Compulsory hijab

Author: Muhammadmahdi Emadi

Compulsory hijab (in persian: حجاب اجباری), which means legally obliging women to wear hijab by the Islamic government, is of the challengeful topics in jurisprudence. The main questions in this discussion include: Can the government oblige women to wear hijab? What are the jurisprudential reasons for or against the requirement of hijab?

A group of jurists, including Imam Khomeini (died 1989), Lutfullāh Ṣāfī Gulpāygānī (died 2022), Mohammad-Ṣādiq Ruḥānī (died 2022) and Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī (born in 1927) can be considered as defenders of the obligation of Islamic Hijab by the government. The reasons provided by this group are: the need to preserve religious rituals, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil, hadiths on the obligation of punishment, the rule of no harm, and the conduct of the wise.

It has been said that jurists like Sayyid Kāẓim Sharī‘atmadārī (died 1986), Yousef Ṣāni‘ī (died 2020), Sayyid Taqī Ṭabāṭabā’ī Qomī (died 2016) and Hossein-Ali Muntaẓirī (died 2009) were against the obligation of hijab by the government. The reasons mentioned by this group are: the individuality of the hijab ruling, the privacy of the hijab, the inability of the hijab to be legally required, and lack of historical reports about the obligation of hijab. Criticisms have been made on each of the aforementioned reasons put forth by jurists for and against the requirement of hijab.

Explanation of the issue and its status

The obligation of veiling for women and men against non-mahram people is one of the issues on which Shia and Sunni jurists agree. On the other hand, some dispute the principle of the obligation of veiling the head and hair or question the primary evidence indicating the compulsory hijab or resort to secondary topics to reject the obligation of hijab. Others consider hijab to be an individual issue, and according to some opponents, there is no clear reference to the obligation of hijab in the Quran. With the development of the range of issues such as privacy protection, the relationship between sovereignty and citizenship rights, and responsibilities of the Islamic government in the modern era and by looking into the texts on punishments and commanding the good and forbidding the evil, the position of this issue has been clarified within the scope of contemporary jurisprudence.

Obligation of hijab from the perspective of secondary topics

This article aims to examine the opinions and arguments put forth by proponents and opponents of the obligation of hijab from the perspective of primary, not secondary, rulings. However, jurists have also addressed this issue from the perspective of secondary topics and rulings, including benefit. Among other things, it has been said that obligating hijab may have a negative effect on the Islamic society. Mohsen Faqīhī (born in 1952), of the high-level professors of the seminary, believes that the benefit of the [Islamic] system is different to jurisprudential principles, and although there is no problem in forcing hijab from the point of view of jurisprudence, the Islamic system can avoid to impose the hijab because of some expediency. Also Ali Naṣīrī Gīlānī (born in 1965), a seminary professor, divides religion into real and actual religion and believes that although from the perspective of real religion, it is necessary to make hijab compulsory, but when interests require another ruling and the society does not give in to hijab, we should follow the actual religion, which covers benefits and harms, i.e. the secondary rulings.

Jurists who support mandating the hijab

There are various opinions about the obligation of hijab among jurists. Lutfullāh Ṣāfī Gulpāygānī, Muhammad Ṣādiq Ruḥānī and Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī agree with the government’s intervention in dealing with public sins such as not wearing hijab, and Imam Khomeini believed that the religious government is allowed to establish laws and set punishments for disobeying the laws of Sharia, with the aim of implementing the rules of religion in the society. In this regard, it has even been said that in order to preserve and revive the rituals, this responsibility of the religious government includes even actions that are not punishable in the Sharia. In support of this view, some jurists who agree with the governmental requirement of hijab have cited reasons such as the necessity of maintaining religious rites, enjoining good and forbidding evil, hadiths on punishments and some other reasons such as jurisprudential principles and the conduct of the Infallible people. Description of these reasons is as follows:

The necessity of maintaining religious rites

The necessity of maintaining religious rites is one of the reasons cited by proponents of the governmental requirement of hijab, and since Islamic hijab is of the religious rites and of the symbols of the Islamic society, it is the responsibility of the Islamic ruler to protect and prevent the desecration of the hijab.

Criticism

Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī (born in 1958), lecturer of highest level courses of the seminary, has criticized mandating the hijab on reasons of preserving religious rites and has said that the principle of preserving rites is generally acceptable, however, it is doubtful whether it can be generalized to all religious obligations. He believes that individual evidence can prove such an obligation only in that limit and no further than that. Secondly, assuming the existence of such a general rule, not all instances of not wearing hijab can be considered as desecration.

Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil

One basis for governmentally obligating those religious rules for which no punishment or limit has been determined in the religion (such as hijab) is the reasons that exist for enjoining the good and forbidding the evil; among them are verse 71 of surah at-Tawbah and 110 of surah Āli ‘Imrān. Various levels have been mentioned for enjoining the good and forbidding the evil in hadiths and statements of jurists, one of which is a level that requires control over other states and most Shia jurists have considered the third level of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil as one of the exclusive duties and powers of the Islamic government. However, a group of jurists have emphasized that, based on the forbidding the evil reason, guidance must take place first and the earlier levels should take place prior to physical intervention. According to Imam Khomeini, on this basis, punishment will be to the extent of correcting the behavior and preventing its repetition. Mohammad Bāqir Īrvānī (born in 1949), of the high-level professors of the seminary, is of the opinion that the desirability of realizing the good and avoiding the evil is possible by any means, and there is no specificity about words in this matter. Also, Moḥaqiq Ardabilī (died 1585), a Shia jurist in the tenth century Hijri, does not consider the enjoining and forbidding reasons to include beating and injuring and believes that physical intervention is not an instance of enjoining and forbidding; however, he accepts the main claim because of the consensus by the majority of jurists. Mohammad Mahdi Shabzindidār (born in 1953), of the lecturers of highest level courses in the seminary and one of the jurists of the Guardian Council, believes that the phrase “مَا جَعَلَ اللَّهُ بَسطَ اللِّسَانِ وَکَفَّ الیَدِ وَلَکِن جَعَلَهُمَا یُبسَطَانِ مَعاً وَیُکَفَّانِ مَعاً” implies the permissibility of the enforcement of power by the government. Sayyid Mujtabā Nūrmufīdī (born in 1965), a lecturer of highest level courses of the seminary, among others who support this reason, accepts the implication of three verses of the Holy Quran (verse 41 of surah al-Hajj, verse 157 of surah al-A‘rāf and verse 104 of surah Āli-‘Imrān), the conduct of the Infallible people (AS), and many hadiths on this matter and believes that these arguments, without going into details and stating the manner of implementation, indicate the permission for the government to intervene in the issue of hijab in order to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil.

Criticism

Arguing based on the enjoining the good and forbidding the evil reason has raised several criticisms that include the following:

1. None of the hadiths on the various levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil imply practical and physical intervention in all areas of religious duties so that obligation can be deduced from them. According to Sayyid Muhammad Ali Ayāzī (born in 1954), lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, hadiths on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil appear to be directed toward political protest and jihad against the oppressors, not compulsion to follow all rules of religion.
2. According to Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī, lecturer of highest level courses at the seminary, forbidding the evil is done after the commission of a forbidden act, not before it, and one of the conditions of its obligation is the person's insistence on the continuation of the act or its repetition; because, its primary meaning that is not supported with circumstantial evidence is that it is obligatory to remove [the evil acts], not to repel [them]. It means that it appears that the evil act has been committed, while laws are established to prevent the occurrence of sin and crime. Therefore, there is no common ground between these two, so that all reasons for forbidding the evil can be used as proofs of the claim.
3. Forbidding the evil reasons depend on the realization of conditions such as effectiveness, or the person’s awareness of rules, and do not apply to all cases. Therefore, the scope of these reasons is different to legal coercion and they cannot be used to infer the legal obligation of hijab and the necessity of arraigning the one who does not wear hijab. This is because, obligation of a social act is associated with the necessity of punishing the violator and this punishment can be proven with the reasons for punishment, not for the prohibition of evil.

Hadiths on the obligation of punishment

One reason for mandating hijab is hadiths about the obligation of punishment. Many hadiths have been narrated from Imam Ali (AS) regarding punishment in various subjects including usury, usurpation and taking the orphan's property, breach of trust, cursing, intercourse during the menstrual period or while fasting, eating carrion and blood and pigs, hunting the prohibited, extortion, fruit theft, abortion, and exhumation. Thus, proponents of compulsory hijab believe that these cases are not specific and include punishments for any violation of the rules of Sharia, including hijab. Another evidence for punishment is the authentic hadith from Imam Ṣādiq (AS) who said, “مَا جَعَلَ اللَّهُ بَسْطَ اللِّسَانِ وَ کَفَّ الْیَدِ وَ لَکِنْ جَعَلَهُمَا یُبْسَطَانِ مَعاً وَ یُکَفَّانِ مَعاً” [God does not make the tongue to be free while the hands are tied, but He has made them such that they become free together and become tied together]. It has been said that the definite meaning of this hadith is the exercise of power by the government and it outlines the limits of practical intervention. Another hadith that is a document in support of punishment is the hadith “ان اللّه جعل لکل شیء حدّا، وجعل علی کل من تعدّی ذلک حدّا” which means God has set limits for everything and has set punishments for anyone who violates those limits. Among Shia jurists in various eras, Sheikh Ṭūsī (died 1067), Abūlṣalāḥ Ḥalabī (died 1055), ibn Zuhra Ḥalabī (1189), Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī (died 1277) and ‘Allāmah Ḥillī (died 1325) believed that anyone who commits a forbidden act or abandons an obligation that does not require a prescribed punishment, the Imam can punish him. The author of Javāhir introduces this idea as the belief of most jurists, although he believes that punishment is specific to mortal sins. In contrast, Fāḍil al-Hindī (died 1719) and the author of Rīāḍ (died 1815) believe that punishment is allowed when advise, reproach and reprimand have not had an effect. Otherwise, there is no reason for punishment except in cases mentioned in religious texts.

Criticism

A group of jurists, including Muḥaqiq Ardabilī, doubt the principle that any forbidden act requires punishment. Sayyid Muhammad-Riḍā Gulpāygānī (died 1993), a Shia marja, believed that there is no reliable proof that the perpetrator of any forbidden act (even the perpetrator of mortal sins) deserves punishment and considered punishment to belong only to the cases mentioned in religious texts. Another group has defined the scope of punishment in such a way that it includes admonitions, reprimands and threats, so that if reprimands are effective, there is no need for imprisonment and further punishments. Sheikh Ṭūsī (died 1067), Allāmah al-Ḥillī (died 1325), Ibn Fahd al- Ḥillī (died 1437), and Fāḍil Hindī (died 1725) agree with this view. Another doubt attributed, by Sayyid Muhammad-Ali Ayāzī, to the hadiths about punishment is that these hadiths either refer to the violation of the rights of others, or they are vague and have weak documents, or it is possible that they were issued about a specific case, so they cannot be relied on to establish a rule which states that the commission of any haram is punishable.

The principle of no harm on oneself and others

One of the reasons for agreeing to the requirement of hijab is the implementation of the jurisprudential rule of “no harm on oneself and other” in order to maintain the psychological security of the society and also to prevent the increase of crimes against women. Therefore, it has been said that in case of proving that voluntary hijab incurs harms on ethics, mental peace and public modesty, compulsory hijab can be defended by resorting to the principle of no harm on oneself and others. It is necessary to mention that it is possible to vote in favor of compulsory hijab by means of this principle based on only one basis, and that is the basis that considers the principle of no harm to be related to the implementation of rules, as well, not only to the establishment of rules.

The conduct of the wise regarding compulsory hijab

It has been said that since not wearing hijab leads to social misbehavior, in such cases, the method of the wise people is to maintain the interests of the [Islamic] system and avoid disorder. Thus, it is not right to re-determine punishments for crimes for which the Sharia has determined a fixed punishment. In other cases, however, this wise way, which has not been rejected by the Sharia, will be the basis of action.

Criticism

Sayyid Mohammad-Ali Ayāzī has explained, in his criticism of the argument based on the conduct of the wise, that not wearing hijab does not lead to disorder in the system; as, in rural and nomadic areas, religious hijab is not common, but this has not caused family discord, moral corruption and disruption in the social system. Apart from this, Muslims do not have a fixed method in punishing those who do not wear hijab, and to solve this problem, cultural and non-compulsory methods can be used, which are preferable to the compulsory method according to intellectuals.

Jurists opposed to mandating hijab and their reasons

It has been said that Sayyid Kāẓim Shari‘atmadārī, Yūṣif Ṣāni‘ī and Sayyid Taqī Ṭabāṭabā’ī Qomī were against mandating hijab by the government. While believing in the necessity of preserving religious rituals, Hossein-Ali Muntaẓirī believed that the implementation of Islamic rules, including the rules for which punishments are prescribed in the religion and those for which no punishments are prescribed in the religion, is not legitimate without the consent of the majority of people. If the majority of people are not Muslims or, for any reason, do not want to follow Islamic laws and realize religious values, then the government has no religious nor intellectual right to implement religious laws and values by coercion. In this case, religious scholars will have no duty except to guide and preach religion. According to Sayyid Muhammad-Ali Ayāzī, the government has to increase people’s awareness so that they would choose their duty by themselves, without being forced by anyone; because, coercion cannot make a society religious. Muhammad-Surūsh Maḥallātī believes that using methods that strengthen hijab in the society is of the responsibilities of the Islamic government and this responsibility is not connected with the punishment of offenders. Coercion does not have a specific jurisprudential evidence in this case, and those who confirm it cannot present a jurisprudential document. Rather, they can argue based on social or educational reasons that such a thing is useful or necessary.

The reasons stated in rejecting compulsory hijab, along with the criticism of each, are as follows:

Individuality of the rule of hijab

In support of optional hijab, it has been said that ordering women to wear hijab is an individual matter, not a social one. Therefore, it lies outside the government’s limit of supervision and interference. Proponents of this standpoint cite the Quran to document their view. Qāsim Amīn, an Egyptian researcher, does not consider the prohibitions mentioned in religious texts and the necessity of hijab as proof of its sociality, because the Quran and hadiths do not refer to its sociality. Mohammad Shahrur, Syrian writer and Quranic researcher, in his explanation of the meaning of جیوب in verse 31 of surah an-Noor, while believing in the non-obligation of head covering for women, considers the ruling on the obligation of this amount of cover to be a personal and educational ruling that has been issued only to train women and to prevent them from behaviors that are contrary to modesty, and believes that there is no prosecutable ruling in the territory of law.

Criticism

Regarding the theory of the sociality of hijab, it has been said that statements about the philosophy of hijab from various perspectives (sociological and psychological perspectives), mostly refer to the public and social aspects of hijab rather than its individual aspects. Therefore, although the hijab ruling addresses the individual, given its social effects, it cannot be considered as a merely individual matter. Thus, although sociality is not specified in the verse, its definition and requirements are not exclusive to the personal domain. It has also been said that on the assumption of its individuality, there is no connection between the individuality of a matter and the absence of government intervention; because, determining the punishment for an act in Islam does not depend on whether it is an individual or social act.

Hijab as part of privacy

Some of the opponents of mandating hijab believe that the issue of wearing or not wearing hijab belongs to the private domain of individuals’ lives, and so lies outside the limit of the government’s supervision and interference. In order to support this claim, they cite the individuality of the address in the verse of the Quran. Although the title “privacy” is not found in old jurisprudence texts, its examples are abundantly found in religious texts. Privacy has been studied in four domains: territorial, informational, communicational, and physical. Arguments of the opponents of mandating hijab by the government lie within the informational and physical domains. In this way, based on instances of privacy, hijab is considered as part of informational privacy; because it is part of individuals’ opinions, and according to the freedom of opinion, no one can be bound to believe in a particular opinion. According to some others, hijab is related to physical privacy. Mustafa Muḥaqiq Dāmād and a number of other opponents of compulsory hijab believe that the government never has the right to interfere in the private affairs of the people of the society, and hijab is one of the private areas of individuals’ lives. Based on this, Muḥaqiq Dāmād believes that although this matter is one of the necessities of religion and an individual obligation, but since it is an individual and private matter, the government has no right to interfere in it in the form of formulating restrictive laws, including the imposition of punishments.

Criticism

In critique of the view that accepts hijab as part of privacy, the following have been said:

1. Clothing does not have only a personal aspect in covering the body; rather, it also possesses a social aspect. Therefore, the issue of mandating women’s social clothing is about social communications and contacts with non-mahram people in the society, not about private life. According to Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the Shia Marja’ (legal authority), what is done in streets and in the public is actually public activity and education, and creates a duty for the system that has emerged from Islam, and what is made forbidden by the Sharia should not be openly performed in the country.
2. It has been said that even if not wearing hijab is part of privacy, believing in something is different from expressing that belief, and not believing in hijab does not necessarily enable the person to act according to that belief. Clear examples of this are religious minorities who live in Islamic countries, but one of the compulsory rules for them and also for other citizens is not to openly perform what is prohibited in Islam.
3. It has been said that on the premise of accepting the freedom of expression for everyone, it should be noted that if this right leads to corruption and has negative effects on the society, it conflicts with the right of others to benefit from a suitable religious atmosphere, which is one of the indices of the right to religion and religiosity, and when there is a conflict between individual rights and interests of the society, general interests take precedence over privacy.
4. It has been said that private matters do not necessarily fall outside the government's authority. For example, crimes such as zina (unlawful sexual intercourse) are punishable even if they are committed in privacy and with the consent of the parties. This issue is not exclusive to the Islamic society and ruler. Rather, in other societies, governments allow themselves to interfere with private matters, such as the use of drugs or psychoactive pills in the private aspect, as well as the use of safety equipment while working and wearing seat belts when driving.

Hijab does not have the capacity to be legally required

In his article, Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī specifies the “impossibility of requiring hijab by the law” as one of the reasons provided by the opponents of compulsory hijab; such that since the Lawmaker has not obligated hijab for the two groups of “non-Muslim women” and “bondwomen,” on the one hand, there can be no general rule for all women, and on the other hand, a law limited to free Muslim women is not enforceable. This is because, considering the scope of the issue, it is not possible to refer all cases of violation to the judicial system so as to distinguish “mukallaf (subjects of religious obligation) women” from “non-mukallaf women,” nor can making such distinctions be entrusted to ordinary bailiffs and agents, such as the police. According to Muhammad Surūsh Maḥallātī, the Islamic government has a justifiable responsibility regarding the observation of religious rules only when those rules can be turned into law and the implementation can be entrusted to the government. Hijab, however, does not have such a capacity. Sayyid Ahmad Khānsārī and Sayyid Muhammad-Riḍā Gulpāygānī, of Shia legal authorities (marja’), believe that the dhimmis (protected non-Muslim people) are left free to practice their religion and they shall not be disturbed because of their behaviors. According to Murtaḍavī, the existence of such a rule shows that the Sharia has not made the government responsible for its implementation; rather, the holy Lawmaker had determined it only as a limit that Muslims need to observe among themselves.

Lack of historical reports about the obligation of hijab

Some opponents of mandating hijab by the government claim that there is no evidence for the obligation of hijab, nor is there any evidence for punishment. They believe that if mandating hijab was a governmental requirement, we should have received historical reports of dealing with the phenomenon of improper hijab during the governments of the Prophet (PBUH) and Imam Ali (AS). Therefore, because of the absence of historical reports about dealing with the phenomenon of improper hijab during the rule of Infallible people (AS), the Islamic government has no right to intervene in the issue of hijab during the Occultation.

Criticism

The above argument has received a number of responses:

• The existence or absence of historical reports is not among the quadruple evidences and is not considered as a jurisprudential reference source, and the jurist does not wait for a historical document of the execution of the ruling after obtaining persuasive evidence through intellectual effort (ijtihad).
• Instances in hadith and historical texts show that the holy Prophet (PBUH) and Imam Ali (AS) took a stance and intervened, from a governmental position, regarding women or men’s manner of presence in the society. Two hadiths quoted from Imam Ali (AS) in this regard show that he directed such blame toward Iraqis from the governmental position, not from the position of a person who commands the good and forbids the evil.
• Applying the conduct of the Infallible people (AS) to the present time is possible when the conditions that prevailed in the early Islamic period also exist during the Occultation. The current situation of the Islamic society, however, is different from the early Islamic society in several ways. In the past, governments were often small and many interventions were carried out by families, clans and people, and the government played the role of a general supervisor and guide and occasional intervener. While in the contemporary era, governments have maximum involvement in economic, cultural and social affairs.
• The claim that there are no historical reports can be cited when it is proved there were cases of not wearing hijab, along with the depth and effects of this phenomenon, while this has not been proven.
• Accepting that not wearing hijab did not meet with a binding or deterrent treatment in early Islam only has the conclusion that the government’s intervention is not necessary, not that it is not allowed.

Study resources

Template:Main Books, articles and theses have been authored about the obligation of the rules of Sharia in general, and on mandating hijab by the Islamic government in particular. Among others, Sayyid Muhammad-Ali Ayāzī has discussed and presented critiques on the basics and jurisprudential reasons for mandating the rules of Sharia by the Islamic government in a book titled Qalamru-yi Ijrā-yi Sharī‘at dar Ḥukūmat-i Dīnī. Also, the book Vākāvī-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Ḥukūmatī dar Tarbīyat-i Dīnī-yi Shahrvandān, authored by Hasan Mahdavī, has collected and criticized the principles and reasons related to this issue. This work has been published by Markaz-i Fiqhī-yi A’immi-yi Aṭhār. Moreover, a book titled Hijab-i Ijbārī, Arī yā Na? authored by Javād Irvānī, investigates hijab in the Sharia, based on the Quran and hadiths, and its mandate by the government. Other jurists and researchers have also presented investigations and critiques on the principles and reasons for the mandate of hijab by the government. Sayyid Ḍīyā’ Murtaḍavī’s article titled Darāmadī bar Mabānī-yi Kullī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab va Mas’ūlīyyat-i Dulat-i Islāmī, Sayyid Muhammad-Ali Ayāzī’s article titled Naqd va Barrisī-yi Adilli-yi Fiqhī-yi Ilzām-i Hukūmatī-yi Hijāb and the article Vākāvī-yi Adilli-yi Ilzām-i Ijrā-yi Qavānīn va Arzishhā-yi Dīnī Tavassuṭ-i Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī authored by Sayyid Mujtabā Husseinī-Nijād are among these. Among other researches about the mandate of hijab by the government are the two master’s theses titled Barrisī-yi Fiqhī-yi Hijab bi Mathābi-yi Yik Ilzām-i Ḥukūmatī and Barrisī-yi Mabānī-yi Fiqhī va Jāygāh-i Ḥākimīyyst dar Ilzām bi Ra‘āyat-i Hijab.

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• Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ali (the second martyr), Masālik al-Ifhām Ilā Tanqīḥ Sharā’i‘ al-Islām, Qom, Mu’assisat al-Ma‘ārif al-Islāmīyyah, first edition 1994 AD/ 1414 AH
• Zībāyī-Nijād, Muhammad-Riḍā, Niẓām-i Islāmī va Mas’ali-yi Pūshish-i Zanān, collection of articles on hijab