Pre-emptive Defence (Book): Difference between revisions
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===Citing the Practice of the Prophet to Find Answer=== | ===Citing the Practice of the Prophet to Find Answer=== | ||
The author continues to examine four events related to the conduct of the infallible, based on which some Islamic jurists have issued fatwas permitting assassination: | The author continues to examine four events related to the conduct of the infallible, based on which some Islamic jurists have issued fatwas permitting assassination: | ||
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# The command issued by the Prophet for the killing of specific individuals during the conquest of Mecca; the writer does not categorize this incident as a murder, since the directive was made openly, not secretly (pp. 95-96). | # The command issued by the Prophet for the killing of specific individuals during the conquest of Mecca; the writer does not categorize this incident as a murder, since the directive was made openly, not secretly (pp. 95-96). | ||
# Organized assassinations of Jews during the early Islamic period; Seyyed Jafar Mortezā Amelī argues that such acts are not permissible if the individual is under the protection of a Muslim (as exemplified by Muslim ibn Aqil's refusal to assassinate Ibn Ziyad). However, in situations where the enemy is not protected, killing is allowed with the Imam's permission. Conversely, the author contends that based on the Prophet's practices, such an assassination (even that of a woman nursing her child) cannot be considered as having been ordered by the Prophet. Furthermore, the narration «إِنَّ الْإِيمَانَ قَيَّدَ الْفَتْكَ» is general and cannot be restricted by such actions (pp. 96-100). | # Organized assassinations of Jews during the early Islamic period; Seyyed Jafar Mortezā Amelī argues that such acts are not permissible if the individual is under the protection of a Muslim (as exemplified by Muslim ibn Aqil's refusal to assassinate Ibn Ziyad). However, in situations where the enemy is not protected, killing is allowed with the Imam's permission. Conversely, the author contends that based on the Prophet's practices, such an assassination (even that of a woman nursing her child) cannot be considered as having been ordered by the Prophet. Furthermore, the narration «إِنَّ الْإِيمَانَ قَيَّدَ الْفَتْكَ» is general and cannot be restricted by such actions (pp. 96-100). | ||
# There was no admonition from Imam Sadiq (AS) regarding the assassination of Nāṣibī (anti-Shia) individuals; in discussing the definition and the ruling on blasphemy against the Prophet, Āghābagherī regards these individuals as deserving of death, maintaining that the Imam (AS) publicly expressed this ruling, and was not done secretly or unexpectedly (100-103). | # There was no admonition from Imam Sadiq (AS) regarding the assassination of Nāṣibī (anti-Shia) individuals; in discussing the definition and the ruling on blasphemy against the Prophet, Āghābagherī regards these individuals as deserving of death, maintaining that the Imam (AS) publicly expressed this ruling, and was not done secretly or unexpectedly (100-103). | ||
# The silence of Imam Ali (AS) regarding the assassination of the second caliph; according to the author, Imam's silence was due to the fact that the second caliph faced the consequences of his own actions (pp. 104-106). | # The silence of Imam Ali (AS) regarding the assassination of the second caliph; according to the author, Imam's silence was due to the fact that the second caliph faced the consequences of his own actions (pp. 104-106). | ||
The author subsequently references the fatwa for the execution of Salman Rushdie issued by Imam Khomeini and the fatwa for the execution of Rāfiq Taqi by Muhammad Fazel Lankarani, arguing that due to their public nature, these instances fall outside the category of terrorism (pp. 106-112). | The author subsequently references the fatwa for the execution of Salman Rushdie issued by Imam Khomeini and the fatwa for the execution of Rāfiq Taqi by Muhammad Fazel Lankarani, arguing that due to their public nature, these instances fall outside the category of terrorism (pp. 106-112). | ||
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==Evidence for the Impermissibility of Assassination== | ==Evidence for the Impermissibility of Assassination== | ||
Āghābagherī cites a narration from Imam Sadiq (AS) to demonstrate that assassination is not permissible, indicating that the Prophet (PBUH) prohibited such acts. The fact that Ibn Ziyād was not assassinated by Muslim ibn Aqil, along with his reference to a saying of the Prophet (PBUH), serves as another argument by the author against the permissibility of assassination in Islam (pp. 112-115). | Āghābagherī cites a narration from Imam Sadiq (AS) to demonstrate that assassination is not permissible, indicating that the Prophet (PBUH) prohibited such acts. The fact that Ibn Ziyād was not assassinated by Muslim ibn Aqil, along with his reference to a saying of the Prophet (PBUH), serves as another argument by the author against the permissibility of assassination in Islam (pp. 112-115). | ||
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Aghabagheri has outlined three conditions for the eligibility of the martyrdom operation: | Aghabagheri has outlined three conditions for the eligibility of the martyrdom operation: | ||
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# It must be the only way to defend Islam and Muslims and there are no alternative defensive methods; | # It must be the only way to defend Islam and Muslims and there are no alternative defensive methods; | ||
# it must be conducted with the permission of the religious authority; | # it must be conducted with the permission of the religious authority; | ||
# It must not involve killing the Innocent, such as women, children, and the elderly. | # It must not involve killing the Innocent, such as women, children, and the elderly. | ||
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===Using Human Shields (tatarrus)=== | ===Using Human Shields (tatarrus)=== | ||
The author asserts that for conducting martyrdom operations against Israeli society, the third condition is not necessary to be observed, as all Israeli citizens are, in some way, military personnel with assigned missions. Consequently, the author further discusses the issue of human shields. According to the author, all Islamic jurists agree on the permissibility of killing individuals used as human shields, although differing views exist regarding the details. Sheikh Tusi conditions the permissibility of this act on the intensity of the conflict. Additionally, Allameh Ḥelli considers the fear of enemy dominance as a factor in its permissibility. [[Imam Khomeini]] and [[Seyyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi]] also deem this action permissible if it is essential for overcoming the enemy (pp. 152-162). | The author asserts that for conducting martyrdom operations against Israeli society, the third condition is not necessary to be observed, as all Israeli citizens are, in some way, military personnel with assigned missions. Consequently, the author further discusses the issue of human shields. According to the author, all Islamic jurists agree on the permissibility of killing individuals used as human shields, although differing views exist regarding the details. Sheikh Tusi conditions the permissibility of this act on the intensity of the conflict. Additionally, Allameh Ḥelli considers the fear of enemy dominance as a factor in its permissibility. [[Imam Khomeini]] and [[Seyyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi]] also deem this action permissible if it is essential for overcoming the enemy (pp. 152-162). | ||
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[[fa:دفاع پیشدستانه (کتاب)]] | [[fa:دفاع پیشدستانه (کتاب)]] | ||
[[category: book review]] | [[category: book review]] | ||
[[ | [[Category:Persian-language Books on Political Jurisprudence]] | ||
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Javad Aghabagheri]] | |||
[[Category:Books published by Imam Sadiq (AS) University]] |