Imitation of Women

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  • Abstract

Imitation of Women (Taqlid of women) or Women's Religious Authority (Marja'iyya of women) in Sharia rulings is primarily addressed by jurists and Fiqhi researchers under the discussion of the conditions of religious authority, especially the condition of masculinity (Dhukuriyya). In Fiqhi sources, two main views have formed regarding the religious authority of women: the famous view (Mashhur) of jurists which considers masculinity a condition, and the non-famous view which does not consider such a condition necessary and deems the religious authority of women permissible.

Shahid al-Thani is the first jurist to explicitly consider masculinity a condition for issuing Fatwas (Ifta) and claimed consensus (Ijma') on it. After him, this opinion was consolidated in works such as Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa; although some jurists such as Sahib al-Jawahir, Muhaqqiq Isfahani, and Sayyid Muhsin Hakim have doubted this condition.

Jurists who argue for the impermissibility of imitating women have cited a set of evidences to prove their claim; including Quranic verses such as the Verse of Qawwamun and the Verse of Daraja, narrations that consider holding the position of judgeship exclusive to men or forbid entrusting affairs to women, the claim of consensus, and also citing what is interpreted as the Taste of the Sharia (Madhaq al-Shar'). In contrast, critics of these evidences, by emphasizing the familial context of the cited verses, the weakness of the chain of narrations or the narrations being specific to particular social and historical conditions, the claimed consensus being based on evidence (Madraki), and also the ambiguity and lack of criteria for the concept of the Taste of the Sharia, have evaluated this set of evidences as insufficient to prove the condition of masculinity.

Opposing the famous view, a group of contemporary jurists, relying on the absolute nature (Itlaq) of verses such as the Verse of Ahl al-Dhikr, citing the absolute nature of narrations regarding the conditions of jurists in which no restriction regarding gender is seen, paying attention to the Seerah of the Infallibles (a.s.), and especially appealing to Rational Custom (Bana' al-Uqala), have considered the condition of masculinity to lack Sharia documentation. According to this view, the main criterion in religious authority is knowledge, Fiqh, and being the most learned (A'lamiyya), and gender plays no decisive role in this. Some of these jurists, even if they doubt the absolute permissibility of imitating women, have accepted imitation of a woman at least for women and considered it compatible with Fiqhi standards and principles of deduction.

Summing up and evaluating the arguments of the two views shows that each is based on specific foundations and deductive methods. The famous view mainly relies on specific evidences, a particular understanding of the texts (Nass), and a kind of precaution in the realm of religious positions, while the non-famous view emphasizes the general and absolute nature of other evidences, a critical re-reading of the texts, and a broader interpretation of Rational Custom and the Seerah of the Infallibles. The mutual critiques between these two approaches are also mainly formed around the axis of the implication and context of the texts, the validity and issuance of narrations, and how to understand and apply the Seerah of the Infallibles (a.s.).

Clarification of the Issue

Taqlid means a non-specialist individual (Layperson) acting based on the opinion of a Faqih (Jurist), in such a way that it places the responsibility for the correctness and invalidity of the action upon the Faqih.[1] In Fiqhi sources, numerous conditions are mentioned for holding the position of Religious Authority (Marja' al-Taqlid), some of which, such as puberty, sanity, and faith, are unproblematic.[2] However, regarding the condition of "masculinity" (Dhukuriyya), there is a difference of opinion. In this regard, two views can be distinguished: the famous view which considers masculinity a condition, and the non-famous view which does not consider such a condition necessary and considers imitating women permissible.

According to some researchers, an examination of early Fiqhi texts shows that the issue of religious authority was not raised as an independent and explicit topic; rather, many early jurists stated the conditions of a Mufti in the chapter of Judgeship and sometimes in the chapter of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil. Since in that era, there was no clear distinction between the positions of Ifta (issuing verdicts) and Judgeship, many jurists considered the necessary conditions for a judge to be applicable to a Mufti as well.[3] The historical turning point in this discussion is the view of Shahid al-Thani[4] who for the first time specifically raised masculinity as one of the necessary conditions for a Mufti and claimed consensus on it.[5]

Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Tabatabai Yazdi in the book Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa listed masculinity as one of the conditions of a Marja' al-Taqlid, and commentators have not critiqued it.[6] Nevertheless, jurists such as Sahib al-Jawahir,[7] Muhaqqiq Isfahani[8] and Sayyid Muhsin Hakim,[9] have doubted the conditionality of masculinity for the position of Ifta or have not accepted it.

Evidence for the Impermissibility of Imitating Women

Jurists who argue for the impermissibility of imitating women, who form the famous view, have cited evidences from the Quran, narrations, Consensus, and the Taste of the Sharia to prove their claim.

Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa

The first verse reasoned by this group is Verse 34 of Surah An-Nisa, known as the Verse of Qawwamun.[10] Based on the interpretation provided for the word "Qawwamun" in this verse, "Qiyam (standing/management), Wilaya (guardianship), and Siyasa (politics)" over women is exclusive to men, and this superiority has been placed by God for men due to reasons such as perfection of intellect, greater strength, and payment of Nafaqa (maintenance) and Mahr to the woman. Therefore, since religious authority is considered a type of Wilaya and intellectual leadership over society, this position will be exclusive to men due to the existence of the mentioned causes, which are found in men and missing in women.[11]

In critique of this argument, it has been said that the meaning of "Qiyam" in the verse is merely disciplining and organizing the affairs of life, not the general leadership of men.[12] It is also said that considering the context of the verse and the mention of "Infaq" (spending), the mentioned Qawwamiyya refers to the man's leadership within the framework of the family and in the marital relationship, and it cannot be generalized to other social arenas, including religious authority which is an intellectual Wilaya. According to this view, religious authority is merely stating the divine ruling, and the follower's adherence to the Fatwa stems from devotion to God, not the dominance of the Marja's person.[13]

Verse 228 of Surah Al-Baqarah

Another verse that is cited is a part of Verse 228 of Surah Al-Baqarah (wa li-r-rijali 'alayhinna daraja - and men have a degree over them), known as the Verse of Daraja. The arguers believe that men have a degree and virtue over women due to possessing "strength" and "spiritual firmness". This virtue has been interpreted as the necessity of women avoiding involvement in political affairs and public management, including religious authority.[14]

Critics state in response that this verse also appears in the context of family and divorce laws, and many commentators and jurists have interpreted the word "degree" as specific rights of the man in the family such as the Right of Divorce and return, not an intrinsic superiority in all social affairs.[15] Muhammad Ishaq Fayyaz has also stated that "degree" in this verse means "status" within the framework of the family, not absolute superiority. This status gives the man the right of "Qawwamiyya" over the woman, which includes the right of enjoyment and the option of divorce. In contrast, the woman also has rights such as Nafaqa, housing, clothing, and food; but outside the family, in public aspects of life such as politics, economics, and education, there is no difference between men and women.[16]

Verse 33 of Surah Al-Ahzab

The argument using Verse 33 of Surah Al-Ahzab (wa qarna fi buyutikunna wa la tabarrajna tabarruj al-jahiliyya al-ula - And stay in your houses and do not display yourselves as was the display of the former times of ignorance) to prove the condition of masculinity for the Marja' al-Taqlid is based on the axis that the woman's main duty is "staying in the house", "maintaining Hijab", and "avoiding display". These matters depict the woman's nature and position in a way that prevents her from undertaking responsibilities that require extensive communication with the masses and presence in social arenas. Although these limitations do not mean deprivation of knowledge and acquiring learning, they define the woman's main role in family upbringing and society-building from within the home. Therefore, the nature and duties determined for the woman make her unsuitable for holding the position of religious authority, which necessitates manifestation and presence in society.[17]

In critique of this argument, it is stated that the verse's intent is not absolute confinement to the house; rather, it is avoiding display in the manner of the Jahiliyya. Additionally, in today's world, a large part of the communication between the Marja' and the follower can take place without the need for physical presence and through modern communication tools.[18]

Sahih of Abi Khadija

The Sahih of Abi Khadija is considered among the texts from which the lack of women's qualification for religious authority might be inferred. In this narration, the Imam (a.s.) used the expression "man" (Rajul) for referring judicial matters: "Look to a man among you who knows something of our judgments".[19] And they have said that the expression "to a man among you" indicates the validity of masculinity.[20]

Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in critiquing the argument based on the Sahih of Abi Khadija, believes that mentioning the title "man" in the subject of the ruling of referral (judge) is due to the contrast with "people of tyranny and their rulers" and the prohibition of referring to them. Also, since in custom, judges were predominantly men and women's judgeship was not customary at that time and not even a single case has been reported, the title "man" in the narration is mentioned due to predominance (Ghalaba) and prevalence, not due to devotion and restriction of judgeship to men. Therefore, this narration does not indicate the validity of being a man in the chapter of judgeship, let alone Ifta. Furthermore, there is no reason for correlation between judgeship and Ifta such that the rulings of one would be valid in the other.[21]

Narrations Condemning Entrusting Affairs to Women

To prove the necessity of the Marja' al-Taqlid being male, narrations have been cited whose content implies the lack of success of a people who entrust the guardianship of their affairs to women. According to some jurists, these narrations clearly indicate the lack of qualification of women to undertake public affairs, including religious authority.[22] For example, a narration from the Prophet (s) states: "A people whose affair is managed by a woman will not succeed."[23]

In contrast, a number of jurists believe that these narrations are not "reliable" and even "verifiable". The meaning of these narrations is that a woman, due to being a woman, is incapable of managing the country's affairs, and her guardianship over affairs leads to the collapse of society in all its vital dimensions. But our experience today refutes this point, and the successful presence of women in various social and scientific arenas rejects this claim.[24] In addition, it has been said that these narrations contradict the story of the rule of the Queen of Sheba in the Quran, which is described with wisdom and rationality.[25]

Consensus

Shahid al-Thani considered one of the reasons for the condition of masculinity in religious authority to be the Consensus of jurists.[26] Muhaqqiq Isfahani also considered this ruling to be agreed upon by all jurists.[27]

This claim of consensus has faced critiques. Firstly, this issue was not raised in the words of jurists before Shahid al-Thani, and their silence could be a sign of a lack of agreement;[28] and that in the words of the ancients, the masculinity of the judge was raised, and there is no correlation between these two (judgeship and Ifta).[29] Secondly, in all probability, this consensus is "based on evidence" (Madraki) and relies on the same verses and narrations that have been raised as reasons for this condition, and is not an independent proof.[30]

Taste of the Sharia

Ayatollah Khoei, after critiquing the textual evidences, appeals to the essential and non-textual reason of the Taste of the Sharia (Madhaq al-Shar'). He believes that from the collection of religious teachings and Sharia, it is inferred that the woman's main place is managing the internal affairs of the house and maintaining privacy and Hijab, and undertaking the position of religious authority, which entails general leadership and extensive interactions, is not compatible with this taste and general spirit of the Sharia.[31]

Some researchers have specifically evaluated this argument. From their perspective, the most important critique of this view relates to the definition of "Taste of the Sharia"; the key question is raised whether the general spirit of Sharia is an absolute prohibition of women's social presence or its emphasis is merely on observing rulings like Hijab and maintaining privacy, which does not contradict social responsibility. Alongside this, the reconciliation between rational customs and the Taste of the Sharia also requires precision; whether the discovered taste cancels the generality of these customs or only plays an emphatic role. Also, attention to the implications of deduction and the possibility of generalizing it in similar issues to ensure the correctness of the argument has been deemed necessary.[32]

Evidence for the Permissibility of Imitating Women

Opposite the famous view, a group of contemporary jurists, based on criticism of the famous opinion's evidence, believe that there is no valid reason for the condition of masculinity for religious authority. The affirmative arguments of this group are mainly based on the absolute nature (Itlaq) of verses from the Quran, some narrations, the Seerah of the Infallibles, and also the Rational Custom. Of course, opponents of imitating women believe that all evidences claimed by proponents of imitating women have been restricted (Taqyid) by the evidences of the famous view.

Absoluteness of Verses

Verse of Ahl al-Dhikr: According to some researchers, Verse 43 of Surah An-Nahl (Fa-s'alu ahl al-dhikr - So ask the people of the message), as a general rational principle meaning the referral of the ignorant to the learned, is the basis of the principle of Taqlid. According to them, the phrase "Ahl al-Dhikr" has no restriction regarding gender and includes any learned person, whether male or female.[33]

Verse of Nafr: God in Verse 122 of Surah At-Tawbah commands a group of believers to set forth to obtain deep knowledge in religion (Tafaqquh). The word "Ta'ifa" (group) is also absolute and includes both men and women, and has not limited the duty of Tafaqquh and warning (Inzar) to a specific gender.[34]

Verse 18 of Surah Az-Zumar: Muhammad Sadeqi Tehrani considers the nature of Taqlid to be "following the best speech" and relying on Verse 18 of Surah Az-Zumar which emphasizes following the best speech, believes that the only condition for a Marja' al-Taqlid is being the most learned (A'lam) and most pious (Atqa), so that his speech is closer to reality. Based on this, not only is being male not a condition, but being alive, mature, and other conditions mentioned for a Marja' al-Taqlid are also not conditions.[35]

Absoluteness of Narrations

A number of jurists have cited the absolute nature of the Hadith of Hawadith Waji'a (Occurring Events)[36] from Imam Mahdi (a.s.). Based on this, it is said that the phrase "ruwat hadithina" (narrators of our hadith), which is interpreted as jurists fulfilling the conditions, is general and includes female jurists and narrators of hadith as well.[37] Some have also appealed to the absolute nature of Imam Askari's (a.s.) narration regarding the attributes of a Marja' al-Taqlid.[38] In this narration, none of the criteria, scientific and moral attributes enumerated for religious authority are dependent on gender.[39]

Seerah of the Infallibles (a.s.)

Yousef Saanei considered the judgeship and religious authority of women permissible and in this regard cited the Seerah of Fatimah (s.a.) and Zaynab (s.a.).[40] Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati has also argued for the permissibility of imitating women based on the practical Seerah of the Infallibles.[41] He has brought two witnesses in this regard: First, it is reported that Imam Sadiq (a.s.) referred women to his wife, Hamidah Musaffah, to learn the rulings of Hajj.[42] Secondly, to prove this practical Seerah, a question and answer from the Imam has also been argued. The narrator asks about the possibility of a woman performing Hajj on behalf of a man for Hajj al-Tamattu', and the Imam (a.s.), after permitting this vicariousness on the condition of the woman's Islam and Fiqh (being a Muslim woman, a Faqiha), says: "Fa-rubba imra'atin afqahu min rajul" (For perhaps a woman is more learned than a man)[43] and in another report says: "Rubba imra'atin khayrun min rajul" (Perhaps a woman is better than a man).[44]

Rational Custom

The most important and fundamental reason for the permissibility of imitating women is considered to be the continuous Seerah and Rational Custom (Bana' al-Uqala) in all societies.[45] Based on this, it is said that rational people, in all specialized matters, consider the referral of a non-specialist to a specialist necessary, and in this referral, the gender of the specialist (such as a doctor, engineer, etc.) has no relevance. The main criterion is merely expertise and being the most learned, and since the Holy Lawgiver has not rejected this rational construction and has endorsed it by His silence, the same rule applies in the matter of religion; therefore, if a woman reaches the degree of being most learned in Fiqh, referring to her would be in accordance with this rational custom.[46]

Permissibility of Women Imitating Women

Some contemporary jurists, by detailing religious authority for male followers and female followers, have considered the second permissible for women as certain. Based on this theory, even if we accept the evidences for the impermissibility of imitating women and do not accept a woman's religious authority for men due to issues like Qawwamiyya or the Taste of the Sharia, there is no reason to forbid women from imitating a female Mujtahid. Among them, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has not considered the permissibility of women imitating an A'lam female Mujtahid unlikely.[47] Also, Ayatollah Khamenei says in this regard: "Today, fortunately, women who are Mujtahids are not few. I even believe that [for] many women's issues where women are the subject and men do not correctly discern the subject, ladies should imitate a female Mujtahid."[48]

Footnotes

  1. Mishkini, Mustalahat al-Fiqh, p. 157.
  2. Ansari, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 57.
  3. Mu'meni and Adabi Firouzjah, "Religious Authority of Women in Islamic Jurisprudence", p. 132.
  4. Amili, Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah al-Dimashqiyyah, vol. 1, p. 236.
  5. Sayfi Mazandarani, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, pp. 111-112.
  6. Yazdi, Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, vol. 1, p. 26.
  7. Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shara'i' al-Islam, vol. 40, p. 22.
  8. Isfahani, Buhuth fi al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 68.
  9. Hakim, Mustamsak al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, vol. 1, p. 43.
  10. Ardakani, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 74.
  11. Hosseini Tehrani, Wilayat al-Faqih fi Hukumat al-Islam, vol. 3, pp. 145-146.
  12. Ardakani, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 74.
  13. Sasani and Mir-Ahmadi, "Analysis and Evaluation of the Arguments of Imami Jurists regarding Women's Religious Authority with Emphasis on the Views of Ayatollah Khamenei", pp. 99-100.
  14. Ma'rifat, Ta'liq wa Tahqiq 'an Ummahat Masa'il al-Qada'; p. 309.
  15. Izadifard and Kaviar, "Analysis of Evidence Regarding Women's Religious Authority in Imami Jurisprudence", p. 214.
  16. Fayyaz Kabuli, Al-Masa'il al-Mustahdatha, p. 245.
  17. Sanad, Sanad al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, Kitab al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, vol. 2, pp. 66-67.
  18. Izadifard and Kaviar, "Analysis of Evidence Regarding Women's Religious Authority in Imami Jurisprudence", pp. 214-215.
  19. Kulayni, Al-Kafi, vol. 7, p. 412.
  20. Sayfi Mazandarani, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, pp. 117-118.
  21. Khoei, Al-Tanqih fi Sharh al-Urwa al-Wuthqa; Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 225.
  22. Sanad, Sanad al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, Kitab al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, vol. 2, pp. 109-110.
  23. Rawandi, Al-Khara'ij wa al-Jara'ih, vol. 1, p. 79.
  24. Fayyaz Kabuli, Al-Masa'il al-Mustahdatha, p. 246.
  25. Izadifard and Kaviar, "Analysis of Evidence Regarding Women's Religious Authority in Imami Jurisprudence", p. 216.
  26. Amili, Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum'ah al-Dimashqiyyah, vol. 1, p. 236.
  27. Isfahani, Buhuth fi al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 68.
  28. Sayfi Mazandarani, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 112.
  29. Qa'ini, "Imitation of a Female Mujtahid (1)", p. 39.
  30. Mu'meni and Adabi Firouzjah, "Religious Authority of Women in Islamic Jurisprudence", p. 140.
  31. Khoei, Al-Tanqih fi Sharh al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid, p. 226.
  32. Raf'atnejad and Mehdifar, "The Taste of Sharia and Undertaking Public Positions by Women", pp. 352-353.
  33. Izadifard and Kaviar, "Analysis of Evidence Regarding Women's Religious Authority in Imami Jurisprudence", pp. 219-220.
  34. Sasani and Mir-Ahmadi, "Analysis and Evaluation of the Arguments of Imami Jurists regarding Women's Religious Authority with Emphasis on the Views of Ayatollah Khamenei", p. 109.
  35. Sadeqi Tehrani, Tawdih al-Masa'il Novin, p. 26.
  36. Saduq, Kamal al-Din wa Tamam al-Ni'mah, vol. 2, p. 484.
  37. Izadifard and Kaviar, "Analysis of Evidence Regarding Women's Religious Authority in Imami Jurisprudence", p. 223.
  38. Tabarsi, Al-Ihtijaj, vol. 2, p. 458.
  39. Jannati, Adwar-e Fiqh wa Kayfiyyat-e Bayan-e An, p. 369.
  40. Saanei, Majma' al-Masa'il, vol. 2, p. 22.
  41. Jannati, Adwar-e Fiqh wa Kayfiyyat-e Bayan-e An, p. 369.
  42. Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, vol. 5, p. 410.
  43. Kulayni, Al-Kafi, vol. 4, p. 306.
  44. Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, vol. 5, p. 413.
  45. Ha'eri Yazdi, Sharh al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, vol. 1, p. 44.
  46. Mutahhari, Majmu'eh Athar, vol. 29, p. 422.
  47. Javadi Amoli, Tawdih al-Masa'il, p. 22.
  48. Khamenei, "Statements in a meeting with various groups of women with the Leader of the Revolution", located on khamenei.ir.

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