Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence

Rule of Justice

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  • Abstract

The rule of justice is an emerging jurisprudential rule that some jurists and researchers consider superior to other jurisprudential and Usuli proofs and rules. On the one hand, this rule invalidates unjust rulings and considers them outside the Sharia; on the other hand, it has an affirmative function, lending authority to rulings that have no precedent in jurisprudence.

Proponents of the rule of justice identify “rational custom” and “independent reason” as the authorities for determining instances of justice and injustice. Accordingly, if the rule of justice is authoritative, rulings such as the obligation to compensate for the depreciation of money caused by inflation, recognition of intellectual property, and the obligation to respect the rights of future generations may be considered valid.

The rule of justice has faced opposition from many jurists. The arguments advanced by its proponents are based on five foundations: 1. the Quran and Sunna; 2. the rule of rational correlation; 3. the requirement that narrations be compared with the Quran; 4. the practice of rational people; and 5. the precedence of the proofs of justice over other proofs. By contrast, the arguments of those who deny its authority rest on a common premise: “the non-authority of conjectural reason,” the most important justification for which is “the inability of reason to comprehend all the underlying grounds of rulings.” Consequently, rational judgments concerning justice cannot go beyond conjecture and thus fall under the general proofs prohibiting action based on conjecture and the narrations rejecting personal opinion.

The Rule of Justice: Nature and Significance

Some views consider justice a law superior to all other religious laws. On this basis, Morteza Motahhari emphasizes that “from the Islamic perspective, justice is itself a criterion”[1] and describes it as the “spirit of the law,” criticizing rigid adherence to apparent meanings.[2] This approach places justice at the apex of the hierarchy of the Islamic legal system, under which all rulings and even other jurisprudential rules are defined.[3] Justice is regarded as the primary objective of Islamic government, such that justice in the “person of the ruler” is only a means of attaining justice and is not an end in itself. Similarly, Imam Khomeini regarded Islamic rulings as “instruments” for expanding justice in society[4] and expressly stated this in Kitab al-Bay‘.[5]

This rule has both affirmative and negative dimensions: based on conformity with justice, it establishes one ruling while negating another. It has been stated that, like other jurisprudential rules, justice is a general rule because it encompasses multiple categories of rulings and applies throughout different chapters of jurisprudence. It also entails a kind of non-stable, reconcilable conflict with the proofs of other rulings; like the no-harm rule, it conflicts with and restricts the unrestricted scope of other proofs.[6] The authority of the rule of justice in deriving subsidiary jurisprudential rulings has numerous implications and affects various subjects, including the impermissibility of marriage to a minor girl,[7] copyright,[8] and the obligation to compensate for the depreciation of money.[9]

In its negative dimension, the rule demonstrates that no unjust law has been legislated in the Sharia,[10] and that every jurisprudential ruling or theory that reason judges to result in injustice is excluded from and annulled by the Sharia.[11] In other words, the rule of justice governs all laws in which the possibility of injustice exists.

The affirmative function of the rule of justice means establishing a religious ruling in cases where texts independent of the rule also support it. For example, some maintain that khul‘ is an independent and unilateral right of a wife to terminate a marriage, rather than a type of divorce requiring the husband’s consent. According to this view, separation takes effect merely through the woman’s declaration before the religious judge of her serious aversion and her relinquishment of property; no subsequent action or consent by the husband is required to execute the formula of divorce. The principal arguments for this view rest on two foundations. The first is the rule of justice, based on the proposition that reason and justice require both parties to a bilateral contract to have a means of terminating it. The second is explicit narrations attributing khul‘ to the woman, such as “khul‘ … takes place on the woman’s part” (الخلع ... يَكُونُ مِنْ قِبَلِ الْمَرْأَةِ),[12] and describing khul‘ as “a separation not followed by a divorce” (تَطْلِیقَةٌ بِغَیْرِ طَلاقٍ یَتْبَعُهَا),[13] such that separation occurs through the woman’s action.[14]

The combined affirmative and negative function of the rule of justice consists in establishing a religious ruling while simultaneously denying authority to texts that conflict with the rule. In this regard, some proponents of the rule maintain that, according to widely transmitted narrations, hadiths contrary to the Quran lack authority. The Quran, meanwhile, absolutely and without admitting specification, negates every kind of injustice from God. Therefore, if a ruling derived from a narration is considered unjust according to customary understanding, that narration lacks authority because it conflicts with the Quranic principle of justice and must be discarded or interpreted differently.[15] On this basis, Yousef Saanei, invoking the affirmative dimension of the rule of justice, issued a fatwa supporting the equality of blood money for women and men; relying on its negative dimension, he regarded the narrations prescribing half blood money and requiring payment of the excess blood money as unjust, contrary to the Quran, and non-authoritative.[16]

Difference between the Rule of Justice and the Rule of Negation of Injustice

In contemporary jurisprudential research, in addition to the rule of justice, another rule known as the rule of negation of injustice has also been discussed. The central purport of the latter rule is that if the unrestricted application of a religious ruling in a particular case constitutes injustice, that unrestricted application ceases to be authoritative. Thus, the rule of negation of injustice does not challenge the ruling itself; rather, it limits its scope of application where it would lead to injustice.[17] It may therefore be said that the rule of negation of injustice constitutes only the negative dimension of the rule of justice: whenever the implementation of a ruling is unjust, the rule of negation of injustice excludes it.[18]

History

In the works of early jurists, no codified jurisprudential rule known as the “rule of justice” can be found. Despite the Quran and narrations’ extensive emphasis on justice, most jurists did not formulate or consider a general, regulated, and fully developed rule under this title. Although jurists derived general jurisprudential rules from verses such as “fulfill your contracts,” they did not make similar systematic use of the numerous verses concerning justice. Some researchers have therefore regarded this omission as contributing to a form of stagnation in the jurists’ social thought.[19]

Nevertheless, in a limited number of cases, jurists have invoked the justice or injustice of an act in deriving a religious ruling—for example, regarding the invalidity of the prayer of a wine-drinker,[20] interference with another person’s property,[21] insulting or harming a believer,[22] the prohibition of certain devices for circumventing usury,[23] and the prohibition of acquiring a hostile unbeliever’s property without a legitimate cause.[24] In all these cases, however, a specific text exists independently of the appeal to justice or injustice. Reliance on justice or injustice where no text exists, or where the apparent meaning of a text conflicts with such an assessment, is very rare.[25]

Authority for Identifying Justice and Injustice

Some proponents of the authority of the rule of justice or the negation of injustice identify independent reason—not emotions, prejudgments, or hasty perceptions—as the authority for determining instances of justice and injustice.[26] Others take customary injustice, as determined by rational people, as the criterion.[27] Their justification is that if the Lawgiver’s command to refrain from injustice referred to instances unknown to the addressee, or legally responsible person, the command would be futile. Therefore, just as customary understanding determines hardship under rules such as the rule of no hardship, rational custom determines injustice under the rule of negation of injustice.[28] When the Quran and narrations command justice, they do not intend a specifically religious and previously defined concept; rather, the Lawgiver has endorsed rational society’s understanding of justice and commanded adherence to it.[29]

In the same vein, some authors maintain that although the “concept” of justice is fixed and innate, its “instances” may change according to time and place. Drawing on the Quranic concept of ma‘ruf, they argue that a ruling such as marriage to a minor girl may not have been considered unjust in a primitive society, but may today, due to its negative consequences, constitute a manifest instance of injustice. Such a change in its instance necessitates reconsidering the ruling.[30]

General Applications of the Rule of Justice in the Process of Ijtihad

Justice as a Superior Law

Some regard justice not merely as a jurisprudential rule but as a “supra-jurisprudential principle” and one of the objectives of Islam that a jurist must consider at every stage of legal inference. This principle guides the jurist in interpreting conjectural evidence, directly serves as the basis of secondary rulings, and, when an explicit text conflicts with the principle of justice, acts as an important indicator directing the jurist toward definitive rational evidence. If the content of the text is proven unjust, the jurist may set it aside on the basis of that rational proof. Thus, without departing from the framework of principles of jurisprudence, a ruling contrary to the objectives of Sharia can be avoided.[31]

Evaluating Existing Jurisprudential Rulings

One of the principal functions of the rule of justice is to evaluate existing rulings. On this basis, Morteza Motahhari rejected the unrestricted scope of the husband’s right to divorce where it leads to injustice against the wife—retaining her with the intention of causing harm—and regarded it as conflicting with the governing principle of justice.[32] The contemporary jurist Abu al-Qasim Alidoust likewise maintains that although justice is not directly one of the four sources, it is authoritative as a “jurisprudential rule,” because it derives its authority from the aggregate of religious texts and definitive rational judgments. Through induction of religious texts, the jurist reaches the “law of justice and fairness,” and invoking this rule is effectively an appeal to the same proofs from which it has been derived.[33]

Influence on Usuli and Jurisprudential Rules

The rule of justice, in its broad meaning, also affects principles of jurisprudence. It supports “rational exemption”—the impropriety of punishment without prior explanation—and the “negation of obligations beyond one’s capacity,” because punishing an inculpably ignorant person and commanding an act beyond an individual’s ability are, from a rational perspective, instances of injustice.[34] Another author argues that the no-harm rule is an instance of the more general rule of justice. Evidence for this claim is that prohibited harm in jurisprudence is unjust harm, which must be identified through the criteria of justice and injustice.[35]

Application of Justice in Directing Jurisprudential Understanding

According to some authors, justice is not a “jurisprudential rule” but an “indicator” used in ijtihad and the interpretation of evidence; it operates as an auxiliary criterion for understanding texts.[36] Its role appears in matters such as weakening confidence in the issuance of a narration because of its unjust content, determining the circumstances in which a narration was issued, establishing a contextual restriction on the unrestricted meaning of a proof, removing ambiguity from a text, limiting a ruling to a particular period, and preferring evidence compatible with justice over incompatible evidence when proofs conflict.[37]

Examples of Applying the Rule of Justice in Ijtihad

Contemporary authors have identified various subsidiary issues to which the rule may be applied. For example, regarding “copyright and intellectual property,” denying creators rights over their works and permitting reproduction without their consent is regarded by contemporary rational people as injustice to the creator; therefore, the rule of negation of injustice may establish such a right.[38] Respecting the rights of future generations has likewise been regarded as obligatory.[39] Some have also stated that, under present conditions in which modern technologies make the revival of land easy, the unrestricted ruling of ownership may result in an unjust distribution of wealth.[40]

Some authors challenge the well-known view of jurists that permits the destruction of a usurper’s valuable property—such as a ship or building—to recover the owner’s relatively insignificant property, such as a wooden plank or brick. Citing the opinion of Imam Khomeini and others, they argue that although a usurper is unjust, this does not justify reciprocal injustice against him. Reason regards destroying a building worth millions to recover a single brick as unjust. Therefore, the rule of negation of injustice requires recourse in such cases to a substitute, whether an equivalent item or its price.[41]

The obligation to compensate for the depreciation of money is regarded as another consequence of accepting the rule of justice. For example, regarding usury, it has been argued that under conditions of severe inflation, repaying the same nominal sum of a loan after many years constitutes injustice to the lender. The rule of justice requires the real value and purchasing power of money to be considered in repayment in order to realize justice.[42] Similarly, according to the rule of justice, each party to a bilateral transaction is obligated to render the other party’s right in full; otherwise, justice and equity have not been observed.[43]

Arguments for and against the Authority of the Rule of Justice

Proponents and opponents of invoking justice as a rule have advanced various arguments for their respective positions.

Proponents of the Authority of the Rule of Justice

Main article: Authority of the Rule of Justice

To establish the authority of the rule of justice, proponents cite verses that describe God as commanding justice ([[Verse 90 of Sura al-Nahl|Quran 16:90]), negate every kind of injustice from Him (Quran 3:182; Quran 3:108), and identify the establishment of equity as the purpose of sending messengers (Quran 57:25). Numerous narrations[44] that identify justice as the objective of religion also provide strong support for the rule’s authority.[45]

It has also been argued that the absolute and non-specifiable verses of the Quran negate every form of injustice from God. Therefore, in light of the narrations requiring hadiths to be compared with the Quran, if a ruling inferred from a narration is unjust from a rational perspective, that narration ceases to be authoritative because it conflicts with the Quranic principle negating injustice.[46]

Proponents also invoke the well-known rule of correlation, arguing that the goodness of justice is a definitive rational judgment, and that this definitive judgment of reason acquires religious authority through the rule of correlation.[47] Likewise, the continuous practice of rational people is to formulate laws based on justice. Since the Lawgiver is the “foremost of rational beings” and His rulings are not separate from rational principles, the Lawgiver is considered to have endorsed this rational practice. This endorsement may constitute an independent proof of the validity and authority of the rule of justice in the Islamic jurisprudential system.[48]

Proponents of the authority of the rule further argue that, by way of “governance,” the proofs of justice take precedence over proofs from which an unjust ruling might be inferred and deprive them of authority.[49] Justice is a foundational principle underlying rules such as “no harm” and “no hardship,” and thus governs all primary proofs.[50] It has also been stated that the proofs negating injustice restrict the unrestricted scope of other proofs to cases that are “not unjust.”[51]

Arguments of the Opponents of the Rule’s Authority

Main article: Non-Authority of the Rule of Justice

Many jurists do not accept the rule of justice and regard it as non-authoritative. Arguments against its authority all rest on one common premise: “reason lacks authority to identify instances of justice and injustice with certainty.” Their general logic is that applying the rule requires a rational determination of instances of justice and injustice; for various reasons, however, these rational determinations are not definitive or certain but are “conjectural” and therefore lack religious authority according to principles of jurisprudence.

Those who deny the authority of conjectural reason maintain that the human intellect does not comprehend the actual and complete benefits and harms underlying religious rulings.[52] The benefit may lie in the issuance of the obligation itself—as a test of servitude—rather than in the act commanded;[53] reason may be unaware of more important and conflicting benefits or harms;[54] it may be unable to comprehend infinite criteria and complex details;[55] and it is incapable of understanding benefits and harms pertaining to the hereafter.[56] Consequently, its determination that a particular instance is just or unjust is unreliable.[57]

They further maintain that the primary rule in principles of jurisprudence is the prohibition of acting on “conjecture,” as emphasized in numerous verses and narrations. Since reason’s determination of instances of justice is conjectural, it falls under these general prohibitions.[58] They also invoke narrations such as “God’s religion cannot be attained through human intellects” (إِنَّ دینَ اللهِ لا یُصابُ بِالعُقُول)[59] and narrations condemning “analogy” and “personal opinion,”[60] thereby considering rational identification of instances of justice invalid.[61]

Published Works

Main article: Rule of Justice (Further Reading)

Several works have been published on the rule of justice. In the book The Rule of Justice in Imami Jurisprudence, Hasan Ali Ali-Akbarian interviewed five seminary scholars and published the interviews together with a content analysis. The Jurisprudential Rule of Justice by Ali Elahi Khorasani and The Rule of Justice and Negation of Injustice by Hadi Qabel Jami are other written works relating to the rule. Numerous articles have likewise been published either on the rule of justice itself or on its application to jurisprudential issues.

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Motahhari, Yaddasht-haye Ustad Motahhari, vol. 1, p. 52.
  2. ↑ Motahhari, Yaddasht-haye Ustad Motahhari, vol. 3, p. 271.
  3. ↑ Shirvani, “The Status of Justice in the Structure of Jurisprudential Knowledge from the Perspective of Martyr Motahhari and Its Impact on the Relationship between Ethics and Jurisprudence,” p. 101.
  4. ↑ Varaei, “Political Jurisprudence and the Primacy of Justice in Governance,” pp. 91-92.
  5. ↑ Khomeini, Kitab al-Bay‘, vol. 2, p. 633.
  6. ↑ Ali-Akbarian, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat dar Fiqh-i Imamiyya, pp. 31-32.
  7. ↑ Mosallinejad et al., “Ethical Reflections on the Permissibility of Marriage to a Minor Girl and Its Conflict with the Rule of Justice,” pp. 104-105.
  8. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 139-140.
  9. ↑ Saeedi, “The Theory of Compensating for the Depreciation of Money,” p. 94.
  10. ↑ Saeedi, “The Theory of Compensating for the Depreciation of Money,” p. 191.
  11. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 131-132.
  12. ↑ Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, vol. 8, p. 100.
  13. ↑ Kulayni, al-Kafi, vol. 6, p. 140.
  14. ↑ Qabel, Ahkam-i Banovan dar Shari‘at-i Muhammadi (s), pp. 164-200.
  15. ↑ Sanei, Ruykardi bi Huquq-i Zanan, pp. 166-167; Ali-Akbarian, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat dar Fiqh-i Imamiyya, pp. 260-274.
  16. ↑ Sanei, Barabari-yi Diya, pp. 60-64.
  17. ↑ Sorami, “The Jurisprudential Rule of Negating Injustice in the Holy Quran,” pp. 29-30.
  18. ↑ Ali-Akbarian, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat dar Fiqh-i Imamiyya, pp. 38-39.
  19. ↑ Motahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Mabani-yi Iqtisad-i Islami, p. 27.
  20. ↑ Bahrani, al-Hada’iq al-Nadira fi Ahkam al-‘Itra al-Tahira, vol. 6, p. 14.
  21. ↑ Ansari, al-Makasib wa-l-Bay‘, vol. 2, p. 37.
  22. ↑ Khoei, Misbah al-Fiqaha, vol. 1, p. 271.
  23. ↑ Khomeini, Kitab al-Bay‘, vol. 2, p. 415.
  24. ↑ Khoei, Mustanad al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa, pp. 81-82.
  25. ↑ Sanei, Barabari-yi Qisas, pp. 27-75.
  26. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 131-132.
  27. ↑ Sanei, Ruykardi bi Huquq-i Zanan, pp. 166-167.
  28. ↑ Sorami, “The Jurisprudential Rule of Negating Injustice in the Holy Quran,” pp. 37-38.
  29. ↑ Mirzaei and Omidifard, “The Relationship of the Rules of Equity, Fairness, and Justice with the No-Harm Rule,” pp. 24-25.
  30. ↑ Mosallinejad et al., “Ethical Reflections on the Permissibility of Marriage to a Minor Girl and Its Conflict with the Rule of Justice,” pp. 102-103.
  31. ↑ Abdolrezaei Dastgerdi et al., “The Nature and Status of Social Justice in the Process of Deriving Islamic Legal Rulings, with Emphasis on Imami Jurisprudence,” pp. 100-102.
  32. ↑ Motahhari, Nizam-i Huquq-i Zan dar Islam, p. 273.
  33. ↑ Alidoust, “The Role of Justice in the First and Second Processes of Inference,” p. 9.
  34. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 133-134.
  35. ↑ Tabatabaei, “The Relationship between the Rule of Justice and Other Jurisprudential Rules,” pp. 3-9.
  36. ↑ Ziaifar, “Forms of Employing Justice in Jurisprudence and Ijtihad,” p. 308.
  37. ↑ Ziaifar, “Forms of Employing Justice in Jurisprudence and Ijtihad,” pp. 309-319.
  38. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 139-140.
  39. ↑ Hosseini and Hosseini, “The Purport of the Rule of Justice from the Perspective of Professor Motahhari,” p. 253.
  40. ↑ Sorami, “The Jurisprudential Rule of Negating Injustice in the Holy Quran,” pp. 48-50.
  41. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 140-141.
  42. ↑ Soltani Renani, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” pp. 142-143.
  43. ↑ Saeedi, “The Theory of Compensating for the Depreciation of Money,” p. 94.
  44. ↑ Shaykh Saduq, al-Tawhid, p. 96; Shaykh Saduq, al-Faqih, vol. 2, p. 44; Tamimi Amadi, Ghurar al-Hikam, vol. 1, pp. 26-28; Hurr al-Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘a, vol. 27, p. 171; Majlisi, Rawdat al-Muttaqin fi Sharh Man la Yahduruhu al-Faqih, vol. 8, p. 46.
  45. ↑ Mosallinejad et al., “Ethical Reflections on the Permissibility of Marriage to a Minor Girl and Its Conflict with the Rule of Justice,” p. 101.
  46. ↑ Sanei, Ruykardi bi Huquq-i Zanan, pp. 166-167; Ali-Akbarian, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat dar Fiqh-i Imamiyya, pp. 260-274.
  47. ↑ Qabel Jami, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat wa Nafy-i Zulm, pp. 10-103.
  48. ↑ Asghari, “Justice as a Jurisprudential and Legal Rule,” p. 8.
  49. ↑ Ali-Akbarian, Qa‘ida-yi ‘Idalat dar Fiqh-i Imamiyya, pp. 76-77.
  50. ↑ Mirzaei and Omidifard, “The Relationship of the Rules of Equity, Fairness, and Justice with the No-Harm Rule,” p. 27.
  51. ↑ Sorami, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” pp. 62-64.
  52. ↑ Hakim, al-Usul al-‘Amma li-l-Fiqh al-Muqaran, p. 277.
  53. ↑ Khomeini, Tahrirat fi al-Usul, vol. 3, pp. 313-314.
  54. ↑ Khoei, Dirasat fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 77; Subhani Tabrizi, al-Mahsul fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, vol. 3, p. 85.
  55. ↑ Hosseini Shirazi, Bayan al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 149.
  56. ↑ Shahid al-Awwal, Nadd al-Qawa‘id al-Fiqhiyya ‘ala Madhhab al-Imamiyya, p. 7; Tabrizi, Khulasat al-Usul, pp. 68-70.
  57. ↑ Musavi Khalkhali, al-Hakimiyya fi al-Islam, p. 18; Tabatabaei Hakim, al-Muhkam fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, p. 187.
  58. ↑ Sadr, Jawahir al-Usul, p. 177.
  59. ↑ Bahrani, al-Durar al-Najafiyya min al-Multaqatat al-Yusufiyya, vol. 1, p. 324.
  60. ↑ Hurr al-Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘a, vol. 27, pp. 35-62; Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 2, pp. 283-316.
  61. ↑ Makarem Shirazi, Anwar al-Usul, vol. 2, p. 473.

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  • Sanei, Yousef, Barabari-yi Qisas, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1383 SH.
  • Sanei, Yousef, Ruykardi bi Huquq-i Zanan, Qom, Fiqh al-Thaqalayn, 1390 SH.
  • Shahid al-Awwal, Mohammad ibn Makki, Nadd al-Qawa‘id al-Fiqhiyya ‘ala Madhhab al-Imamiyya, Qom, Grand Ayatollah Marashi Najafi Public Library, 1403 AH.
  • Shaykh Saduq, Mohammad ibn Ali, al-Tawhid, Qom, Society of Seminary Teachers, 1398 AH.
  • Shaykh Saduq, Mohammad ibn Ali, Man la Yahduruhu al-Faqih, Qom, Society of Seminary Teachers, 1413 AH.
  • Shirvani, Ali, “The Status of Justice in the Structure of Jurisprudential Knowledge from the Perspective of Martyr Motahhari and Its Impact on the Relationship between Ethics and Jurisprudence,” Revelatory Ethics, no. 19, 1399 SH.
  • Soltani Renani, Mohammad, “The Application of the Rule of Negation of Injustice in Justice-Oriented Jurisprudence,” Contemporary Comparative Legal Studies, no. 21, 1399 SH.
  • Sorami, Sayf Allah, “An Examination of the Authority of the Rule of Justice in Textual and Non-Textual Cases,” Fiqh, no. 87, 1395 SH.
  • Sorami, Sayf Allah, “The Jurisprudential Rule of Negating Injustice in the Holy Quran,” Quran, Jurisprudence, and Islamic Law, no. 12, 1399 SH.
  • Subhani Tabrizi, Jafar, al-Mahsul fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, Qom, Imam al-Sadiq (a) Institute, 1414 AH.
  • Tabatabaei, Sayyid Mahmoud, “The Relationship between the Rule of Justice and Other Jurisprudential Rules,” Fiqh, no. 87, 1395 SH.
  • Tabatabaei Hakim, Mohammad Saeed, al-Muhkam fi Usul al-Fiqh, Qom, al-Manar Institute, 1414 AH.
  • Tabrizi, Gholam-Hossein, Khulasat al-Usul, Mashhad, Tus, 1372 AH.
  • Tamimi Amadi, Abd al-Wahid, Ghurar al-Hikam, Qom, Dar al-Kitab al-Islami, 1410 AH.
  • Tusi, Mohammad ibn Hasan, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, Tehran, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1407 AH.
  • Varaei, Sayyid Javad, “Political Jurisprudence and the Primacy of Justice in Governance,” Political Science, no. 76, 1395 SH.
  • Ziaifar, Saeed, “Forms of Employing Justice in Jurisprudence and Ijtihad,” Jurisprudential Research, no. 17, 1393 SH.
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