Brain Death: Difference between revisions
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Regarding continuing treatment and disconnecting medical assisting devices such as respiratory devices, there are two opinions: many jurists consider killing a brain-dead patient impermissible; in contrast, some consider disconnecting the device not forbidden.<ref>Qāsemī, *Encyclopedia of Medical Jurisprudence*, vol. 3, pp. 334–335.</ref> Those who consider a brain-dead patient alive consider treating him obligatory and disconnecting it impermissible.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 150.</ref> [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], one of the contemporary jurists, explicitly rules on the non-obligation of continuing treatment.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 114, 117.</ref> Also, from the perspective of [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], if there is a probability of patient recovery, discontinuing treatment and disconnecting assisting devices is not permissible; but if there is a more important case and the device is unique to this device, one must attend to the more important case.<ref>Montazerī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 121.</ref> The basis of this ruling is the conflict of more important and important in performing religious duty and the priority of the more important matter. | Regarding continuing treatment and disconnecting medical assisting devices such as respiratory devices, there are two opinions: many jurists consider killing a brain-dead patient impermissible; in contrast, some consider disconnecting the device not forbidden.<ref>Qāsemī, *Encyclopedia of Medical Jurisprudence*, vol. 3, pp. 334–335.</ref> Those who consider a brain-dead patient alive consider treating him obligatory and disconnecting it impermissible.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 150.</ref> [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]], one of the contemporary jurists, explicitly rules on the non-obligation of continuing treatment.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 114, 117.</ref> Also, from the perspective of [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], if there is a probability of patient recovery, discontinuing treatment and disconnecting assisting devices is not permissible; but if there is a more important case and the device is unique to this device, one must attend to the more important case.<ref>Montazerī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 121.</ref> The basis of this ruling is the conflict of more important and important in performing religious duty and the priority of the more important matter. | ||
=== | === Dīyah === | ||
If a person afflicted with brain death is considered alive, killing him is not permissible, and he has full *dīyah*. In case of killing the patient, his *dīyah* belongs to the heirs.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 150.</ref> Some jurists believe that if the patient has permitted his own killing, in this case, the right to retaliation and *dīyah* is dropped. In contrast, some believe that permission to kill does not drop the right to retaliation; because a human has no right and authority over his own destruction.<ref>Qāsemī, *Encyclopedia of Medical Jurisprudence*, vol. 3, pp. 336–339.</ref> Some also consider paying *dīyah* as obligatory caution and believe that the amount of *dīyah* should be spent on charities for the deceased.<ref>Montazerī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 120.</ref> | If a person afflicted with brain death is considered alive, killing him is not permissible, and he has full *dīyah*. In case of killing the patient, his *dīyah* belongs to the heirs.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, p. 150.</ref> Some jurists believe that if the patient has permitted his own killing, in this case, the right to retaliation and *dīyah* is dropped. In contrast, some believe that permission to kill does not drop the right to retaliation; because a human has no right and authority over his own destruction.<ref>Qāsemī, *Encyclopedia of Medical Jurisprudence*, vol. 3, pp. 336–339.</ref> Some also consider paying *dīyah* as obligatory caution and believe that the amount of *dīyah* should be spent on charities for the deceased.<ref>Montazerī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 120.</ref> | ||
Some also believe that regarding *dīyah* for severing an organ, caution is in paying *dīyah*, and paying it is the responsibility of the one who severs the organ.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 115.</ref> | Some also believe that regarding *dīyah* for severing an organ, caution is in paying *dīyah*, and paying it is the responsibility of the one who severs the organ.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, p. 115.</ref> | ||