Brain Death: Difference between revisions

Does the title "dead" apply to patients afflicted with brain death? Jurists have presented various views in response to this question. It seems that this disagreement returns to the difference of opinion in the issue of the validity and credibility of the common diagnosis or the jurist's statement in detecting common subjects. Some jurists consider the common diagnosis valid and the jurist's duty to be merely deducing the ruling; but others in some cases consider the jurist's statement superior to the common opinion.<ref>See: ʿAlīdūst, “Expert Opinions of the Jurist on Subjects of Rulings”, pp. 50–54.</ref> The views of jurists regarding the authority for detecting death in a brain patient can be divided into two categories:

From the perspective of some contemporary jurists such as [[Muhammad Fazel Lankarani|Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī]]<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> and [[Jawad Tabrizi|Javād Tabrīzī]]<ref>Khūʾī and Tabrīzī, 1390 SH, p. 279.</ref> the common diagnosis regarding subjects is valid. According to Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī, since the common people (ʿurf-e ʿāmm) consider a brain-dead patient alive, these patients have the rulings of a living person.<ref>Khodādādī, *Rulings for Physicians and Patients*, pp. 149–150.</ref> [[Muhammad Mumin|Muḥammad Muʾmin]] also believes that although detecting vital signs of the brain is the responsibility of a specialist physician, determining the concept of life and death is a common issue, and to detect it, one must refer to a jurist aware of the common language. Also, Muḥammad Muʾmin and [[Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni]] believe that if the heart's activity is spontaneous and without device assistance, the patient is considered alive, and otherwise, death is ruled.<ref>Muʾmin, “Organ Transplantation”, p. 45; Qāʾinī, *al-Mabsūṭ Masāʾil Ṭibbīyah*, vol. 1, pp. 135–136, 139.</ref>

=== Specific Common (ʿUrf-e Khāṣṣ) ===

A number of other marājiʿ taqlīd such as [[Naser Makarem Shirazi|Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī]]<ref>Makārem Shīrāzī, *Encyclopedia of Comparative Jurisprudence*, vol. 1, p. 44.</ref> and [[Husayn Nuri Hamadani|Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī]]<ref>Nūrī Hamadānī, *A Thousand and One Jurisprudential Issues*, vol. 1, pp. 253–254.</ref> have left the detection of details of the brain death issue to specialist physicians. Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī considers brain death as the complete death of the person; even if other organs continue their activity for a while.<ref>Nūrī Hamadānī, *A Thousand and One Jurisprudential Issues*, vol. 1, pp. 253–254.</ref> Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, considering the statements of physicians—who consider a brain-dead patient like someone whose brain is disintegrated or whose head is separated from the body—believes that a patient afflicted with brain death is not considered alive; however, in the position of fatwa (religious edict), he exercises caution and does not count a brain-dead patient as dead. Therefore, in the rulings related to life and death of such a person, he advocates detail.<ref>ʿAlīān Nezhādī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 113–114.</ref>

Also, [[Husayn Ali Montazeri|Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī]], considers death and life as two common concepts and the criterion for life and death as the detection of experts. He believes that the criterion in a person's death is the application of death in such a way that all manifestations of life and its effects are negated, and there is no probability of return.<ref>Montazerī, *Medical Rulings*, pp. 120–121.</ref>