The Jurisprudential Ruling on Sculpture and Painting
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| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Sediqeh Chalouei |
| Style | Argumentative Jurisprudence |
| Language | Persian |
| Pages | 195 |
| اطلاعات نشر | |
| Publisher | Imam Sadiq University |
- Abstract
The Jurisprudential Ruling on Sculpture and Painting is a Persian book in the field of Art Jurisprudence that, considering the ever-increasing use of the arts of sculpture and painting in today's culture and their industrial production, examines the religious ruling on the production, buying, selling, and keeping of the products resulting from these two arts. The book's author, Sediqeh Chalouei, believes that today, painting and sculpture no longer carry the corruption of polytheism, idolatry, and the promotion of false beliefs, and may even be a means to strengthen and promote religious and Islamic culture. For this reason, from the perspective of prescriptive rulings (*hukm taklifi*), there is no prohibition on sculpture and painting, and from the perspective of declarative rulings (*hukm wad'i*), this activity and its products are eligible for sale, rent, and possession.
In this book, using verses from the Quran, narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt (a), the opinions of jurists, and jurisprudential principles, the ruling on these arts from the perspective of Islamic Sharia is analyzed. The author has attempted to explain the different viewpoints regarding the legitimacy or prohibition of sculpture and painting by categorizing and jurisprudentially analyzing the narrations. Additionally, topics such as the difference between sculpture and painting, the concept of representation (*tamthil*) in religious texts, and the connection of these rulings with issues like idolatry and monotheism are mentioned. Ultimately, the author tries to examine the impact of these rulings on contemporary life and Islamic art and to present practical conclusions for today's society.
Brief Introduction and Structure
The book *The Jurisprudential Ruling on Sculpture and Painting*, authored by Sediqeh Chalouei, examines the jurisprudential rulings related to visual and plastic arts from the perspective of Imami jurists. This book was published by Imam Sadiq University Press in 1395 SH (2016 CE). Ahmad Ali Qane' was responsible for the scholarly editing and revision of the book. The research method of this book is descriptive-analytical. The author analyzes the content by collecting jurisprudential opinions on the subject under discussion (p. 21). In the author's view, the increasing use of sculpture and painting in today's culture and the industrialization of these arts have doubled the necessity of examining their religious ruling in light of new temporal and spatial conditions (p. 19).
Structure
The book is organized into two main parts and four chapters, examining the concepts, jurisprudential evidence, and related theories. In the first part, under two chapters, generalities and definitions are first presented, and then the relationship of these arts with Islamic jurisprudence is analyzed, including the rulings on painting, sculpture, comics, photography, holograms, and puppet theater (pp. 23-46). The second chapter of this part addresses the necessity of jurisprudential research in the field of art and the cultural and ideological effects of visual arts, and examines concepts such as "form" (*surat*) and "image" (*timthal*) in exegetical texts, narrations, and the works of jurists (pp. 47-73).
The second part of the book is dedicated to examining the theories of Imami jurists regarding the ruling on painting and sculpture and includes two main chapters. It first presents the theories of Imami jurists on painting and sculpture and, at the end, provides a brief comparison with the opinions of the jurists of the four Sunni schools of thought (pp. 75-102). The final and main chapter of the book is dedicated to examining the foundations and evidence for the jurisprudential theories of Imami jurists regarding the ruling on sculpture and image-making. This chapter includes an analysis of narrations related to the prohibition or permissibility of these arts, an examination of the juristic consensus, and an analysis of the arguments of those who hold the view of permissibility or prohibition. The author endeavors to provide a precise framework for the jurisprudential study of visual and plastic arts by presenting jurisprudential and historical evidence (pp. 103-178).
The Necessity of Jurisprudential Research in the Field of Art
In the author's belief, today, given the prevalence of new quantitative and qualitative issues in the field of art jurisprudence and the change in their nature, as well as the expanding presence of art in all areas of human life, we need new research in this field, and the research of past jurists no longer meets the new needs. According to her, with the substantive change in the use of some arts like sculpture (from a culture of idolatry) and the rational use of this type of art in fields such as preserving cultural heritage, honoring great figures, and conveying cultural concepts, there is a need to re-examine the past rulings on them. Another point mentioned by the author is that an independent chapter should be opened in jurisprudence under the title of the art of "craft" (*fan*) (pp. 47-49).
Jurists' Views on Painting and Sculpture
Opinions of Imami Jurists
The author points to five main theories from Imami jurists:
- The theory of absolute prohibition of images, whether sculpture or painting, animate or inanimate: Jurists like Abu al-Salah al-Halabi and Qadi Ibn al-Barraj believe that image-making is forbidden even for non-worship purposes (pp. 77-79).
- The theory of the prohibition of depicting animate beings: Jurists like Sheikh Ansari and Muhaqqiq al-Karaki argue that depicting animate beings might lead to resembling the Creator (*tashabbuh bi-l-khaliq*) (pp. 79-83).
- The theory of the absolute prohibition of sculpture, whether of animate or inanimate beings: Jurists like Sheikh al-Mufid and Sheikh al-Tusi believe that sculpture is forbidden in itself (pp. 84-87).
- The theory of the prohibition of sculpting animate beings: Jurists like the author of *Jawahir* and Sayyid Ali Tabataba'i consider only the sculpting of living creatures to be forbidden (pp. 87-90).
- The theory of the non-prohibition of images in an absolute sense, whether sculpture or painting, animate or inanimate: Jurists like Sheikh al-Tusi and Amin al-Islam al-Tabrisi do not consider image-making to be forbidden, unless it is used for forbidden purposes such as idolatry (p. 90).
Opinions of Sunni Jurists
According to the author's report, Sunni jurists usually divide image-making and sculpture into two general categories: the depiction of animate beings and the depiction of inanimate beings. They mostly emphasize the purpose and use of the depiction; that is, if the image-making does not lead to idolatry or incorrect purposes, they consider it permissible, and otherwise, it is forbidden. The Malikis prohibit painting and sculpture under four conditions: it pertains to an animal, is three-dimensional, has complete limbs, and has a shadow. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis prohibit the depiction of animate beings, except in cases like paintings on carpets or cushions that are trodden upon. They permit the depiction of inanimate beings. The Hanafis consider the depiction of inanimate beings to be completely permissible (pp. 96-101).
Evidence for the Theory of Prohibition of Images among Imami Jurists
In the fourth chapter, the author of the book examines the evidence for the opinions of Imami jurists regarding the ruling on sculpture and painting. In this chapter, she first extensively examines the narrations used as evidence for the absolute prohibition of images, the prohibition of sculpting and painting animate beings, the prohibition of sculpting animate beings, the prohibition of keeping sculptures and images, and the narrations permitting their keeping. She then addresses the reason of consensus and finally analyzes the arguments of those who hold the view of permissibility for sculpture and painting.
Narrations Indicating the Absolute Prohibition of Image-Making
The author considers the absolute prohibition of images from the perspective of Imami jurists to be based on several categories of narrations and examines them in terms of their chain of transmission (*sanad*) and indication (*dalalah*):
- Narrations about the Prophet's (s) command to destroy images: By examining the chain of transmission, the author raises the issue of the weakness of some narrators like al-Sakuni and Sahl ibn Ziyad and casts doubt on the authenticity of these hadiths.
- Narrations about angels not entering a house where there are images: While examining the chain of transmission, the author points out that some jurists have interpreted these hadiths as indicating reprehensibility (*karahah*).
- Narrations prohibiting the decoration of houses with images (*tazwiq al-buyut*): The author, pointing to the weakness of the narration's chain (due to the presence of Waqifi narrators), considers it difficult to use it to prove prohibition.
- Narrations about the task of image-makers to breathe life into their works on the Day of Judgment: In terms of the chain of transmission, the author shows the weakness of some narrators, and in terms of indication, she raises the possibility of interpreting these hadiths as referring to sculpture due to the phrase "the act of making images" (*'amal al-suwar*).
- Narrations about the reprehensibility of images in the house: The author explains that reprehensibility here means non-prohibition, and these narrations cannot be a reason for prohibition.
- Narration about the image-maker's departure from Islam: While examining the weakness of this narration's chain, the author states that departure from Islam is usually mentioned in relation to polytheists and innovators, and some jurists have considered this narration to be related to idol-making (pp. 103-122).
Narrations on the Prohibition of Depicting Animate Beings
The author then refers to narrations in which sculptors and image-makers will be tasked on the Day of Judgment to breathe life into their creations but will be unable to do so, and this inability will be the cause of their punishment. The author states that these narrations have problems in terms of their chain of transmission, and there is no authentic chain among them (pp. 122-124). She also believes that, in terms of indication, accepting the absolute applicability of these narrations is problematic (p. 127).
She also refers to narrations that permit the making and drawing of images of inanimate beings, such as trees, the sun, and the moon. According to the author, jurists, by arguing based on the opposite concept (*mafhum al-mukhalif*) of such narrations that permit the depiction of inanimate beings, believe that the depiction of animate beings is not permissible. In response, the author refers to the words of Imam Khomeini (r) in critiquing these narrations, stating that these narrations are in the context of narrating a historical event and it is not clearly known that they indicate the prohibition of depicting animate beings (p. 131). In the end, the author concludes that a definitive argument for the absolute prohibition of sculpting and painting animate beings cannot be derived from these narrations; rather, image-making is an art that, if it has correct content, will be permissible (p. 137).
In examining the evidence and arguments of Imami jurists regarding the prohibition or permissibility of sculpting and painting animate beings, the author, pointing to the difference of opinion among jurists on this issue, first refers to the narrations indicating the prohibition of sculpting animate beings and then critiques and examines these narrations and the jurists' arguments. In this context, she refers to the arguments of Sheikh Ansari for the prohibition of painting animate beings and considers the narrations cited by Sheikh Ansari to be weak in terms of their chain of transmission. She believes that the prohibition emphasized in the narrations might be due to preventing extravagance and luxury, not the prohibition of painting. In the end, after presenting Sheikh Ansari's arguments, the author concludes that the evidence cited for the prohibition of painting animate beings is either weak in its chain of transmission or flawed in its indication. Therefore, this evidence cannot be cited as a firm proof for the prohibition of painting animate beings. She believes that these narrations are mostly cited by those who hold the view of the prohibition of sculpture, and the prohibition of painting cannot also be inferred from them (pp. 137-146).
Narrations on the Prohibition of Keeping Sculptures and Paintings
The author first refers to the view of early jurists like Sheikh al-Mufid and Sheikh al-Tusi, who considered the making of idols, crosses, sculptures, and gambling tools like chess and backgammon to be forbidden, and also deemed their sale and purchase forbidden (pp. 146-147). She then examines the reasons of those who support the prohibition of sculpture and painting. These reasons are mainly based on narrations that consider sculptures and images to be inherently detested by God, and therefore, their creation and keeping are also forbidden. In this regard, she also refers to the opinion of Imam Khomeini, who says the point of discussion is cases where there is evidence that what is forbidden and detested by the Master is the act of creation (the verbal noun), not the essence in its continuous existence" (p. 147). The author then refers to narrations that forbid keeping sculptures and images of animate beings but permit keeping sculptures of inanimate beings (p. 149).
The author believes that many of the narrations cited as reasons for prohibition are weak in their chain of transmission or are not tenable in their indication. Also, the author points to the distinction between creation (*ijad*) and existence (*wujud*) and says that the prohibition of creating an object (like making a sculpture) does not necessarily mean the prohibition of keeping it. For example, the prohibition of adultery does not mean the prohibition of keeping the child resulting from adultery. The author ultimately concludes that the reasons of those who support the prohibition of keeping sculptures and paintings are weak in terms of their chain of transmission and indication. She believes that the prohibition of creating an object does not necessarily mean the prohibition of its existence, and many narrations indicate the reprehensibility (*karahah*) of keeping sculptures and images, not their prohibition. In the end, the author emphasizes that if sculptures and paintings are used for legitimate and useful purposes, they are permissible, but if they are used to promote falsehood and polytheism, they will be forbidden (p. 157).
Narrations on the Permissibility of Keeping Sculptures and Images
In this section, by presenting numerous narrations and analyzing them, the author concludes that keeping images and sculptures in the house is permissible, although it may be reprehensible in some circumstances. She then examines the views of jurists regarding these narrations and, citing the opinion of Sheikh Ansari, states that if we accept the narrations indicating the prohibition of keeping sculptures and images, these narrations conflict with other narrations that prove permissibility. In reconciling the narrations, she believes that the narrations of permissibility are stronger both in number and in indication (p. 163). The author, quoting Imam Khomeini, states that these narrations, in principle, indicate the permissibility of keeping images and sculptures, although keeping them in the house is reprehensible (p. 164). She ultimately concludes that if there are any narrations indicating prohibition, they should be interpreted as indicating reprehensibility (p. 163).
Examination of the Argument of Consensus
According to the book's report, Muhaqqiq al-Karaki is the first jurist to have explicitly spoken of a consensus (*ijma'*) on the prohibition of sculpture. He stated in *Jami' al-Maqasid* that one of the four types of image-making, namely the sculpting of animate beings, is forbidden by the consensus of the jurists. The author also refers to the opinions of Muhaqqiq al-Ardabili, Sayyid Muhammad Jawad al-'Amili, the author of *Jawahir*, and Muhaqqiq al-Sabziwari, who believe that there is no opponent to the prohibition of sculpting animals. The author also points to the opinion of al-Shahid al-Thani, who, without any doubt, considered the depiction of animate beings to be forbidden and especially prohibited it in specific places like mosques. The author then refers to some critiques and opposing views. For example, she quotes that Imam Khomeini considers the consensus on the prohibition of sculpture to be a documented one (*mudraki*) and does not accept it as an independent proof. She then refers to the views of jurists like Sheikh al-Tusi in some of his works and Amin al-Islam al-Tabrisi, who have a different view regarding the consensus and have even mentioned the permissibility of making sculptures.
The author concludes that although many jurists have put forward a consensus on the prohibition of sculpture, it should be noted that this consensus has not been definitively accepted by all jurists and has been subject to criticism. Especially jurists like Imam Khomeini have considered this consensus to be documented and lacking independent validity from the narrations. Therefore, it can be concluded that the consensus on the prohibition of sculpture is still a matter of doubt and disagreement (pp. 164-171).
Arguments of Proponents of the Permissibility of Sculpture and Painting
The author then examines the opinions of jurists who, contrary to the majority, hold the view of the permissibility of sculpture and painting. She distinguishes this group of jurists for their use of rational arguments (*dalalat 'aqliyyah*) instead of relying on consensus and narrations. Specifically, the author points out that this group of jurists does not accept consensus as a valid proof due to its shortcomings, as the consensus is not independently established (*muhassal*) and is merely documented (*mudraki*). Also, the narrations that exist regarding the prohibition of sculpture and painting are flawed, some in their chain of transmission and some in their indication, and cannot be relied upon.
The author emphasizes that this group of jurists believes that sculpture and painting are not purely devotional rulings (*ahkam ta'abbudi mahd*) and their underlying criteria are rationally comprehensible. In other words, these rulings are not such that they can only be understood through transmission and revelation; rather, human reason is capable of grasping their rationale (*manat*). In this regard, this group of jurists pays attention to the influence of time and place (*zaman wa makan*) in the deduction of rulings and believes that with the change of social and cultural conditions, the rulings may also change (p. 171).
The author also refers to some criteria and rationales of Shia and Sunni jurists regarding the prohibition of sculpture and painting. The first criterion is resembling God's creation, which is mentioned in the narrations. She states that these narrations are weak in their indication and chain of transmission, and from the perspective of Islamic principles, there is no rational reason to prohibit resemblance to divine creations, unless this act is done with the intention of opposing God. The second criterion is resembling the Creator and confronting God. The author points out that if art serves high human goals and is used to introduce the greatness of God, there is no reason to prohibit it. The third criterion is the astonishing nature of sculptures, which, in the author's opinion, has no religious or rational basis for prohibition (pp. 172-174).