Important Jurisprudential Discourses (book): Difference between revisions

To prove this view, after an introduction (p. 11), Makarem Shirazi employs a purposive approach (maqāṣidī), citing four main reasons:

# '''The non-essentiality of spilling blood:''' The primary goal of the sacrifice is to feed the poor, not merely to spill blood—a goal that is not achieved today (pp. 12-19).

# '''Non-inclusion under the evidence (adilla):''' The modern form of sacrifice, where a massive volume of meat goes unconsumed, is a newly-arisen issue not covered by the scriptural evidence (pp. 20-22).

# '''Place of slaughter:''' Today, the majority of sacrifices are performed outside the prescribed boundaries of Minā (pp. 23-28).

# '''Prohibition of extravagance (isrāf):''' Burying or burning the sacrificial meat is a clear instance of extravagance and waste (isrāf and tabdhīr) and is therefore forbidden (ḥarām) (pp. 29-35).

==Rulings on Ghināʾ==

The discussion on ghināʾ (singing) is examined in three parts:

# '''Evidence for Prohibition:''' The author finds the Quranic verses' indication of the prohibition of ghināʾ insufficient but establishes its prohibition based on narrations (riwāyāt) (p. 52) categorized into six groups (such as narrations interpreting "zūr" (falsehood) (p. 52) and "lahw al-ḥadīth" (idle talk) (p. 54), prohibitive narrations (p. 55), prohibition of its wage (p. 58), prohibition of listening (p. 59), and prohibition of reciting the Quran in the manner of ghināʾ (p. 60)). He critiques the opposing evidence (pp. 62-66) and ultimately deems two authentic narrations opposing the prohibition unreliable against numerous other narrations and the consensus of the companions (p. 67).

# '''Meaning and Reality of Ghināʾ:''' After mentioning eight definitions for ghināʾ (p. 68), the author accepts Sheikh al-Ansari's definition of "melodies suitable for gatherings of the corrupt and sinful" and adds the condition of "suitability with musical instruments and dance" (p. 70).

# '''Exceptions to Ghināʾ:''' He permits ghināʾ at weddings (pp. 73-74) and on days of Eid and celebration (p. 74), but does not make an exception for ghināʾ in Quranic recitation (p. 76). On the other hand, he does not consider cases like ḥidāʾ (camel-driving songs) (p. 75), eulogies (p. 75-76), and ululation (p. 77) to be instances of ghināʾ in principle.

==Worship in the Polar Regions==

==Issues Related to Medicine and Health==

# '''Birth Control:''' After examining the evidence for the desirability of having many children (pp. 276-278) and the evidence of proponents of birth control (pp. 278-281), the author adopts a detailed view (tafṣīl) (p. 278). In conditions where population growth leads to the weakening of the Islamic community, birth control through permissible methods becomes permissible, and sometimes even obligatory (pp. 283-284).

# '''Abortion:''' Its primary ruling is absolute prohibition (pp. 286-287), but under secondary principles, such as the necessity of preserving the mother's life (p. 299), it is deemed permissible, especially before the ensoulment (wulūj al-rūḥ) (p. 300).

# '''Autopsy:''' Its primary ruling is forbidden due to the prohibition of desecrating a Muslim's corpse (p. 316). However, as a secondary ruling, in cases of necessity (like saving human lives) and the unavailability of a non-Muslim corpse, it is permissible, and the diya is waived (p. 321).

# '''Organ Transplantation and Implantation:''' Taking an organ from a deceased Muslim is not permissible as a primary ruling (p. 328), but if saving a Muslim's life depends on it, it becomes permissible based on the principle of the more important over the important (qāʿidat al-ahamm wa al-muhimm) (pp. 328-329). The sale of organs is considered permissible due to the existence of lawful vital benefits (p. 329). The transplanted organ, after gaining life in the new body, is considered pure (ṭāhir) (p. 332). If the organ is taken with consent or due to religious necessity, diya is not established (p. 331).

==Issues Related to Economics and Financial Affairs==

# '''Banks:''' The author considers current accounts as "loans" (qarḍ) and fixed deposits as "muḍāraba" (profit-sharing partnership) (p. 344). He validates transactions with state-owned banks by affirming the legal personality of governments (pp. 347-350).

# '''Banking Transactions:''' From the author's perspective, the profit from current accounts is permissible only if it is a unilateral commitment from the bank (pp. 352-353). To validate fixed deposits, he proposes the "muḍāraba" contract (pp. 356-358), and for loans, he suggests using alternative contracts with genuine intent (p. 359).

# '''Money:''' The author considers the value of paper money to be "conventional" (iʿtibārī) (p. 363). Consequently, usury in loans (ribā al-qarḍī) applies to it, but usury in trade (ribā al-muʿāwaḍī) does not (p. 366), and zakat is not applicable to it (p. 369). For long-term debts, he considers the "purchasing power" of the money at the time of payment as the criterion, not its nominal value (pp. 374-376).

==Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilāyat al-Faqīh)==

The author outlines three functions for the jurist: issuing fatwas (iftāʾ) (pp. 392-395), adjudication (qaḍāwat) (pp. 397-398), and guardianship (governmental affairs) (wilāyat) (p. 399). In his view, jurists like the author of Javāhir (p. 402) believe in the general guardianship (al-wilāyat al-ʿāmma) of the jurist, while Sheikh al-Ansari (pp. 403-404) accepts it in public affairs but denies absolute guardianship (al-wilāyat al-muṭlaqa). The seven areas of authority for jurists, according to Naser Makarem Shirazi, are:

# '''Guardianship over Orphans and the Absent:''' This is an established principle in jurisprudence to protect assets and prevent chaos (pp. 410-412).

# '''Disposal of Khums and Zakat:''' Paying these funds to the jurist during the era of occultation is preferred, especially if an Islamic government is established (pp. 416-420).

# '''Absence of Legislative Authority:''' The jurist has no legislative authority (wilāyat tashrīʿiyya) (p. 514); his duty is solely to discover and implement divine rulings (p. 515).

# '''Guardianship over Property and Lives:''' This guardianship is not absolute and unlimited; it is solely for the purpose of protecting the public interest and implementing the rulings of the Shari'a (pp. 554-555).

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