The Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad (book)

Author: Reza Bazeli

The Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad is a Persian-language book in the field of the Philosophy of Fiqh written by Saeed Zia'ifar. In this work, the author has sought to identify and examine the influential theological views on ijtihad and jurisprudential theories, showing how theological perspectives affect jurisprudential and, at times, usuli (principles of jurisprudence) theories. Its main focus is on the theological foundations accepted by the Imamiyya.

Book Information
Author	Saeed Zia'ifar
Style	Analytical
Language	Persian
Pages	1024
اطلاعات نشر
Publisher	Bustan-e Ketab Publications

• Abstract

This voluminous book is organized into five "offices" (daftar) and twenty chapters. The first office, titled "Rational Discussions," addresses fundamental creedal issues such as rational good and evil and the like. The second through fifth offices are modeled after theological books, respectively covering "Divine Attributes and Actions," "Prophethood" and its related concepts like infallibility and the Prophet's authority, "Imamate" and its related concepts like infallibility and the functions of the Imams, and finally, the "Characteristics of Sharia" such as its comprehensiveness, eternality, and universality.

The dependence of rulings on underlying interests and harms, the reprehensibility of punishment without prior warning (*qubh 'iqab bila bayan*), the validity of an apostate's acts of worship after repentance, the concept of *mintaqat al-faragh* (the unregulated domain), fixed and variable rulings, the possibility of legislation by non-Infallibles, the implementation of hudud in the era of occultation, the contextualization of some evidence to the customs of the Infallibles' time, the rule of justice, and the extension of the subject of hoarding (*ihtikar*) to non-scripturally specified items are some of the results that Zia'ifar points to as the consequences and effects of various theological foundations.

The book *The Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad* is considered one of the first books in this field. Therefore, the author's method is based more on reporting and analysis rather than critical analysis. In general, in each chapter, the author first presents the background of the discussion, its meanings and related theories, and the arguments of both proponents and opponents, and then discusses the consequences and implications of that topic in fiqh and usul al-fiqh.

Brief Introduction

The book *The Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad*, penned by Saeed Zia'ifar, attempts to identify and examine the influential theological views on ijtihad and jurisprudential theories, and by citing evidence and examples, to show the impact of theological views on jurisprudential and sometimes usuli theories. The main objective of this research is to examine the influence of the theological foundations accepted by the Imami school on fiqh. In this regard, some specific views of Imami theologians are also presented and their impact on jurisprudential reasoning is examined (p. 16).

• The Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad* is a voluminous and comprehensive book, published in 1024 pages, relying on numerous scholarly sources (1079 sources). The book was evaluated by Mostafa Malekian and first published in 1382 SH by Bustan-e Ketab Publications in Qom, reaching its fourth printing in 1401 SH.

The author discusses a large number of theological topics in a detailed and argumentative manner, which sometimes distracts the reader from the main point, such as the analysis of the concept of prophethood in the eleventh chapter. It also pays little attention to modern and new jurisprudential issues and in some cases presents results and propositions that are not considered jurisprudential or usuli theories, such as the necessity of religious obligation and divine law (pp. 192, 265) and the issue of the necessity of imamate and prophethood (pp. 267, 268).

Author

Saeed Zia'ifar, a researcher in the fields of fiqh and the Philosophy of Fiqh, holds a license of ijtihad and is an associate professor and faculty member at the Jurisprudence and Law Research Center of the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy. Several books by him have been published, including *An Introduction to the Schools of Fiqh*, *The Philosophy of the Science of Fiqh*, *The Influence of Ethics on Ijtihad*, and *Existing and Desired Usuli Schools*.

Structure of the Work

The book's discussions are organized into five offices and twenty chapters.

• The first office, "Rational Discussions," consists of five chapters: rational good and evil, the good of justice and the evil of oppression, freedom and the negation of guardianship, freedom to benefit from blessings, and the goodness of thanking the benefactor.
• The second office, "Divine Attributes and Actions," is structured in five chapters, respectively: divine justice, divine wisdom, divine grace, divine obligation, and exclusive divine legislation.
• The third office, "Prophethood," is in three chapters: analysis of the concept of prophethood, the Prophet's (s) infallibility, and the Prophet's (s) functions.
• The fourth office, "Imamate," is in four chapters with the titles: analysis of the concept of imamate, the infallibility of the Imam, the functions of the Imam, and the era of occultation.
• The fifth office, "Characteristics of Sharia," is in three chapters: comprehensiveness and perfection of Sharia, the eternality of Sharia, and the universality of Sharia.

Research Method

According to the book's author, no comprehensive research has been conducted on the role of theological foundations in fiqh and reasoning. Therefore, the book's method is based more on reporting and analysis than on critical analysis (pp. 13-14). In general, the author's approach in each chapter is to first present the background of the discussion, its meanings and related theories, and the arguments of both proponents and opponents, and then to address the implications of that issue in fiqh and usul. The author's method in the present book consists of:

1. Extracting the influential theological issues on jurisprudential theories from the vast array of theological issues.
2. Quoting, examining, and critiquing the arguments presented for the affirmation or negation of each of these theological issues.
3. Presenting for judgment the results that have been or can be derived from theological foundations in the words of Imami jurists and usulis, so that in selecting jurisprudential and usuli theories, attention is also paid to the foundations of these theories.
4. Demonstrating, with documentation, the cases where differences in theological foundations can affect the adoption of a jurisprudential or usuli theory, and examining and critiquing them.
5. Making existing fiqh the axis of research, extracting its theological foundations, and examining the results that scholars of fiqh and usul have derived from them.
6. Placing the influential theological issues in fiqh into an organized, systematic, and coherent framework (pp. 18-19).

Importance and Position of Theological Foundations in Ijtihad

The influence of theological foundations in ijtihad on fiqh and jurisprudential theories is considered a new issue in the Philosophy of Fiqh (pp. 13, 16). The main question of this research is on which creedal propositions—whose explanation and proof are the responsibility of the science of Kalam—fiqh is based, and which the jurist takes for granted to engage in ijtihad (p. 16).

The influence of theological foundations in ijtihad has been discussed in the words of early and later theologians and jurists. The author also reports the opinion of scholars who considered addressing theological issues to be logically prior to addressing jurisprudential and usuli issues and stated that knowledge of the attributes of God, the Prophet (s), and the Imam is a prerequisite for ijtihad; among them are Shaykh al-Tusi, Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, 'Allama al-Hilli, al-Shahid al-Awwal and al-Shahid al-Thani, al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki, and Wahid Bihbahani. He also refers to another group of scholars who, in the midst of their jurisprudential discussions and reasoning, have explicitly stated some theological propositions or have sought help from theological foundations in arguing for their jurisprudential theory or have made theological knowledge the basis of their jurisprudential theory (p. 17). Sayyid Muhammad Mujahid in his book *Mafatih al-Usul* has considered theological propositions such as the rule of grace (*lutf*), the rule of no obligation beyond capacity, the rule of the impossibility of an evil act from a wise being, and the rule of infallibility to be influential in jurisprudential reasoning (p. 17).

In the author's belief, the theological discussions effective in jurisprudential reasoning are more numerous than these, and revealing the positions where theological views have directly or indirectly influenced ijtihad, clarifying the scope and conditions of their influence, and examining their evidence is an important and necessary matter for reconsidering some jurisprudential fatwas, especially in the field of human relations (p. 18).

The Influence of Rational Discussions on Fiqh and Ijtihad

The position of rational discussions in ijtihad is investigated in the first part of the book. In this section, among the rational propositions, the author examines the role and influence of five creedal topics on ijtihad and jurisprudential theories, which are: rational good and evil, the good of justice and the evil of oppression, freedom and the negation of guardianship, freedom to benefit from blessings, and the goodness of thanking the benefactor (p. 23).

Rational Good and Evil

Zia'ifar considers rational good and evil (*al-husn wa al-qubh al-'aqliyyayn*) to be one of the most important theological issues, which is the basis for many creedal beliefs, and these creedal beliefs have sometimes become the basis for jurisprudential and usuli discussions (p. 31). According to the author, the issue of good and evil is influential in usul and fiqh in two ways: A: It directly becomes one of the premises of a syllogism through which a legal ruling is proven; B: Or it is placed in the major premise of other propositions such as the reprehensibility of acting against one's purpose and the reprehensibility of obligating beyond capacity, which are themselves the foundations of usuli and jurisprudential propositions (p. 32).

The author discusses the correlation between the rational judgment of good and evil and the legal ruling, and recalls the opinion of the Akhbaris (deniers of the correlation) and the Usulis (proponents of the correlation) (pp. 47-63). According to the author, many Muslim theologians, thinkers, and jurists have accepted the correlation of rational good and evil with the legal ruling (p. 55).

The author considers the necessity of obeying God to be one of the important results of rational good and evil, which itself is the basis of several other rational judgments such as: the rational obligation of repentance, the rational judgment of the reprehensibility of aiding in sin, and the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil (pp. 64, 65). Also, the necessity of precaution; the reprehensibility of punishment without prior warning (rational acquittal); interpretation of scriptural evidence in case of conflict between rational and legal evidence; discovering the legal ruling through reason; the authoritativeness of apparent meanings; the prohibition of religious innovation (*tashri'*); and the necessity of choosing a ruler in the era of occultation are reported as other results of accepting rational good and evil (pp. 64-72).

The Good of Justice and the Evil of Oppression

In the second chapter of the first part, after stating the background, position, definition, and arguments for the issue of the goodness of justice and the evil of oppression (pp. 76-93), the role of this issue in fiqh is explained. The rejection of narrations that are inconsistent with the good of justice and the evil of oppression (p. 106), the stipulation of justice for social positions (p. 107), the establishment of the jurisprudential rule of justice (p. 100), the authoritativeness of certainty, and the rule of the reprehensibility of punishment without prior warning (pp. 94-96) are stated as the implications of this rule in fiqh and usul. Other results of this discussion in fiqh and usul include the following points:

• Justice as a criterion and a preponderant factor for choosing a theory where there is a difference of opinion among jurisprudential views. For example, one of the indications for the prohibition of hoarding is the rational judgment of the evil of oppression. (pp. 103-104)
• Restricting the meaning of religious texts: One of the results of the good of justice and the evil of oppression is the interpretation of scriptural evidence in the form of qualification (*taqyid*) or specification (*takhsis*) (p. 104).
• Extending the subject of rulings: For example, in cases where the prohibition of something is based on the criterion of the evil of oppression, jurists have extended it to any instance to which oppression applies, such as hoarding, where some jurists, based on the evil of oppression, have gone beyond the scripturally specified items and extended it to everything that people need (pp. 105-106).

In the author's view, some of the jurisprudential propositions that have been or can be inferred from the rule of the good of justice and the evil of oppression are: the endorsement and confirmation of private property (p. 98); the permissibility of demanding usurped property from the usurper at any time and place (pp. 97-98); the necessity of paying the price of a destroyed good (p. 99); and the sanctity of the property of a dhimmi non-Muslim (p. 99).

Freedom of Will and the Negation of Guardianship

Human freedom of will and choice is one of the rational judgments from which Shia theologians and jurists have extracted the "principle of no one having guardianship over another." After examining the background, definition, and arguments for this principle, the author states the implications of this issue in Imami fiqh and usul as follows: acquittal from obligation, acquittal from punishment, restricting the scope of guardianship and the guardian's authority, reducing the authority of the jurist in the era of occultation, elective government in the era of occultation, the rule of dominion over one's own property, the interpretation of religious texts, and the validity of the marriage of a mature girl based on the principle of human freedom, and the impermissibility of price-setting on hoarded goods (pp. 110-129).

Freedom to Benefit from Blessings

The freedom to benefit from blessings, which relates to the relationship between humans and nature, is considered one of the rational judgments (p. 133). In the fourth chapter, the author explains the background, content, and meaning of the proposition, the existing theories and their arguments, and finally its role and influence in fiqh and usul. According to the author, there are three views on the issue of benefiting from nature: suspension of judgment (*tawaqquf*), the principle of prohibition (*asalat al-hazr*), and the principle of permissibility (*asalat al-ibahah*). The author, rejecting the arguments for the first and second theories, advocates for the principle of permissibility, which is based on the freedom to benefit from nature, and examines its effects (pp. 137-152).

The Goodness of Thanking the Benefactor

After stating the background, definition, and arguments for the goodness and obligation of thanking the benefactor (pp. 160-169), the author considers this proposition to be influential in some jurisprudential theories such as the obligation to know God, the obligation to worship God, the recommendation of prostration, the obligation to obey God, the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil, the obligation to obey parents, and the obligation to obey a just ruler (pp. 169-179).

The Influence of Divine Attributes and Actions on Jurisprudential Theories

In the second office of the book, among the divine attributes and actions, the influence of five attributes and actions of God on the reasoning of jurisprudential propositions is researched, which are: divine knowledge, divine wisdom, divine grace, divine obligation, and exclusive divine legislation (p. 186). These attributes primarily have effects on the foundations of fiqh and usul and are considered among the foundations of these two sciences. However, some of them have also been considered influential in some jurisprudential branches.

Divine Knowledge, Wisdom, and Grace

Divine knowledge has an effect on the analysis of the meaning of the command form when used for something other than a request, and on the invalidity of *'awl* and *ta'sib* in inheritance (pp. 192-199). The dependence of rulings on real interests and harms, the validity of verbal principles, the validity of concepts such as the concept of condition or description, the formation of the premises of wisdom, the impermissibility of delaying clarification beyond the time of need, interpreting verbal evidence such as specifying a general term or qualifying an absolute one, achieving the cause and basis of a ruling, and the necessity of forming an Islamic government in all eras are among the results of divine wisdom (pp. 212-240). A group of jurists has even said that the intervention of all people in the practical levels of forbidding evil leads to chaos and corruption. Therefore, based on the proof of divine wisdom, they have abandoned the absolute application of the evidence for forbidding evil (p. 228).

The necessity of a superior law, the need to create the conditions for performing obligations, the necessity of divine government, the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil, the authoritativeness of the speech and actions of the Infallible, the authoritativeness of consensus, the reprehensibility of punishment without prior warning, the conditionality of acquittal upon searching for valid proof, extending the scope of obedience to the Infallible to the social life of people, and using it in the conflict of narrations are also considered among the effects of the belief in divine grace (pp. 264-275).

Divine Obligation

In the discussion of the effects of divine obligation, the author reports the views on the scope of obligation and then recalls fifteen results of the principle of obligation in jurisprudential and usuli reasoning and theories, some of which are: the necessity or non-necessity of internal and heartfelt obedience to God (the discussion of *tajarrī*), the stipulation of ability in all religious commands, the non-obligation of an incomplete compound, the authoritativeness of certainty and conjecture, the reprehensibility of punishment without prior warning, the impermissibility of delaying clarification beyond the time of need, and the validity of an apostate's acts of worship after repentance (pp. 291-301), a number of which are in fact related to the reprehensibility of obligating beyond capacity (pp. 293-301).

Exclusive Divine Legislation

After defining law and the characteristics of divine law (such as being complete, stable, and continuous) and its difference from human law (pp. 305-314), the author refers to four views regarding the compatibility of divine and human legislation (pp. 315-344). In the author's view, the first result of the exclusivity of legislation to God becomes clear in the discussion of the comprehensiveness of religion. Some jurists believe that everything needed for the administration of society is found in religion, and therefore, there is no need for new legislation. In contrast, some believe in a *mintaqat al-faragh* (unregulated domain) in religion and have accepted human legislation with certain criteria (pp. 344-347). The interpretation and function of the practice of the rational, the role of reason in legislation, the divine origin of the legitimacy of sovereignty and governance, and the interpretation of a just and unjust government are considered other results of the exclusivity of legislation to God (pp. 348-359).

The Role of Discussions on Prophethood on Jurisprudential Theories

The third office of the book, in three chapters (from chapter eleven to thirteen), analyzes the concept of prophethood, infallibility, and the functions of the Prophet. In the eleventh chapter, he derives two points from the previous discussions: "the devotional nature of all rulings" and "the distinction between prophethood and the functions of the prophet" (pp. 363-384).

Infallibility of the Prophet (s)

In the twelfth chapter of the book, which is about the infallibility of the Prophet, he writes that the Prophet's infallibility has one major impact on fiqh and usul, which is the authoritativeness of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (s), including his speech, actions, and approvals. It also has an impact on the scope of fiqh, which is the recognition of authentic Sunnah from fabricated Sunnah and the negation of the Prophet's (s) ijtihad based on a specific interpretation of infallibility and its scope (pp. 440-450).

Functions of the Prophet (s)

In the chapter related to the functions of the Prophet (s), the author enumerates the Prophet's functions from the perspective of jurists as: communicating revelation, interpreting revelation, legislating laws, ruling, and judging (pp. 455-456).

While explaining the function of interpreting revelation, the author explains that according to one definition of Sunnah, all the sayings, deeds, and approvals of the Prophet or an Infallible are considered Sunnah. According to another definition, only the non-ordinary and religious sayings and actions of the Prophet are considered Sunnah, but his ordinary conduct is not part of the Sunnah, and emulation in them is not relevant (pp. 460-463).

In the discussion of legislating law, the author reports two opposing views on the Prophet's (s) authority in legislation, and after mentioning the arguments of both sides, he emphasizes the Prophet's (s) authority and right to legislate (p. 510).

The author believes that attention to the Prophet's functions clarifies whether the Prophet's (s) speech and actions represent a fixed and eternal ruling or a temporary one subject to the interests of society (p. 525). Whether the Prophet's (s) speech or action was based on which of his functions, for example, arising from his governmental function or his guardianship function, will have a significant impact on the reasoning of jurisprudential theories, resolving the conflict of narrations, and also resolving differences in jurisprudential fatwas (pp. 527-544).

The Role of Discussions on Imamate in Ijtihad

The fourth office of the book is about the position of discussions on imamate in fiqh and from chapter fourteen to seventeen, it addresses four issues: analysis of the concept of imamate, the infallibility of the Imam, the functions of the Imam, and the era of occultation.

Analysis of the Concept of Imamate

In the fourteenth chapter of the book, following the analysis and definition of religion, the author presents two meanings of imamate: an institution whose sole duty is to interpret and protect the Sharia, or an institution that, in addition to the duty of interpretation and protection, also undertakes the leadership and organization of society's affairs (pp. 549-550). Reporting the Shia beliefs about imamate, he concludes that imamate is the leadership of the people in various dimensions and functions that the Prophet was responsible for, meaning religious and worldly authority (pp. 556-559). The negation of people's involvement in the selection of the ruler, the non-dismissal of those appointed by the Imam, such as a judge, after the Imam's death, and the existence of governmental rulings among the narrations are stated as the results of this discussion in fiqh (pp. 585-587).

Infallibility of the Imam

In the fifteenth chapter, after presenting introductory discussions such as the background, arguments, and scope of the Imam's infallibility, its results and role in fiqh are stated. The authoritativeness of the Sunnah of the Ahl al-Bayt; creating consistency among seemingly inconsistent jurisprudential narrations; the authoritativeness of consensus based on its being indicative of the Imam's opinion; taking the absolute sense from the words of the hadiths of the Ahl al-Bayt (a); setting aside hadiths if they are inconsistent with the infallibility of the Imams; the negation of ijtihad from the Imams due to their infallibility; and the condition of infallibility for the ruler are among the effects of infallibility in fiqh (pp. 637-647).

The Interpretive Function of the Imams

In the sixteenth chapter, under the title "Functions of the Imam," after proving the function of interpreting the Sharia for the Imams, the author raises two questions and answers them:

• First: Was the Imam's knowledge of the Sharia through rules and regulations and like the faculty of ijtihad, or was their knowledge personal and particular, and through hearing, reading, or inspiration? In response to this question, three possibilities are stated: the statement of all the details of the Sharia and its collection by Imam Ali (a); the statement of the general principles of the Sharia by the Quran and the Prophet (s) and the teaching of the rules for extracting details to the Imams and their possession of unseen knowledge. In the author's view, the third possibility has had the most impact on fiqh (pp. 655-669).
• Second: Was the Imams' method of interpreting the Sharia a method unique to them, or was it a rational method that could be taught and learned? (p. 653) In response to this question, two possibilities are also mentioned: some Akhbaris considered the Imams' method of interpreting the Sharia to be a special and unique method, but the Usulis considered the method of deriving from the Sharia to be a rational and learnable method (pp. 669-670).

The Imams' Authority in Legislation

In the discussion of the Imams' authority in legislation, the author refers to two views and their arguments. In comparing the two functions of interpretation-propagation and the Imam's political management, Zia'ifar has said that those who consider these two to be equal have issued fatwas for the continuation of the system of imamate in the era of occultation, and those who oppose considering them equal have issued fatwas for the non-continuation of that system in the time of occultation (pp. 684-685).

In the sixteenth chapter, some of the jurisprudential results of the Imams' authority in legislation are stated, one of which is systematic knowledge of the Sharia. According to the author, if the Imam's knowledge of the Sharia is particular, such as inspiration, what the Infallible says will be a general and eternal ruling, and otherwise, it will not be eternal. The permissibility of going beyond the scripturally specified preponderant factors in the discussion of the conflict of evidence, the non-delegation of the right of legislation to others, the preference of specification over abrogation, and different interpretations of religious texts are considered other results of this discussion (pp. 690-698).

The Era of Occultation

In the seventeenth chapter, four views regarding the continuation of the Imam's duties in the era of occultation are reported: 1. The suspension of all of the Imam's duties except for judging and arbitration; 2. The continuation of the duty of interpreting the Sharia and judging; 3. The continuation of the duties of interpretation, judging, and implementing penal regulations; 4. The continuation of all of the Imam's duties (p. 704). This theological issue has been influential on the following jurisprudential issues: the permissibility or impermissibility of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the continuation or suspension of economic regulations such as khums and zakat, the implementation or suspension of penal regulations such as for murder, adultery, and theft, and the suspension or continuation of social acts of worship such as congregational or Friday prayers (pp. 712-736).

The Influence of the Characteristics of Sharia on Ijtihad

Three characteristics of Islamic Sharia—comprehensiveness, eternality, and universality—and their influence on jurisprudential reasoning are discussed in the final three chapters of the book.

Comprehensiveness of Islam

In the eighteenth chapter, which is about the comprehensiveness and perfection of the Sharia, the difference of opinion among jurists regarding the scope of the Sharia with respect to particular rulings is reported in three views: First: the comprehensiveness of the Sharia in providing principles and generalities; Second: the view of the Usulis based on the comprehensiveness of the Sharia in details (no event is devoid of a legal ruling); and Third: the view of the Akhbaris who believe that the Quran and Sunnah have stated all commands in detail and with all their specifics, but the knowledge of it is with the infallible Imams (a). The author states the arguments for these three views and critiques the arguments of the second and third views (pp. 770-793).

The theory of the comprehensiveness of Sharia is influential in several important jurisprudential and usuli discussions. Issues such as the understanding and interpretation of religious texts, conformity with the spirit and general rules of the Book and Sunnah as a criterion in the issue of balancing and preponderating, the inclusion or non-inclusion of methods of interpretation and reasoning within the Sharia, the acceptance or rejection of a *mintaqat al-faragh* in social and worldly relations, the rejection or acceptance of a human legislative institution, the possibility of various interpretations of ijtihad and fallibility in it, the rejection of unenumerated interests (*masalih mursala*), whether all the sayings and actions of the Prophet (s) are legislative or not, and the inclusion or non-inclusion of a specific form of government and legislation within religion (pp. 794-816).

Eternality of Islam

The nineteenth chapter of the book is dedicated to the eternality of the Sharia, and the author considers it the basis for any intellectual and rational effort to attain the laws and jurisprudential rulings (p. 819). He then reports four different views on the interpretation of the eternality of the Sharia, which are: the eternality of all the rulings of the Book and Sunnah, the eternality of innate rulings and the change of non-innate regulations such as rulings related to government, the eternality of the rulings of the Quran and the propagational Sunnah, and the non-eternality of political-penal rulings (pp. 839-849). According to the author, the first view is considered the prevailing view in Imami theology and fiqh (p. 850).

Among the important results that the eternality of the Sharia has on jurisprudential and usuli theories are: the establishment of a principle and primary rule based on the continuity and eternality of the rulings of the Book and Sunnah; the change of a legal ruling with the change of the subject's title, such as the buying and selling of blood, selling weapons to the enemies of religion, and gambling tools; the specification or non-specification of the prohibition of hoarding to the items specified in the narrations; the permissibility or impermissibility of taking responsibility and cooperating in an unjust government; the non-abrogation of the prophetic Sunnah by the hadiths of the Imams (a); and the necessity of forming an Islamic government in all eras (pp. 850-866).

Universality of Islam

The universality of the Islamic Sharia is the subject of the final chapter of the book. In this chapter, after stating the background, meaning, and arguments for the universality of Islam and its negation (pp. 867-880), the author states its results and implications in fiqh and usul as follows: examining the possibility of a legal ruling being supra-regional or regional in the context of reasoning; avoiding the confusion of religious teachings with the culture of the environment in the usuli issue of contextualization (*insiraf*), such as the claim of contextualization of the evidence for the Arabic form of the marriage contract; and examining the customs and habits of the time of the Infallibles in taking the absolute sense from the evidence (pp. 881-895).