Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad: Difference between revisions
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Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that provides a legal power for retaliation on the positive side and prevents transgression and excesses on the negative side.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref> | Regarding the word "Life" (Hayat) in the [[Verse of Qisas]], Mohaghegh Damad is of opinion that "Life" refers not to physical life, but to social life, and it has a goal beyond the mere permissibility of revenge, e.g. controlling violence, enhancing order and justice, and strengthening piety in the believer community.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 43–47.</ref> From his perspective, Qisas is introduced in the Quran as an "executable right," not a "binding obligation." Considering the circumstances of the revelation of the verses and the cultural backgrounds of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the Quran legislates the ruling of Qisas to restrain tribal vendetta and illegal revenge. His conclusion is that Qisas is not an obligation to kill, but a conditional right that provides a legal power for retaliation on the positive side and prevents transgression and excesses on the negative side.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 47–48.</ref> | ||
=== | === Woman's Diyah as a Judicial and Sovereign Affair === | ||
In the discussion of [[Equality of | In the discussion of [[Equality of Diyah between Woman and Man]] in Islam, Mohaghegh Damad points to the "signatory" (Imda'i) nature of rulings related to Diyah that could change in the Islamic law. He thinks [[Verse 92 of Sura an-Nisa]] simply concerned with paying blood money and does not state any rule about the amount of Diyah or difference between man and woman. Examination of Hadiths also shows that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined Diyah of murder based on criteria such as camels, cows, sheep, Dinars, and Dirhams that are of [[Signatory Rulings|signatory (Imda'i) rulings]] rather than "establishmed" (Ta'sisi) ones. This means that they would have confirmed by Sharia if they have been customary in the age of the Prophet (PBUH); so they are capable of change if the custom changes; just as today, payment of Diyyah in Rial is common. Mohaghegh Damad argues that justifying the half-Diyyah of a woman by citing the economic status of the man is devoid of merit and acceptability in current conditions where women have active social, political, and economic roles. Considering the absolute nature of the Diyyah verse, the variety of narrations, the diversity of Diyyah criteria among different peoples, and the signatory nature of the Diyyah ruling, he concludes that the principle of compensation for damages is definitive and permanent; but the amount and method of Diyyah payment depend on social developments and its ruling is judicial and governmental, not a fixed Shari'ah one.<ref>Mohaghegh Damad, Argumentative Comparative Criminal Fiqh, pp. 71–73; Mohaghegh Damad, "Separation of Judicial Narrations from Fiqhi Narrations," pp. 49–74.</ref> | ||
== Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery == | == Customary Nature of Pyramid Schemes, Chess, Hoarding, Riba, and Bribery == | ||