State theories in Shiite jurisprudence (book): Difference between revisions

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 * The scope of the Guardianship (Wilayah): In these theories, the scope of the Guardianship (Wilayah) is considered to be related to the interests of the society and is never limited to the matters of discretion.
 === The difference of appointment theories ===
-According to the author, in addition to having commonalities in the foundations and principles, the theories of appointment also have some specific features for themselves. Among other things, in the theory of the appointment of public jurists, the ruler has no jurist (wali al-faqih) beyond the Sharia rulings. Accordingly, the ruler is not bound by the probate affairs and the primary and secondary recommendations of God and the laws of human affairs. On the other hand, this Guardianship (Wilayah) is bound by the interest of the Islamic society, public affairs, state and politics. (pp. 107-108). This is a new theory which represents jurisprudence, some of its features include paying attention to the expedients of the state and society in jurisprudence, paying attention to the role of time and place in ijtihad and the ability to solve the political, and, finally, economic and cultural problems of society. (p. 109)
+According to the author, theories of appointive Guardianship (Wilayah al-Intisab), despite sharing commonalities in their foundations and essential elements, each possess certain distinctive features of their own. Among these, in the theory of general appointive guardianship of the jurists (al-wilayah al-intisabiyyah al-amma li-l-fuqaha), the ruler (al-hakim) has no discretionary authority beyond the Sharia rulings themselves. (p. 95)
+By contrast, in the theory of Absolute Guardianship (al-Wilayah al-Mutlaqah), both the scope of Guardianship (Wilayah) and the conception of jurisprudence (fiqh and faqahah) are expanded. On this basis, the ruler is not confined to non-litigious matters (al-omour al-hesbiah), nor limited by primary and secondary divine subsidiary rulings (al-ahkam al-far’iyyah al-awwaliyya wa al-thanawiyya), nor by man-made statutory laws. At the same time, this guardianship is restricted by the interests (maslahah / Istislah) of Islamic society, as well as by public affairs, governance, and politics. (pp. 107-108)
+This theory presents a new understanding of faqahah (juristic authority), some of whose salient features include: close attention to the interests of government and society within fiqh, careful consideration of the role of time and place in ijtihad, and the capacity to resolve the political, economic, and cultural problems of society. (p. 109)
 The difference between the theory of public appointing jurist (wali al-faqih) of the Council of religious jurist (wali al-faqih) and the two theories of public appointing jurist (wali al-faqih) of the jurists and absolute jurist (wali al-faqih) is that instead of one person at the top of the pyramid of power, a council of authorities takes over the affairs of the nation (p. 97). Meanwhile, according to the previous two theories, if a righteous jurist exercises guardianship, no more jurists are allowed to exercise guardianship (p. 88. So, the guardian of the matter is determined from among the righteous jurists who have the current guardianship (p. 89).