Women's Fiqh: Difference between revisions

Created page with "{{Related topics|Family Fiqh}} {{author |author = Mahdi Shajarian |author2 = |author3 = |compilation = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = |translator = }} *'''Abstract''' '''Women's Fiqh''' is one of the genitive Fiqhs (Fiqh al-Mudaf) and a newly emerged branch in the knowledge of Fiqh that examines the rights and rulings related to women in various chapters of Islamic Fiqh with a social, problem-oriented, and critical approach. Although the roots of Women's Fiqh go back..."
 
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*'''Abstract'''
*'''Abstract'''
'''Women's Fiqh''' is one of the genitive Fiqhs (Fiqh al-Mudaf) and a newly emerged branch in the knowledge of Fiqh that examines the rights and rulings related to women in various chapters of Islamic Fiqh with a social, problem-oriented, and critical approach. Although the roots of Women's Fiqh go back to traditional Shia Fiqh, its contemporary formulation is fundamentally different from the past tradition. In previous eras, attention to women's issues mainly took place in the form of compiling their specific rulings with the aim of facilitating the education of religious duties. These works, despite their historical importance, lacked an analytical perspective on the reasons for distinctions, their social consequences, and the relationship of these rulings with the developments of the times.
'''Women's Fiqh''' (in Persian: [[:fa:فقه_زنان|فقه زنان]]) is one of the genitive Fiqhs (Fiqh al-Mudaf) and a newly emerged branch in the knowledge of Fiqh that examines the rights and rulings related to women in various chapters of Islamic Fiqh with a social, problem-oriented, and critical approach. Although the roots of Women's Fiqh go back to traditional Shia Fiqh, its contemporary formulation is fundamentally different from the past tradition. In previous eras, attention to women's issues mainly took place in the form of compiling their specific rulings with the aim of facilitating the education of religious duties. These works, despite their historical importance, lacked an analytical perspective on the reasons for distinctions, their social consequences, and the relationship of these rulings with the developments of the times.


The fundamental transformation of Women's Fiqh in the contemporary era has occurred in the context of Fiqh's encounter with modernity and profound social changes. In this period, Fiqhi distinctions between men and women, which previously remained at the level of a question, have turned into a social issue with legal, cultural, and political effects. The problematization of women's rulings stems from several key factors: first, the reduced persuasive power of some traditional Fiqhi answers for the new generation and their inconsistency with the lived experience of women in the new world; second, the emergence of new issues in areas such as modern medicine, reproductive technologies, and economic developments; and third, the role of media and the public sphere in highlighting these issues and turning them into a social concern.
The fundamental transformation of Women's Fiqh in the contemporary era has occurred in the context of Fiqh's encounter with modernity and profound social changes. In this period, Fiqhi distinctions between men and women, which previously remained at the level of a question, have turned into a social issue with legal, cultural, and political effects. The problematization of women's rulings stems from several key factors: first, the reduced persuasive power of some traditional Fiqhi answers for the new generation and their inconsistency with the lived experience of women in the new world; second, the emergence of new issues in areas such as modern medicine, reproductive technologies, and economic developments; and third, the role of media and the public sphere in highlighting these issues and turning them into a social concern.
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== Fiqhi Approaches to Women's Issues ==
== Fiqhi Approaches to Women's Issues ==
Fiqhi efforts in the field of Women's Fiqh have been carried out with different approaches. From one perspective, these approaches are divided into two macro categories: traditional and revisionist. Disregarding the traditional approach which emphasizes inferring and implementing the same famous rulings and distinctions between men and women, a rival intellectual approach believes that many Fiqhi differences between men and women are not permanent and intrinsic rulings of religion and emphasizes the necessity of reviewing the evidence and even the foundations of Ijtihad to reach different results appropriate for the times. Instead of defending the famous opinion, this approach focuses on "re-reading religious sources" to "change the famous opinion."<ref>Mehrizi, "The Dominance of Tradition over the Atmosphere of Women's Religious Studies", p. 81.</ref> The most important representatives of this current include jurists such as [[Yusef Saanei]], [[Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati Shahroudi|Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati]], and [[Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din]].<ref>Mehrizi, "Women's Fiqh; First Discourse: Legal Typology of Women", pp. 704-707.</ref>
Fiqhi efforts in the field of Women's Fiqh have been carried out with different approaches. From one perspective, these approaches are divided into two macro categories: traditional and revisionist. Disregarding the traditional approach which emphasizes inferring and implementing the same famous rulings and distinctions between men and women, a rival intellectual approach believes that many Fiqhi differences between men and women are not permanent and intrinsic rulings of religion and emphasizes the necessity of reviewing the evidence and even the foundations of Ijtihad to reach different results appropriate for the times. Instead of defending the famous opinion, this approach focuses on "re-reading religious sources" to "change the famous opinion."<ref>Mehrizi, "The Dominance of Tradition over the Atmosphere of Women's Religious Studies", p. 81.</ref> The most important representatives of this current include jurists such as [[Yousef Saanei]], [[Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi]], and [[Mohammad Mahdi Shams al-Din]].<ref>Mehrizi, "Women's Fiqh; First Discourse: Legal Typology of Women", pp. 704-707.</ref>


From another detailed perspective, these approaches are explained more specifically. Based on what has occurred in practice by contemporary jurists and thinkers in the field of women's issues, Fiqhi efforts can be categorized into a five-fold spectrum of methods and approaches. This five-fold model indicates the breadth existing in this field, and mentioning a person in one approach does not mean their exclusive presence in it; because a single person may have a combined approach in their macro Fiqhi thought.<ref>Shajarian, "Gender Justice and the Desirable Fiqhi Approach in the Realm of Governance", pp. 101-129.</ref> The approaches and also the figures who have expressed opinions under each approach in the field of women's issues are as follows:
From another detailed perspective, these approaches are explained more specifically. Based on what has occurred in practice by contemporary jurists and thinkers in the field of women's issues, Fiqhi efforts can be categorized into a five-fold spectrum of methods and approaches. This five-fold model indicates the breadth existing in this field, and mentioning a person in one approach does not mean their exclusive presence in it; because a single person may have a combined approach in their macro Fiqhi thought.<ref>Shajarian, "Gender Justice and the Desirable Fiqhi Approach in the Realm of Governance", pp. 101-129.</ref> The approaches and also the figures who have expressed opinions under each approach in the field of women's issues are as follows:
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This approach, while fully accepting the famous Fatwas, goes a step further and employs a theological and philosophical effort to rationally justify distinctions and persuade public opinion, considering itself obliged to provide a rational and wisdom-based support for Fiqhi rulings. This approach is crystallized in the works of individuals such as [[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai|Allameh Tabatabai]], [[Morteza Motahhari|Motahhari]], [[Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi|Misbah Yazdi]], and [[Abdullah Javadi Amoli|Javadi Amoli]]. In this approach, jurists, while accepting and adhering to famous Fiqhi rulings, try to explain the wisdom and basis of these legal distinctions using rational and theological foundations and answer the doubts and criticisms raised in the modern world.
This approach, while fully accepting the famous Fatwas, goes a step further and employs a theological and philosophical effort to rationally justify distinctions and persuade public opinion, considering itself obliged to provide a rational and wisdom-based support for Fiqhi rulings. This approach is crystallized in the works of individuals such as [[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai|Allameh Tabatabai]], [[Morteza Motahhari|Motahhari]], [[Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi|Misbah Yazdi]], and [[Abdullah Javadi Amoli|Javadi Amoli]]. In this approach, jurists, while accepting and adhering to famous Fiqhi rulings, try to explain the wisdom and basis of these legal distinctions using rational and theological foundations and answer the doubts and criticisms raised in the modern world.


For example, Morteza Motahhari, by analyzing [[Men's headship over the family]] (Qawamiyyah) in the Quran ([[Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa|Nisa: 34]]), does not consider man's guardianship as his absolute superiority, but relates it to the aggregate of the man's relative advantages in the family structure. In his belief, the expression "bima faddala Allahu ba'dahum ala ba'd" (by what Allah has given one over the other) indicates that each man and woman has their own specific advantages and superiority is mutual.<ref>Motahhari, ''Collection of Works'', Vol. 29, p. 447.</ref> Abdullah Javadi Amoli, in justifying [[Equality of blood money for men and women|inequality of blood money]], believes this ruling has no relation to the spiritual, scientific, or practical value of individuals, but rather looks at the economic consequences of murder and the man's economic role in the family, emphasizing that just as the blood money of a scientist and an illiterate person is the same, this matter does not indicate a reduction in the woman's status.<ref>Javadi, ''Woman in the Mirror of Glory and Beauty'', pp. 354-355.</ref> Also, Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi considers the wisdom of the difference in accepting [[Women's testimony in court|women's testimony]] to be related to preserving the rights of individuals. Men, due to difference in creation, are more alert in recording events precisely, and due to less dominance of emotions, are less influenced by feelings in the position of giving testimony. The Lawgiver has accepted the principle of women's testimony but, as a precautionary measure, has considered the testimony of a second woman necessary to complete and confirm the testimony of the first woman.<ref>Misbah Yazdi, ''Questions and Answers'', Vol. 5, pp. 296-298.</ref>
For example, Morteza Motahhari, by analyzing [[Men's headship over the family]] (Qawamiyyah) in the [[Quran 4:34]], does not consider man's guardianship as his absolute superiority, but relates it to the aggregate of the man's relative advantages in the family structure. In his belief, the expression "bima faddala Allahu ba'dahum ala ba'd" (by what Allah has given one over the other) indicates that each man and woman has their own specific advantages and superiority is mutual.<ref>Motahhari, ''Collection of Works'', Vol. 29, p. 447.</ref> Abdullah Javadi Amoli, in justifying [[Equality of blood money for men and women|inequality of blood money]], believes this ruling has no relation to the spiritual, scientific, or practical value of individuals, but rather looks at the economic consequences of murder and the man's economic role in the family, emphasizing that just as the blood money of a scientist and an illiterate person is the same, this matter does not indicate a reduction in the woman's status.<ref>Javadi, ''Woman in the Mirror of Glory and Beauty'', pp. 354-355.</ref> Also, Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi considers the wisdom of the difference in accepting [[Women's testimony in court|women's testimony]] to be related to preserving the rights of individuals. Men, due to difference in creation, are more alert in recording events precisely, and due to less dominance of emotions, are less influenced by feelings in the position of giving testimony. The Lawgiver has accepted the principle of women's testimony but, as a precautionary measure, has considered the testimony of a second woman necessary to complete and confirm the testimony of the first woman.<ref>Misbah Yazdi, ''Questions and Answers'', Vol. 5, pp. 296-298.</ref>


=== Reducing Distinctions in the Execution Stage of Shari'a Rulings ===
=== Reducing Distinctions in the Execution Stage of Shari'a Rulings ===
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=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Fiqhi Evidence ===
=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Fiqhi Evidence ===
This approach, unlike the three previous approaches, directly intervenes in the Fatwa stage and achieves egalitarian Fatwas by critical re-reading of evidence and disputing the chain of transmission (Sanad) or indication (Dalalah) of narrations. For example, [[Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati Shahroudi|Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati]], in this very line, believes: "Holding the position of judgeship by a woman, provided she possesses the conditions, is not impeded. For women, holding other positions such as social, political, scientific, cultural, artistic, managerial positions, presidencies, etc., provided they have the capability to perform them and maintain Shari'a standards regarding covering and otherwise, is not problematic."<ref>Jannati, Selected Fatwas, contained in the information website of Ayatollah Jannati.</ref> This approach is committed to following the common Usuli method among jurists and believes that even with the same common methods, rethinking the evidence can lead to new opinions.
This approach, unlike the three previous approaches, directly intervenes in the Fatwa stage and achieves egalitarian Fatwas by critical re-reading of evidence and disputing the chain of transmission (Sanad) or indication (Dalalah) of narrations. For example, [[Mohammad-Ebrahim Jannati Shahroudi]], in this very line, believes: "Holding the position of judgeship by a woman, provided she possesses the conditions, is not impeded. For women, holding other positions such as social, political, scientific, cultural, artistic, managerial positions, presidencies, etc., provided they have the capability to perform them and maintain Shari'a standards regarding covering and otherwise, is not problematic."<ref>Jannati, Selected Fatwas, contained in the information website of Ayatollah Jannati.</ref> This approach is committed to following the common Usuli method among jurists and believes that even with the same common methods, rethinking the evidence can lead to new opinions.


[[Yusef Saanei]] has also utilized the common Usuli rule of "priority of Quranic texts over narrational texts in the assumption of divergence" in the issue of unequal retaliation (Qisas) for men and women. He cites some Quranic verses and believes that their indication of [[Equality of retaliation for men and women|equality of retaliation for men and women]] is explicit. Consequently, acting upon narrations that look at inequality and make the retaliation of a woman against a man contingent upon paying half the man's blood money to his next of kin is difficult due to explicit opposition to the Quran.<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Retaliation'', p. 43.</ref> In another example, by detailed examination of three categories of narrations that are the documentation of the famous Fatwa on the inequality of blood money for men and women, he disputes the indication or document of all these narrations and tries to reject the validity of these narrations using the same accepted Fiqhi rules, and finally issues a Fatwa on [[Equality of blood money for men and women|equality of blood money for men and women]] by citing Quranic generalities and absolutes.<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Blood Money'', pp. 36-59.</ref>
[[Yousef Saanei]] has also utilized the common Usuli rule of "priority of Quranic texts over narrational texts in the assumption of divergence" in the issue of unequal retaliation (Qisas) for men and women. He cites some Quranic verses and believes that their indication of [[Equality of retaliation for men and women|equality of retaliation for men and women]] is explicit. Consequently, acting upon narrations that look at inequality and make the retaliation of a woman against a man contingent upon paying half the man's blood money to his next of kin is difficult due to explicit opposition to the Quran.<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Retaliation'', p. 43.</ref> In another example, by detailed examination of three categories of narrations that are the documentation of the famous Fatwa on the inequality of blood money for men and women, he disputes the indication or document of all these narrations and tries to reject the validity of these narrations using the same accepted Fiqhi rules, and finally issues a Fatwa on [[Equality of blood money for men and women|equality of blood money for men and women]] by citing Quranic generalities and absolutes.<ref>Saanei, ''Equality of Blood Money'', pp. 36-59.</ref>


=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Usuli Rules ===
=== Reducing Distinctions by Rethinking Usuli Rules ===
This approach seeks transformation in the process of inference by rethinking the foundations and methodological principles of Fiqh. This attitude believes that some common principles may not be efficient for answering today's needs. Citing new foundations such as the [[Authority of speculative reason]] (Hujjiyyah of Aql-e Zanni) alongside tradition or revising the authority of the single report (Khabar Wahid) are examples of this approach that can lead to completely different results in women's issues.<ref>Fanaei, ''Ethics of Religious Study'', pp. 72-73; Shajarian, "Authority of Speculative Reason in Fiqhi Inference", pp. 75-93; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref>
This approach seeks transformation in the process of inference by rethinking the foundations and methodological principles of Fiqh. This attitude believes that some common principles may not be efficient for answering today's needs. Citing new foundations such as the [[Authority of speculative reason]] (Hujjiyyah of Aql-e Zanni) alongside tradition or revising the authority of the single report (Khabar Wahid) are examples of this approach that can lead to completely different results in women's issues.<ref>Fanaei, ''Ethics of Religious Study'', pp. 72-73; Shajarian, "Authority of Speculative Reason in Fiqhi Inference", pp. 75-93; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref>


[[Muhammad Sadeqi Tehrani]], in this vein, does not consider Tradition (Sunnah) to be even a speculative proof due to problems such as the men of the chain (Rijal), lack of Tawatur (mass transmission), contradiction and conflict, possibility of fabrication, possibility of Taqiyyah (dissimulation), transmission by meaning, and possibility of fragmentation, and believes that the appearances and texts of the Quran, due to being free from all these problems, exist in a much stronger rank and must be the main reference in inferring rulings.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref> For example, in the [[Nature of blood money|issue of blood money]], based on strong opposition to the famous narration of Aban<ref>Hurr al-Amili, ''Wasa'il al-Shia'', Vol. 20, p. 352.</ref> he cites the absoluteness of two verses "So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you" ([[Verse 194 of Surah Al-Baqarah|Baqarah: 194]]) and "Wounds equal for equal" ([[Verse 45 of Surah Al-Ma'idah|Ma'idah: 45]]) and attempts to prove the excess of blood money for 4 fingers of a woman over her 3 fingers, in opposition to the mentioned narration and the famous opinion.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Rights of Ladies in Islam'', pp. 30-31; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''New Clarification of Questions'', p. 448.</ref>
[[Muhammad Sadeqi Tehrani]], in this vein, does not consider Tradition (Sunnah) to be even a speculative proof due to problems such as the men of the chain (Rijal), lack of Tawatur (mass transmission), contradiction and conflict, possibility of fabrication, possibility of Taqiyyah (dissimulation), transmission by meaning, and possibility of fragmentation, and believes that the appearances and texts of the Quran, due to being free from all these problems, exist in a much stronger rank and must be the main reference in inferring rulings.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Expressive Fiqh'', pp. 19-23.</ref> For example, in the [[Nature of blood money|issue of blood money]], based on strong opposition to the famous narration of Aban<ref>Hurr al-Amili, ''Wasa'il al-Shia'', Vol. 20, p. 352.</ref> he cites the absoluteness of two verses "So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you" ([[Verse 194 of Surah Al-Baqarah|Quran 2:134]]) and "Wounds equal for equal" ([[Verse 45 of Surah Al-Ma'idah|Quran 5:45]]) and attempts to prove the excess of blood money for 4 fingers of a woman over her 3 fingers, in opposition to the mentioned narration and the famous opinion.<ref>Sadeqi Tehrani, ''Rights of Ladies in Islam'', pp. 30-31; Sadeqi Tehrani, ''New Clarification of Questions'', p. 448.</ref>
== Footnotes ==
== Footnotes ==
{{Footnotes}}
{{Footnotes}}
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Mehrizi, Mahdi, "[https://www.noormags.ir/view/fa/articlepage/2224866 Women's Fiqh; First Discourse: Legal Typology of Women]", ''Horizons of Ijtihad - Discourses on Fiqhi and Usuli Topics and Issues'', No. 1, 1396 SH.
Mehrizi, Mahdi, "[https://www.noormags.ir/view/fa/articlepage/2224866 Women's Fiqh; First Discourse: Legal Typology of Women]", ''Horizons of Ijtihad - Discourses on Fiqhi and Usuli Topics and Issues'', No. 1, 1396 SH.
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[[fa:فقه زنان]]
[[Category:Contemporary Jurisprudence Articles]]