Children's Rights (book): Difference between revisions

This book covers topics such as child guardianship and its levels (natural guardian, testamentary guardian, and appointed guardian), the rights of the fetus (preservation of life, prohibition of [[abortion]], and financial rights), and the rights of the newborn (breastfeeding, birth registration, and naming). The author also explains issues related to [[custody]] and its conditions, maintenance (*nafaqah*) and payment priorities, the property and transactions of children and their limitations, [[child marriage]] and the conditions for its validity, proof of lineage and ways to deny it, [[adoption]] and its legal effects, and finally, the nationality and domicile of the child.

*Children's Rights* is a book in the field of [[Family Jurisprudence]]. It was authored by Gholamreza Yazdani, a faculty member at the [[Razavi University of Islamic Sciences]]. The books [[Commercial Law (Book)|Commercial Law]] and [[Family Law (Book)|Family Law]] are among the author's other works in the field of contemporary jurisprudence. The book *Children's Rights* was published in 1400 SH by Ketab Taha Publications in 120 pages.

The author states that his purpose in writing this book is to familiarize the general public with children's rights; therefore, he has avoided using jurisprudential and legal arguments as well as technical terms, and has compiled the book based on legal texts and authoritative fatwas (p. 9). In this work, "children" refers to girls under 9 years old and boys under 15 years old, who are called "minors" (*saghir*) in jurisprudential terminology (p. 11).

In the second chapter of the book, the author examines the legal status of the fetus and emphasizes that the fetus has the right to life; therefore, [[abortion]] is generally prohibited, and the perpetrator must pay blood money (*diyah*). The amount of blood money varies depending on the stage of fetal development.

The author then addresses the issue of foster kinship (*qarabat al-rada'i*) and considers it similar to blood kinship in terms of marriage prohibition. He divides foster kinship into two types: longitudinal and latitudinal. The longitudinal type includes the child's relationship with the wet nurse, her husband, her children, and her relatives; the latitudinal type pertains to two children who have been breastfed by the same foster mother without having a common biological mother. The author mentions six conditions for the establishment of foster kinship, such as the milk being the result of a legitimate pregnancy and the milk being suckled from the breast (pp. 38-45).

In the fourth chapter, the author examines the issue of [[custody]] and care of the child, considering it simultaneously a right and a duty of the parents and a fundamental right of the child. According to him, custody ends when the child reaches the age of puberty and is deemed mature (*rushd*).

Conditions such as mental and physical health, moral competence, and being a Muslim are considered for the custodian. Also, according to Iranian civil law, a mother who wants custody of the child must not marry another man. The author notes that the custodian cannot receive wages for custody; also, the parent who does not have custody has the right to visit the child, and this right cannot be denied. At the end of the fourth chapter, he makes a clear distinction between custody (related to the child's physical affairs) and upbringing (related to spiritual growth) and assigns the responsibility of upbringing to the following individuals in order: parents, paternal grandfather, appointed testamentary guardian, and appointed guardian (*qayyim*) (pp. 47-56).

The author identifies the child's guardian as the natural guardian (*wali*), testamentary guardian (*wasi*), and appointed guardian (*qayyim*) and explains the scope of their powers:

* Natural Guardian (*Wali al-Qahri*); transactions made by the natural guardian (father or paternal grandfather) with the child's property are generally valid, and are void only if they are detrimental.

* Testamentary Guardian (*Wasi*); the testamentary guardian of the natural guardian also has the powers of the natural guardian.

* Appointed Guardian (*Qayyim*); the appointed guardian, in addition to ensuring the transaction is not detrimental, must also consider the child's best interests. Also, the appointed guardian cannot be a party to a transaction with the child, and in such a case, the transaction is void. The author provides a list of legal prohibitions for the appointed guardian, including: selling or mortgaging the child's real estate, and borrowing money for them (pp. 67-71).

In the eighth chapter, the author addresses the issue of the child's lineage and explains that this lineage is legitimate if there is a valid marriage or intercourse by misapprehension (*wati bi shubha*). In his view, proving maternal lineage is not very difficult, as evidence such as a history of pregnancy, childbirth, and circumstantial evidence can confirm the mother's claim in this regard. However, the mother must be able to show that her pregnancy was through a legitimate means. Yazdani, pointing to the complexities of determining the origin of the child's conception, considers proving paternal lineage to be more difficult, for which the legislator relies on presumptions such as the presumption of legitimacy (*amarah al-firash*), acknowledgment of paternity, blood tests, and DNA (pp. 77-87). He then addresses the denial of lineage and explains the issue of denial by the child, father, and mother, citing jurisprudential and legal evidence (pp. 87-94).

In the tenth chapter, the author examines the issue of the child's nationality and domicile from a legal perspective. Countries have adopted either the nationality of the parents (*jus sanguinis*) or the place of birth (*jus soli*) as the criterion for imposing nationality on a child. The Iranian legal system, for instance, considers the parents' nationality (*jus sanguinis*) as the criterion for the child's nationality. The author then examines the issue of the child's domicile. According to him, a child does not have the authority to determine their own domicile. Consequently, the child's domicile will be the same as their guardian's domicile (pp. 111-116).