Brain Death

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'''Brain Death''' (in persian: [[:fa:مرگ_مغزی|مرگ مغزی]]) is the irreversible cessation of brain activities. This issue is one of the emerging medical matters and from a jurisprudential perspective, it falls under the category of *masāʾil mustaḥdathah* (emerging issues). From a medical standpoint, brain death will lead to certain death in a short period; however, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, there is disagreement among jurists as to whether patients afflicted with brain death are alive or dead. This disagreement arises from the jurists' differences in determining and diagnosing the subject of brain death.

From the perspective of some contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd* (sources of emulation) such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani]] and [[Jawad Tabrizi]], the diagnosis of the common people is valid in determining the subject, and since the common people consider a brain-dead patient alive, from a jurisprudential standpoint, such a person has the ruling of a living person. A group of contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], and [[Husayn Nuri Hamadani|Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī]] consider the criterion for determining whether brain-dead patients are alive or dead to be the diagnosis of the specific common (*ʿurf-e khāṣṣ*) (specialist physicians). According to the general rules of deduction, the application of all rulings related to brain death such as organ transplantation, continuation or cessation of treatment, *dīyah* (blood money) for organs, and equipping the deceased is contingent upon diagnosing the subject.

From the perspective of some contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd* (sources of emulation) such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]] and [[Jawad Tabrizi]], the diagnosis of the common people is valid in determining the subject, and since the common people consider a brain-dead patient alive, from a jurisprudential standpoint, such a person has the ruling of a living person. A group of contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], and [[Husayn Nuri Hamadani|Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī]] consider the criterion for determining whether brain-dead patients are alive or dead to be the diagnosis of the specific common (*ʿurf-e khāṣṣ*) (specialist physicians). According to the general rules of deduction, the application of all rulings related to brain death such as organ transplantation, continuation or cessation of treatment, *dīyah* (blood money) for organs, and equipping the deceased is contingent upon diagnosing the subject.

== Position of the Issue in Contemporary Jurisprudence ==

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Does the title "dead" apply to patients afflicted with brain death? Jurists have presented various views in response to this question. It seems that this disagreement returns to the difference of opinion in the issue of the validity and credibility of the common diagnosis or the jurist's statement in detecting common subjects. Some jurists consider the common diagnosis valid and the jurist's duty to be merely deducing the ruling; but others in some cases consider the jurist's statement superior to the common opinion.<ref>See: ʿAlīdūst, “Expert Opinions of the Jurist on Subjects of Rulings”, pp. 50–54.</ref> The views of jurists regarding the authority for detecting death in a brain patient can be divided into two categories:

=== General Common (*ʿUrf-e ʿĀmm*) ===

From the perspective of some contemporary jurists such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]]<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> and [[Jawad Tabrizi|Javād Tabrīzī]]<ref>Khūʾī and Tabrīzī, 1390 SH, p. 279.</ref> the common diagnosis regarding subjects is valid. According to Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī, since the common people (*ʿurf-e ʿāmm*) consider a brain-dead patient alive, these patients have the rulings of a living person.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] also believes that although detecting vital signs of the brain is the responsibility of a specialist physician, determining the concept of life and death is a common issue, and to detect it, one must refer to a jurist aware of the common language. Also, Muḥammad Muʾmin and [[~~Muhammad Muhammadi Qaini|Muḥammad Muḥammadī Qāʾinī~~]] believe that if the heart's activity is spontaneous and without device assistance, the patient is considered alive, and otherwise, death is ruled.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 45; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 135–136, 139.</ref>

From the perspective of some contemporary jurists such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]]<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> and [[Jawad Tabrizi|Javād Tabrīzī]]<ref>Khūʾī and Tabrīzī, 1390 SH, p. 279.</ref> the common diagnosis regarding subjects is valid. According to Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī, since the common people (*ʿurf-e ʿāmm*) consider a brain-dead patient alive, these patients have the rulings of a living person.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] also believes that although detecting vital signs of the brain is the responsibility of a specialist physician, determining the concept of life and death is a common issue, and to detect it, one must refer to a jurist aware of the common language. Also, Muḥammad Muʾmin and [[Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni]] believe that if the heart's activity is spontaneous and without device assistance, the patient is considered alive, and otherwise, death is ruled.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 45; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 135–136, 139.</ref>

=== Specific Common (*ʿUrf-e Khāṣṣ*) ===

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=== Organ Transplantation ===

Regarding the transplantation of organs from brain-dead patients, there is disagreement following whether they are dead or alive. [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], one of the contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd*, believes that given the medical death of a brain-dead patient, removing organs from brain-dead patients to save Muslims' lives is unobjectionable.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 114–115.</ref> Also, some scholars such as [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] believe that if the heart's activity is through a device not spontaneously, severing organs and transplanting them is permissible.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 44; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, p. 140.</ref> In contrast, some others believe that if using the body organs of brain-dead patients causes accelerating their death, it is not permissible;<ref>Khāmeneʾī, *Ajwibat al-Istiftāʾāt*, p. 287; Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 151.</ref> but if it is not so and is done with his prior permission or saving the life of a respected person (Muslim) depends on organ transplantation, it is unobjectionable.<ref>Khāmeneʾī, *Ajwibat al-Istiftāʾāt*, p. 287.</ref>

[[~~Muhammad Muhammadi Qaini|Muḥammad Muḥammadī Qāʾinī~~]] considers the permissibility of transplanting an organ from a brain patient based on the rule of necessity and adds that if a brain-dead patient follows a religion that considers organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient permissible, one can consider his organ transplantation permissible using the rule of obligation.<ref>Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 140–142.</ref>

[[Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni]] considers the permissibility of transplanting an organ from a brain patient based on the rule of necessity and adds that if a brain-dead patient follows a religion that considers organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient permissible, one can consider his organ transplantation permissible using the rule of obligation.<ref>Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 140–142.</ref>

=== Continuation or Cessation of Patient Treatment ===

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== Study Resources ==

Numerous works in Persian and Arabic languages and in the form of books, articles, and theses have examined brain death jurisprudentially. Among these works, one can mention the book *Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Law*; Muḥammad Raḥmatī in this book, after conceptualizing death and life in jurisprudential sources and medical texts, mentions the reasons of supporters and opponents of the vitality of a brain-dead patient and examines the permissibility of organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient. He also, in collaboration with ʿAlī Akbar Farahzādī, has authored an article titled “Study of Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Criminal Law” and after conceptual explanation and argumentative examination of the issue, in the position of conclusion, has stated that the criterion for human life is the connection of soul and body, and since this connection is through the brain, a brain-dead patient has the ruling of a dead human. The book [[Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence (book)|*Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence*]] written by Sayyid Muḥsin Mortażavī and the book [[Brain Death: ~~Juridical~~-~~Legal~~ Processing (book)|*Brain Death: ~~Juridical~~-~~Legal~~ Processing*]] written by Ḥamīd Sotūdeh, and [[Mawt al-Dimagh fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (book)|*Mawt al-Dimāgh fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*]] written by Masʿūd Ṣabrī which has been published in Egypt are other published works in this field.

Numerous works in Persian and Arabic languages and in the form of books, articles, and theses have examined brain death jurisprudentially. Among these works, one can mention the book *Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Law*; Muḥammad Raḥmatī in this book, after conceptualizing death and life in jurisprudential sources and medical texts, mentions the reasons of supporters and opponents of the vitality of a brain-dead patient and examines the permissibility of organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient. He also, in collaboration with ʿAlī Akbar Farahzādī, has authored an article titled “Study of Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Criminal Law” and after conceptual explanation and argumentative examination of the issue, in the position of conclusion, has stated that the criterion for human life is the connection of soul and body, and since this connection is through the brain, a brain-dead patient has the ruling of a dead human. The book [[Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence (book)|Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence]] written by Sayyid Muḥsin Mortażavī and the book [[Brain Death: Legal-Jurisprudential Processing (book)|Brain Death: Legal-Jurisprudential Processing]] written by Ḥamīd Sotūdeh, and [[Mawt al-Dimagh fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (book)|*Mawt al-Dimāgh fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*]] written by Masʿūd Ṣabrī which has been published in Egypt are other published works in this field.

== references ==

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 '''Brain Death''' (in persian: [[:fa:مرگ_مغزی|مرگ مغزی]]) is the irreversible cessation of brain activities. This issue is one of the emerging medical matters and from a jurisprudential perspective, it falls under the category of *masāʾil mustaḥdathah* (emerging issues). From a medical standpoint, brain death will lead to certain death in a short period; however, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, there is disagreement among jurists as to whether patients afflicted with brain death are alive or dead. This disagreement arises from the jurists' differences in determining and diagnosing the subject of brain death.
-From the perspective of some contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd* (sources of emulation) such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani]] and [[Jawad Tabrizi]], the diagnosis of the common people is valid in determining the subject, and since the common people consider a brain-dead patient alive, from a jurisprudential standpoint, such a person has the ruling of a living person. A group of contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], and [[Husayn Nuri Hamadani|Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī]] consider the criterion for determining whether brain-dead patients are alive or dead to be the diagnosis of the specific common (*ʿurf-e khāṣṣ*) (specialist physicians). According to the general rules of deduction, the application of all rulings related to brain death such as organ transplantation, continuation or cessation of treatment, *dīyah* (blood money) for organs, and equipping the deceased is contingent upon diagnosing the subject.
+From the perspective of some contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd* (sources of emulation) such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]] and [[Jawad Tabrizi]], the diagnosis of the common people is valid in determining the subject, and since the common people consider a brain-dead patient alive, from a jurisprudential standpoint, such a person has the ruling of a living person. A group of contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], and [[Husayn Nuri Hamadani|Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī]] consider the criterion for determining whether brain-dead patients are alive or dead to be the diagnosis of the specific common (*ʿurf-e khāṣṣ*) (specialist physicians). According to the general rules of deduction, the application of all rulings related to brain death such as organ transplantation, continuation or cessation of treatment, *dīyah* (blood money) for organs, and equipping the deceased is contingent upon diagnosing the subject.
 == Position of the Issue in Contemporary Jurisprudence ==
@@ Line 38: / Line 38: @@
 Does the title "dead" apply to patients afflicted with brain death? Jurists have presented various views in response to this question. It seems that this disagreement returns to the difference of opinion in the issue of the validity and credibility of the common diagnosis or the jurist's statement in detecting common subjects. Some jurists consider the common diagnosis valid and the jurist's duty to be merely deducing the ruling; but others in some cases consider the jurist's statement superior to the common opinion.<ref>See: ʿAlīdūst, “Expert Opinions of the Jurist on Subjects of Rulings”, pp. 50–54.</ref> The views of jurists regarding the authority for detecting death in a brain patient can be divided into two categories:
 === General Common (*ʿUrf-e ʿĀmm*) ===
-From the perspective of some contemporary jurists such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]]<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> and [[Jawad Tabrizi|Javād Tabrīzī]]<ref>Khūʾī and Tabrīzī, 1390 SH, p. 279.</ref> the common diagnosis regarding subjects is valid. According to Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī, since the common people (*ʿurf-e ʿāmm*) consider a brain-dead patient alive, these patients have the rulings of a living person.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] also believes that although detecting vital signs of the brain is the responsibility of a specialist physician, determining the concept of life and death is a common issue, and to detect it, one must refer to a jurist aware of the common language. Also, Muḥammad Muʾmin and [[Muhammad Muhammadi Qaini|Muḥammad Muḥammadī Qāʾinī]] believe that if the heart's activity is spontaneous and without device assistance, the patient is considered alive, and otherwise, death is ruled.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 45; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 135–136, 139.</ref>
+From the perspective of some contemporary jurists such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]]<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> and [[Jawad Tabrizi|Javād Tabrīzī]]<ref>Khūʾī and Tabrīzī, 1390 SH, p. 279.</ref> the common diagnosis regarding subjects is valid. According to Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī, since the common people (*ʿurf-e ʿāmm*) consider a brain-dead patient alive, these patients have the rulings of a living person.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] also believes that although detecting vital signs of the brain is the responsibility of a specialist physician, determining the concept of life and death is a common issue, and to detect it, one must refer to a jurist aware of the common language. Also, Muḥammad Muʾmin and [[Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni]] believe that if the heart's activity is spontaneous and without device assistance, the patient is considered alive, and otherwise, death is ruled.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 45; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 135–136, 139.</ref>
 === Specific Common (*ʿUrf-e Khāṣṣ*) ===
@@ Line 52: / Line 52: @@
 === Organ Transplantation ===
 Regarding the transplantation of organs from brain-dead patients, there is disagreement following whether they are dead or alive. [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], one of the contemporary *marājiʿ taqlīd*, believes that given the medical death of a brain-dead patient, removing organs from brain-dead patients to save Muslims' lives is unobjectionable.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 114–115.</ref> Also, some scholars such as [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] believe that if the heart's activity is through a device not spontaneously, severing organs and transplanting them is permissible.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 44; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, p. 140.</ref> In contrast, some others believe that if using the body organs of brain-dead patients causes accelerating their death, it is not permissible;<ref>Khāmeneʾī, *Ajwibat al-Istiftāʾāt*, p. 287; Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 151.</ref> but if it is not so and is done with his prior permission or saving the life of a respected person (Muslim) depends on organ transplantation, it is unobjectionable.<ref>Khāmeneʾī, *Ajwibat al-Istiftāʾāt*, p. 287.</ref>
-[[Muhammad Muhammadi Qaini|Muḥammad Muḥammadī Qāʾinī]] considers the permissibility of transplanting an organ from a brain patient based on the rule of necessity and adds that if a brain-dead patient follows a religion that considers organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient permissible, one can consider his organ transplantation permissible using the rule of obligation.<ref>Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 140–142.</ref>
+[[Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni]] considers the permissibility of transplanting an organ from a brain patient based on the rule of necessity and adds that if a brain-dead patient follows a religion that considers organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient permissible, one can consider his organ transplantation permissible using the rule of obligation.<ref>Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 140–142.</ref>
 === Continuation or Cessation of Patient Treatment ===
@@ Line 66: / Line 66: @@
 == Study Resources ==
 {{Main|Brain Death (Study Resources)}}
-Numerous works in Persian and Arabic languages and in the form of books, articles, and theses have examined brain death jurisprudentially. Among these works, one can mention the book *Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Law*; Muḥammad Raḥmatī in this book, after conceptualizing death and life in jurisprudential sources and medical texts, mentions the reasons of supporters and opponents of the vitality of a brain-dead patient and examines the permissibility of organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient. He also, in collaboration with ʿAlī Akbar Farahzādī, has authored an article titled “Study of Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Criminal Law” and after conceptual explanation and argumentative examination of the issue, in the position of conclusion, has stated that the criterion for human life is the connection of soul and body, and since this connection is through the brain, a brain-dead patient has the ruling of a dead human. The book [[Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence (book)|*Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence*]] written by Sayyid Muḥsin Mortażavī and the book [[Brain Death: Juridical-Legal Processing (book)|*Brain Death: Juridical-Legal Processing*]] written by Ḥamīd Sotūdeh, and [[Mawt al-Dimagh fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (book)|*Mawt al-Dimāgh fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*]] written by Masʿūd Ṣabrī which has been published in Egypt are other published works in this field.
+Numerous works in Persian and Arabic languages and in the form of books, articles, and theses have examined brain death jurisprudentially. Among these works, one can mention the book *Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Law*; Muḥammad Raḥmatī in this book, after conceptualizing death and life in jurisprudential sources and medical texts, mentions the reasons of supporters and opponents of the vitality of a brain-dead patient and examines the permissibility of organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient. He also, in collaboration with ʿAlī Akbar Farahzādī, has authored an article titled “Study of Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Criminal Law” and after conceptual explanation and argumentative examination of the issue, in the position of conclusion, has stated that the criterion for human life is the connection of soul and body, and since this connection is through the brain, a brain-dead patient has the ruling of a dead human. The book [[Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence (book)|Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence]] written by Sayyid Muḥsin Mortażavī and the book [[Brain Death: Legal-Jurisprudential Processing (book)|Brain Death: Legal-Jurisprudential Processing]] written by Ḥamīd Sotūdeh, and [[Mawt al-Dimagh fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (book)|*Mawt al-Dimāgh fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*]] written by Masʿūd Ṣabrī which has been published in Egypt are other published works in this field.
 == references ==

Brain Death: Difference between revisions