Invalidity of the Majority Vote in Government

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  • abstract

The invalidity of the majority vote in government (in persian: عدم اعتبار رأی اکثریت در حکومت) is a theory about the majority vote in contemporary jurisprudence that considers the legitimacy and acceptability of the government, law, and ruler only from the perspective of valid Islamic principles, and they do not believe in any authority for the majority vote in governmental issues. This theory is opposed to theories such as the validity of the majority vote in the government and the conditional validity of the majority vote. Jurists who adhere to this theory have relied on interpreting the majority vote as an innovation, citing several Quranic verses that condemn the majority, as well as narrations that did not consider the infallibles themselves obligated to obey advisors and sometimes acted contrary to their opinions.

Introduction

The legitimacy of referring to public opinions and the preference of the majority vote in shaping political systems in the Islamic world, drafting laws, and choosing the leaders of the Islamic community, as well as the necessity of adhering to the majority vote for everyone, are issues that have emerged and are faced in contemporary jurisprudence. Some Shia jurists believe that the majority vote is not valid in issues related to governance. Those who believe that the majority vote is not valid in governmental issues do not consider it to be a method that garners legitimacy or acceptability and believe that in Islam, legitimacy and acceptability are only created by the Divine legislation (sharī’ah), and only a government, law, and ruler determined by the sharī’ah are legitimate. According to this spectrum of jurists, the validity of the majority vote in such matters is considered an innovation.[1] According to Masoud Emāmī, a researcher of religious issues, those that believe in the invalidity of the majority opinion on governmental matters have not considered it valid based on the principles of “discovering the truth,” “religious legitimacy,” “expediency (maṣlahat),” and “acceptability”; however, based on the principle of the right to determine one’s destiny, the majority opinion has been considered valid.[2] According to Emāmī’s view, the verses of the Quran that the opponents of this view have cited to support the invalidity of the majority vote do so based on the principle of discovering the truth, not the right to determine destiny; in the sense that the Qur’ān does not consider the majority of society in terms of belief, ethics, and behaviour to be in the right, and in the context of discerning the truth, deems their opinion as invalid. Therefore, the verses of the Qur’ān that criticize the majority do not tarnish the validity of the majority opinion based on the right to determine one’s destiny, and the majority opinion takes precedence over the minority opinion regardless of whether it is based on truth or falsehood. [3] Furthermore, based on this perspective, the verses that emphasize the necessity of the believers obeying God and His Messenger and refraining from choosing another command are seen as defining the duty of believers in the legislative realm. In other words, these verses negate the legislative freedom of believers in relation to God while the validity of the majority opinion based on the right to determine one’s destiny is related to ontological freedom, not legislative freedom.[4]

Alternative Theories

Regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the majority vote in governmental issues, in addition to the theory of illegitimacy, two other theories titled “Legitimacy of the Majority Vote in Government” and “Conditional Legitimacy of the Majority Vote” have been proposed by contemporary jurists.

Legitimacy of the Majority Vote in Government

Belief in the legitimacy of the majority vote in governmental decision-making in the contemporary era, especially since the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, has been included in jurisprudential works. Some jurists such as Mohammad Husain Nā’īnī, Sheikh Ismā’īl Mahallātī, Husain-Ali Montazerī, Mohammad Hādī Ma'refat, and others who support the constitutional system, consider the majority vote to be binding upon everyone making that decision obligatory for everyone to follow. This group of jurists view the acceptance and legitimacy of the government, the ruler, governmental laws, and even the actuality of the ruler's authority as contingent upon the consent and majority vote.[5] Referring to the fundamental principle of “taking preferences in conflict”[6] and the principle of the reprehensibility of preferring the minority opinion over the vote and opinion of the majority”[7] are the most important proofs cited by this group of scholars. They also refer to verses related to the concept of consultation and the authority of the believers over each other,[8] as well as narrations from Imam Ali (a) that link the actuality of his authority over the people to the consent and acceptance of all.[9]

Conditional Validity of the Majority Vote

Thinkers like Abdullāh Jawādi Āmolī and Mohammad Sādiq Rouhānī, contemporary jurists, believe in the conditional validity of majority vote. According to Jawādī Āmolī, from the Islamic perspective, the truth originates from the Almighty God and Divine speech is the only determinant of the truth. Therefore, following the majority implies adopting beliefs and moral values from them is condemned.[10] He believes that the majority opinion can only be used as a method and rule for decision-making in social disputes and should be a tool for determining the truth, not establishing it.[11] Mohammad Sādiq Rouhānī also believes that majority vote is valid not in determining the ruler,[12] but only in specific socio-political matters where the ruler does not have knowledge of its benefits and detriments[13].

Supporters and Proofs

Sheikh Fazlollāh Noorī in his treatise on “The Prohibition of the Constitutionalism”,[14] Mohammad Husain Tabrīzī in his treatise on “Kashf al-Murād”,[15] Sayyid Mohammad Husaini Tehrānī in his book “Wilāyat al-faqīh fī hukūmat al-Islamiyyah”,[16] and Mohammad Taqī Misbāh Yazdī in his book “Islamic Political Theory”[17] are among the jurists and theorists who do not believe in the validity of majority vote in governmental issues and consider it invalid. Those who believe in the illegitimacy and invalidity of the majority vote in governmental affairs have presented several proofs to support their claim, which can be categorized into two types of rational and textual proofs:

Rational Proofs

The opponents of the legitimacy of the majority vote state that simply accepting the opinion of the majority because they are the majority against the opinion of others, even if they are in the minority, is contrary to reason. In their view, the majority of people are usually influenced by whims and the propaganda of others, and they act based on emotions rather than rational logic.[18] For this reason, the majority vote will not have legitimacy in determining the Islamic system or the ruler and government laws.[19]

Textual Reasons

Those who believe in this view have referred to several categories of Qur’ānic verses to reject the position of the majority vote in the Islamic political system. The first category of Qur’ānic verses condemns the belief and behaviour of the majority of people in more than sixty verses, where God rebukes most people for their ignorance,[20] irrationality,[21] disbelief,[22] ingratitude,[23] idolatry,[24] misguidance,[25] debauchery,[26] lies,[27] and following conjecture.[28][29] Some contemporary interpreters and jurists have used these verses to refute the preference of the majority vote.[30] Another category of verses cited by those who do not consider the majority vote valid are the ones that consider governance, authority,[31] and legislation[32] as exclusive to God. Therefore, whenever the people's vote contradicts the command of God and His Prophet, the Divine command takes precedence. Thus, in a religious government, theocracy takes precedence over democracy, and the people's opinion is only valuable when it does not oppose God's command.[33] Some Shī’ah scholars even interpret the most important verses cited in support of the validity of the majority vote, such as verse 159 of Chapter Āl-‘Imrān, as emphasizing the necessity of the Prophet consulting with the Muslims in a way that implies the invalidity of the majority vote.[34] Referring to some narrations is another reason for opposing the validity of the majority vote by some contemporary jurists. According to this view, it is understood from these narrations that although the infallibles consulted with others, they did not consider themselves obligated to obey the advisors and sometimes acted contrary to their opinions.[35] For example, there is a narration about Imām Ridhā consulting with his companions and then making a decision based on his own will,[36] or in response to Imām Ali's rejection of Ibn Abbās's proposal to keep Mu’āwiyah in power, it is mentioned that the Imām said: “I will dismiss Mu’āwiyah, but you must present your consultative opinion and I will also consider it; so, if I oppose you, you must obey me.”[37]

Footnotes

  1. Noorī, “Risāleye Hurmat Mashrūteh”, Vol. 1, p. 106; Tabrīzī, “Risāleye Kashf al-Murād”, p. 132.
  2. Imāmī, I’tibār Ra’y Aktharīyyat bar Mabnāye Kashf Haqīqat o Sāyir Mabānī”, p. 73.
  3. Imāmī, “I’tibār Ra’y Akthariyat dar Partov e Kitāb o Sunnat”, p .58.
  4. Imāmī, “I’tibār Ra’y Akthariyat dar Partov e Kitāb o Sunnat”, p .60.
  5. Imām Khomeini, Sahīfeye Imām, 1385, Vol. 20, p. 459; Montazerī, Hukūmat e Dīnī wa Huqūq Insān, 1429, p. 37-38.
  6. Nā’īnī, Tanbīh al-Ummah, 1382, p. 115.
  7. Montazerī, Dirāsāt fī Wilāyatil Faqīh, 1409, Vol. 1, p. 554; Vol. 1, p. 564.
  8. Ma’refat, Jāme’yeh Mudunī, 1378, p. 73 – 75; Sālehī Najafābādī, Wilāyat e Faqīh e Hukūmat e Sālihān, 1380, p. 278, Ardebīlī, Hampāye Inqilāb, 1385, p.464 – 465.
  9. Ibn Shahrāshūb, Manāqib, 1379, Vol. 1, p. 225; Imāmī, I’tibār Ra’y Aktharīyyat dar Partov e Kitāb o Sunnat, p. 71 – 73.
  10. Javādī Āmolī, Wilāyatul Faqīh, 1379, p. 90.
  11. Javādī Āmolī, Wilāyatul Faqīh, 1379, p. 92.
  12. Rouhānī, Nizām e Hukūmat dar Islam, 1357, p. 28 – 31.
  13. Rouhānī, Nizām e Hukūmat dar Islam, 1357, p. 70 – 72.
  14. Nourī, Risāleye Hurmat Mashrūteh, Quoted from Turkmān, Letters, writings, and the newspapers of Sheikh Shahīd Fazlullāh Nourī, 1362, Vol. 1, p. 106.
  15. Tabrīzī, Risāleye Kashf al-Murād, Quoted by Zargarīnezhād, Rasā’il Mashrūtiyyat, 1374, p. 132.
  16. Husainī Tehrānī, Wilāyatul Faqīh fī Hukūmat al-Islāmiyyah, 1418, Vol. 3, p. 183 – 184.
  17. Misbāh Yazdī, Nazariyyeh Siyāsī e Islam, 1391, Vol. 1, p. 103 – 282.
  18. Kharqānī, p. 226 & 240.
  19. Husainī Tehrānī, Wilāyatul Faqīh dar Hukūmat e Islamī, 1421, Vol. 3, p. 190 – 192.
  20. Chapter A’rāf: 131 & 187; Chapter Yūsuf: 21 & 40; Chapter An’ām: 37.
  21. Chapter Mā’idah:103; Chapter ‘Ankabūt:63.
  22. Chapter Hūd: 17; Chapter Ghāfir: 59.
  23. Chapter Baqarah: 243.
  24. Chapter Yūsuf: 106
  25. Chapter Furqān: 44
  26. Chapter Mā’idah: 29
  27. Chapter ‘Ankabūt: 63.
  28. Chapter An’ām: 116; Chapter Yūnus: 36.
  29. Imāmī, I’tibār Ra’y Aktharīyyat dar Partov e Kitāb o Sunnat, p. 56 – 57.
  30. ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’ī, Al-Mīzān, 1390, Vol. 4, p. 103; Makārim Shīrāzī, Tafsīr Nemooneh, 1371, Vol. 14, p. 281; Mūsavī Khalkhālī, Al-Hākimīyyah fī al-Isla., 1425, p. 111; Husainī Tehrānī, Wilāyatul Faqīh fī Hukūmat al-Islāmiyyah, 1418, Vol. 3, p. 183 – 184.
  31. Chapter Nisā: 59; Chapter Mā’idah: 55.
  32. Chapter Ahzāb: 36.
  33. Qarā’atī, Tafsīr e Noor, 1383, Vol. 9, p. 368.
  34. Misbāh Yazdī, Nazariyyeh Siyāsī e Islam 1391, p. 282.
  35. Morādī & Mūsāzādeh, Mashrū’īyyat e Jomhūrīyyat dar Islam, p. 103.
  36. Barqī, Al-Mahāsin, 1371, Vol. 2, p. 601.
  37. Nahjul Balāgha, Short Sayings #321, p. 531.

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