Instruments of Pointless Amusment and Music (book)
- abstract
Instruments of Pointless Amusment and Music (in persian: آلات لهو و موسیقی) is a jurisprudential-analytical textbook in Persian, written by Muhammad Sorouh Maḥallati, which examines the jurisprudential ruling on music and its instruments. This book, compiled in 212 pages, without specific chapter divisions, discusses topics such as the rational ruling on music, jurisprudential opinions on music, hadiths on instruments of lahv (pointless amusment) and music, reasons for the prohibition of lahv, the criterion for lahv-oriented music, and the ruling on the use of shared instruments.
According to Surūsh Maḥallātī, reason alone is incapable of discovering the ruling on music and its instruments, and this can only be achieved through a triangle of evidence (reason, the Quran, and hadiths). To this end, he examines the ruling on music from the perspective of two subjects: lahv and corruption (fasād). Referring to verses of Quran and hadiths, he concludes that the ruling derived from reason, the Quran, and hadiths is that absolute prohibition of music and its instruments cannot be established; rather, the prohibition applies only to lahv-oriented music and instruments of lahv.
The author also reconciles the hadiths on music and resolves their contradictions by presenting a discussion on their chains of narrators (document) and implications. He proposes several solutions, including referring to examples in hadiths, interpreting the hadiths as being specific to cases of lahv, and absence of absoluteness in hadiths on music. He concludes that musical instruments are not inherently forbidden, and only using them for lahv leads to the ruling of forbiddance.
In explaining the criteria for lahv-oriented music, the author presents two interpretations provided by jurists: 1) being suitable for lahv gatherings and 2) fulfilling criteria such as arousing lust and having lahv-oriented content. However, he believes that determining the criterion for lahv-oriented music is a matter of subject analysis, left to customary understanding. Surūsh Maḥallātī ultimately examines the ruling on shared instruments and, after presenting various opinions on this matter, concludes that using these instruments for non-forbidden purposes is permissible, and also there is no problem to keep them.
Introduction and structure
The book Instruments of Pointless Amusment and Music, a jurisprudential-analytical textbook authored by Muhammad Soroush Maḥallati, was published in 212 pages by Mīrāth-i Ahl-i Qalam publication in spring 1402 SH (2023). The book, which is the result of a teaching course by the author, examines various topics related to instruments of lahv and music. The book is structured without formal divisions, but it covers diverse topics, including the rational ruling on music, non-ethical music, hadiths on instruments of lahv and music, the ruling on non-lahv-oriented music, the theory of the forbiddance of all types of music, the scope of forbiddance in the use of musical instruments, the criterion for lahv and lahv-oriented music, the standard for determining the lahv-oriented nature of musical instruments, and the ruling on the use of shared instruments. At the beginning, under the title of rational and Quranic foundations, the author discusses lexical issues, the previous literature on the issue of singing and ghinā (a kind of music that drives one out of his normal state), music within the scope of ijtihad (analytical effort), sources for deriving the ruling on music, the ruling on music in the Quran, and the role of reason in examining musical instruments (pp. 11–21).
The rational ruling on music
In examining the rational ruling on music, the author believes that to derive a jurisprudential ruling on various issues, first the ruling of reason and then verses of the Quran and hadiths should be considered. He attributes the lack of attention to rational and Quranic sources to the fact that Shia jurists, due to their access to hadiths of the Ahl al-Bayt, feel no need to examine rational and Quranic foundations. He examines the issue of reason and the baseness (qubḥ) of music from the two perspectives of lahv and corruption (pp. 23–24).
Lahv
The author, while explaining the interpretation of forbidden lahv (pointless amusment) from the perspectives of Ayatollah Burūjirdī and Sheikh Anṣārī and based on the critique on Sheikh Anṣārī’s view, emphasizes that the basis considered by Ayatollah Burūjirdī about lahv is accepted by many jurists. According to this basis, lahv is any act that takes a person out of their normal state and disrupts their reason and will. The author believes that, according to this basis, the forbiddance of musical instruments cannot be proven; because not all types of lahv are forbidden. Therefore, the use of musical instruments is not inherently forbidden; rather, only playing a music that takes a person out of their normal state is forbidden. Based on this interpretation, few cases can be instances of forbidden lahv (pp. 25–30).
Corruption (Fasād)
The author raises and examines the question of whether musical instruments can be considered as tools of corruption, and thus be deemed as ugly by reason as well? He refers to the statements of Mirza Shīrāzī and Imam Khomeini and emphasizes that, rationally, the title of corruption cannot be applied to all musical instruments in all cases of playing. However, due to the expression “pure corruption” used in the Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl hadith regarding some musical instruments [1], this discussion also takes on a devotional aspect. Therefore, musical instruments are not independently subject to rational rulings, and reason alone cannot judge them. The author believes that relying on reason alone, a prohibition cannot be established for all musical instruments and all their uses, as there is no general reason to prove the baseness of all types of lahv-oriented sounds and that they lead to corruption. Such baseness can only be proven in specific cases (pp. 31–36).
Limits of the ability of reason in discovering the ruling on music
Under the title of non-ethical music, Surūsh Maḥallātī argues that reason alone is incapable of determining the ruling on music, and that this ruling must be sought within a triangle of evidence (the Quran, hadiths, and reason) (p. 37). He states that many jurists believe the issue of musical instruments is not explicitly addressed in the Quran, but it can be traced in verses such as the ‘lahv al-hadith’ verse (Quran 31:6). The author refers to two opinions on the term ‘lahv al-hadith’ in this verse: 1) the view of jurists who consider the verse to refer to ghinā and, thus, to not include musical instruments, and 2) the view of commentators who envision a broader scope for ‘lahv al-hadith’ and believe it to include musical instruments as well (pp. 39–42). After presenting opinions on this verse, Surūsh Maḥallātī concludes that there is a correspondence between the ruling derived from reason and what is extracted from the lahv al-hadith verse. This correspondence indicates that only when the title of “leading astray from the path of God” applies to instruments of lahv and music can they be considered as forbidden (pp. 38–43).
The author then proceeds to examine the ruling on musical instruments in hadiths. He states that the hadiths on this subject have varying expressions. Some hadiths describe the effects and consequences of using musical instruments. These hadiths refer to the ruling of reason and do not contain rulings of the sharia; rather, they examine the ethical and social effects of musical instruments and their use. The author then examines five hadiths, analyzing their chains of narrators, and concludes that these hadiths are consistent with the rational perspective on musical instruments and that there is no reason for the absolute forbiddance of musical instruments. However, the question of whether there are any hadiths which indicate the absolute forbiddance of any use of musical instruments in any gathering, still remains. For this reason, he conducts a detailed examination of the hadiths in this regard (pp. 43–51).
Examining hadiths on instruments of lahv and music
According to the author, some have enumerated up to forty hadiths on music, which can be categorized into two general groups: 1) hadiths that use the term malāhī (instruments of lahv) and the expression ‘instruments of lahv’ and whose ruling addresses the title of malāhī, and 2) hadiths that specifically address musical instruments such as flute, and drum. In these hadiths, the ruling applies to the instruments themselves, with no mention of lahv (pp. 53–62). After presenting several hadiths, the author notes that in the face of conflicting hadiths, some jurists have refrained from expressing an opinion, while others have favored one side. He proposes several solutions for reconciling these hadiths (pp. 62–64).
Reconciling hadiths based on examples in the hadiths
Soroush Maḥallati’s first solution for reconciling hadiths on music is to categorize them based on examples and instances within the hadiths. For instance, some hadiths condition the forbiddance of musical instruments on their being lahv-oriented or causing corruption. These hadiths can, therefore, serve as evidence for reconciling and resolving the conflict between the first and second groups of hadiths. Among these hadiths is the one narrated by A‘mash from Imam Ṣādiq (AS) [2], which considers using instruments as malāhī (lahv instruments) that prevent the remembrance of God as the reason for prohibiting musical instruments (pp. 64–67).
Interpreting hadiths on the forbiddance of musical instruments as being specific to lahv-oriented cases
The author’s second solution for reconciling the two groups of hadiths on music is to interpret the hadiths prohibiting musical instruments as being specific to cases of lahv. Surūsh Maḥallātī, citing the opinion of Mirza Muhammad Taqī Shīrāzī in this regard, argues that by disregarding the absoluteness of the evidence, there is definitely no reason to forbid musical instruments in general, and the ruling of forbiddance only applies when they are used for lahv (pp. 67–69).
Absence of absoluteness in hadiths on music
The third solution for reconciling hadiths on music is to reject the absolute nature of hadiths on musical instruments. The author believes that if hadiths mentioning music are absolute, the use of these instruments, whether for lahv or not, would be forbidden. While after examining over twenty hadiths on this subject, Surūsh Maḥallātī considers only four hadiths to be reliable in terms of their chains of narrators, and after analyzing the implications of these four hadiths, he concludes that they are not inherently absolute. Therefore, the mere fact of being a musical instrument does not make something forbidden, and only their use for lahv creates the grounds for forbiddance (pp. 71–86).
Theories on the forbiddance of music
To clarify the roots of jurisprudential disagreements on musical instruments, the author presents two jurisprudential theories:
The theory of absolute forbiddance
The absolute forbiddance of all types of music and their instruments, whether lahv-oriented or not, is the first jurisprudential theory on musical instruments. This theory is based on the fact that in hadiths, the names of musical instruments, either generally (ma‘āḏif) or specifically (drum and flute), are the subjects of the ruling, and absolute forbiddance applies to using them (pp. 88–89).
The theory of conditional forbiddance
The forbiddance of lahv-oriented music is the second theory on music and its instruments. This theory is based on evidence in hadiths that only prohibit the lahv-oriented use of these instruments (pp. 88–89). In examining the reasons presented to prove the basis of conditional forbiddance, the author refers to six reasons: 1) the lexical meaning of the term malāhī; 2) verse 11 of surah al-Jum‘ah; 3) hadiths on the term lahv; 4) jurists’ understanding of hadiths on musical instruments; 5) the point that hadiths on musical instruments refer to their beneficial uses; and 6) restricting the application of hadiths on general forbiddance to specific cases. The author accepts the first four reasons as supporting the forbiddance of lahv-oriented instruments (conditional forbiddance) but rejects the last two due to certain objections (pp. 88–114).
Reasons for the forbiddance of instruments of lahv
After examining the two theories on music and accepting the view that the forbiddance mentioned in hadiths applies to instruments of lahv rather than all musical instruments, the author addresses the question as to whether there are sufficient reasons for the forbiddance of instruments of lahv. In response to this question, he argues that the forbiddance of instruments of lahv cannot be understood from verses of the Quran and it must be sought in hadiths. However, many hadiths are either problematic in terms of their chains of narrators or are subject to controversy in terms of their implications (pp. 114–117).
He then examines how jurists have approached hadiths on instruments of lahv, coming up with four approaches: 1) considering the forbiddance as self-evident despite controversies over the chains of narrators and implications of hadiths; 2) relying on valid hadiths, as some jurists like Sayyid Kāẓim Ḥā’irī have only relied on two hadiths; 3) establishing general confidence in the hadiths despite the possibility of controversy regarding each individual hadith, which necessitates proving a minimal forbiddance; and 4) relying on the opinions of jurists to compensate for weaknesses in the chains of narrators and implications of hadiths. After presenting these four approaches, Surūsh Maḥallātī critiques them and concludes that neither the fatwas of prominent companions of the Imams (AS) nor the fatwas of early jurists show any consensus on this matter (pp. 119–139).
The criterion for lahv-oriented music
Soroush Maḥallati considers the criterion for distinguishing lahv-oriented music from non-lahv-oriented music to be a subject-related matter, the understanding of which, like other subject-related matters, is left to the custom. However, here, the understanding of the lahv that is the subject of the jurisprudential ruling, is ambiguous. According to the author, two interpretations have been proposed to resolve the ambiguity of the concept of lahv, although they are very brief (pp. 141–143).
Suitability for play and lahv gatherings
The first interpretation regarding the criterion for distinguishing lahv-oriented music is whether it is suitable for gatherings around lahv, play (la‘ib), transgression (fisq) and immorality (fujūr). The author states that many jurists have accepted this criterion, though they have not specified a particular reason for it (pp. 143–144).
Determining the criteria
The second interpretation for determining the criterion for lahv-oriented music is the establishment of specific criteria for this issue. The author states that two criteria have been proposed by jurists:
- Arousing lust: According to this criterion, any music that arouses lust in man is lahv-oriented and forbidden. The author raises objections to the opinions of jurists on this matter and concludes that we cannot use the major premise to understand that wherever music arouses lust, it is lahv-oriented and forbidden; since lack of clarity regarding the arousal of lust in the criteria for determining lahv weakens this conclusion. Additionally, besides forbidden arousal, there can also be lawful arousal (pp. 144–151).
- Lahv content: The author states that jurists have defined lahv as something that harms a person’s humanity or faith. Thus, two criteria are seen in the statements of jurists: the human criterion and the faith criterion. According to the author, in the human criterion, lahv is something that disrupts a person’s personality and takes away their reason and will. In the faith criterion, anything that harms a person’s faith and encourages them to commit sin and transgression is considered lahv-oriented (pp. 151–157).
Surūsh Maḥallātī raises the question of whether instruments of lahv can be used for non-lahv purposes and refers to two theories.
The theory of absolute forbiddance
The absolute forbiddance of using instruments of lahv, even for non-lahv purposes, is the first theory the author discusses, citing the late Narāqī’s opinion. He critiques this opinion and argues that there must be evidence to forbid all uses of shared instruments, and such evidence does not exist (pp. 161–169).
The theory of conditional forbiddance
The second theory regarding the use of shared instruments is that it is forbidden to use them for haram purposes, and their use for non-haram purposes is permissible. After categorizing objects into things of permissible uses, things of forbidden uses, and things of shared uses, the author states that most of what is available to human beings in their lives falls under instruments of shared use. He explains that if a person acquires an instrument for a permissible use, its purchase and sale are permissible for him. The author believes that the more faithful individuals use shared instruments for permissible purposes, the more these instruments lose their association with lahv, and thus the ruling on the issue will change (pp. 169–174).
The criterion to determine a lahv instrument
Sproush Maḥallātī continues the discussion on shared instruments by examining the criteria for determining whether an instrument is lahv-oriented. He proposes four possibilities for identifying lahv-oriented instruments, noting that references to each possibility can be found in the statements of jurists: 1) the production of instruments for the purpose of creating lahv; 2) the inherent suitability of instruments for lahv; 3) the actual use of instruments for lahv in practice; and 4) the exclusiveness of these instruments for lahv. In the final discussion, Surūsh Maḥallātī addresses the forbiddance of shared instruments based on the sharia and based on benefit and presents points about the ruling on these instruments based on benefit, which are more exploratory than conclusive (pp. 175–206).