisis management, the precedence of invitation to Islam over jihad, strategies for unity, political solutions and diplomacy, disputes and arbitration, as well as military preparedness and rapid response. Additionally, the author compares Islamic views with imperialistic perspectives, highlighting eight key differences (pp. 137-199).
In the final chapter of the first part of the book, the author thoroughly examines methods to aid in the elimination of war discussing topics such as disarmament from an Islamic perspective, crisis management, the precedence of invitation to Islam over jihad, strategies for unity, political solutions and diplomacy, disputes and arbitration, as well as military preparedness and rapid response. Additionally, the author compares Islamic views with imperialistic perspectives, highlighting eight key differences (pp. 137-199).
==Is the permission of the Imam or his representative a prerequisite for jihad?==
==Is the permission of the Imam or his representative a prerequisite for jihad?==
According to Amid Zanjani, the Quran mentions two terms: jihad and qital, indicating that jihad is a form of qital, albeit with specific conditions and limitations. Furthermore, jihad is considered a communal and collective obligation, but is it permissible and legitimate to engage in jihad without the presence and organization of an Imam or his representative during the era of occultation? Zanjānī emphasizes that many Shia jurists, such as Kashif al-Ghita, do not regard the permission of the infallible Imam during his presence or the authorization of a fully qualified jurist during the occultation as a prerequisite for defensive jihad. In his discussion on preliminary jihad, he refers to the differing opinions among Shia jurists regarding the necessity of the Imam's permission, stating that the prevailing view is that preliminary jihad requires the consent of the rightful Imam. The author cites [[Imam Khomeini]]'s ruling in 'Tahrīr al-Wasīlah', which asserts that the initiation of an offensive war is a prerogative of the infallible Imam. He notes, 'For this reason, Shia jurists have defined jihad as warfare against enemies, encompassing both domestic armed conflict with rebels and external combat against polytheists, with the objectives of jihad including defense against aggression and hostility, as well as supporting Islam and upholding the tenets of the faith.' (pp. 203-205)
According to Amid Zanjani, the Quran mentions two terms: jihad and qital, indicating that jihad is a form of qital, albeit with specific conditions and limitations. Furthermore, jihad is considered a communal and collective obligation, but is it permissible and legitimate to engage in jihad without the presence and organization of an Imam or his representative during the era of occultation? Zanjānī emphasizes that many Shia jurists, such as Kashif al-Ghita, do not regard the permission of the infallible Imam during his presence or the authorization of a fully qualified jurist during the occultation as a prerequisite for defensive jihad. In his discussion on preliminary jihad, he refers to the differing opinions among Shia jurists regarding the necessity of the Imam's permission, stating that the prevailing view is that preliminary jihad requires the consent of the rightful Imam. The author cites [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]]'s ruling in 'Tahrīr al-Wasīlah', which asserts that the initiation of an offensive war is a prerogative of the infallible Imam. He notes, 'For this reason, Shia jurists have defined jihad as warfare against enemies, encompassing both domestic armed conflict with rebels and external combat against polytheists, with the objectives of jihad including defense against aggression and hostility, as well as supporting Islam and upholding the tenets of the faith.' (pp. 203-205)
==Waging war to gain political authority does not constitute a form of jihad==
==Waging war to gain political authority does not constitute a form of jihad==
In the context of jihad, alongside material elements, there exists a spiritual component related to the intentions of the fighters, which is the pursuit of divine proximity and motivation for divine objectives. Consequently, Islamic jurists categorize jihad within the realm of worship in their thematic classification of jurisprudential texts. The author of the book elucidates that engaging in armed conflict against an enemy for non-divine purposes, such as acquiring war spoils or achieving political or military power, cannot be considered a valid form of jihad.
In the context of jihad, alongside material elements, there exists a spiritual component related to the intentions of the fighters, which is the pursuit of divine proximity and motivation for divine objectives. Consequently, Islamic jurists categorize jihad within the realm of worship in their thematic classification of jurisprudential texts. The author of the book elucidates that engaging in armed conflict against an enemy for non-divine purposes, such as acquiring war spoils or achieving political or military power, cannot be considered a valid form of jihad.