Modernizing Islamic Thought

Author: MohammadQasim Mobarez

• abstract

Tadḥīth al-Fikr al-Islāmī (Modernizing Islamic Thought) (Book), (in persian: تحدیث الفکر الاسلامی (کتاب)) originally written in Arabic by Abd al-Majid al-Sharafi, is a critical exploration of the challenges facing the sciences of jurisprudence (fiqh) and legal theory (usul al-fiqh) within Sunni Islam. The work seeks to respond to the demands of modern life by adopting a critical and historically grounded approach. The author divides the book into three sections, addressing topics such as the distinction between religion and religious thought, the legitimacy of critiquing religious thought, a critique of usul al-fiqh and its sources, and an overall critique of Islamic jurisprudence. According to al-Sharafi, perceiving Islam as a closed and immutable system has hindered its capacity for development and renewal. By distinguishing between the religion of Islam itself and human interpretations of it, the author advocates for the legitimacy of modernizing Islamic thought. Critiquing the traditional reliance on the nass (text), al-Sharafi argues that textual authority has historically been unstable: certain texts have been disregarded by religious scholars, many are context-dependent, and thus, in his view, the only viable alternative is a direct and renewed engagement with the Quran. In the second section, al-Sharafi critically examines the six fundamental assumptions of Sunni legal theory, underscoring the need for their modernization. Holding that the scope of legal rulings is limited in relation to human actions, that the Prophet’s (s) conduct is distinct from that of the Companions and their successors, and that divine rulings differ from juristic ones, al-Sharafi contends that the science of usul al-fiqh is a human construct. He raises the pivotal question: can these legal principles be adapted to contemporary contexts? In the final section, he references ambiguities in jurists’ interpretations of Quranic verses, asserting that the existing legal system is composed of inherited techniques lacking a philosophy of legislation. Thus, a fundamental transformation is necessary. Al-Sharafi insists that revising the current system of Islamic jurisprudence will not compromise the essential pillars of religion.

Overview

Tadḥīth al-Fikr al-Islāmī is authored by Abd al-Majid al-Sharafi, a professor of the history of Islamic thought and civilization at Manouba University in Tunisia. A leading voice among contemporary Arab reformers and head of the Arab Rationalist Association, al-Sharafi engages in this work with the intent to address the needs of modern humanity. He critiques the foundational structures of fiqh and usul al-fiqh, contending that these disciplines consist of juristic methodologies formulated in the second and third Islamic centuries, shaped by the demands and culture of their time. These methods, he argues, are no longer sufficient for the present age. Therefore, he suggests a choice must be made: either revise these sciences or let them fall into obsolescence. Al-Sharafi opts for the former and, utilizing historical methodology, identifies the deficiencies of these fields and reconstructs them based on two principles—freedom and individual responsibility—to present a renewed understanding of religious texts. Published in 1998 by al-Fanak in Casablanca, Tadḥīth al-Fikr al-Islāmī was translated into Persian by Muhammad Amjad under the title Asri-sazi-ye Andishe-ye Dini and published by Naqid in Tehran in 2003 (1382 SH).

Structure of the Book

The book consists of three chapters, originally delivered as lectures. At the end of each chapter, the author responds to audience questions.

• Chapter One: The distinction between religion and religious thought, the legitimacy of critiquing religious thought, and a critique of text (nass) and consensus (ijma).
• Chapter Two: A critique of the science of legal theory and its sources of derivation.
• Chapter Three: An analysis and critique of the science of jurisprudence.

Methodology

The author’s principal methodological approach is historical. Al-Sharafi asserts that the Islamic legal system emerged under specific temporal, cultural, political, and social conditions. By historically analyzing these circumstances and comparing them both to the time of the Prophet (s) and to modern-day realities, a new understanding of Islamic law may be achieved.

Critique of the Totalizing View of Islam

In the first chapter, al-Sharafi challenges the common scholarly view that Islam is a monolithic and closed system, within which one must either accept everything or reject it altogether. He argues that any civilization or intellectual system that presents itself as a fixed, unalterable whole ultimately loses the capacity to grow and adapt. To support the legitimacy of modernization, the author begins by rejecting the view that religion is a closed set. He maintains that one must first distinguish between religion and religious knowledge, as the essence of religion is unchanging, whereas our understanding of it constantly evolves. This stands in contrast to the traditional view, which equates human understanding of religion with the religion itself, thus rendering it immutable. In this book, therefore, “modernization” refers specifically to the modernization of Islamic thought and discourse—fields such as exegesis, theology, jurisprudence, legal theory, and hadith. According to al-Sharafi, this interwoven intellectual system did not exist during the Prophet’s time but emerged later during the formative period of Islamic scholarship (pp. 11–12).

Critique of Textualism in Traditional Thought

In the continuation of the first part of his book, al-Sharafi critiques the traditional view of the frequently-used concept of the nass (نصّ). He argues that nass is a concept that can correspond to various meanings. Citing the statement of Imam Ali (AS), who described the Quran as ḥammālun dhū wujūh (حمّالٌ ذو وجوه), al-Sharafi maintains that books of Usul al-Fiqh reflect a one-dimensional view of the nass—a view that has always been justifiable and, In some cases, has even been interpreted with two contradictory meanings. Al-Sharafi lists several criticisms of the authority of nass in traditional thinking:

• The historical instability and lack of clarity in the nass;
• Religious scholars relying only on portions of texts in their argumentation;
• Jurists isolating verses from their historical and contextual settings (even though some texts were revealed for specific issues and in unique temporal circumstances, jurists have often generalized them beyond their original context);
• The fallibility of scholars in the process of deriving rulings due to neglecting the proper methodology for citing texts;
• The use of nass throughout history as a tool of justification and as a means of legitimizing social legislation;
• The transformation of interpretations and derivations by jurists, commentators, and theologians into authoritative texts themselves—as if only they were the true addressees of the Quran, and others must consult them to understand it;
• The fabrication of various principles of jurisprudence and Quranic sciences by post-prophetic scholars (such as Amm and Khass, Mutlaq and Muqayyad, and Naskh and Mansukh), which became cornerstones in the understanding of the sacred text, though these principles might be either correct or flawed;
• The presentation of hadith as explanatory texts that clarify the ambiguities of the Quran and provide rulings where the Quran is silent—even though, in al-Sharafi’s view, the ambiguity of the Quran is intentional and desirable.

Ultimately, the author concludes that there is a gap between the ideal and the historical reality. The ideal presupposes that the nass contains an abstract truth that human beings must strive to understand without shaping it themselves. However, historical reality shows that Muslims during the compilation era played a role in shaping the texts and employed them instrumentally to standardize social norms. They projected meanings onto the nass that reveal its historical character. Al-Sharafi argues that, in light of the flaws in the traditional approach to nass, we have no choice but to return directly to the Quran and approach the text with a new lens, independent of the understandings of previous generations (pp. 13–20).

Critique of Sunni Usul al-Fiqh

In the second part of the book, considering the significance of usul al-fiqh in the structure of Sunni ijtihad and the abundance of writings on the subject, al-Sharafi seeks to critique the foundational assumptions and six main presuppositions of Sunni jurisprudential theory (usul al-fiqh) in light of contemporary conditions. He emphasizes the need to contemporize (ta'sir) this discipline. He believes that all the foundational principles upon which this science is built are human constructs, and therefore, at minimum, we should be able to question whether these principles align with modern realities. The six presuppositions and his critiques are as follows:

1. The Principle of the Pervasiveness of Sharīʿah Rulings over All Human Actions: Al-Sharafi traces the idea that every human action must fall under one of the five legal rulings (al-ahkam al-khamsah) to the ideas of al-Shafi'i and subsequent jurists, particularly the notion: “Kullu mā nazala bi-Muslimin fīhi ḥukmun lāzim…” (كُلُّ ما نَزَلَ بِمُسلِمٍ فَفِيهِ حُكمٌ لازِم...). He argues that although earlier religions contained this notion of sacred law dominating all spheres of life, this idea did not exist among early Muslims. They engaged freely in cultural exchange and adopted elements from various civilizations without religiously codifying every interaction (pp. 48–50).
2. The Principle of the Continuity of the Prophet’s Practice (Sunnah) in the Eras of the Companions, Followers, and Their Followers: Al-Sharafi considers this presumption an illusion. He believes its roots lie in Christian theology, particularly Catholicism, where the continuity of Christ’s tradition is claimed through the Popes (p. 51).
3. The Principle of Preferring the General Meaning of a Text over the Specific Context of Its Revelation: According to the author, this principle amounts to ignoring the particular circumstances of a ruling at the time of revelation (p. 52).
4. The Separation Between the Realms of Jurisprudence and Creed: One of the problems, in al-Sharafi’s view, is the inconsistency between jurisprudential rulings and creedal standards. In theology, taqlid is invalid and conjectural proofs are unacceptable; but in usul al-fiqh, solitary reports (ahad) and probabilistic evidence are relied upon, with imitation and religious submission forming the basis of the science (p. 52).
5. The Principle of Basing Divine Rulings on Outward Forms: Al-Sharafi attributes this principle to the jurists’ and theorists’ concern for social cohesion, believing that conformity to external appearances ensures unity among Muslims. However, he sees this as producing hypocrisy, secrecy, ostentation, and duplicity (p. 54).
6. Equating Jurists’ Rulings with Divine Law: He states that one of the foundational assumptions in Sunni usul is to consider the standards and rules of the discipline as identical to God’s law. This gave rise to the two major schools of thought: musawwibah (those who believe every sincere juristic opinion is correct) and mukhti'ah (those who believe only one opinion is correct). Al-Sharafi notes that early jurists were far more cautious and hesitant to attribute halal or haram to God and exercised meticulous care in issuing rulings (p. 55).

Critique of the Sources of Derivation

After critiquing Sunni usul al-fiqh, al-Sharafi turns to analyze the primary sources of derivation in this science: the Quran, Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas. He presents examples of disagreement among jurists, theorists, and exegetes—even regarding rulings deemed essential to religion. His aim is to challenge the assertion that human interpretation, derivation, and exegesis should be categorized as “divine rulings.” How can one simultaneously perform ta'wil (interpretive reinterpretation) and then label that very interpretation as a “hukm ilahi” (divine ruling)?

The Quran

Al-Sharafi affirms the foundational authority of the Quran for Muslims, but he expresses serious doubt about the jurists’ approach to Quranic rulings and their methods of interpretation. According to him, jurists have treated Quranic rulings as absolute and universally applicable, regardless of changing circumstances, temporal contexts, or geographical differences. They consider their interpretations as definitive in meaning (qat'iyy al-dalalah). However, al-Sharafi contends that many of these so-called definitive rulings are, upon careful analysis, not definitive at all. Even those rulings classified under the essentials of religion have been subject to significant disagreement. As an example, he references Quranic rulings on inheritance. Though considered qat'iyy al-dalalah, their application to some hypothetical cases is impossible and disputed. He cites cases involving awl (proportional reduction) and ta'sib (residual allotment), where the sum of the shares exceeds the estate itself, creating mathematical inconsistencies. Thus, al-Sharafi argues for a reevaluation of this approach. Rather than treating Quranic rulings as rigid commands, we should see them as moral guidelines meant to direct the Muslim community based on evolving contexts and changing realities (pp. 56–58).

The Sunnah

Al-Sharafi also examines how the concept of sunnah evolved over time. Citing historical examples, he argues that the state of transmitted reports and the skepticism of earlier generations toward many narrations reflect that sunnah never attained the same degree of certainty or authority as the Quran. Therefore, it should not be uncritically accepted as a source for legal derivation. He also critiques the Idea that sunnah can abrogate Quranic rulings—highlighting it as a major point of contention between Sunnis and Shi'is, especially in the case of mut'ah (temporary marriage), where opposing interpretations hinge on whether a Quranic ruling was overridden by Prophetic tradition (p. 60).

Ijma and Qiyas

Al-Sharafi argues that the claim of ijma (consensus) lacks sufficient supporting evidence. Moreover, Sunni theorists fall into circular reasoning when they try to justify the authority of the Quran by ijma and vice versa: the Quran proves ijma, and ijma proves the Quran—an explicit logical fallacy. From the time of al-Shafi'i onward, Sunnis have relied on reports such as “Lā tajtamiʿu ummatī ʿalā ḍalālah (my ummah shall not agree upon misguidance)” to support ijma. Al-Sharafi observes that over time, the broad concept of ummah was narrowed down to the consensus of scholars and companions. This reduces the expansive notion of community to an elite minority. Additionally, such a notion of ijma becomes ineffective in addressing evolving societal needs, as it anchors problem-solving to the views of earlier generations rather than fostering new legal developments. He also critiques qiyas (analogy), stating that drawing legal conclusions by comparing one case to another is not an ideal or sound method for deriving rulings (pp. 25, 61–63).

Critique of the Science of Fiqh

In the final part of the book, al-Sharafi addresses the discipline of fiqh itself, aiming to assess its place in the modern era and its relevance in contemporary legal systems. He begins with a brief historical overview of fiqh and offers a comparative analysis between fiqh and modern law, illustrating the current role of Islamic jurisprudence in the legal systems of Muslim countries. He identifies the most significant difference between fiqh and law as the former’s lack of flexibility. Law is based on the idea of a social contract, while fiqh is rooted in divine rulings (ahkam shar'iyyah)—leaving no room for the notion of contractual consensus (pp. 77–84). Overall, al-Sharafi argues that the fiqh system is a set of inherited techniques based on the solutions of previous generations, lacking an underlying philosophy of legislation. As such, it either requires fundamental transformation—or faces obsolescence. He insists that rethinking this system will not destroy any pillars of the faith. Instead of repeating inherited methodologies to extract rulings, he proposes adopting a new approach aligned directly with the Quran, even if it does not remain loyal to the interpretations of earlier scholars. Those scholars operated within their own historical conditions and offered their own justifications—which are no longer effective or meaningful today. In the question-and-answer section, he identifies freedom and individual responsibility as the two most crucial principles. These, he asserts, provide the foundation for contemporizing fiqh and cultivating diverse, context-sensitive interpretations of the Quran (p. 32). Finally, al-Sharafi concludes that any meaningful reform of the fiqh tradition must begin by returning to history. Only through this historical perspective can we grasp the extent to which the juristic system has been shaped by the culture of its time—and how far it has diverged from the behavior of believers during the Prophet’s era and the ethical vision of the Quran.

Some Jurisprudential Examples

Al-Sharafi cites examples from the Quran that, within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, are considered qat'iyy al-dalalah (textually definitive). However, he argues that such determinations are set by the jurists themselves. For instance, he refers to the ruling concerning theft in transactional laws and fasting in devotional matters. Al-Sharafi claims that although the cutting off of the thief’s hand, based on the verse: "وَٱلسَّارِقُ وَٱلسَّارِقَةُ فَٱقۡطَعُواْ أَيۡدِيَهُمَا" (“As to the thief, male or female, cut off their hands…” — Sūrat al-Māʾidah, 5:38) Is considered qat'iyy al-dalalah in the legal tradition, it is actually beset with several ambiguities: ambiguity in the meaning of cutting, the extent of the hand to be amputated, and—most importantly—the varied juristic approaches to thieves across historical periods. These, he asserts, indicate that the definitiveness of this ruling is a construct of the developed juristic system. (pp. 83–86) Al-Sharafi raises similar doubts concerning the number and manner of prayer units (rak'at) and the obligation of fasting. Regarding fasting, he contends that contrary to juristic interpretations of Quranic verses, there is no obligation for those who can fast but find it difficult. Referring to historical reports, the asbab al-nuzul (occasions of revelation), and this verse: "وَعَلَى ٱلَّذِينَ يُطِيقُونَهُۥ فِدۡيَةٞ طَعَامُ مِسۡكِينٖۖ فَمَن تَطَوَّعَ خَيۡرٗا فَهُوَ خَيۡرٞ لَّهُۥۚ وَأَن تَصُومُواْ خَيۡرٞ لَّكُمۡ إِن كُنتُمۡ تَعۡلَمُونَ" (“And upon those who can [fast with difficulty] is a ransom: feeding a poor person. But whoever volunteers more—it is better for him. And to fast is better for you, if only you knew.” — Sūrat al-Baqarah, 2:184) He argues that early Muslims during the Prophet’s time were given the choice between fasting and feeding the poor, although fasting was encouraged by the Quran. According to al-Sharafi, the historical context compelled the earliest Muslims after the Prophet to enforce uniform religious behavior in society and to interpret acts of worship, including fasting, as obligatory. (pp. 88–95) He also cites the first verse of Sūrat al-Ṭalāq: "وَٱتَّقُواْ ٱللَّهَ رَبَّكُمۡۖ لَا تُخۡرِجُوهُنَّ مِنۢ بُيُوتِهِنَّ" (“And fear Allah, your Lord, and do not drive them out of their houses…” — Sūrat al-Ṭalāq, 65:1) As an example of how contemporary culture influenced the legal framework. He states that the verse was intended to protect women from being expelled from their homes during divorce proceedings. However, jurists—based on this verse—have imposed restrictions on women, interpreting it to mean that they are not permitted to leave the house during this period. (pp. 95–96)

Sources

• The Noble Qurʾān.
• Nahj al-Balāghah.
• Al-Shafi'i, Muhammad ibn Idris. Al-Risalah. Egypt: Maktabat al-Halabi, 1940.
• Al-Sharafi, Abd al-Majid. Al-Islam bayna al-Haqiqah wa al-Tajalli al-Tarikhi, trans. Abd Allah Nasiri Tahiri. Tehran: Kawir, 2015 [1394 Sh].
• Al-Sharafi, Abd al-Majid. Al-Islam wa al-Moderniyyah, trans. Mahdi Mihrizi. Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 2004 [1383 Sh].
• Al-Sharafi, Abd al-Majid. Asri Sazi-yi Andisheh-yi Dini, trans. Muhammad Amjad. Tehran: Naqid Publications, 2003 [1382 Sh].