Image and Sculpture in Shia Jurisprudence (Book): Difference between revisions
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In the fourth chapter of the book, the author examines significant jurisprudential details concerning the prohibition of sculpture. The author analyzes these details based on the opinions of those who advocate for the prohibition. | In the fourth chapter of the book, the author examines significant jurisprudential details concerning the prohibition of sculpture. The author analyzes these details based on the opinions of those who advocate for the prohibition. | ||
=== "Direct agent" and "indirect agent" === | === "Direct agent" and "indirect agent" === | ||
Some Islamic jurists assert that the prohibition against creating statues and images is limited to the direct agent. In contrast, a number of jurists broaden this prohibition to encompass those who are indirectly involved. The direct agent is defined as the individual who constructs the statue directly, while indirect involvement refers to someone who, without direct participation, contributes by supplying the necessary tools or equipment. [[Imam Khomeini]] accepts this distinction and allows for indirect involvement, while Seyyed Kazem Yazdi firmly denies this differentiation, claiming it is inseparable (p. 127). | Some Islamic jurists assert that the prohibition against creating statues and images is limited to the direct agent. In contrast, a number of jurists broaden this prohibition to encompass those who are indirectly involved. The direct agent is defined as the individual who constructs the statue directly, while indirect involvement refers to someone who, without direct participation, contributes by supplying the necessary tools or equipment. [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] accepts this distinction and allows for indirect involvement, while Seyyed Kazem Yazdi firmly denies this differentiation, claiming it is inseparable (p. 127). | ||
After critically examining these viewpoints, the author raises several questions, one of the most significant being whether the prohibition can be extended from the direct agent to the indirect agent. The author references the words of Seyyed Yazdi, who states that the initial implication of any action is its attribution to direct involvement; however, this characteristic can be disregarded when supporting evidence is present (p. 131). Seyyed Yazdi also distinguishes between transitive and intransitive actions, indicating that transitive actions are more general, while intransitive actions are exclusively linked to direct involvement (p. 132). Ultimately, the author accepts Seyyed Yazdi's perspective on this matter and rejects the view of [[Seyyed Abul-Qasim Khoei]], who advocates for extension without evidence (p. 137). | After critically examining these viewpoints, the author raises several questions, one of the most significant being whether the prohibition can be extended from the direct agent to the indirect agent. The author references the words of Seyyed Yazdi, who states that the initial implication of any action is its attribution to direct involvement; however, this characteristic can be disregarded when supporting evidence is present (p. 131). Seyyed Yazdi also distinguishes between transitive and intransitive actions, indicating that transitive actions are more general, while intransitive actions are exclusively linked to direct involvement (p. 132). Ultimately, the author accepts Seyyed Yazdi's perspective on this matter and rejects the view of [[Seyyed Abul-Qasim Khoei]], who advocates for extension without evidence (p. 137). | ||
=== The ruling on images === | === The ruling on images === | ||
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The author states that some Islamic jurists view astonishment as a prerequisite for the prohibition of images. He questions whether astonishment is indeed a necessary condition for the prohibition of image creation and explores the perspectives of various jurists on this issue. He points out that Sheikh Ansari recognized astonishment as a crucial condition for the prohibition of image-making, while [[Mirza Ali Iravani]] critiqued Sheikh's position, asserting that astonishment is not part of the subject matter of the evidence and that all images are inherently astonishing at first, but this quality diminishes with time. Thus, astonishment should not be considered a necessary condition. The writer acknowledges Irawani's critique of Sheikh Ansari's statements and asserts that astonishment is not naturally part of the subject, and this requirement, due to the fleeting nature of astonishment associated with images, cannot form the foundation for a jurisprudential decision (pp. 139-141). | The author states that some Islamic jurists view astonishment as a prerequisite for the prohibition of images. He questions whether astonishment is indeed a necessary condition for the prohibition of image creation and explores the perspectives of various jurists on this issue. He points out that Sheikh Ansari recognized astonishment as a crucial condition for the prohibition of image-making, while [[Mirza Ali Iravani]] critiqued Sheikh's position, asserting that astonishment is not part of the subject matter of the evidence and that all images are inherently astonishing at first, but this quality diminishes with time. Thus, astonishment should not be considered a necessary condition. The writer acknowledges Irawani's critique of Sheikh Ansari's statements and asserts that astonishment is not naturally part of the subject, and this requirement, due to the fleeting nature of astonishment associated with images, cannot form the foundation for a jurisprudential decision (pp. 139-141). | ||
=== The ruling on participation in creating sculpture or images === | === The ruling on participation in creating sculpture or images === | ||
The topic of collaborative image creation is another focus of the author, who examines whether the prohibition applies to all individuals involved when a group creates an image together. He cites various opinions, including that of [[Imam Khomeini]], who claims that the existing evidence does not adequately demonstrate the prohibition of collaborative efforts in image creation, yet he advises caution (p. 162). The author critiques this viewpoint, asserting that differentiating between independent and joint agents is a means to circumvent the jurisprudential ruling. He contends that this distinction allows individuals to engage in actions that are religiously prohibited without assuming direct responsibility, by relying on the assistance of others (p. 163). | The topic of collaborative image creation is another focus of the author, who examines whether the prohibition applies to all individuals involved when a group creates an image together. He cites various opinions, including that of [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]], who claims that the existing evidence does not adequately demonstrate the prohibition of collaborative efforts in image creation, yet he advises caution (p. 162). The author critiques this viewpoint, asserting that differentiating between independent and joint agents is a means to circumvent the jurisprudential ruling. He contends that this distinction allows individuals to engage in actions that are religiously prohibited without assuming direct responsibility, by relying on the assistance of others (p. 163). | ||
=== imaginary pictures === | === imaginary pictures === | ||
Do images of imaginary animals carry the same prohibition as those of real beings? This discussion revolves around the scope of the prohibitive evidence. In simpler terms, if we accept the broad interpretation of the evidence, the prohibition would apply to imaginary animals as well. On the other hand, if we reject this broad interpretation and limit the evidence to real beings, then the images of imaginary animals would not be subject to the prohibition (p. 164). The author mentions that Sheikh Ansari did not address this topic, but both Sahib Jawahir and Imam Khomeini assert that imaginary beings should be included with real ones, thus confirming the prohibition on their depiction (p. 164). | Do images of imaginary animals carry the same prohibition as those of real beings? This discussion revolves around the scope of the prohibitive evidence. In simpler terms, if we accept the broad interpretation of the evidence, the prohibition would apply to imaginary animals as well. On the other hand, if we reject this broad interpretation and limit the evidence to real beings, then the images of imaginary animals would not be subject to the prohibition (p. 164). The author mentions that Sheikh Ansari did not address this topic, but both Sahib Jawahir and Imam Khomeini assert that imaginary beings should be included with real ones, thus confirming the prohibition on their depiction (p. 164). | ||
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The author has analyzed the ruling on the possession of images and statues after examining seven significant narratives, including the authentic narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim <ref>6. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 296.</ref>, the narration of Ali ibn Ja'far <ref>7. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307.</ref>, and the authentic narration of Zararah <ref>8. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307</ref>. Similar to the original issue of image creation, he maintains a nuanced perspective; specifically, images or statues created for particular purposes, such as employment or service, are permissible to keep. However, if the images or statues are made for veneration or as symbols of respect and worship, their possession is prohibited. This distinction is based on the intentions and purposes behind the creation of images, highlighting the differences in the various uses of images and statues (pp. 189-211). | The author has analyzed the ruling on the possession of images and statues after examining seven significant narratives, including the authentic narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim <ref>6. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 296.</ref>, the narration of Ali ibn Ja'far <ref>7. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307.</ref>, and the authentic narration of Zararah <ref>8. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307</ref>. Similar to the original issue of image creation, he maintains a nuanced perspective; specifically, images or statues created for particular purposes, such as employment or service, are permissible to keep. However, if the images or statues are made for veneration or as symbols of respect and worship, their possession is prohibited. This distinction is based on the intentions and purposes behind the creation of images, highlighting the differences in the various uses of images and statues (pp. 189-211). | ||
== footnotes == | == footnotes == | ||
{{footnotes}} | |||
[[fa:تصویر و مجسمهسازی در فقه شیعی (کتاب)]] | [[fa:تصویر و مجسمهسازی در فقه شیعی (کتاب)]] | ||
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