Jurisprudential Foundations of Conciliatory Taqiyyah (book)
Jurisprudential Foundations of Conciliatory Taqiyyah is a study in the field of Political Fiqh by Sayyid Muhammad Ya'qub Musavi. The author of the book considers the legislation of taqiyyah (dissimulation) to be for the purpose of preserving the unity of Muslims and the peaceful coexistence of Islamic schools of thought. According to him, taqiyyah is a strategy to avoid hypocrisy and disunity among Muslims. Furthermore, through taqiyyah, peaceful coexistence can also be maintained with non-believers, thereby introducing them to the teachings of Islam. The author considers taqiyyah to be one of the important jurisprudential principles and defines it as concealing the truth for the sake of an underlying interest. Among the proofs for the legitimacy of taqiyyah, according to the author, is Quran 3:28, which, although forbidding Muslims from befriending non-believers, exceptionally permits friendship with them under certain conditions. Commentators interpret this exception to mean taqiyyah.
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| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Sayyid Muhammad Ya'qub Musavi (Sanglakhi) |
| Style | Argumentative |
| Language | Persian |
| Volumes | 1 |
| Pages | 199 |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Jurisprudential Center of the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt (a) |
- Abstract
The author considers conciliatory taqiyyah (*taqiyyah al-modarati*) to be one of the divisions of taqiyyah that leads to the preservation of the Islamic ummah and the avoidance of discord and disunity. For instance, Imam al-Sadiq (a) advised praying with them, visiting their sick, and participating in the funerals of Sunnis. The author counts the 25-year silence of Ali after the event of Saqifah, the peace treaty of Imam al-Hasan, and Imam al-Rida's acceptance of the heir apparency as evidence for the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah. However, according to the author, conciliatory taqiyyah also has exceptions, including the preservation of the essence of Islam and the madhhab, dissociating from the Imams, and drinking wine, in which cases taqiyyah should not be practiced.
Brief Introduction and Structure
The book "Jurisprudential Foundations of Conciliatory Taqiyyah" is the result of research by Sayyid Muhammad Ya'qub Musavi (Sanglakhi) in the field of Political Fiqh, examining the jurisprudential foundations for the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah, its rulings, scope, and exceptional cases in Shia jurisprudence. The book was published in 1392 SH by the publications of the Jurisprudential Center of the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt. Although this book is compiled with a focus on Shia jurisprudence, it also makes comparative use of Sunni sources.
This book is organized into three chapters.
- The first chapter, under the title "Concepts and General Principles," deals with the lexical and technical meaning of taqiyyah, the evidence for the legitimacy of taqiyyah, and the types of taqiyyah (pp. 15-73).
- The second chapter is dedicated to examining the evidence for the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah, in which it examines Quranic verses, narrations, the conduct of the pious, nature, reason, and the practice of the wise as evidence for its legitimacy (pp. 77-130).
- The third chapter examines the divisions, scope, and rulings of conciliatory taqiyyah (pp. 133-188).
Evidence for the Legitimacy of Taqiyyah
After examining and critiquing the definitions of taqiyyah in Shia and Sunni texts, the author ultimately presents his chosen definition. He defines taqiyyah as concealing the truth from others or expressing its opposite for the sake of an interest (*maslahah*) that is more important than the interest of revealing it. According to the author, this definition includes various types of taqiyyah, including conciliatory and fear-based, and its scope encompasses acts of worship, beliefs, and transactions. The author considers taqiyyah permissible on the condition that it does not lead to the fundamental destruction of a right or the establishment of a falsehood (pp. 18-23).
The author refers to Quranic and narrative evidence, nature (*fitrah*), consensus (*ijma'*), reason (*'aql*), the conduct of the pious (*sirat al-mutasharri'ah*), and the practice of the wise (*sirat al-'uqala'*) to prove the legitimacy of taqiyyah.
Quranic Evidence
The author considers the evidence for the legitimacy of taqiyyah to include verses of the Quran, numerous narrations, consensus, rational arguments, the conduct of the pious, and the practice of the wise (p. 24). According to him, Shia and Sunni jurists have referred to several categories of Quranic verses for the legitimacy of taqiyyah; one category of these verses indicates the legitimacy of taqiyyah from non-believers, but the legitimacy of taqiyyah towards other Muslims can be derived from these verses by analogy (*tanqih al-manat*) (pp. 24-35), and another category of verses can be considered as pertaining to the legitimacy of taqiyyah from both Muslims and non-Muslims (pp. 35-39).
Among the verses cited by the author regarding taqiyyah from non-believers is Quran 3:28, which warns Muslims against befriending non-believers, except in situations where they need to protect themselves from the harm of non-believers, in which case they can enter into friendship. Commentators have interpreted the phrase "unless you fear a danger from them" in the verse as taqiyyah; for instance, 'Allama Tabataba'i also believes that the indication of this verse on the permissibility of taqiyyah is clear (pp. 24-25). The author also refers to the occasion of revelation of Quran 16:106, concerning 'Ammar, his father, and his mother. When 'Ammar's parents were killed, 'Ammar uttered whatever the polytheists wanted and was saved; and his action was approved by God and the Prophet (s). It is evident that from the correspondence between the verse and its occasion of revelation, the permissibility of taqiyyah is derived (pp. 29-30).
The author also points to another category of verses that prove the legitimacy of taqiyyah in an absolute sense, such as the verse on the negation of hardship, which 'Allama Tabataba'i considered a divine favor upon the believers. In presenting the matter, the author, based on this verse, believes that one of the instances of hardship is the implementation of Islamic rulings in the face of opponents when there is danger, which is negated by this verse. According to him, this verse, by implication, proves the legitimacy of taqiyyah in a general sense, just as a similar indication can be derived from the verse on the negation of difficulty (pp. 36-37).
Narrations
The author quotes numerous narrations from Shia and Sunni narrative texts, some of which indicate the legitimacy or preference of taqiyyah, and some of which indicate its obligation (pp. 39-40). Among them is the authentic narration of Zurarah from Imam al-Baqir (a), which speaks of the permissibility of taqiyyah in cases of necessity. According to the author, this category of narrations only indicates the legitimacy and preference of taqiyyah (pp. 40-41). The author has also referred to other narrations that indicate the obligation of taqiyyah, such as the narration of Muhammad ibn Khallad from Imam al-Kazim (a), who considered taqiyyah to be part of his religion and that of his forefathers, and considers one who does not practice taqiyyah not to be a believer. Also, the narration of Dawud al-Sirmi from Imam al-Hadi (a), which describes one who abandons taqiyyah as being like one who abandons prayer (pp. 42-43). The author also refers to some Sunni narrations which, from their perspective, indicate taqiyyah (pp. 43-44).
Other Evidence
Nature is also among the evidence for the legitimacy of taqiyyah for the author. In this regard, he says that taqiyyah is an innate matter that first and foremost calls man towards it. Also, consensus, reason, the conduct of the pious, and the practice of the wise are considered other evidence for the legitimacy of taqiyyah (pp. 50-59).
Types of Taqiyyah
According to the author's report, some Shia jurists, in their classification of taqiyyah, have divided it into taqiyyah in the principles of religion and the branches of religion, and others have divided it into taqiyyah in acts of worship and transactions. Some have even divided taqiyyah according to its rulings into the five categories of obligatory, recommended, forbidden, disliked, and permissible. In the definition of obligatory taqiyyah, it has been said that it is a taqiyyah that has a stronger and more binding interest compared to its abandonment, such as where certain harm is directed at the person or their believing brethren. In the definition of forbidden taqiyyah, it has been said that it is a taqiyyah where the interest of abandoning it is stronger than the taqiyyah-based behavior, such as where no physical, financial, or honor-related harm, in the present or future, threatens the person or their religious brethren (pp. 62-65).
According to the author, taqiyyah also has divisions based on its quality and outward form:
- Concealing Taqiyyah (*Taqiyyah Kitmani*): Hiding one's belief and acting secretly to advance one's goals in a position of weakness and when conditions are not ripe for spreading one's creed.
- Fear-Based Taqiyyah (*Taqiyyah Khawfi*): Performing an act contrary to one's own madhhab and creed out of fear of others causing harm to one's life, property, or honor.
- Conciliatory Taqiyyah (*Taqiyyah Modarati*): Concord, tolerance, good conduct, and peaceful coexistence with other madhhabs and religions. Conciliatory taqiyyah is considered the opposite of fear-based taqiyyah (pp. 69-73).
Evidence for the Legitimacy of Conciliatory Taqiyyah
To prove the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah, the author refers to numerous pieces of evidence, including Quranic verses, narrations, the conduct of the pious, etc. (p. 77).
Quran
Citing Quran 41:34, which speaks of repelling evil with good, the author believes that the meaning of "good" (*hasanah*) in this verse is conciliatory taqiyyah. According to him, God commanded His Prophet to be tolerant and practice conciliatory taqiyyah with people. Although the Prophet is apparently the addressee of this command, we have no reason to believe the ruling is exclusive to him. Any ruling for which there is no evidence of exclusivity is considered universal and general according to the rule of shared rulings. Thus, all obligated persons are commanded to practice conciliatory taqiyyah (pp. 77-79). The author also refers to verses of the Quran that command the preservation of unity and warn against disunity, including the verse of holding fast, according to which the causes of the ummah's division are forbidden, and anything that causes unity among the ummah is commanded and considered desirable. The author considers this verse as evidence for conciliatory taqiyyah because it causes the preservation and realization of unity. The author names other verses in the Quran that indicate the prohibition of conflict, condemn sectarianism, and the tendency towards factionalism in the matter of religion, and which indicate the preservation of unity and the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah (pp. 82-87).
Narrations
The author refers to many narrations in Shia and Sunni texts that indicate the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah; some of them are related to being tolerant with Sunnis, and others are related to the unity and cohesion of the Islamic ummah. For example, the narration of Muhammad ibn Yahya from Imam al-Sadiq recommends praying with Sunnis, visiting their sick, and participating in their funerals (pp. 88-89). The author believes that the matters recommended by Imam al-Sadiq (a) in this hadith are prominent examples of tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and conciliatory taqiyyah (p. 90). However, opposite to this group of narrations, some narrations do not consider praying with Sunnis to be valid and only permit prayer with someone who is reliable in terms of belief. The late Fazel Lankarani says about this group of narrations that their meaning is that if other interests such as the unity and consolidation of Muslim power and the like are not at stake, then prayer with them is naturally impermissible; but considering those aspects, not only is prayer with them legitimate, but it becomes preferable and even necessary (100 and 106).
The author points to another category of narrations that emphasize the desirability and necessity of brotherhood and unity among Muslims, such as the narration transmitted from Imam al-Sadiq who said, "A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim; he does not oppress him, he does not humiliate him, and he does not betray him." According to the author, the Imam in this narration calls people to brotherhood, and brotherhood is the highest level of unity and convergence. Conciliatory taqiyyah creates and preserves brotherhood and convergence, eliminates suspicions, and brings Muslims closer together. It is evident that this narration also indicates the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah. Furthermore, regarding unity and convergence, similar narrations have been transmitted from Sunnis as well (pp. 106-113).
Conduct of the Pious
The conduct of the pious is also among the evidence for the legitimacy of conciliatory taqiyyah for the author. By reviewing the lives of the infallibles, he believes that tolerance and good conduct towards others are visible throughout their lives; such as the removal of the title "Messenger of God" after the Prophet's name during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, concealing the names of the hypocrites who intended to assassinate the Prophet on the return from Tabuk, the 25-year silence of Imam Ali (a) after the event of Saqifah to preserve the unity of Muslims, and his participation in the congregational prayers of the Muslims. All of these could be for the advancement of Islam's goals and for strengthening the unity of the Islamic community (pp. 118-122).
The author considers the most prominent examples of the Imams' conciliatory taqiyyah to be Imam al-Hasan's peace treaty with Mu'awiya, Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn praying behind Marwan ibn al-Hakam, the governor of Medina, Imam al-Sadiq greeting and shaking hands with those who cursed Imam Ali, and Imam al-Rida accepting the heir apparency from Ma'mun and marrying his daughter, which were done with the intention of preventing disunity among Muslims and creating unity and convergence among them (pp. 123-124).
Aims of Conciliatory Taqiyyah
The author considers one of the most important aims of conciliatory taqiyyah to be the unity of the Islamic ummah. As Imam Ali (a) said, addressing some of the Prophet's companions who refused to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr: "Pledge allegiance to him, for he and his followers placed me between two choices: either to forgo my right and hand over to them what is not their right, or to fight them and cause division among Muslims." The Imam, in this hadith, considers the reason for his and his companions' pledge of allegiance to be the preservation of Muslim unity and the avoidance of disunity. Similarly, Imam al-Hasan, in his letter to Mu'awiya, states the reason for the Ahl al-Bayt's restraint as preventing the enemy from taking advantage and countering any breach in the religion (pp. 135-136). Another aim of conciliatory taqiyyah that the author points to, citing a statement from Imam al-Sadiq, is fulfilling each other's needs and cooperation and peaceful coexistence (p. 140).
According to the author, whatever the aim of conciliatory taqiyyah, it is apparent from the words of Imam Khomeini and the late Araki that acting according to conciliatory taqiyyah towards all Sunnis is sufficient for fulfilling the actual obligation and does not need to be repeated, although there are different views on this matter (pp. 148-151).
Exceptions to Conciliatory Taqiyyah
In the author's opinion, among the exceptional cases in conciliatory taqiyyah are the commission of corruption in the madhhab, performing some forbidden acts, and abandoning some obligations that are of great importance in the view of the Lawgiver, or where the essence of Islam or the madhhab or a necessary tenet of religion or the madhhab is in danger of being destroyed or altered, or if conciliatory taqiyyah leads to the destruction of one of its legislative goals, for example, instead of creating unity, it causes disunity among Muslims, and instead of preserving the honor of the religion and the madhhab, it causes disgrace to the madhhab. In this case, conciliatory taqiyyah will not be permissible (p. 165). Another exception to conciliatory taqiyyah is the shedding of the blood of a respected person. In this regard, in addition to the consensus of jurists in terms of fatwa, there are also reliable narrations. The late Khu'i, because he considers the legitimacy of taqiyyah to be for the prevention of bloodshed and as a favor to the believers, and injuring a respected person is contrary to this favor, does not accept taqiyyah with respect to causing injury (pp. 167-168).
Other exceptions to conciliatory taqiyyah, in the author's opinion, are dissociating from the Imams and cursing them. Dissociation, cursing, and reviling the Imams are legitimate in fear-based taqiyyah but are not legitimate in conciliatory taqiyyah and are contrary to the goal and purpose of conciliatory taqiyyah, which is to preserve the honor of the madhhab and the school of thought and to prevent the humiliation of Shias. Also, where it leads to the disclosure of the secrets of the infallible Imams and the madhhab, drinking wine, wiping over shoes, and denying *mut'at al-hajj*, the author believes that conciliatory taqiyyah has no way of being permissible in these cases (pp. 168-187).