Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book)

Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book)
Islam and the Human Right to Life (Book)
Book Information
Author	Hamidreza Nouri
Language	Persian
Editor	Sayyid Sadeq Heydari
Publication Information
Publisher	Islamic Research Foundation of Astan Quds Razavi

Author: Mahdi Khosravi Sereshki

Islam and the Human Right to Life (اسلام و حق حیات انسان) is a Persian book written by Hamidreza Nouri, authored with the aim of answering ambiguities regarding the deprivation of the right to life in rulings such as retaliation (Qisas), waging war against God and society (Muharabah), apostasy (Irtidad), and offensive jihad (Jihad Ibtida'i). The author believes that although depriving the right to life is abhorrent (Qabih), depriving the material right to life of certain individuals who are the cause of depriving the spiritual right to life of others is justified.

Abstract

Relying on the Quran, the author enumerates ranks for human beings; however, he states that the right to life exists for all human beings, even disbelievers, except in exceptional cases mentioned in the Quran. He then addresses the ambiguities regarding the rulings that lead to the deprivation of human life and answers them. By mentioning ten solutions proposed by Muslim intellectuals to justify or alter the penal rulings of Islam, Hamidreza Nouri rejects them and asserts that methodical independent reasoning (Ijtihad Rawishmand) based on secondary rulings (Ahkam Thanawiyyah), jurisprudential rules such as the No-Harm rule (Qa'idah La Darar), and attention to strategies from within Islamic jurisprudence, including customary expediency (Maslahat 'Urfiyyah), governmental (Hukm Hakumati) and state rulings (Ahkam Wila'i), as well as converting certain punishments into discretionary punishments (Ta'zir), can resolve the ambiguities regarding the conflict between Islamic rulings and human rights.

The author then addresses the cases that are excepted from the general ruling prohibiting the deprivation of life in the Quran and answers the ambiguities; in explaining the ruling of *Qisas*, he calls it a rational ruling (Hukm 'Aqli) based on retaliation in kind, established to prevent widespread bloodshed, and considers it a preventive measure and a source of life for human beings. Regarding *Muharabah*, by mentioning that executing the *Muharib* (one who wages war) is for the protection of citizens' lives, the author believes that the punishment for *Muharabah* is not death, and the *Muharib* is sentenced to death only if he commits murder.

In examining the deprivation of life resulting from apostasy, Hamidreza Nouri, although critiquing and rejecting four reasons stated against the death penalty for the apostate (Murtadd), nevertheless believes that one can doubt the absolute temporal application and inclusiveness of the ruling on the apostate; because, in his view, there is a possibility that it is a state ruling (Hukm Wila'i) and exclusive to the ruler (the Prophet of Islam). Furthermore, he asserts that to prevent the execution ruling of the apostate from becoming an objective reality, without denying the principle of the death penalty ruling, the conditions for its realization can be severely restricted.

Finally, regarding the deprivation of the right to life through offensive jihad, the author believes that only the initial verses of Surah al-Tawbah refer to offensive war, and this command is neither general nor permanent. On the other hand, it cannot be considered as meaning the deprivation of the right to life; because the target of this ruling is not the general public, but rather the seditionists (Fitnah-garan).

Structure of the Book

The book "Islam and the Human Right to Life", written by Hamidreza Nouri, was published in 2022 (1401 SH) by the Islamic Research Foundation and commissioned by the Ma'aref Islamic University. The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Islamic Studies at K. N. Toosi University of Technology. In the preface, while examining the research background including books and articles (pp. 13-24), he considers the motive for writing the book to be answering the claims arising from the modern era, which sees a conflict between reason and religion, science and religion, and law and religion, and considers it contradictory to religious duty-centeredness (p. 11).

This book is organized into four main sections:

Preface (pp. 11-24): The research background relying on mystical, social, theological, and jurisprudential exegeses, based on various verses of the Quran, as well as non-exegetical works of Shia and Sunni scholars concerning human rights and the human right to life.
Section One: Concepts and Foundations (pp. 25-75): Examination of the three concepts of right (Haqq), life (Hayat), and human being (Insan), with an emphasis that although depriving the right to life is abhorrent and incorrect, depriving the material right to life of some human beings, because they are the cause of depriving the spiritual right to life of others, is justified.
Section Two: The Human Right to Life from the Perspective of the Quran (pp. 77-110): A study of the identity and position of the human being, human ranks, and the right to life of religious and non-religious people based on Quranic verses.
Section Three: Permissible Cases of Depriving Life in the Quran (pp. 111-185): Analysis of the rulings related to intentional murder, *Muharabah*, and apostasy from a Quranic perspective.
Section Four: Critique of Doubts (pp. 187-330): Examination of the contexts in which doubts are raised (such as human rights issues), the reactions of intellectuals (such as the objectives of Sharia or *Maqasid al-Shari'ah), and the analysis of doubts on the subjects of *Qisas*, apostasy, offensive jihad, and the difference between the right to life of men and women.

Jurisprudential and Legal Foundations of the Human Right to Life

The author first examines the concept of right (Haqq) from a lexical, Quranic, and philosophical perspective, and then introduces it in jurisprudential terminology as a conventional matter (Amr I'tibari) from the Lawgiver (Shari'), which arises from the dominion of individuals over affairs and necessitates the respect of others (p. 30).

Subsequently, he addresses the foundations of the human right to life, examining it from a theological (p. 55), mystical (p. 61), jurisprudential (p. 67), and legal (p. 73) perspective. In the author's view, the jurisprudential foundation of this right is the preservation of life (Hifdh al-Nafs), and he introduces Islamic rulings as the guarantor of the continuation of life (p. 69). To confirm this jurisprudential foundation, he proposes two principles:

The prohibition of homicide in all divine religions (p. 70)
The preservation of life as an objective of the Sharia (p. 71).

Furthermore, the author believes that certain jurisprudential rules such as causing damage (Itlaf), the removal of physical punishments due to doubts (Raf' al-Hudud bi al-Shubuhat), the rule of no harm and no inflicting of harm (Qa'idah La Darar wa La Dirar), and dissimulation (Taqiyyah), have been applied throughout jurisprudence and are the guarantors of the preservation of life (p. 72). In the legal domain, he proposes two fundamental axes for the right to life: 1. The legal and objective right of the human being (p. 73), and the personal right and privilege based on human dignity and inviolability (p. 74).

Human Identity and Distinction in the Quran

Human Identity

To examine human identity from the perspective of the Quran, the author analyzes the verses in three categories:

Identifying identity by reflecting on the verses of the creation of the first human: These verses emphasize the two elements of intellect ('Aql) and free will (Ikhtiyar) in humans and show that humanity depends on the power of reasoning (pp. 83-84).
Identifying identity by reflecting on the stages of human creation: The stages of creation are presented in seven categories; from the time when the human was not yet a significant thing until the breathing of the spirit (Ruh) into him. Based on these verses, although the material dimension of the human is weaker compared to the spiritual dimension, it has high importance due to its association with the spirit (pp. 85-86).
Identifying identity by reflecting on human values in the Quran: The author, based on Quranic verses, divides human values into two categories: principal and accidental. Principal characteristics, which are attributed to God, include innate nature (Fitrah), knowledge ('Ilm), moral conscience, and being two-dimensional (matter and meaning). Accidental characteristics, without attribution to God, include dignity (Karamah), responsibility, the blessings created for humans, and the revelation of truths after death. Also, accidental characteristics with attribution to God include vicegerency (Khilafah), being chosen, and being a trustee (pp. 87-88).

Four Distinctive Characteristics of the Human Being

The author considers the human being's possession of two dimensions, material and spiritual, to be the most fundamental human characteristic, and points out the effects of these two dimensions according to the Quran (p. 88). Ultimately, he enumerates four factors distinguishing humans from other creatures:

Possessing the rank of soul (Nafs)
Being independent and having will
Possessing a knowledge that does not exist in angels and other material beings
The enduring nature of human existence (pp. 89-90).

Ranks of the Human Being and Their Connection with the Right to Life

In line with determining the human right to life, the author presents a method for discovering human ranks from the perspective of the Quran, to ultimately find out whether a minimum right to life exists for all human beings at every rank or not (p. 93). The author's intended method is: 1. Enumerating the secondary titles and designations of the human being in the Quran, and 2. Words that express the human rank and have the capability of being categorized (p. 95).

Then, pointing to seven indicators of difference in rank among human beings based on Quranic verses, he lists the ranks of the human being: 1. Human versus non-human, 2. Prophet (Nabi) versus non-prophet, 3. Prophet of resolve (Ulu al-'Azm) versus prophet not of resolve, 4. Non-prophet human who observes human principles versus a non-prophet human who does not observe human principles, 5. Religious person (Mutadayyin) versus disbeliever (Kafir), 6. Muslim versus People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), and 7. Muslim who observes human principles and religious rulings versus a Muslim and non-Muslim not adhering to human principles and religious rulings.

In conclusion, the author emphasizes that the criterion for ascertaining the rank is the degree of proximity to the True God (Haqq), and every difference does not necessarily create a rank. On the other hand, God has provided the opportunity for elevation until the final moments of life for all human beings, and the possibility of crossing from the current rank to a higher rank exists. Therefore, superior or inferior human differences do not affect the principle of the attachment of the right to life, and the right to life is established for all human beings until the point of natural consumption (Istihlak Tabi'i), except for the exceptional cases that the Quran has briefly alluded to (p. 99).

The Right to Life of the Religious

From the perspective of the Quran, the author introduces three indicators to define religiosity: faith in God, faith in the Day of Judgment, and following religious and human teachings under the title of righteous deed ('Amal Salih) (p. 100). He then presents six Quranic pieces of evidence for the increased value of human life:

Believers not being afflicted by divine punishment: The Quran, while reporting the destruction of disbelievers by heavenly and earthly punishments, speaks of the salvation of the followers of divine prophets (p. 102).
Saving the lives of believers through miracles: Such as preventing the massacre of believers in the story of the Children of Israel and Prophet Salih (p. 103).
Saving the life of a believer at the cost of the death of a disbeliever: Such as the story of Khidr and Moses and the killing of the disbelieving child by Prophet Khidr, who would kill his believing parents in the future (p. 103).
The blood money of a believer on the battlefield, which God undertakes, and that is Paradise (p. 104).
Taking a covenant with the aim of avoiding the killing of co-religionists (p. 104).
Unseen assistance for preserving the lives of believers: Such as saving the lives of prophets like Abraham and Moses and sending angels to the battlefield to preserve the lives of believers (pp. 104-105).

The Right to Life of the Irreligious

The author explains two Quranic principles that consider the right to life valid for all human beings, regardless of their religion:

The principle of the right to life for all human beings: In the Quran and in the view of God, the life and soul of the general public, regardless of faith and disbelief, are respected. Verses related to wishing death or the command to kill (Qatiluhum) regarding groups of non-Muslims like hypocrites (Munafiqin) or the People of the Book, due to their denial of prophets, oppressive behaviors, and polytheistic beliefs, although indicating the intensity of aversion and the worthlessness of their lives in those contexts, are never a basis for justifying the killing of human beings (p. 107).
The right to the continuation of life for disbelievers: The principle in Islam is the universality of the right to life and its continuation. The Quran has explicitly stated the right to life of disbelievers in numerous instances or, while expressing the absolute right to life, has considered it valid for all human beings. The author points to four groups of these verses (p. 109).

Permissible Cases of Depriving the Right to Life and Answering Its Ambiguities

The author has examined ten solutions proposed by Muslim intellectuals to justify or alter the penal rulings of Islam, and at the end, he has presented his own analysis. According to what the author has mentioned, the solutions of the intellectuals are: 1. Differentiating religious rulings based on their essential and accidental nature (p. 207), 2. The impact of likes and dislikes for the revision of divine rulings by jurists (p. 208), 3. Attention to the objectives of Sharia (Maqasid al-Shari'ah) (p. 209), 4. The difference between spiritual Islam and historical Islam (pp. 209-210), 5. The difference between devotional rulings and legal and social rulings (p. 210), 6. The difference between the era of establishment and the era of the consolidation of religion (p. 210), 7. The execution of physical punishments (Hudud) with the endorsement of the procedure and custom of society (p. 211), 8. The authority of custom ('Urf) in religious and legal rulings (p. 212), 9. The necessity of aligning legal rulings with the culture of society (p. 212), 10. The alteration of rational conduct (Sirah 'Uqala'iyyah) and the endorsement of rational rulings (p. 214).

He further, by generally critiquing and rejecting these solutions, considers methodical independent reasoning (Ijtihad) as the alternative to such solutions and asserts that attention to secondary rulings (Ahkam Thanawiyyah) and rules such as no-harm (La Darar) and necessity (Idhtirar) can assist jurists in achieving the rights and duties of the obligated (Mukallafin) in every era. In this path, attention to customary expediency, governmental and state rulings, as well as converting certain punishments into discretionary punishments (Ta'zir) and removing them from the state of religious physical punishments (Hudud Shar'i), are solutions that both draw nourishment from within religion and resolve discussions related to human rights (pp. 218-220).

Retaliation (Qisas): The Philosophy of Qisas and Critique of Doubts

The author explains Qisas in the third section of the book and answers some doubts regarding it in the fourth section. He first examines Qisas from the perspective of reason (p. 117) and then the Quran (p. 122), and subsequently, he analyzes seven verses related to murder and the ruling of Qisas for life (Qisas al-Nafs) under subheadings (pp. 124-134). Also, he points to the preference of forgiveness in the position of retaliation from the perspective of the Quran; because in all the verses related to Qisas, forgiveness, pardon, and patience are immediately spoken of, and human beings are encouraged and persuaded toward it (p. 135).

The author considers the legitimacy of Qisas to belong to the pre-Islamic era and introduces it as a rational ruling (Hukm 'Aqli). From the perspective of the Quran and Islam, Qisas merely emphasizes retaliation in kind and equality to prevent ignorant (Jahili) traditions and widespread bloodshed. Qisas is more of a preventive measure and a source of life for human beings than a harsh penal ruling. Also, since Qisas is considered a right of the people (Haqq al-Nas), in the event of the consent of the victim's heir (Wali al-Dam) or forgiveness in exchange for receiving blood money (Diyah), the murderer's life continues (pp. 135-136).

In this book, ten critiques regarding the ruling of Qisas are then addressed and answered:

Contradiction with humanitarian sentiment
Creating a sense of revenge and promoting it
Conflict with the religion of mercy
Conflict with the contemporary culture and morals of humanity
Doubt regarding its deterrent effect
Occurrence of a mistake in identifying the criminal
The possibility of Qisas not being just
The inherent nature of the murderer's right to life
Qisas being a reaction to the effect (rather than the cause)
The disproportion of the murderer's crime with the death penalty (pp. 230-247).

Waging War (Muharabah): Instances and Variety of Punishment

After examining the connection of *Muharabah* with the title of corruption on earth (Ifsad fi al-Ardh) (p. 137) and the lexical meaning of *Muharabah* (p. 140), the author concludes from the jurisprudential meaning of *Muharabah* that the jurisprudential term *Muharib* encompasses a spectrum of human beings, each having a punishment proportionate to themselves (pp. 143-145).

The concept and instance of *Muharabah* are examined through two ways: the Verse of Muharabah (Verse 33 of Surah al-Ma'idah) and its occasion of revelation (Sha'n al-Nuzul). In the section on the verse of *Muharabah*, the author states the semantic possibilities of the verse (pp. 145-148), and based on the premise that the meaning of this verse is *Muharabah* with Muslims and is not restricted to the era of the Prophet of Islam, he introduces five instances for *Muharabah* (pp. 148-149). Then, considering other contextual clues, such as the following verse which is about the repentance of the *Muharibs*, he critiques and examines the primary assumptions and instances, and considers certain cases outside the scope of the verse (pp. 149-150). In the section on the occasion of the revelation of the verse, the author enumerates six instances (p. 156) and expresses the concept of *Muharabah* based on the meaning of the key concept "corruption on earth" (pp. 157, 160).

The author defines three instances for the *Muharib*, in all three of which "striving for corruption on earth" exists: *Muharabah* with God (God's servants), *Muharabah* with the Messenger of God (PBUH), and *Muharabah* with God (God's servants) and the Messenger of God (PBUH). Also, based on the apparent meaning of the verse of *Muharabah*, the ruling of *Muharabah* includes non-Muslims as well (p. 160) and is not exclusive to Islamic territories (p. 161). Of course, there is one exception, and that is highway robbery for retaliation and reclaiming a lost right when there was no other choice; such as the Muslims' night attack on the trade caravan of the Quraysh in the first year of the Hijra (p. 161).

The punishment for *Muharabah* is among the few punishments whose ruling is mentioned in the Quran (p. 162), and since in *Muharabah* the violation of two types of rights occurs, namely the right of God (Haqq-Allah) and the right of the people (Haqq al-Nas), the punishments must be proportionate and compensatory for the damages (p. 163). Based on the author's conclusion regarding the punishment for *Muharabah*, the death sentence is not definitively mandated for the *Muharib*, and only in the event that the *Muharib* commits murder is he sentenced to death, which cannot be pardoned or converted to blood money (Diyah). Also, the philosophy of executing the *Muharib* is the protection of citizens' lives and, more importantly, the financial, physical, and psychological security of all members of society, which the Lawgiver does not compromise on and is not exclusive to Muslims. On the other hand, the variety in the punishment of the *Muharib*, meaning execution, crucifixion (Salb), amputation of the right hand and left foot in case of taking property, and banishment (Nafi Balad), allows the religious ruler and executor of the punishment to determine a punishment proportionate to the *Muharabah* and the reflection of the execution of the punishment in society (p. 165).

Apostasy and the Human Right to Life

The author believes that the claim of those who consider apostasy (Irtidad) as one of the exceptional cases to the human right to life in the Quran lacks validity and credibility (p. 166). To prove this claim, he first examines the lexical meaning of apostasy (p. 167) and then its jurisprudential meaning (p. 168), and explains two instances of terminological apostasy in Imami jurisprudence:

Theoretical denial of Islam and choosing disbelief (Kafir-Kishi) through speech and expression of opinion, whether as an innate apostate (Murtadd Fitri) or a national apostate (Murtadd Milli) (p. 169)
Practical denial of Islamic rulings, including considering some lawful things (Halal) of Islam as forbidden (Haram) or considering some divine forbidden things as lawful (p. 170).

Then, apostasy is examined from the perspective of the Quran, and the author, after mentioning the nine causes of apostasy in the Quran (p. 172), states the conditions for the realization of the effects of apostasy in the Quran: 1. Death in a state of disbelief, 2. Belief in the truthfulness of Islam, 3. Free will in choosing alternative thinking and the absence of coercion (Ikrah) (pp. 175-177). In the end, verses related to the otherworldly and worldly punishment of the apostate are examined, and the derivation of the death penalty ruling is critiqued (pp. 177-185).

The author believes that the worldly punishment for apostasy contradicts the personal rights of the human being from two aspects and creates doubt: the violation of the right to life, and the violation of the right to freedom of belief (p. 248). He has divided the strategies for resolving this doubt into two types, explaining and critiquing various solutions in each case. In this regard, he points to four reasons against the worldly punishment for apostasy, three of which relate to the fact that the evidence for depriving the life of an apostate is based on solitary reports (Khabar Wahid). The author has provided answers to each of the reasons:

The lack of authority of a solitary report (Hujjiyyah Khabar al-Wahid) in grave matters, such as the deprivation of the right to life (p. 250): The author asserts that the evidence for the worldly punishment of the apostate is not merely a solitary report, and there are other narrations in this regard; although there might be flaws in them as well (pp. 250-251).
The absence of rational conduct (Sirah 'Uqala'iyyah) regarding the worldly punishment of the apostate; referring to the fact that rational conduct is the main reason for accepting the authority of a solitary report (p. 251): The author asserts that from the view of great Shia scholars, the most important reason for the authority of a solitary report is consensus (Ijma') which indicates the view of the Infallible, not rational conduct; and it is for this reason that the narrations regarding the ruling on the apostate, which are mostly solitary reports, have been accepted by Shia jurists.
The impossibility of abrogating (Naskh) the Quran with a solitary report and the fact that the Quran has not mentioned a worldly punishment for the apostate (p. 252): The author asserts that expressing a ruling that is not mentioned in the Quran cannot be called the abrogation of the Quran; because abrogation means that a ruling which was not legitimate becomes legitimate at another time.
The conflict between the punishment of the apostate and the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" (La ikraha fi al-din) (p. 253): The author asserts that although the aforementioned verse means "freedom of belief", it does not mean "freedom of expression", and if a false belief causes the intellectual deviation of others, the worldly punishment of the apostate does not contradict the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" (pp. 256-257).

The author then addresses the reasons presented regarding the doubt about the absolute temporal application and inclusiveness of the ruling on the apostate, and critiques them. The author does not accept the historical nature of the ruling on the apostate and its restriction to the establishment era of Islam, but accepts the possibility of its being a state ruling (Hukm Wila'i) and exclusive to the ruler (the Prophet of Islam), presenting evidence in this regard, and finally stating that this justification is compatible with the sanctity of human blood (pp. 257-270). In this same regard, and to prevent the ruling on the apostate from becoming an objective reality, the author believes that through a restrictive method, without denying the principle of the death penalty ruling, but by imposing various constraints and conditions derived from history, conduct (Sirah), and Hadith, the scope of the ruling on the apostate can be limited to such an extent that practically, the realization of this ruling can only be imagined in very rare cases (pp. 270-274).

Offensive Jihad

The author, while stating the doubt that legitimizing and sanctifying offensive war in Islam violates the right to life of non-Muslims (p. 276), first addresses the underlying factors that gave rise to this ambiguity, listing: 1. The reaction of Muslims to the violence of the polytheists, 2. The necessities of the consolidation era, 3. The exaggeration and magnification of Islamic wars by biographers (Sirah-Nivisan), 4. The Islamic conquests during the era of the Caliphs, and 5. The weakness of the opponents' front and the influence of Islam (pp. 278-282), and then enumerates the motives for the occurrence of Muslim wars; including: 1. Preventing the enemy's aggression, 2. Rescuing the oppressed, defense, and 4. Destroying the rebels (Bughat) (pp. 282-286).

The author then, by examining the verses of jihad in the Quran, enumerates six categories of verses referring to jihad, and finally, referring to the verses containing the command for offensive jihad (including Verse 5 of Surah al-Tawbah: "And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush"), answers the doubt regarding the necessary connection between offensive jihad and the deprivation of the right to life (pp. 294-303).

To resolve the doubt, the author first presents a picture of the historical atmosphere of the revelation of Surah Bara'ah (p. 304) and posits offensive jihad as a return to defensive jihad (p. 307), concluding that only the initial verses of Surah al-Tawbah refer to offensive war, and this command is neither general nor permanent. Based on this, in Islam, only one type of offensive war is officially recognized, which is the jihad to remove obstacles to guidance and confront seditionists who prevent the message of guidance from reaching the people. According to the author, this concept returns to defensive jihad, and therefore, offensive jihad does not mean the deprivation of life, and its target is the seditionists, not the general public. In addition, the legitimacy of offensive jihad was limited to the early period of Islam, and if there is an insistence on its continuation to convert disbelievers to Islam, it will only be during the era of the government of Imam al-Mahdi (a) (pp. 310-311).

The Difference Between the Right to Life of Men and Women in Islam

The difference between the right to life of men and women is among the ambiguities related to Qisas, but the author, due to the prominence of this subject, preferred to examine it independently and in the section on doubts (p. 312). He has considered two axes for examining this doubt:

1. Gender Discrimination in Bearing the Blood Money (Diyah)

According to Islamic jurisprudence, if a Muslim man murders a Muslim woman, the retaliation (Qisas) against the man is conditioned upon the payment of half of a man's blood money by the victim's heirs. The author, while emphasizing that this ruling is among the indisputable tenets of Shia jurisprudence, nevertheless points to a group of Sunni scholars, as well as Yousef Saanei, one of the Shia sources of emulation (Maraji' Taqlid), who do not see a difference between a man and a woman in the execution of Qisas (pp. 317-318). He also asserts that this jurisprudential ruling, at the time of its issuance, was considered a defense of the woman's right to life and does not imply that the intentional murder of women is permissible (p. 318), and the payment of half the blood money of the male murderer is an assistance to his family's livelihood after the execution of Qisas (p. 319).

2. Gender Discrimination in the Attachment of Blood Money for a Fetus

In Shia jurisprudence, the blood money for the abortion of a female fetus in the stage after the ensoulment (Wuluj al-Ruh), unlike a male fetus, is considered half the full blood money for a life. The author, in response to this doubt, points to the proportionality of the blood money ruling with the important life responsibilities of a male fetus in the event of continued life, and calls it a guarantee for potential loss (Dhaman Khasarat Sha'ni) (p. 325).