Compulsory hijab: Difference between revisions
Created page with "{{Author |author = Muhammadmahdi Emadi |author2 = |author3 = |compiler = |editor1 = |editor2 = |editor3 = }} '''Compulsory hijab''' (in persian: [https://ency.feqhemoaser.com/fa/view/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C حجاب اجباری]), which means legally obliging women to wear hijab by the Islamic government, is of the challengeful topics in jurisprudence. The main questions in this discussion include: Can the government oblig..." |
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====Criticism==== | ====Criticism==== | ||
Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following: | Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following: | ||
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# None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref> | # None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them.<ref>Husseinī-Faqīh, highest level jurisprudence course, 26th October 2020 and 28th October 2020</ref> According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.<ref>Ayāzī, Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb, p. 208</ref> | ||
# According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref> | # According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.<ref>Murtaḍavī, Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, p. 127</ref> | ||
# Forbidding the evil reasons depend on the realization of conditions such as effectiveness, or the person’s awareness of rules, and do not apply to all cases. Therefore, the scope of these reasons is different to legal coercion and they cannot be used to infer the legal obligation of hijab and the necessity of arraigning the one who does not wear hijab. This is because, obligation of a social act is associated with the necessity of punishing the violator and this punishment can be proven with the reasons for punishment, not for the prohibition of evil. | # Forbidding the evil reasons depend on the realization of conditions such as effectiveness, or the person’s awareness of rules, and do not apply to all cases. Therefore, the scope of these reasons is different to legal coercion and they cannot be used to infer the legal obligation of hijab and the necessity of arraigning the one who does not wear hijab. This is because, obligation of a social act is associated with the necessity of punishing the violator and this punishment can be proven with the reasons for punishment, not for the prohibition of evil. | ||
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===Hadiths on the obligation of punishment=== | ===Hadiths on the obligation of punishment=== | ||