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* '''Abstract'''
* '''Abstract'''
The non-authority of the rule of justice in jurisprudence is the theory held by the majority of jurists, because identifying the subjects of the [[rule of justice]] is accomplished through reason, whereas they consider reason incapable of identifying instances of justice. The most important argument advanced in this regard is “the impossibility of reason’s comprehensive knowledge of the underlying grounds of the rulings of the Sharia”; because the human intellect, owing to its lack of knowledge of conflicting interests, possible impediments, and otherworldly dimensions, is incapable of fully comprehending the benefits and harms underlying the rulings. Consequently, reason’s identification of instances of justice is not definitive and is merely “conjectural.”
The '''Non-authority of the rule of justice''' in jurisprudence is the theory held by the majority of jurists, because identifying the subjects of the [[Rule of Justice]] is accomplished through reason, whereas they consider reason incapable of identifying instances of justice. The most important argument advanced in this regard is “the impossibility of reason’s comprehensive knowledge of the underlying grounds of the rulings of the Sharia”; because the human intellect, owing to its lack of knowledge of conflicting interests, possible impediments, and otherworldly dimensions, is incapable of fully comprehending the benefits and harms underlying the rulings. Consequently, reason’s identification of instances of justice is not definitive and is merely “conjectural.”


According to the principles of jurisprudence, on the one hand, “the intrinsic authority of certainty” requires a rational proof to be authoritative only if it produces certainty; on the other hand, the “general proofs prohibiting action based on conjecture” encompass such conjectural judgments and deprive them of authority. Narrations such as “Indeed, the religion of God cannot be attained through human intellects” (إِنَّ دینَ اللهِ لا یُصابُ بِالعُقُول), as well as the proofs rejecting analogy and personal opinion, also reinforce this view.
According to the principles of jurisprudence, on the one hand, “the intrinsic authority of certainty” requires a rational proof to be authoritative only if it produces certainty; on the other hand, the “general proofs prohibiting action based on conjecture” encompass such conjectural judgments and deprive them of authority. Narrations such as “Indeed, the religion of God cannot be attained through human intellects” (إِنَّ دینَ اللهِ لا یُصابُ بِالعُقُول), as well as the proofs rejecting analogy and personal opinion, also reinforce this view.

Revision as of 18:17, 18 September 2026

  • Abstract

The Non-authority of the rule of justice in jurisprudence is the theory held by the majority of jurists, because identifying the subjects of the Rule of Justice is accomplished through reason, whereas they consider reason incapable of identifying instances of justice. The most important argument advanced in this regard is “the impossibility of reason’s comprehensive knowledge of the underlying grounds of the rulings of the Sharia”; because the human intellect, owing to its lack of knowledge of conflicting interests, possible impediments, and otherworldly dimensions, is incapable of fully comprehending the benefits and harms underlying the rulings. Consequently, reason’s identification of instances of justice is not definitive and is merely “conjectural.”

According to the principles of jurisprudence, on the one hand, “the intrinsic authority of certainty” requires a rational proof to be authoritative only if it produces certainty; on the other hand, the “general proofs prohibiting action based on conjecture” encompass such conjectural judgments and deprive them of authority. Narrations such as “Indeed, the religion of God cannot be attained through human intellects” (إِنَّ دینَ اللهِ لا یُصابُ بِالعُقُول), as well as the proofs rejecting analogy and personal opinion, also reinforce this view.

Some contemporary scholars, in criticizing the proofs for the authority of the rule of justice, maintain and demonstrate that Quranic verses expressed in the language of negating injustice have only a negative function, while verses expressed in the language of commanding justice concern the actions of legally responsible persons, not the Lawgiver’s legislation. Therefore, because of these epistemological and foundational obstacles, the rule of justice has been regarded as lacking the authority required for the independent derivation of religious rulings.

The rejection of the rule of justice has been regarded as one of the factors preventing the establishment of rulings such as copyright, the obligation to compensate for the depreciation of money, and the obligation to respect the rights of future generations. It sometimes also results in the confirmation of fatwas such as the permissibility of sexual enjoyment from a minor girl, which are incompatible with customary and rational understandings of justice.

Non-Authority of the Rule of Justice: The Predominant View among Jurists

A study of the jurisprudential works of early and later jurists demonstrates that acceptance of justice as a rule has not been prevalent. Contemporary authors have used the rule of justice in two specific and general senses. In its specific sense, the rule of justice is a jurisprudential rule alongside other jurisprudential rules, such as the no-harm and no-hardship rules. According to this meaning, if a religious ruling is regarded as unjust, the rule of justice excludes that ruling from the Sharia.[1] In its general sense, however, the rule of justice functions beyond a jurisprudential rule, and other jurisprudential rules are themselves derivatives of the rule of justice. In other words, the rule of justice occupies the position of a fundamental and universal principle within the system of divine rulings and is regarded as the spirit of the Sharia;[2] all religious rulings must conform to it.[3] According to this conception, justice is in fact understood as one of the objectives of the Sharia and the most important among them.[4]

It appears that the common element on which the possibility of both meanings of the rule of justice depends is the identification of instances of justice through reason, whether individual or collective reason. If a jurist does not accept the authority of reason in identifying these instances and does not regard it as providing exculpation or establishing liability, that jurist will in no respect accept justice as a rule. The authority of reason in this matter is also denied in the works of most jurists, and the non-authority of the rule of justice originates in their rejection of reason’s ability to identify instances of justice. Therefore, the arguments for the non-authority of the rule of justice ultimately return to the arguments for the non-authority of reason in identifying instances of justice.

Effects of the Non-Authority of the Rule of Justice

If the authority of the rule of justice is not accepted, the principal basis of certain contemporary jurisprudential opinions is challenged. For example, although the general proofs permitting sexual enjoyment from one’s wife apparently include the permissibility of sexual enjoyment from a minor wife,[5] and only intercourse is excluded from the scope of these general proofs,[6] some scholars have invoked the rule of justice to restrict these general proofs and have deemed every form of sexual enjoyment from a minor girl impermissible.[7] The obligation to compensate for the depreciation of money when repaying a loan,[8] the establishment of copyright and intellectual property,[9] and the obligation to respect the rights of future generations[10] are among the other such opinions.

Intrinsic Authority of Certainty

At a fundamental level, the most important foundation of the non-authority of the rule of justice may be regarded as dependent on the intrinsic authority of certainty. According to the view of many jurists, it is “certainty” that possesses intrinsic authority, and the validity of every other proof must ultimately be traced back to it. On this basis, a rational judgment is valid only when it is certain and free from every form of conjecture and doubt. According to this view, the authority of reason is itself extrinsic and depends on attaining certainty.[11]

Using the same argument, Shaykh Ansari states in a counterargument to the Akhbaris that if certainty obtained from rational proof is not authoritative, then certainty obtained from transmitted proof should likewise not be authoritative, because the criterion of authority in both cases is merely the “attainment of certainty.”[12] Mohammad Reza Muzaffar likewise maintains that a rational proof is authoritative only if it leads to certainty, because certainty is an authoritative proof on which the authority of every other proof, including reason, depends.[13] The conclusion is that, because reason cannot comprehensively apprehend the underlying grounds of religious rulings, its judgment in such cases is not definitive. Consequently, reason’s judgment under the rule of justice is not authoritative.

General Proofs Prohibiting Conjecture

Because reason does not comprehensively apprehend the underlying grounds when identifying instances of justice and injustice, its judgments are conjectural and fall under the general proofs prohibiting action based on conjecture, such as Verse 18 of Sura Yunus and Verse 116 of Sura al-An‘am, as well as numerous narrations.[14] Some Usuli scholars explicitly maintain that, because no specific proof establishes the authority of conjectural reason, these general proofs suffice to establish its non-authority.[15] On this basis, the authority of the rule of justice is likewise negated, because instances of justice under this rule are identified through conjectural reason. According to these Usuli scholars, reason’s definitive judgment is confined to the universal titles of “justice” and “injustice,”[16] while rational apprehensions concerning particular instances of these titles remain merely at the level of a causal requirement rather than a complete cause.[17] Therefore, judgments concerning instances of these two titles are conjectural and invalid because reason lacks comprehensive knowledge of the underlying grounds.

Narrations Negating the Authority of Conjectural Reason

From the perspective of Usuli scholars, abundant narrative evidence establishes the non-authority of conjectural reason concerning instances of justice. By negating the authority of reason’s determinations, this evidence also undermines the validity of the rule of justice. The best-known expression in these narrations is “Indeed, the religion of God cannot be attained through human intellects” (إِنَّ دینَ اللهِ لا یُصابُ بِالعُقُول).[18] In analyzing this narration, it has been stated that rational understanding does not attain the divine religion because reason does not comprehend the benefits and harms beyond actions; if reason becomes accustomed to this method, it will lose confidence in the Sharia’s textually prescribed commands.[19]

The narrations rejecting analogy and personal opinion are also among the proofs cited by opponents of the authority of the rule of justice. The narrative heritage contains dozens of narrations criticizing personal opinion and analogy.[20] In the narrations, analogy and personal opinion are treated as methods for resolving religious questions, severely condemned, and characterized as satanic practices. Some scholars have also generalized these narrations beyond their particular subjects and extended them to the general category of conjectural rational proofs.[21]

Impossibility of Comprehensively Apprehending the Underlying Grounds of the Rulings of the Sharia

The impossibility of comprehensively apprehending the underlying grounds of the rulings of the Sharia appears to be the most important argument for the non-authority of the rule of justice, such that several other arguments also depend on it and construct one of their premises by relying on this argument.

Accepting the rule of justice requires discovering the underlying grounds of rulings so that instances of justice and injustice may be identified. Jurists, however, maintain that the human intellect does not comprehensively apprehend the underlying grounds of rulings,[22] because only God knows all the characteristics of an act,[23] and reason, because of the possibility of error, cannot identify all of them.[24] The consequence of this lack of comprehensive knowledge is that only the Lawgiver can determine instances of justice and injustice.[25]

Some explicitly state: “The identification of instances of titles such as justice and injustice follows religious legislation, not customary determination. The subject of rational goodness and evil is the actual instance specified by the Lawgiver; for this reason, retaliation against a believer for killing an unbeliever is not justice, and assisting an apostate is not benevolence.”[26]

Interest in the Legislation Itself

One possibility that prevents reason from definitively discovering an underlying ground is that the interest of a ruling may lie in the legislation and obligation itself rather than in its object.[27] In other words, the Lawgiver sometimes institutes obligations to test the servants’ obedience, while the acts themselves do not necessarily entail any benefit or harm; rather, the very act of commanding them entails an interest. Examples include certain details of devotional acts, such as the number of prayer units, whose interest appears to lie in obligating legally responsible persons to follow these commands in order to test the extent of their servitude. Because reason is unaware of the interests inherent in the very imposition of obligations, it may err in this regard, and the precise identification of instances of justice and injustice in such cases is likewise impossible.

Reason’s Failure to Consider Conflicting Factors and Impediments

Opponents of the authority of the rule of justice explain that rational apprehensions always face “the possibility of failing to consider conflicting factors or impediments.”[28] This is because there may always be a benefit or harm stronger than that discovered by reason that conflicts with it and of which reason is unaware. For example, reason may perceive the harm of retaliation in the offender’s family being deprived of him, while overlooking the more general interest of deterrence. Alternatively, it may perceive an obligatory interest in brushing one’s teeth but remain unaware of the impediment of “facilitating matters for the servants,” which prevents it from becoming obligatory.[29] On this basis, many matters initially regarded as justice or injustice are not so in reality, and identifying the subject of the rule of justice consequently becomes impossible.

Lack of Comprehensive Knowledge of Particulars

Another argument advanced by opponents of the authority of the rule of justice is that reason is incapable of comprehending the goodness and evil of particular matters, because such comprehension depends on innumerable benefits and harms that reason cannot comprehensively apprehend; consequently, certainty regarding the religious ruling cannot be attained.[30] In fact, in the process of discovery, reason cannot confine itself to what it apprehends and regard it as the entire underlying ground, because it can always conceive of infinitely many other benefits and harms of which it is unaware.

Some maintain that reason has access neither to the causes of rulings nor to the wisdoms underlying divine commands, particularly in complex social rulings;[31] it is evident that, under such circumstances, reason cannot identify actual justice and injustice.

Unawareness of Otherworldly Benefits and Harms

Reason’s inability to access “otherworldly benefits and harms” and the confinement of rational apprehension to the characteristics of worldly life constitute another argument invoked to undermine the authority of the rule of justice.[32] On this basis, the mysteries and causes of jurisprudential rulings can be accepted only through transmitted evidence, because it is unknown whether the domain of their benefits is this world or the hereafter and whether they pertain to the individual or the human species; therefore, reason cannot issue a definitive judgment concerning these matters.[33] For example, although men’s unilateral right to divorce may entail harms in this world, women’s marital obedience in relation to this religious ruling may entail innumerable otherworldly benefits that cannot be compared with those harms.

Disputing the Textual Proofs Establishing the Rule of Justice

The contemporary researcher Sayf Allah Sorami maintains that the rule of justice has only a negative function and can negate unjust rulings;[34] it cannot affirmatively and independently establish a religious ruling in cases not addressed by texts. He critically examines in detail the Quranic proofs invoked to establish the rule of justice.[35] To substantiate this claim, he divides the proofs invoked for the authority of the rule of justice into two categories and criticizes each of them.[36]

Proofs Expressed in the Language of Negating Injustice

The first category of proofs for the rule of justice consists of those that negate injustice from God through negative language, such as the verse “Your Lord is not unjust to His servants” (وَ ما رَبُّکَ بِظَلّامٍ لِلعَبید) (Quran 41:46). Sorami maintains that these proofs cannot establish the authority of the rule of justice, because an “affirmation” cannot be inferred from “negative language.” These rules concern only existing rulings and exclude from the Sharia those rulings that constitute harm, hardship, or, in the present case, injustice. These proofs cannot, however, independently establish a ruling in order to eliminate harm or injustice.[37]

Sorami also explicitly states that theological foundations such as the “perfection of the Sharia” or “the absence of any event without a ruling,” although rationally and ontologically correct, cannot alter the indication of a verbal proof at the level of demonstration and customary understanding. Customary understanding does not infer from the statement “God is not unjust” that God has therefore legislated a specific ruling to eliminate every instance of injustice.[38] Attempting to establish a ruling through these proofs is a form of “invalid juristic preference.” For example, the no-harm rule cannot be used to establish “liability” for a defrauding seller who charges an excessive price in order to compensate the defrauded party’s loss. Similarly, the fact that an act is not unjust is, at most, a “component of the cause” for legislating a ruling rather than its “complete cause.”[39]

Proofs Expressed in the Language of Affirming Justice

The second category of proofs establishing the rule of justice consists of those that command justice, such as the verse “Indeed, God commands justice and benevolence.” Sorami maintains that the addressees of these proofs are individuals and that their subject matter is the “act of the legally responsible person.” Their primary and definitive apparent meaning is that God requires His servants to act justly.[40] The command to justice does not concern the “act of the Lawgiver,” namely the legislation of rulings. The other commands and prohibitions in Verse 90 of Sura al-Nahl—such as benevolence, giving, and the prohibition of indecency—all concern the actions of legally responsible persons. The concluding phrase of the verse, “He admonishes you so that you may take heed,” likewise confirms that the verse is intended to admonish its addressees.[41]

In responding to an objection, Sorami explains that although it may be inferred by “definitive a fortiori reasoning” from the command addressed to legally responsible persons that God is also just in legislation, this has no bearing on the affirmative dimension of the rule of justice. This is because the proposition that “every religious ruling is just” does not mean that “everything just is a religious ruling.” The only benefit of this proposition is the same negative function of the proofs, understood through the “contrapositive”: “Whatever is not just—that is, whatever is unjust—is not a religious ruling.”[42] Second, understanding a proposition through rational a fortiori reasoning differs from understanding it from the expression itself. The authority of “customary understanding” in comprehending meanings pertains to the indications of the expression itself, not to rational implications external to it. Therefore, one cannot rely on a fortiori reasoning to extend the authority of customary understanding in identifying instances of justice to every context and derive a religious ruling from it.[43]

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Ali-Akbarian, The Rule of Justice in Imami Jurisprudence, pp. 31-32.
  2. ↑ Motahhari, Notes of Professor Motahhari, vol. 1, p. 52; and vol. 3, p. 271.
  3. ↑ Shirvani, “The Status of Justice in the Structure of Jurisprudential Knowledge from the Perspective of Martyr Motahhari and Its Impact on the Relationship between Ethics and Jurisprudence,” p. 101.
  4. ↑ Abdolrezaei Dastgerdi, Qaramaleki, and Hashemi, “The Nature and Status of Social Justice in the Process of Deriving Islamic Legal Rulings, with Emphasis on Imami Jurisprudence,” pp. 100-102.
  5. ↑ Khoei, Mawsu‘at al-Imam al-Khoei, vol. 32, p. 126.
  6. ↑ Ashari Qomi, al-Nawadir, p. 135.
  7. ↑ Esmaeili Fallah, Gharavi Naeini, and Shakeri Golpayegani, “The Permissibility of Sexual Enjoyment from a Minor Wife: A Critical Reading,” pp. 16-17.
  8. ↑ Saeedi, “The Theory of Compensating for the Depreciation of Money,” p. 94.
  9. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 139-140.
  10. ↑ Hosseini and Hosseini, “The Purport of the Rule of Justice from the Perspective of Professor Motahhari,” p. 253.
  11. ↑ Montazeri, Majma‘ al-Fawa’id, p. 213.
  12. ↑ Ansari, Fara’id al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 15.
  13. ↑ Muzaffar, Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, pp. 125-127.
  14. ↑ Barqi, al-Mahasin, vol. 1, p. 205; Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 1, p. 208.
  15. ↑ Sadr, Jawahir al-Usul, p. 177.
  16. ↑ Hakim, al-Usul al-‘Amma li-l-Fiqh al-Muqaran, p. 277.
  17. ↑ Kharrazi, ‘Umdat al-Usul, vol. 4, p. 388; Khoei, al-Hidaya fi al-Usul, vol. 3, pp. 69-70.
  18. ↑ Bahrani, al-Durar al-Najafiyya min al-Multaqatat al-Yusufiyya, vol. 1, p. 324.
  19. ↑ Madani Tabrizi, Qawa‘id al-Usul, pp. 109-110.
  20. ↑ For examples, see: Hurr al-Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘a, vol. 27, pp. 35-62; Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 2, pp. 283-316.
  21. ↑ Makarem Shirazi, Anwar al-Usul, vol. 2, p. 473.
  22. ↑ Hakim, al-Usul al-‘Amma li-l-Fiqh al-Muqaran, p. 277.
  23. ↑ Tabatabaei Hakim, al-Muhkam fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, p. 180.
  24. ↑ Hosseini Shirazi, Bayan al-Usul, vol. 1, pp. 149-150; Tabatabaei Qomi, Ara’una fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, pp. 38-39.
  25. ↑ Musavi Khalkhali, al-Hakimiyya fi al-Islam, p. 18.
  26. ↑ Tabatabaei Hakim, al-Muhkam fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, p. 187.
  27. ↑ Khomeini, Tahrirat fi al-Usul, vol. 3, pp. 313-314.
  28. ↑ Khoei, Dirasat fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 77; Subhani Tabrizi, al-Mahsul fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 85.
  29. ↑ Tabatabaei Hakim, al-Muhkam fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, p. 177.
  30. ↑ Hosseini Shirazi, Bayan al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 149.
  31. ↑ Sanad, Usus al-Nizam al-Siyasi ‘inda al-Imamiyya, p. 277.
  32. ↑ Shahid al-Awwal, Nadd al-Qawa‘id al-Fiqhiyya ‘ala Madhhab al-Imamiyya, p. 7.
  33. ↑ Tabrizi, Khulasat al-Usul, pp. 68-70.
  34. ↑ Sorami, “The Jurisprudential Rule of Negating Injustice in the Holy Quran,” pp. 29-51.
  35. ↑ Sorami, “A Critique of Arguments from the Holy Quran for Establishing the Jurisprudential Rules of Justice and the Negation of Injustice,” pp. 70-77.
  36. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” pp. 52-55.
  37. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” p. 53.
  38. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” p. 53.
  39. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” pp. 53-54.
  40. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” p. 54.
  41. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” pp. 53-54.
  42. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” p. 55.
  43. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” p. 55.

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