State theories in Shiite jurisprudence (book): Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
|||
| Line 56: | Line 56: | ||
=== The structure of the book and its Content === | === The structure of the book and its Content === | ||
Before dealing with the nine theories, the author has reviewed four articles as an introduction. In the first introduction, he has discussed the four stages of the development of Shiite political jurisprudence, that is to say, the flourishing era of [[private jurisprudence]], the era of monarchy and | Before dealing with the nine theories, the author has reviewed four articles as an introduction. In the first introduction, he has discussed the four stages of the development of Shiite political jurisprudence, that is to say, the flourishing era of [[private jurisprudence]], the era of monarchy and Guardianship (Wilayah), the era of constitutionalism and supervision, and the era of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The theory and purpose of writing the book has been justified (pp. 29-33). | ||
In the third introduction, the author points to two categories of negative and positive theories about the state during the time of occultation in Shiite jurisprudence. The first group of jurists who do not derive a specific form of governance from jurisprudential evidence considers the presence of jurists in public affairs to be limited to probate matters (pp. 33-39) whereas, there are jurists who recommend the comprehensive plan for governing the society according to Sharia (pp.39-40). In the fourth introduction, he also deals with the classification of state theories based on the foundations of political legitimacy. In this introduction, by posing the question whether the consent of the Islamic Ummah is involved in the legitimacy of the state or not, two bases of direct divine legitimacy and divine-popular legitimacy have been given. According to him, based on direct divine legitimacy, four theories and based on divine-popular legitimacy, five theories have been presented about the state in Shiite jurisprudence, and the main questions and common principles of both theories have been extracted (pp. 41-56). | In the third introduction, the author points to two categories of negative and positive theories about the state during the time of occultation in Shiite jurisprudence. The first group of jurists who do not derive a specific form of governance from jurisprudential evidence considers the presence of jurists in public affairs to be limited to probate matters (pp. 33-39) whereas, there are jurists who recommend the comprehensive plan for governing the society according to Sharia (pp.39-40). In the fourth introduction, he also deals with the classification of state theories based on the foundations of political legitimacy. In this introduction, by posing the question whether the consent of the Islamic Ummah is involved in the legitimacy of the state or not, two bases of direct divine legitimacy and divine-popular legitimacy have been given. According to him, based on direct divine legitimacy, four theories and based on divine-popular legitimacy, five theories have been presented about the state in Shiite jurisprudence, and the main questions and common principles of both theories have been extracted (pp. 41-56). | ||
| Line 84: | Line 84: | ||
Legitimate monarchy is one of the other theories of appointment, according to the author, it is one of the few theories in Shiite political jurisprudence that has been experienced in practice and has been governing the political practice of Shiites for a long time. (p. 58) This theory has two principles: one; The appointment of jurisprudents in probate matters, such as decree and propagation of religious rules, enforcement of limits, administration of endowments, etc., which is also interpreted as Sharia. The king has power in this area with conditions such as Islam, Shiism, and having authority. Of course, according to him, this separation was due to the imposing the conditions of the time, and the jurists were forced to be satisfied with this amount of authority (pp. 59-60). Five interpretations of this theory are presented by Allameh Majlesi, Mirzaye Qomi, Seyyed Jafar Kashafi, Fazolollah Nouri, and Abd Al-Karim Haeri Yazdi and Mohammad Ali Araki (p. 61-79). | Legitimate monarchy is one of the other theories of appointment, according to the author, it is one of the few theories in Shiite political jurisprudence that has been experienced in practice and has been governing the political practice of Shiites for a long time. (p. 58) This theory has two principles: one; The appointment of jurisprudents in probate matters, such as decree and propagation of religious rules, enforcement of limits, administration of endowments, etc., which is also interpreted as Sharia. The king has power in this area with conditions such as Islam, Shiism, and having authority. Of course, according to him, this separation was due to the imposing the conditions of the time, and the jurists were forced to be satisfied with this amount of authority (pp. 59-60). Five interpretations of this theory are presented by Allameh Majlesi, Mirzaye Qomi, Seyyed Jafar Kashafi, Fazolollah Nouri, and Abd Al-Karim Haeri Yazdi and Mohammad Ali Araki (p. 61-79). | ||
== Selection theories == | == Selection theories == | ||
[[The constitutional-legitimate state]], [[The caliphate of the people under the supervision of the authority|the caliphate of the people under the supervision of the authority]], [[The elected governorship of the jurist|the elected | [[The constitutional-legitimate state]], [[The caliphate of the people under the supervision of the authority|the caliphate of the people under the supervision of the authority]], [[The elected governorship of the jurist|the elected Guardianship (Wilayah) of the jurist]], [[The Islamic elected state|the Islamic elected state]] and [[The representation of the common private owners|the representation of the common private owners]] are the five theories that Mohsen Kadivar examined under the tile of selection theories. According to him, the theories of choice have several common features, the most important of which is increasing the role of the people in the state and reducing the powers of the jurists. Of course, each of the five theories has a special feature that is referred to. | ||
=== Limitation of power under the theory of constitutional state === | === Limitation of power under the theory of constitutional state === | ||
Kadivar considers the theory of constitutional state with the permission and supervision of jurists with its two readings (legitimate and constitutional) to be the fruit of the constitutional revolution and in response to the questions and demands raised at that time (pp. 112-115). The most prominent feature is restricting the power by the constitution and the separation of powers (p. 112). According to him, These two interpretations according to the constitutional state have the commonalities and differences. Both of them acknowledge the maintaining the principles of religion, Islamic splendor, observance of justice, consultation and performing the state in the occultation era. However, they differ in the way of managing public affairs during absence, the relationship between law and legislation and the perception of equality and freedom. (p. 118-117) | Kadivar considers the theory of constitutional state with the permission and supervision of jurists with its two readings (legitimate and constitutional) to be the fruit of the constitutional revolution and in response to the questions and demands raised at that time (pp. 112-115). The most prominent feature is restricting the power by the constitution and the separation of powers (p. 112). According to him, These two interpretations according to the constitutional state have the commonalities and differences. Both of them acknowledge the maintaining the principles of religion, Islamic splendor, observance of justice, consultation and performing the state in the occultation era. However, they differ in the way of managing public affairs during absence, the relationship between law and legislation and the perception of equality and freedom. (p. 118-117) | ||