Vasā’il al-Injāb al-Ṣanā‘īyyah (book)
Author: Sayyid Muhammad-Riḍā Sīstānī
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Vasā’il al-Injāb al-Ṣanā‘īyyah is a book written by Sayyid Mohammad-Riḍā Sīstānī that jurisprudentially examines methods of artificial insemination and the jurisprudential effects and rulings related to it. In this book, the author has tried to resolve the jurisprudential challenges facing artificial insemination and to answer the questions raised regarding the permissibility of artificial insemination or its consequences through analytical reasoning (ijtihad). After examining the reasons presented to prove the forbiddance of artificial insemination, he writes that among the various methods of artificial insemination, it is only forbidden to inseminate the egg with the sperm or stem cell of a stranger (non-mahram) man. To prove this forbiddance, he argues based on the Irtikāz of Muslims (what promptly appears as true to Muslims based on their background of religious knowledge) . Also, this ruling is only a defining law and the child resulting from artificial insemination is always a legitimate child. Sayyid Mohammad-Riḍā Sīstānī is the son of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sīstānī, and one of the prominent professors of principles of jurisprudence at the Najaf seminary. This book is one of the pioneering and important works on jurisprudential examination of artificial insemination, which was published in 2007 by Dār al-Muvarrikh al-Arabi publishing house in Beirut.
Brief introduction of the book
The book Vasā’il al-Injāb al-Ṣanā‘īyyah is written by Sayyid Mohammad-Riḍā Sīstānī, who has examined and researched the effects of and rulings related to artificial insemination from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence through analytical reasoning (ijtihadi approach). Contents of the book are not compiled based on the common research structure; rather, the writing style is closer to the methods of presentation of the lessons of the highest level courses of the seminary. The topics of the book are organized in three main chapters and a sub-chapter titled appendices. In the first chapter, the legitimacy of different methods of artificial insemination, in the second chapter, issues related to the implementation process of artificial insemination, such as the rulings on touch and looking [at a non-mahram person], and in the third chapter, jurisprudential consequences after pregnancy through artificial insemination have been discussed and investigated. It is noteworthy that the author has also dealt with hypothetical forms in the jurisprudential examination of the problem and has not sufficed with studying the existing methods; for example, pregnancy through maternal stem cell transplantation or egg insemination with plant sperm have also been discussed. At the end of the book, he has written a section titled appendices, in which he has provided explanations about some principles of jurisprudence or the authorities used in the book, such as the rule of the bed (farāsh), examining the reliability of hadith narrators and investigating the authenticity of hadith books. See the book here.
Claims
The author is of the opinion that the child born from artificial insemination is no different to the child born from natural pregnancy and belongs to the owner of the uterus and the owner of the sperm (p. 417). Also, among the various methods of artificial insemination, only in case if the woman’s egg is fertilized with the sperm or stem cell of a non-mahram man, the artificial insemination is not permissible. From the author's point of view, the only reason that can be cited for the forbiddance of this presumption is the irtikāz of Muslims, and other jurisprudential evidence do not indicate its forbiddance (p. 67). It should be mentioned that the effects of a pregnancy resulting from fornication do not apply to illegal artificial insemination, and the child resulting from that is considered a legitimate child (p. 14).
Artificial insemination methods
The first chapter includes the introduction and three sections. In the introduction, the author investigates legitimate and illegitimate pregnancy and writes that the rulings about an illegitimate child only apply to pregnancy resulting from intercourse between two unmarried people, with knowledge of the absence of a marriage bond, and other forms of illegitimate pregnancy, such as the injection of a non-mahram man’s sperm into the womb of a married woman, are not subject to the rulings about a pregnancy resulting from fornication (p. 14). After the introduction, the author has examined the three methods of artificial insemination from the perspective of jurisprudence in three sections.
Injection of the husband’s sperm
In this case, if the insemination is accompanied by the consent of both parties, there is no reason for its forbiddance and it is permissible. However, if one of the couples does not consent, neither of them has the right to oblige the other to undergo artificial insemination. Nonetheless, if insemination is done, the resulting pregnancy is considered a legitimate pregnancy (pp. 20, 24 and 35). Also, if the husband’s semen is mixed with semen of a non-mahram man (to increase the probability of pregnancy), there will be problems about the permissibility of the insemination. The resulting pregnancy, however, will be a legitimate pregnancy (p. 37). Also, insemination with the husband’s sperm is permissible during the Iddah of a revocable divorce or the Iddah of death (pp. 39 and 41).
Injection of a non-mahram man’s sperm
The author considers the arguments based on verses, traditions and the originality of precaution for the forbiddance of artificial insemination using the sperm of a non-mahram man to be incomplete and only accepts the argument based on the irtikāz of Muslims. In the explanation of this irtikāz, it should be noted that pregnancy with someone other than the husband (Istibḍā’) was common before Islam, and after Islam, it was made forbidden in the irtikāz of Muslims, and this belief arises from the Sharia. Therefore, the belief of Muslims can indicate forbiddance of pregnancy with other than the husband (p. 67). Nonetheless, at the end of the section and in the conclusion, the author did not issue a fatwa on the forbiddance of insemination with a non-mahram man’s sperm, and has sufficed with obligatory precaution (p. 91).
Implanting the egg of the owner of the uterus
Egg implantation is carried out after in vitro fertilization. Egg fertilization with sperm or stem cell of the husband is permissible only with the consent of both parties, and if one of the spouses does not consent, neither of them has the right to obligate the other. However, if it is done without consent, it is considered a legitimate pregnancy (p. 102). Also, if the sperm or stem cell belongs to a non-mahram man, it goes under the ruling of injecting a non-mahram man’s sperm as mentioned above.
Implanting another woman’s egg
In this assumption, if the consent of the owner of the egg, the owner of the uterus and her husband is obtained, implantation of the egg is permissible. Also, consent of the egg owner's spouse is not necessary unless we assume that the lineage of the child belongs to the egg owner or that the egg donation is against his rights, in which case his consent is also required (p. 114).
Genital organ implants
According to the author, implantation of sex organs does not cause problems for subsequent pregnancies from the jurisprudential point of view, and if pregnancy occurs after the implantation of genital organs, it is considered a legitimate pregnancy. This ruling is not specific to men or women and includes the implantation of genitals in the body of both (p. 133).
In the second chapter, the author has discussed a series of forbidden matters that may be done in the process of artificial insemination; for example, looking at the private parts of the opposite sex is haram, and uncovering the private parts is also not permissible because it causes a haram look. However, uncovering the private parts before a doctor of the same sex for the purpose of artificial insemination may be considered permissible because it has a rational intention, and it is definitely permissible if there is a necessity. Also, uncovering the body of a woman who is not elderly before a doctor of the opposite sex is forbidden and is permissible only on the assumption of necessity (p. 190).
Secondary reasons
According to secondary rules such as the principle of “no harm,” if it is not possible to perform artificial insemination based on religious conditions and if avoiding it entails harm to the spouses, some matters such as not covering the body before a doctor or nurse who does not abide by the rules of Sharia are permissible based on secondary rulings (p. 339). Also, according to the rule of “no hardship,” if conducting artificial insemination in compliance with the conditions of Sharia results in severe hardship and trouble for the couple, then performing it without abiding by the rules of Sharia is permissible by a secondary ruling (p. 349).
Jurisprudential consequences of artificial insemination
Iddah and cost of maintenance for the wife
In the third chapter, the effects of artificial insemination are discussed. In general, if divorce or death occurs during the various methods of artificial insemination, the Iddah is fixed for the woman, and this ruling does not apply to a penetrated woman alone, and includes a non-penetrated one as well (pp. 383 and 385). Also, paying the costs of maintenance to a woman who has been made pregnant through artificial insemination is obligatory upon the husband, unless the sperm of a non-mahram man was used in the insemination process, in which case it is possible, from the point of view of jurisprudence, that the owner of the sperm be responsible for the costs of maintenance of the woman during pregnancy (p. 411).
Lineage and adoption
Regarding paternal lineage, Sayyid Mohsen Hakim is of the opinion that from the jurisprudential point of view, the child resulting from artificial insemination does not belong to the owner of the sperm, but only belongs to the mother (p. 412). But from the author’s point of view, this statement and its reasons can be criticized, and the child resulting from artificial insemination takes its paternal lineage from the owner of the sperm or stem cell by which the egg was fertilized (pp. 417 and 421). Regarding attribution to the mother, according to custom and lexicology, the title of mother refers to the owner of the womb who gives birth to the child (p. 440). From the jurisprudential point of view as well, the strongest possibility is attribution of the child to the owner of the womb (p. 450). In any case, if parentage of the child is not known, from the point of view of jurisprudence, adoption is invalid and is not affected by the religious effects and requirements of parent and child (p. 466).
Inheritance and rules of fostering
In pregnancies resulting from various methods of artificial insemination, the author believes that if the child takes lineage from the living parent, the rules of inheritance will apply, but if artificial insemination is done after the death of the mother or father, the child resulting from artificial insemination will not inherit from them (pp. 468 and 472). Also, comparing fostering to artificial insemination is not correct, and if we consider the owner of the egg as the child’s mother, the owner of the womb has no relationship with the child from the religious point of view, and the rulings related to fostering, such as the forbiddance of marriage, do not apply between the owner of the womb and the child born by artificial insemination (p. 481).
Abortion
Abortion is forbidden in any case and there is no difference between a fetus resulting from artificial insemination and a fetus resulting from natural pregnancy. Even if we consider the mother to be the owner of the egg, abortion is forbidden for the owner of the womb as well. However, if avoiding abortion leads to severe hardship and trouble, abortion is permissible until before the soul is blown into the body (pp. 483-484).