Public and Private Arenas in Shia Jurisprudence (book)
- abstract
Public and Private Arenas in Shia Jurisprudence (Book) (in persian: عرصه عمومی و خصوصی در فقه شیعه (کتاب)) is a book in the social and political areas of jurisprudence, authored by Muhammad Pezeshgi who has explained concepts of the public and private arenas as two new concepts in the modern political structure and has researched their position in relation to political and social rulings of Shia jurisprudence. In the present work, the author has tried to compare the mentioned concepts with some concepts and rules in Shia jurisprudence such as guardianship and Imamat, hisbiyyah matters (matters of common good), the equality rule and the expediency rule, and to show their differences and similarities. The main difference between the aforementioned concepts is that in the framework of Shia jurisprudence, the concepts and rules are bound to the religion of Islam and are specific to Muslims; while the new sense of the issue of public and private arenas is concerned with man as a citizen of the modern society, regardless of any religious beliefs. This book has been published by the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy.
Brief introduction
The book “Public and Private Arenas in Shia Jurisprudence,” authored by Muhammad Pizishgi, has been published by the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy in 2015. Compiled in eleven chapters, this work tries to explain the two concepts of public and private arenas, compare them with jurisprudential concepts and rules, and investigate the necessity of differentiating these two arenas from each other, from the point of view of political jurisprudence. The author’s goal in writing this book is to study the feasibility of developing the theory of public and private arenas from the perspective of the concepts and rules of Shia jurisprudence. He has not provided a specific definition for these two concepts and has only sufficed with [explaining] the causes of their emergence from Habermas' point of view. From the author's point of view, the rules of social and economic jurisprudence can be considered a jurisprudential basis for the public and private arenas. On the other hand, guardianship matters or hisbiyyah matters, the general rules of political jurisprudence and the criteria of rulings cannot be accepted as the basis for the mentioned arenas. Although this work faces some criticisms in terms of method and content, it is the first work that has tried to examine and study the public and private arenas from a jurisprudential point of view.
Method of the book
This book is a library research, comparing the conceptual indicators of vocabulary. In different chapters of the book, the author compares characteristics of the concept of the public arena and the private arena, such as the possibility of discussing public issues, public access to resources, and the possibility of protecting private interests, with jurisprudential vocabulary and rules, such as hisbiyyah matters, preserving the [Islamic] system, negating the domination of Non-Muslims over Muslims, and fulfilling agreements. Therefore, the method of the book is not the common professional method used in jurisprudential research. Also, the basis of the research is based on the concept derived from Habermas's theory in the analysis of the new political structure, and is different from jurisprudential and principled foundations.
Subject identification
In subject identification, the author first raises the question whether the public and private arenas have a historical background in Shia jurisprudence and have been dealt with in the history of jurisprudence, or they are two new topics and are considered to be new upcoming issues. Then, referring to the theory of Habermas, a German sociologist and theorist, he states that the public and private arenas are new concepts that emerged in the 13th century due to the appearance of commercial capitalism (pages 54 and 66).
Structure of the book
In this book, in accordance with the common method of research, the author first described the problem, the main and secondary questions, the previous literature and the method, and then allocated the following chapters to subject identification; comparing the conceptual indicators of the public and private arenas with the concepts raised about governance; hisbiyyah matters; general rules in the fields of political jurisprudence, social jurisprudence, economic jurisprudence; and general methodological rules. In the author’s opinion, although different jurisprudential rules are not the same in terms of scope and extent, they all have some kind of generality.
Comparison with jurisprudential rules and concepts
In order to verify the possibility of matching the two discussed concepts with jurisprudential concepts and rules, the author compares them with each other and, finally, states that neither the terms of public and private arenas nor terms that have similar characteristics can be found in the words of jurists. Also, by analyzing three elements, that are a hisbi matter, the rules of political jurisprudence and the general goals of Sharia, it becomes clear that it is only the hisbi matter that can affect the one-dimensional or two-dimensional nature of the society with a minimal or maximal interpretation (p. 230). In the following, some instances of the concepts and rules that have been discussed in the book and the method of comparing them will be mentioned.
The government and its related concepts are among the concepts that have been investigated by the author. According to him, the use of the word “government” in the sense of the power resulting from the choice of the majority depends on the area of guardianship of the jurist and determining the scope of hisbiyyah matters. In addition, separating the public and private arenas in the framework of jurisprudence is based on determination by the guardian jurist (Valī-yi Faqīh) in hisbiyyah matters and the assignment of hisbiyyah matters to non-governmental public affairs (p. 89). The word “government” is found only in texts written by contemporary jurists such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya and Hossein-Ali Montazeri and is not used in old jurisprudential texts. Nonetheless, it is possible to retrieve [information about] leadership in public affairs in jurisprudential texts under the seven concepts of ruler, Imam, jurist, sultan, supervisor, governor, and vicegerent during the Occultation.
Hisbiyyah matters
Hisbiyyah matters are among the jurisprudential concepts investigated in the book. Conceptual indicators of hisbiyyah matters can be explained in the two minimal and maximal methods. In the minimal method, hisbiyyah matters have three indicators: 1. Being achievable and the desirability of the mere realization of hisbiyyah matters, 2. Defining it among the duties of all Muslims, and 3. Not depending on guardianship (ghiyr-i Vilāyī) and following the political custom ruling the society. On the other hand, the maximal view considers hisbiyyah matters among the matters depending on guardianship (Vilāyī), of the duties of the Islamic government and dependent on permission by the Imam or the competent jurist (p. 130). The concept of the public and private arenas, on the one hand, possesses the characteristics of hisbiyyah matters. On the other hand, however, it is not easily possible to match these two concepts together. This is because allowing the realization of hisbiyyah matters by Muslims in general, cannot be extended to those citizens who believe in other heavenly books or those who do not. This is despite the fact that in the definition of the public arena, the index of belief in Islam, or religious belief in general, is not included (p. 132).
The rule of negation of guardianship over others
In this book, the rule of negation of guardianship over others has been examined and compared among the political rules. According to this rule, no one has the right to coerce other people to obey him. Quranic verses, authentic hadiths, wisdom and the conduct of the wise are cited as the bases of this rule. The guardianship of the Infallible Imam and the guardianship of the jurists in the age of Occultation are excluded from this rule. Nevertheless, although the absence of guardianship over others may require the separation of the public and private arenas, it is also compatible with the exercise of governance in a one-dimensional political structure without separation between these two arenas (p. 144).
The principle of negating the domination of non-Muslims over Muslims
The principle of negating the domination of non-Muslims over Muslims is another principle that has been studied in this book. Based on this principle, any law or process that leads to the domination of non-Muslims over Muslims is jurisprudentially invalid. Accordingly, the concept of the public and private arenas, which is the gift of the western social system, is not accepted by the Lawmaker. This principle can also negate the two concepts of the public and private arenas that result in the introduction of the liberal lifestyle into the lives of Muslims (p. 160).
The principle of preserving the [Islamic] system
In this book, the principle of preserving the [Islamic] system is investigated as a general social rule. Based on this principle, any act on which the preservation of Muslim’s social life depends is a collective duty, and any act that disrupts people’s daily life and causes hardship and embarrassment in social life is prohibited (p. 166). Also in political jurisprudence, this rule is obligatory in the sense of the obligation to defend the territory of Islam. Therefore, if preserving the Islamic society depends on the existence of the indicators of the public and private arenas, this principle can be used to prove that these two realms are religiously lawful (p. 169).
The principle of harmony between the rule of reason and the rule of Sharia
This principle is examined in the book as one of the general methodological principles. The provisions of the principle of harmony can be stated as follows: The Islamic Sharia has no ruling contrary to the ruling of reason, and the definitive rulings of reason are also accepted in the Sharia. According to the author, this means that the achievements of reason and the conduct of the wise are approved by the Sharia, and the wise conduct referring to the virtue of the existence of the public and private arenas requires the consent of the Lawmaker (p. 191).
General goals of Sharia
The criteria of rulings or the general goals of Sharia are examined in the final chapter of the book. The general goals of Sharia mean the Lawmaker’s intentions in making laws. According to some Sunni jurists, the goals of Sharia are of the sources of inferring legal rulings, and by inferring the Lawmaker’s purpose by making a rule it can be generalized to other cases. According to Shia jurists, there is no way to obtain the criteria of the rules of Sharia unless they are expressed through religious evidence. Therefore, extracting the criterion of a rule of Sharia from jurisprudential reasons depends on the skill of the jurist and expert in religious matters. In the author’s opinion, on the assumption of discovering the foundations of the establishment of the public arena from religious reasons, the ultimate implication is that separating the public and private arenas is inappropriate. Therefore, achieving justice, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil, taking advantage of consultation or observing expediency in social affairs are not exclusive to the separation of public and private arenas (p. 219).
Critique of the book
In a brief examination of the present work, some criticism can be made based on the study method and conformity with jurisprudential principles. In terms of the study method, the author's principles in the present work are based on Habermas’ sociological opinions on the separation of the public and private arenas and are different from the jurisprudential method. Some concepts such as cooperation, friendship and dissociation have been proposed as jurisprudential principles, while they are not part of jurisprudential principles. Also, some synonymous concepts, such as justice and equality, are mentioned separately and as two jurisprudential principles. In the comparative study of some principles, such as friendship and dissociation and the principle of sovereignty, no clear explanation has been presented for the comparison of the principle with the public and private arenas. In the discussion on the principle of negating the domination of non-Muslims over Muslims, the author criticizes acceptance of the public and private concepts because of leading to the domination of disbelievers over Muslims. The author’s understanding of this principle, regardless of its correctness or falsehood, is incompatible with believing in the good acceptance of the public and private arenas that he has mentioned under the principle of benevolence. In addition, the author’s inference based on the principle of intellectual inherence faces some problems; since, the provisions of this principle pertain to the rationale behind the rules and are grounded in the principles of legal philosophy and jurisprudence. The ruling of reason is different to the conduct of the wise. Moreover, the existence of the intellectual conduct claimed by the author needs to be proved. Sometimes, in examining the principles, the author has left the method of comparing conceptual indicators - which is proposed as a research method. For instance, when investigating the rule of benevolence, he has considered the separation of public and private arenas, as an example of the rule of benevolence, as a good matter, which is not compatible with the general research method regardless of whether it is right or wrong.