The Scope of Sharia Implementation in a Religious Government (book)
 | |
| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi |
| Style | Analytical-Reportorial |
| Language | Persian |
| Volumes | 1 |
| Pages | 346 |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Sarayi |
- Abstract
‘’‘The Scope of Sharia Implementation in a Religious Government’‘’ (in Persian: قلمرو اجرای شریعت در حکومت دینی) is a research work in Governmental Fiqh by Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi. It examines the limits of a religious government‘s intervention in citizens’ personal religious practices.
Ayazi uses jurisprudential, theological, and Quranic analyses to show that coercing duties like prayer, fasting, zakat, and especially hijab lack sufficient support. The philosophy and objectives of Sharia are incompatible with such coercion.
He reviews verses on worship and enjoining good and forbidding evil, as well as narrations on enforcement. The verses, particularly the "hand" stage, focus on social evils and public crimes, not individual actions like prayer and fasting. The narrations cited for governmental enforcement of Sharia rulings are either unconvincing or relate to specific times, not all eras.
Through a critical analysis of narrations on Ta'zir (discretionary punishment), Ayazi shows that they address overt social transgressions and rights violations, not personal worship. He emphasizes that the aim of enjoining good is to prevent and reform, not to punish or impose. Any government interference in individual worship could lead to hypocrisy and insincerity, as the true spiritual essence of such acts may not be realized even under compulsion.
Overall, Ayazi presents a new ijtihadi perspective on the scope of Sharia in religious governance. Theological foundations, authentic narrations, and a rational-social approach are the tools he uses. In this view, religion expands through persuasion, education, and encouragement, not through governmental force. The objectives of Sharia and modern social needs are better aligned with this.
Introduction and Structure
The book The Scope of Sharia Implementation in a Religious Government by Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi is a work in the field of governmental fiqh that examines the issue of the scope of Sharia implementation within the framework of a religious government. The third edition of this book was published in 345 pages by Sarayi Publications in 1401 SH (c. 2022 CE).
The first part of this work is dedicated to generalities and an analysis of the evidence for coercion and punishment, including verses related to worship, enjoining good and forbidding evil, and narrations on compelling adherence to rulings, which spans pages 24 to 124. The second part explains the theological foundations of a religious government and its characteristics, such as spiritual responsibility, guidance to unseen matters, safeguarding morality and human values, and the acceptance of the spiritual responsibility of the community's leader in guidance. It also addresses the perils of such a government (pp. 125–186). In the third part, the author provides a jurisprudential examination of the evidence for the governmental enforcement of hijab, analyzing and critiquing evidence such as the practice of the wise (sirat al-'uqala), the absolute application of evidence for individual and social rulings, the evidence for forbidding evil, and discretionary punishments (ta'zirat) (pp. 187–244). The final two parts of the book are dedicated to explaining the issue of hijab enforcement in a religious government and a tafsiri and jurisprudential analysis of verse 59 of Surah al-Ahzab in this context (pp. 245–331).
Analysis and Critique of the Evidence for Governmental Coercion in Implementing Religious Duties
Verses Commanding Worship
Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi believes that the verses related to acts of worship do not indicate a necessity for the government to compel people to perform religious duties. These verses are based on religious education and the endogenous growth of faith in society, not external coercion.
He does not accept the interpretation of some exegetes and jurists of the verse "Those who, if We establish them in the land, establish prayer and give zakat..." as indicating a government's duty to compel people to perform religious obligations. In his view, the verse is in the context of encouraging and guiding Muslims to establish a religious society where the performance of worship and moral and social values can flourish, not in the context of expressing a religious obligation to force others to perform acts of worship. An interpretation that relies on religious coercion from the verse is considered to be lacking in precision.
Similarly, he presents verses like "And he used to enjoin on his people prayer and zakat and was to his Lord pleasing" and "And enjoin prayer upon your family [and people] and be steadfast therein" as having an educational aspect for the head of the family. His argument is that they are purely related to the educational and moral role of the family guardian in leading the household towards religiosity, and there is no sense of authoritarianism or coercion in them. Therefore, there is no evidence of using coercion or governmental authority in the realm of worship.
Regarding the verse "Take, [O, Muhammad], from their wealth a charity...", although the author accepts that zakat is a public financial resource of the Islamic government and not exclusively for the poor, he emphasizes that its method of implementation must also be based on tolerance, encouragement, and gentleness, not authoritarian compulsion or coercive measures in economic spheres like tax collection (pp. 56–62).
Verses on Enjoining Good
In his analysis of the verses related to the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil, the author concludes that these verses do not indicate a necessity to use power or coercion to realize individual religious duties, such as prayer and fasting. According to him, the common stages of enjoining good and forbidding evil -- by heart, tongue, and hand -- are not directly applicable to personal rulings and acts of worship like prayer and fasting.
Considering the absolute nature of the Quranic verses and reflecting on the existing narrations, he considers the "hand" stage to be applicable to instances of good and evil that have a social nature and pertain to collective rights, such as oppression, corruption, disruption of public security, and violation of the rights of others. This context allows for the use of coercive force or physical compulsion, but not in the realm of individual obligations. Furthermore, referencing the Nahj al-Balaghah, the author emphasizes that all instances of the use of the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil in this source are related to social issues and the defense of justice and people's rights, and have been carried out to reform the structure of society, fight against oppression, and support the oppressed (pp. 63–67).
Narrations on Forbidding Evil
The author does not find a clear and explicit indication in the narrations on forbidding evil that are cited in the context of compelling adherence to rulings. According to the author, there are no clear and explicit indications in the narrations on forbidding evil that are cited in the context of compelling adherence to rulings.
He stresses a fundamental point in the philosophy of enforcing good and forbidding evil: the ultimate objective of these two obligations is to prevent vices and promote virtues, not to punish them. The government's practical intervention in forbidding evil must have a positive and encouraging effect that encourages good and discourages evil. Especially in the domain of individual duties such as prayer, fasting, Hajj, and moral virtues, coercive government intervention not only does not guarantee the correct performance of those acts but may also cause the spread of hypocrisy, insincerity, and duplicity in society, as the true essence of those acts may not be achieved even with coercion. In contrast, in the domain of public and social evils such as harming people, creating insecurity, theft, oppression, usurpation, and the like, practical intervention by the government in forbidding evil would be meaningful, possible, and effective (pp. 75–80).
Narrations on Compelling Adherence to Rulings
In examining the evidence for compelling the implementation of religious rulings, the author disputes the narrations cited regarding the obligation and compulsion of prayer, fasting, zakat, and Hajj. He points to several problems with the indication of these narrations, including: doubt about the authenticity and true applicability of the narration's subject matter and the possibility of it being specific to a particular incident; the incompatibility of the apparent compulsory nature of these narrations with the practical conduct (sirah) of the Prophet (s); the fact that this category of reports pertains to the state before the act and is related to the punishment for abandoning an obligation; the social nature of financial obligations in Islam, including zakat; and also that the narrations on compelling Hajj are not about the obligation itself but about a rare scenario where no Muslim intends to travel to Mecca, a scenario that seems practically impossible (pp. 80–99).
Evidence for Discretionary Punishment (Ta'zir)
From the author's perspective, citing the evidence for discretionary punishment (ta'zir) to prove the legitimacy of compelling individuals to adhere to religious rulings is also inadequate. The reason for this is that the concept of ta'zir is more evident in the statements of jurists than in the statements of the Infallibles (a). Jurists, in arguing for the legitimacy of ta'zir, have only cited the evidence for enjoining good and forbidding evil, and only in cases where divine limits have been transgressed, not for the mere commission of any sin. Therefore, the evidence for ta'zir is mainly related to moral issues, the commission of indecencies, and social corruptions, and not to individual and personal rulings (pp. 100–106).
Characteristics and Perils of a Religious Government
In Ayazi's view, the first and most fundamental characteristic of a religious government is its spiritual responsibility to guide society towards faith, belief in the unseen, and the hereafter. He emphasizes that although faith in the religious system is originally based on creedal principles, in the context of governance, faith has tangible and functional effects on social life, such that it strengthens work ethic, adherence to the law, and the better realization of laws. Therefore, faith in God and the future in religious governance is not merely a creedal element but a practical pillar in achieving the state's goals. Accordingly, a religious government has the primary duty to guide people towards religious knowledge and belief in innate and sound doctrines to provide a suitable foundation for spiritual growth and social order (pp. 131–139).
As a second point, the author identifies the safeguarding of morality and human values as another special responsibility of a religious government. While some secular governments may also be committed to ethics in areas like justice, honesty, and trustworthiness, this responsibility has a distinct depth and manifestation in a religious government. In Ayazi's view, religious teachings in the realm of ethics have a high capacity for implementation that can be as effective as economic and security programs. He believes that even in times of economic and social crises, individuals who are morally committed are more protected from psychological harm and criminal tendencies, and a more peaceful environment for collective life is formed. Therefore, safeguarding morality is not merely an individual recommendation but a governmental duty in a religious society (pp. 139–146).
Ayazi then points to two other features of a religious government: first, the acceptance of the community's spiritual responsibility by an individual who is knowledgeable, pious, and subject to public opinion, constantly under the people's critique and evaluation; second, the existence of external oversight mechanisms alongside internal ones, which guarantee a set of checks on power in a religious society (pp. 146–153).
Ayazi believes that understanding the characteristics of a religious government without considering its potential perils and harms would present an incomplete picture of this system. In this regard, he mentions three significant perils: the instrumentalization of religion, meaning the instrumental and authoritarian use of religion to consolidate power; the dominance of emotions and sentiment over rationality in governmental decisions; and the sacralization of the government and its rulers, such that criticism and opposition to them are equated with impiety or opposition to sacred things (pp. 160–167).
Finally, in another part of his analysis, citing the structure of Islamic teachings, Ayazi emphasizes the dissimilarity between Islam and Christianity regarding the sacralization of power and the experience of secularism. In his view, Islamic teachings contain explicit elements that prevent the formation of a sacred and uncriticizable authority. These elements include the non-separation of religion and politics, emphasis on the role of the people in governance, creating a balance between this world and the hereafter, the high status of knowledge and scholars, the dynamism of religious teachings, the absence of a sacralizing mindset regarding the infallible power, and the reduced validity of earthly power compared to divine legitimacy. These components show that Islam, unlike the historical experience of Christianity, does not lay the groundwork for the formation of a sacred and unaccountable power (pp. 176–182).
Jurisprudential Analysis and Critique of the Evidence for Governmental Coercion of Hijab
In this section, relying on jurisprudential sources and rational analysis, the author examines the foundations for the impermissibility of governmental coercion regarding individual religious duties, analyzing the issue from various perspectives. In the discussion of the practice of the wise (sirat al-'uqala), he considers such an argument for proving the obligation of hijab to be more specific than the claim (akhas min al-mudda'a) and clarifies that coercion by the wise is only justified when all persuasive paths have been exhausted without any result. He believes that no such practice exists among the religiously observant to prescribe a punishment for every sin. Furthermore, as long as a general and widespread practice among the wise regarding individual acts is not proven, one cannot speak of the existence of a practice of the wise in this area (pp. 187–196).
Negating the Absolute Application of the Cited Evidence
Regarding the absolute application of the evidence for individual and social religious rulings, the author, citing the incompleteness of the premises of wisdom, does not accept an absolute interpretation of the evidence. He considers religious compulsion and coercion to be not only against the divine will but also in conflict with the nature of humanity's creation as a free being. In his view, one cannot infer from the absolute application of the evidence that any means can be used to realize the Lawgiver's commands, because the realization of religion is a process that must be based on criteria such as sanctity, rationality, and religious justification (pp. 197–201).
In the discussion of the evidence for forbidding evil, the author does not see this evidence as permitting the prevention of any forbidden act. He considers "evil" (munkar) to be valid only in cases where its ugliness is apparent in the public sphere and interferes with social rights. In other words, not all forbidden things are evil, and not all obligatory things are considered "good" (ma'ruf), unless their desirability or reprehensibility is recognizable in public custom. Furthermore, forbidding evil is only meaningful if the perpetrator acts with the intention of disobedience and knowledge of the act's reprehensibility; otherwise, how can the prohibition be applied to them? The author also believes that if the narrations on forbidding evil do indicate practical enforcement and coercion, this indication is still not general and does not include every type of abandonment of an obligation or commission of a forbidden act, unless the act in question leads to social deviance and the violation of the rights of others (pp. 201–214).
Inadequacy of the Evidence for Discretionary Punishments (Ta'zirat)
In the section on the evidence for discretionary punishments, the author points out that if a general meaning is inferred from specific topics but no clear criterion for its discovery is available, this conflicts with the principle of the non-guardianship of individuals over one another. Therefore, one must suffice with the certain extent that is obtained from authentic narrations. In the domain of acts of worship like prayer and fasting, where the intention of proximity to God is a condition for validity, he believes that discretionary punishment and coercion are meaningless. However, in non-devotional matters, he accepts discretionary punishment only where it pertains to the social rights of others. In contrast, regarding the narrations that have permitted discretionary punishment in non-devotional matters related to individual rights, he suggests the possibility that they are either specific cases (qadiyyatun fi al-waqi'ah) or were deemed worthy of discretionary punishment because the act was committed in public view, not because of the act itself (pp. 214–228).
In examining the jurisprudential principle "Whoever violates the Sharia is subject to a prescribed punishment (hadd) or a discretionary punishment (ta'zir)," the author finds the fame and consensus on this principle to be unprovable. He emphasizes that the discussions of jurists regarding discretionary punishment for abandoning an obligation or committing a forbidden act are mostly found under the chapter of adultery and pertain to crimes that do not have a prescribed punishment, not any kind of violation of religious rulings (pp. 234–244).
Limitations on the Authority of the Guardian Jurist (Wali al-Faqih)
In the discussion of the authority of the Guardian Jurist (Wali al-Faqih) to punish violators, Ayazi states that in his view, God has not given such authority to the Islamic ruler to compel people to observe individual religious duties by enacting penal laws. In his opinion, the guardianship of the Prophet (s) is in general social affairs—matters in which the wise refer to their rulers—not in personal and private affairs that pertain to individual duties or rulings unrelated to the rights of others. He also does not consider the scope of the Guardian Jurist's authority to be greater than that of the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imam. Therefore, even if we consider this guardianship to be a rational matter (not a devotional one), it is only meaningful in domains where the wise refer to the government for the administration of society, such as order, security, welfare, and development (pp. 228–234).