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Image and Sculpture in Shia Jurisprudence (Book)

From Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence
  • abstract

Image and Sculpture in Shia Jurisprudence(in persian: تصویر و مجسمه‌سازی در فقه شیعی) is a Persian book by Seyyed Abbas Seyyed Karimi Hosseini that explores the jurisprudential and analytical rulings on image-making and sculpture from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence. The author investigates various narrations, the views of both Shia and Sunni jurists, and the jurisprudential consensus regarding imagery. He addresses the implications of the narrations that discuss the prohibition of image-making and sculpture, raising concerns about their validity. Furthermore, he critiques the consensus among jurists and argues for a nuanced understanding. The author believes that sculpture is not categorically forbidden; its permissibility is contingent upon the intention and objective behind its creation. If the purpose is to honor and sanctify the image, he views it as contrary to caution; conversely, if the intent is not one of veneration, he considers the act permissible.

A brief review and structure of the book

"Image and Sculpture in Shia Jurisprudence" is a compilation based on advanced jurisprudential courses on art, delivered by Seyyed Abbas Seyed Karimi Hosseini at the Islamic Art School in a scientific committee featuring various researchers. The publication was released by the Islamic Art School Press in 2014. The book is structured into five chapters, each addressing specific topics. The first chapter presents introductory topic, including the literal and terminological definitions of images, as well as the perspectives of Shia and Sunni jurists on the subject. The second chapter analyzes eleven essential narrations related to images, focusing on their evidential and interpretative challenges. In the third chapter, the author critiques the consensus among Islamic jurists regarding the prohibition of image-making, discussing the foundations of this consensus and its inherent limitations and ambiguities. The fourth chapter examines several important and well-established jurisprudential issues, assuming the prohibition of sculpture is accepted. Lastly, the fifth chapter scrutinizes and critiques the arguments against the possession of statues and images.

Methodology

The author's approach is grounded in an analytical-critical framework. Utilizing principles of jurisprudence and narratives, he examines the subject and arrives at his conclusions through several stages. Essentially, the author's method is characterized by a perspective that is detailed and based on ijtihad. Rather than outright accepting or rejecting the prohibition of creating images and sculpture, he advocates for a nuanced understanding by critically evaluating all presented arguments. Overall, the methodology of the book is based on the analysis of sources, critique of previous opinions, and the provision of a balanced and practical viewpoint that considers both foundational principles and contemporary requirements.

Examination of the narrative evidence regarding prohibition (of creating images and sculpture)

In the second chapter of the book, the author examines eleven narratives that have been utilized to support the prohibition of image-making and sculpture. Among these narratives are the Sahih of Muhammad ibn Muslim [1], the Hadith of the Prohibitions [2], the Hadith of Muhammad ibn Marwan [3], and the Hadith of Asbagh ibn Nabatah [4]. After conducting a thorough analysis of the chains of transmission and the implications of these narratives, the author concludes that, in terms of authenticity, most of them are credible and without issue. However, regarding their implications, all these narratives present problems and do not definitively indicate the prohibition of image-making and sculpture. For instance, concerning the Hadith of the Prohibitions and several other narratives, the author argues that the prohibitions mentioned do not imply a ban but can be classified as disliked based on existing contextual clues. Regarding the implications of other narratives, such as the one from Abi Basir [5], it is stated that the prohibition in this narrative does not pertain to the creation and possession of statues but rather to adornment and display. The author notes that due to the flaws present in these narratives, some jurists have attempted to compensate for the deficiencies of these arguments by utilizing other supporting evidence. For instance, Sheikh Ansari bases the prohibition on the resemblance to the Creator. However, the author considers these supporting arguments to be weak and maintains that the issues with the narratives remain unresolved, asserting that this additional evidence cannot substantiate the prohibition of image-making and sculpture (pp. 25-85).

Consensus [of Islamic jurists] as evidence

In the third chapter of the book, the author examines the reasons behind the consensus among Islamic jurists regarding the prohibition of image-making (including both sculpture and painting). He argues that this consensus serves as the most significant evidence supporting the claim of the prohibition. By analyzing the opinions of 23 Islamic jurists, from Sheikh Mufid to Sheikh Ansari, he demonstrates that the majority of early jurists, up until the time of Mohaghegh Helli, regarded image-making as entirely forbidden. However, after the era of Mohaghegh Helli, variations in opinions among Islamic jurists began to emerge (pp. 87-100). The author believes that the alleged consensus on the prohibition of image-making is fundamentally flawed in four key respects:

  1. The evidential or probably evidential nature of consensus: The author believes that this consensus is based on specific reasons derived from narratives and texts, thus qualifying it as an evidential consensus.
  2. The limited duration of consensus: This consensus has a history of approximately 500 years and does not extend to the jurists of earlier periods.
  3. Ambiguity regarding the subject of consensus: The exact subject of the consensus is not clearly defined, and there are differing opinions regarding the topic, particularly concerning rulings related to image-making after its creation.
  4. Interpretation of consensus through contextual clues: The author, referencing hadiths from various jurisprudential topics and the opinions of Sunni scholars, suggests that the intention of the jurists who reached a consensus on the prohibition of image-making was specifically regarding statues that were worshipped or venerated, rather than all forms of sculpture.

After outlining the aforementioned flaws, the author emphasizes the need for a reevaluation of consensus, arguing that reliance on the consensus as a justification for the prohibition of image-making lacks sufficient support (pp. 101-122).

The absolute permissibility of image and sculpture creation

After critically examining the arguments presented, including the evidence from narrative and consensus, concludes that sculpting is not inherently forbidden. Rather, its permissibility is determined by the underlying intention and purpose. He argues that if a statue is created for the purpose of veneration and images are depicted in a complete form with all bodily features, this practice is deemed contrary to caution. He maintains that this ruling extends beyond sculptures; any creation made with the intent of veneration is also forbidden. Conversely, if the intention behind creating a statue is not for veneration but for educational, service-oriented, or practical purposes, then such an act is permissible. Examples include the creation of service robots that assist people, educational dolls for children's learning, or decorative patterns used in carpets, which are all permissible (pp. 122-123).

Details on the prohibition of sculpture

In the fourth chapter of the book, the author examines significant jurisprudential details concerning the prohibition of sculpture. The author analyzes these details based on the opinions of those who advocate for the prohibition.

"Direct agent" and "indirect agent"

Some Islamic jurists assert that the prohibition against creating statues and images is limited to the direct agent. In contrast, a number of jurists broaden this prohibition to encompass those who are indirectly involved. The direct agent is defined as the individual who constructs the statue directly, while indirect involvement refers to someone who, without direct participation, contributes by supplying the necessary tools or equipment. Imam Khomeini accepts this distinction and allows for indirect involvement, while Seyyed Kazem Yazdi firmly denies this differentiation, claiming it is inseparable (p. 127). After critically examining these viewpoints, the author raises several questions, one of the most significant being whether the prohibition can be extended from the direct agent to the indirect agent. The author references the words of Seyyed Yazdi, who states that the initial implication of any action is its attribution to direct involvement; however, this characteristic can be disregarded when supporting evidence is present (p. 131). Seyyed Yazdi also distinguishes between transitive and intransitive actions, indicating that transitive actions are more general, while intransitive actions are exclusively linked to direct involvement (p. 132). Ultimately, the author accepts Seyyed Yazdi's perspective on this matter and rejects the view of Seyyed Abul-Qasim Khoei, who advocates for extension without evidence (p. 137).

The ruling on images

The author examines the distinctions or lack thereof between photography and painting in Islamic jurisprudence. Some scholars, including Seyyed Yazdi, Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani, and Mirza Javad Tabrizi, assert that there is no difference between photography and painting, and that both are subject to the same rulings (p. 137). In contrast, Seyyed Abul Qasim Khoei argues that there is a difference between the two, believing that photography is akin to using materials on walls or polished objects to capture the shadows of items on a wall or to fix the image reflected on a shiny surface (p. 139). Upon reviewing these perspectives, the author arrives at the conclusion that there is no distinction between photography and painting in terms of their attribution to the agent, since both ultimately lead to the creation of an image of entities. Thus, the only difference is in the tools and techniques employed in image production, which has no bearing on the jurisprudential ruling. Consequently, the author does not recognize a difference in the fundamental nature of the image created by photography and painting, merely highlighting the difference in the tools used for its production (p. 139).

Miraculous Condition

The author states that some Islamic jurists view astonishment as a prerequisite for the prohibition of images. He questions whether astonishment is indeed a necessary condition for the prohibition of image creation and explores the perspectives of various jurists on this issue. He points out that Sheikh Ansari recognized astonishment as a crucial condition for the prohibition of image-making, while Mirza Ali Iravani critiqued Sheikh's position, asserting that astonishment is not part of the subject matter of the evidence and that all images are inherently astonishing at first, but this quality diminishes with time. Thus, astonishment should not be considered a necessary condition. The writer acknowledges Irawani's critique of Sheikh Ansari's statements and asserts that astonishment is not naturally part of the subject, and this requirement, due to the fleeting nature of astonishment associated with images, cannot form the foundation for a jurisprudential decision (pp. 139-141).

The ruling on participation in creating sculpture or images

The topic of collaborative image creation is another focus of the author, who examines whether the prohibition applies to all individuals involved when a group creates an image together. He cites various opinions, including that of Imam Khomeini, who claims that the existing evidence does not adequately demonstrate the prohibition of collaborative efforts in image creation, yet he advises caution (p. 162). The author critiques this viewpoint, asserting that differentiating between independent and joint agents is a means to circumvent the jurisprudential ruling. He contends that this distinction allows individuals to engage in actions that are religiously prohibited without assuming direct responsibility, by relying on the assistance of others (p. 163).

imaginary pictures

Do images of imaginary animals carry the same prohibition as those of real beings? This discussion revolves around the scope of the prohibitive evidence. In simpler terms, if we accept the broad interpretation of the evidence, the prohibition would apply to imaginary animals as well. On the other hand, if we reject this broad interpretation and limit the evidence to real beings, then the images of imaginary animals would not be subject to the prohibition (p. 164). The author mentions that Sheikh Ansari did not address this topic, but both Sahib Jawahir and Imam Khomeini assert that imaginary beings should be included with real ones, thus confirming the prohibition on their depiction (p. 164). However, the author contends that the evidence applies to real beings and that the ruling of prohibition cannot be applied to mythical animals. He argues that the term «من صور» indicates a representation, which is relevant only when a comparison between the image and the represented is possible. In the case of mythical creatures, such a comparison is not possible (p. 165). The author permits the depiction of jinn and angels. He believes that, similar to the case of imaginary animals, the ruling is the same here. This means that although jinn and angels are real entities, their physical characteristics and forms are not known to us, and we can only conceive of them through imagination. Therefore, illustrating or depicting them is permissible (p. 167).

An examination and critique of the permissibility of possessing images and statues

The author has analyzed the ruling on the possession of images and statues after examining seven significant narratives, including the authentic narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim [6], the narration of Ali ibn Ja'far [7], and the authentic narration of Zararah [8]. Similar to the original issue of image creation, he maintains a nuanced perspective; specifically, images or statues created for particular purposes, such as employment or service, are permissible to keep. However, if the images or statues are made for veneration or as symbols of respect and worship, their possession is prohibited. This distinction is based on the intentions and purposes behind the creation of images, highlighting the differences in the various uses of images and statues (pp. 189-211).

footnotes

  1. ↑ Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 296, Hadith 3.
  2. ↑ Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 297, Hadith 6.
  3. ↑ Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 297, Hadiths 7-8
  4. ↑ Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, Vol. 1, p. 459.
  5. ↑ Majlisi, Mir'at al-Uqul, Vol. 22, pp. 437-438.
  6. ↑ 6. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 17, p. 296.
  7. ↑ 7. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307.
  8. ↑ 8. Hurr Ameli, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, Vol. 5, p. 307
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