Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad: Difference between revisions
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=== Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair === | === Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair === | ||
In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference | In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or its difference for men and women. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[signed Rulings|signed (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes, as nowadays in Iran payment of Diyah in Rials is common. considering nowadays circumstances when women have active social, political, and economic roles, Mohaghegh Damad argues that it is unacceptable and unrighteous to justify the being half of Diyah's women by citing the economic status of men. based on the absoluteness of Diyah ruling in the Quranic verse, the divergence between Hadiths, the diversity of Diyah criteria among tribes and nations, and the signatory nature of the Diyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent, but the amount and method of paying Diyah depend on social developments and its ruling is a Judicial and Sovereign Affair, not an unalterable Sharia one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref> | ||
== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery == | == Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery == | ||
The Fiqhi maxim "illicit acquisition of property" (Akl al-mal bi-al-batil), in his opinion, is a customary matter and depends on the customary nature of transactions, in such a way that this rule applies to any transaction considered unfair by custom, such as [[Pyramid Schemes]].<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of property in Islamic Law, pp. 21–28.</ref> | |||
The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is | The prohibition of hoarding also, from his perspective, is based on the reasonable analysis. citing to the religious texts as supportive evidence, he considers this prohibition to extend beyond four or six items mentioned in Fiqhi works and includes any commodity that causes loss to the people and trouble in social order.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 44–58.</ref> | ||
Regarding playing with gambling instruments such as chess and backgammon, Mohaghegh Damad states that if | Regarding playing with gambling instruments such as chess and backgammon, Mohaghegh Damad states that if the gambling feature is removed from them due to social changes, their prohibition can be lifted and may be regarded as permissible.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 182–197.</ref> | ||
In the discussion of Riba, the author considers the main goal of its prohibition to be the prevention of oppression, economic abuse, and steering people toward productive and useful activities, rather than merely the unregulated increase of capital. Distinguishing between the "cause" ('Illah) and the "wisdom" (Hikmah) of the prohibition of Riba, he argues that if oppression is the real cause of the prohibition, the practical principle of innocence can justify the legitimacy of some types of Riba, such as [[Production-oriented Riba]]. Also, by changing the subject or the object of the ruling, the possibility of legitimizing some ribawi transactions is provided.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 217–281.</ref> | In the discussion of Riba, the author considers the main goal of its prohibition to be the prevention of oppression, economic abuse, and steering people toward productive and useful activities, rather than merely the unregulated increase of capital. Distinguishing between the "cause" ('Illah) and the "wisdom" (Hikmah) of the prohibition of Riba, he argues that if oppression is the real cause of the prohibition, the practical principle of innocence can justify the legitimacy of some types of Riba, such as [[Production-oriented Riba]]. Also, by changing the subject or the object of the ruling, the possibility of legitimizing some ribawi transactions is provided.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Illicit Acquisition of Wealth in Islamic Law, pp. 217–281.</ref> | ||