Brain Death

Author: Reza Bazeli

• Abstract

Brain Death (Persian: مرگ مغزی) refers to the irreversible cessation of all vital brain functions. It is regarded as one of the emerging medical issues (masāʾil mustaḥdathah) in contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, as it lacks a direct precedent in classical jurisprudential sources. Although from a medical perspective brain death inevitably leads to biological death within a short period, jurists differ over whether a brain-dead patient should be considered legally alive or dead. This disagreement primarily stems from divergent approaches to identifying and determining the subject (taḥqīq al-mawḍūʿ) of brain death.

According to some contemporary Shiʿi marājiʿ al-taqlīd, such as Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī and Javād Tabrīzī, the criterion for determining the status of a brain-dead patient is the judgment of general custom (ʿurf ʿāmm). Since common social understanding typically regards such patients as alive, they are considered legally living persons. In contrast, other jurists, including Ḥusayn‑ʿAlī Montazerī, Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, and Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī, assign authority to expert custom (ʿurf khāṣṣ), namely specialist physicians, in determining whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead.

Based on general principles of jurisprudential deduction, the applicability of legal rulings related to brain death—such as organ transplantation, continuation or cessation of medical treatment, liability for dīyah (blood money), and the performance of funeral rites—depends entirely on how the subject of brain death is identified.

Brain Death from a Medical Perspective

Brain death refers to the permanent and irreversible cessation of all vital brain functions, including those responsible for regulating respiratory and cardiac activities. In this condition, the brain sustains severe and extensive damage, resulting in the destruction of major parts of the cerebrum and the brain stem. As blood circulation to the brain is completely halted and oxygen no longer reaches neural tissues, brain cells undergo irreversible death, and the brain loses all functional capacity. Although other organs of the body, such as the heart, lungs, and kidneys, may continue to function temporarily with the assistance of medications and medical devices, they will inevitably cease functioning after a short period.

Given that brain tissues, including the cerebrum and brain stem, are irreversibly destroyed due to prolonged oxygen deprivation and that no possibility of regeneration or transplantation exists, the likelihood of recovery for a brain-dead patient is effectively nonexistent. Such patients will, from a medical standpoint, experience certain and definitive death within a short time. The distinction between brain death and conditions such as coma or the vegetative state lies precisely at this point. Coma represents a severe disturbance of consciousness in which the brain remains alive and spontaneous breathing continues, making recovery possible in some cases. In contrast, in brain death the brain itself is destroyed, the brain stem has ceased functioning, and there is no possibility of return to life or persistence of vegetative life.

Death from the Perspective of Jurists

Many jurists, considering the concept of death to be sufficiently clear in customary and jurisprudential usage, have not devoted separate discussions to its terminological definition and have instead confined themselves to explaining its legal rulings. Nevertheless, a number of jurists have explicitly defined death as the separation and departure of the soul from the body.

From this perspective, the reality of death in jurisprudential thought lies in the separation of the soul from the body. Consequently, the continued vitality of individual cells bears no necessary relation to the life of the human person, just as the death of certain cells does not in itself constitute human death. Among contemporary Shiʿi authorities, Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī maintains that once death is understood as the separation of the soul from the body, the failure of the brain signifies the occurrence of human death. This is because the brain functions as the central organ responsible for directing and governing the body and its organs.

Signs of Death

Since determining the precise moment of death and identifying the separation of the soul from the body is inherently difficult, classical jurisprudential texts have referred to a number of signs as indicators of death. Among these signs are the recession of the temples, loosening and bending of the nose, wrinkling of the facial skin, slackening of the legs, cessation of breathing and pulse, yellowing of the skin, and abdominal swelling.

A number of jurists, including the author of *Javāhir al-Kalām*, emphasize that these signs do not in themselves constitute definitive proof of death. Rather, the true criterion for death is the attainment of knowledge and certainty regarding its occurrence, not merely the appearance of such signs. Nevertheless, it is generally observed that the simultaneous presence of these signs ordinarily leads to certainty about death.

Some scholars maintain that the human soul governs and directs the body through the higher centers of the brain, namely the cerebral hemispheres and the brain stem. Accordingly, when these higher brain centers cease functioning, the soul separates from the body, as the capacity required for the soul’s governance of the body is lost with their destruction. Others consider the fundamental cause of the soul’s separation from the body to be the simultaneous cessation of both cardiac and cerebral functions.

Criterion for Detecting Death in a Brain-Dead Patient

Does the designation of “dead” apply to a patient afflicted with brain death? Jurists have offered differing answers to this question. The roots of this disagreement can be traced to divergent views regarding the authority and validity of customary diagnosis in identifying common subjects, as opposed to the role of the jurist’s own judgment in such determinations. While some jurists regard the identification of the subject as a matter entrusted to customary understanding and consider the task of the jurist to be limited to deducing the legal ruling, others maintain that in certain cases the jurist’s assessment may take precedence over customary opinion. On this basis, juristic views concerning the authority for determining death in a brain-dead patient may be classified into two general approaches.

General Custom (ʿUrf ʿĀmm)

According to some contemporary jurists, including Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī and Javād Tabrīzī, customary understanding is authoritative in identifying subjects. Muḥammad Fāżel Lankarānī holds that since general social custom (*ʿurf ʿāmm*) regards a brain-dead patient as alive, such individuals are subject to the legal rulings applicable to living persons. Muḥammad Muʾmin similarly maintains that although the identification of the brain’s vital signs lies within the expertise of specialist physicians, the determination of the concepts of life and death is a customary matter. Accordingly, such determination should be referred to a jurist who is familiar with common linguistic and social usage. Muḥammad Muʾmin and Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni further argue that if cardiac activity occurs spontaneously and without mechanical assistance, the patient is to be considered alive; otherwise, death is to be established.

Expert Custom (ʿUrf Khāṣṣ)

Other contemporary Shiʿi *marājiʿ al-taqlīd*, such as Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī and Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī, entrust the determination of the details of brain death to specialist physicians. Ḥusayn Nūrī Hamadānī considers brain death to constitute the complete death of the person, even if other bodily organs continue to function for a period of time. Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, relying on medical assessments that liken a brain-dead patient to one whose brain has been destroyed or whose head has been severed from the body, maintains that such a patient cannot be regarded as alive. Nevertheless, out of juristic caution in the context of issuing a *fatwa*, he refrains from categorically declaring a brain-dead patient to be dead and therefore adopts a differentiated approach in rulings related to life and death.

Ḥusayn‑ʿAlī Montazerī likewise regards life and death as customary concepts and considers their determination to rest with qualified experts. In his view, death is realized when it applies in such a manner that all manifestations and effects of life have ceased and no possibility of return remains.

Rulings Related to Brain Death

From the perspective of jurists who consider a brain-dead patient alive, none of the rulings of the deceased apply to these patients. Jurists who leave the detection of whether brain-dead patients are alive or dead to the common of experts and specialists believe that if the title of dead applies to a brain-dead patient from the experts' view, such a person has the rulings of the deceased, and otherwise, the rulings of the living apply to him. Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, one of the contemporary marājiʿ taqlīd, with the statement of detail in this regard, believes that some rulings of the deceased such as the dropping of agency, the right to buy and sell, marriage and divorce, and also some rulings of the living person such as that his property is not divided among heirs and his wife does not observe the waiting period of death, apply to such a person. The specific rulings of the deceased such as the ritual washing of touching the deceased, the obligation of equipping, the obligation of prayer for the deceased, and burial of the deceased also do not apply to brain-dead patients until the heart stops and the body becomes cold. Some specific rulings for patients afflicted with brain death are as follows:

Equipping the Deceased

Most jurists believe that until a person's death is certain, his ritual washing, prayer, burial, and shrouding are not permissible, and in doubtful cases, one must wait until certainty of death is obtained. Therefore, jurists who do not believe in the death of a brain-dead patient cannot rule on his shrouding and burial.

Organ Transplantation

Regarding the transplantation of organs from brain-dead patients, there is disagreement following whether they are dead or alive. Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, one of the contemporary marājiʿ taqlīd, believes that given the medical death of a brain-dead patient, removing organs from brain-dead patients to save Muslims' lives is unobjectionable. Also, some scholars such as Muḥammad Muʾmin believe that if the heart's activity is through a device not spontaneously, severing organs and transplanting them is permissible. In contrast, some others believe that if using the body organs of brain-dead patients causes accelerating their death, it is not permissible; but if it is not so and is done with his prior permission or saving the life of a respected person (Muslim) depends on organ transplantation, it is unobjectionable. Mohammad Mohammadi Ghaeni considers the permissibility of transplanting an organ from a brain patient based on the rule of necessity and adds that if a brain-dead patient follows a religion that considers organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient permissible, one can consider his organ transplantation permissible using the rule of obligation.

Continuation or Cessation of Patient Treatment

Regarding continuing treatment and disconnecting medical assisting devices such as respiratory devices, there are two opinions: many jurists consider killing a brain-dead patient impermissible;‌ in contrast, some consider disconnecting the device not forbidden. Those who consider a brain-dead patient alive consider treating him obligatory and disconnecting it impermissible. Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, one of the contemporary jurists, explicitly rules on the non-obligation of continuing treatment. Also, from the perspective of Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Montazerī, if there is a probability of patient recovery, discontinuing treatment and disconnecting assisting devices is not permissible; but if there is a more important case and the device is unique to this device, one must attend to the more important case. The basis of this ruling is the conflict of more important and important in performing religious duty and the priority of the more important matter.

Dīyah

If a person afflicted with brain death is considered alive, killing him is not permissible, and he has full dīyah. In case of killing the patient, his dīyah belongs to the heirs. Some jurists believe that if the patient has permitted his own killing, in this case, the right to retaliation and dīyah is dropped. In contrast, some believe that permission to kill does not drop the right to retaliation; because a human has no right and authority over his own destruction. Some also consider paying dīyah as obligatory caution and believe that the amount of dīyah should be spent on charities for the deceased. Some also believe that regarding dīyah for severing an organ, caution is in paying dīyah, and paying it is the responsibility of the one who severs the organ.

Marriage

Rulings consequent upon marriage such as the obligation to pay maintenance depend on whether marriage exists after brain death or not. From the perspective of some jurists, in brain-dead patients, the ruling of marriage remains; but since the treatment costs of such patients exceed the usual limit, it is not considered part of obligatory maintenance, and paying it is not obligatory on the spouse. Also, from the perspective of Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī, until the brain-dead patient reaches complete and certain death, the wife cannot observe the waiting period of death.

Study Resources

Numerous works in Persian and Arabic languages and in the form of books, articles, and theses have examined brain death jurisprudentially. Among these works, one can mention the book Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Law; Muḥammad Raḥmatī in this book, after conceptualizing death and life in jurisprudential sources and medical texts, mentions the reasons of supporters and opponents of the vitality of a brain-dead patient and examines the permissibility of organ transplantation from a brain-dead patient. He also, in collaboration with ʿAlī Akbar Farahzādī, has authored an article titled “Study of Brain Death from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Criminal Law” and after conceptual explanation and argumentative examination of the issue, in the position of conclusion, has stated that the criterion for human life is the connection of soul and body, and since this connection is through the brain, a brain-dead patient has the ruling of a dead human. The book Organ Transplantation and Brain Death in the Mirror of Jurisprudence written by Sayyid Muḥsin Mortażavī and the book Brain Death: Legal-Jurisprudential Processing written by Ḥamīd Sotūdeh, and Mawt al-Dimāgh fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī written by Masʿūd Ṣabrī which has been published in Egypt are other published works in this field.