Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh (book)
In contrast, the author critiques this view, arguing that jihad against polytheists is obligatory only if they commit hostile acts, and fighting the People of the Book is obligatory only if they fail to adhere to the dhimma pact. He also critiques Khoei's view on the Guardianship of the Jurist and his role in the decision-making process for jihad.
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| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Mohammad Soroush Mahallati |
| Style | Argumentative-Critical |
| Language | Persian |
| Pages | 184 |
| اطلاعات نشر | |
| Publisher | Miras-e Ahl-e Qalam |
- Abstract
- Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh* is a book written by Mohammad Soroush Mahallati in the field of Political Fiqh. In this work, the concept of jihad is explained in an argumentative-critical manner based on the views of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. By critiquing Khoei's perspective on jihad, the author delineates the legitimacy and scope of jihad in Islam. Khoei divides jihad into three types (jihad against polytheists, the People of the Book, and rebels) and considers it obligatory in these cases.
In the discussion of rebels (*bughat*), Soroush Mahallati, by critiquing the views of jurists and their evidence, considers the rebels to be among the believers and believes that they only leave the religion if they become Nasibis. By examining the narrations about rising up against an unjust ruler, the author concludes that these hadiths only prohibit violent actions.
Introduction and Structure of the Book
- Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh* is a book in the field of Political Fiqh that examines the issue of jihad from a jurisprudential perspective. In this text, the fatwa-argumentative writing of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei on the subject of jihad (published within the book *Minhaj al-Salihin*) is the central focus, and the author provides an argumentative-critical explanation of it. In addition to a detailed examination of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's views, the author also considers the opinions of other contemporary jurists such as Husayn Vahid Khorasani, Jawad Tabrizi, Dia' al-Din al-'Iraqi, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, and Murtada Mutahhari.
The discussions in this book are organized into two main parts. The work lacks a list of sources and a detailed table of contents; a general table of contents is provided at the beginning of the book. The first part examines the types of jihad and the conditions for its obligation during the era of the Imam's presence, and the second part discusses the legitimacy or illegitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation. The first part covers jihad against polytheists, jihad against the People of the Book, jihad against rebels, and the conditions for the obligation of jihad. The second part consists of five discussions: the legitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the illegitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the philosophy of the Imam's permission for jihad, guardianship over jihad, and rising with the sword against an unjust ruler.
The author of the book, Mohammad Soroush Mahallati (b. 1340 SH), is a teacher of jurisprudence and its principles in the seminary and a researcher in the science of jurisprudence, especially political fiqh. The books *The State and the Implementation of Sharia* and *Instruments of Diversion and Music* are among the author's other works. The book *Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh* was published by Miras-e Ahl-e Qalam publications in 1396 SH in 184 pages.
Jihad against Polytheists
Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei defines jihad as fighting to raise the flag of Islam and realize the rituals of faith and considers it necessary in three cases: 1. Jihad against polytheists, 2. Jihad against the People of the Book, and 3. Jihad against rebels. Khoei considered polytheism and disbelief to be the origin of jihad and deemed fighting polytheists to be absolutely obligatory until polytheism is eradicated (pp. 11-13).
Soroush Mahallati considers the restriction of jihad to these three categories to be baseless and enumerates more relevant and important types of jihad, such as defensive jihad (pp. 77-79). He also suggests that jihad against polytheists may only be obligatory if the polytheists prevent the call to Islam or attack Muslims (p. 13).
Arguing for the Absolute Obligation of Jihad against Polytheists based on Verses
Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, citing Quran 4:74, Quran 8:39, Quran 8:65, Quran 9:5, and Quran 9:36, argues for the absolute obligation of jihad against polytheists (their blood being unprotected) (p. 13). He believes that the verses which restrict the performance of jihad to the hostile actions of enemies (Quran 2:190 and 191) pertain to the People of the Book (p. 19).
Soroush considers the argument from these verses to be incomplete. In his view, these verses are of two types, and neither indicates that the blood of polytheists is unprotected. The first type (Quran 4:74 and 8:65) states the principle of the obligation to fight but is silent about who must be fought. The second type (Quran 8:39 and 9:5, 36) also makes jihad against polytheists obligatory, but considers the hostile behavior of polytheists, such as sedition and harming Muslims, as the cause for jihad, not their polytheism. He also believes that the restrictive verses pertain only to polytheists and are not related to the People of the Book (pp. 19-21).
The Verses Being Restricted to the Hostile Actions of Enemies
In Soroush Mahallati's view, based on Quran 2:190 and 9:13, fighting polytheists who pose no harm to the believers is baseless. He also believes that, according to Quran 60:8 and 9, fighting polytheists is only justified if they have killed or exiled Muslims. However, regarding polytheists who have not exhibited such behavior, good conduct towards them is recommended (pp. 23-25).
The author responds to the objection that the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah relate to a time of Islam's weakness and have been abrogated by Quran 9:5 ("kill the polytheists wherever you find them" - the verse is not quoted correctly in the book). According to him, firstly, the verse of Surah al-Tawbah is general and the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah are specific, and a general rule is specified by a specific one. Secondly, the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah cannot be abrogated because they call for justice and good conduct and are among the clear verses (*muhkamat*) of the Quran (pp. 25-27).
The Incorrectness of Reducing Offensive Jihad to Defensive Jihad
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, in arguing for the absolute obligation of jihad against polytheists, has reduced offensive jihad to defensive jihad. According to him, since monotheism is rooted in human nature (*fitra*), and polytheists are deprived of this right due to the oppression of tyrants or due to imposed ignorance, it is necessary for Muslims to eliminate all polytheism, because defending innate rights is obligatory, both for those deprived of those rights and for others (pp. 27-29).
The author, who considers jihad a form of interaction between Muslims and other nations, does not find this argument presentable to the world. He also sees this interpretation as conflicting with the Quranic view that humans are free to accept religion (pp. 31-35). According to Soroush, the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" indicates human freedom in accepting religion, and other interpretations of this verse (like Mr. Khoei's interpretation based on a distinction between freedom and choice) are not acceptable (pp. 38-44).
Examination of Narrations
Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei considers the established part of the narrations on jihad to be about fighting polytheists and argues for the legitimacy of offensive jihad against them. Similarly, some jurists have cited the narration of Hafs ibn Ghiyath to prove offensive jihad against polytheists. However, the author considers the narration of Hafs ibn Ghiyath to be flawed in its chain of transmission and its indication, and considers the established part of the narrations to be the legitimacy of defensive jihad, not offensive jihad against polytheists (pp. 44-53).
Jihad against the People of the Book
Citing Quran 9:29, Khoei considered jihad against the People of the Book obligatory until they either become Muslims or pay the jizya. However, in the author's opinion, since Quran 3:110 affirms the true faith of some of the People of the Book, the word "min" (from) in the verse in question is partitive, and it does not command fighting all of the People of the Book.
According to some jurists, the verses of fighting are not absolute; rather, other verses have restricted them to cases where the disbelievers attack Muslims. In contrast, other jurists believe that the verses of fighting abrogate those restrictive verses, and for this reason, the ruling on jihad against the People of the Book is also absolute. Soroush Mahallati prefers the first opinion and believes that the restrictive verses cannot be abrogated because fighting non-aggressors is an instance of transgression.
The author, who considers the collection of jizya from the People of the Book to be relevant only to those residing in the Abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), deems fighting the People of the Book who are in the Abode of Disbelief (*Dar al-Kufr*) to be baseless (as long as they have not attacked Muslims). He also believes that the Abode of Disbelief cannot be turned into the Abode of Islam by force and pressure (pp. 55-63).
Jihad against Rebels
Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei divided rebels (*bughat*) into two categories: 1. Those who rebel against an infallible Imam; 2. Those who rebel against a group of Muslims. In Khoei's view, according to the verse of rebellion, those who rebel against Muslims should be invited to reconciliation, and if they do not accept peace, they should be fought. However, since individuals who rebel against the Imam have left Islam and their blood is unprotected, they are not included in the verse, and they must be fought without being invited to reconciliation (pp. 65-68).
In Soroush Mahallati's opinion, in Quranic terminology, rebels are a group of believers and are within the fold of Muslims. He believes that as long as the rebels have not become Nasibis, they are not subject to the proofs of disbelief and impurity and are not jurisprudentially considered disbelievers. Indeed, Imam Ali (a) also called those who rebelled against him, and even the Syrians, his brothers. Therefore, those who rebel against the infallible Imam are also included in the verse of rebellion and must be invited to reconcile before being fought. According to the author, since the verse of rebellion includes rebels, it will, *a fortiori*, also include rebels against a just, non-infallible ruler (pp. 73-77).
Conditions for the Obligation of Jihad
Khoei stated three conditions for the obligation of jihad: 1. Being legally accountable (including having reason and reaching puberty), 2. Having the ability, 3. Being male. Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, based on the *sirah* and the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah, does not consider jihad obligatory for women. In the author's view, the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah is problematic in its chain and indication and cannot be relied upon. He raises the question of whether jihad is not obligatory for women or is forbidden for them, providing inconclusive evidence for both possibilities. In the author's opinion, even if jihad is forbidden for women, in emergency situations, jihad and defensive training may become obligatory for them (pp. 81-90).
In Soroush Mahallati's view, the conditions for jihad differ from the conditions for other obligations. Although the conditions for obligations like prayer and fasting are purely devotional, in jihad, these conditions are subject to the exigencies of time and place and it is possible for the Islamic ruler to set a different age requirement for jihad. Similarly, the condition of ability (physical and financial power) must be considered in proportion to the time and circumstances; having the ability for hand-to-hand combat in the past is different from having the ability for war in the present time. The ruler can also, within his sphere of authority (mintaqat al-faragh or broader), set other conditions for participation in jihad (pp. 91-94).
Examining the Proofs for the Legitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation
Most Shia jurists make offensive jihad conditional on the presence of the Imam, but Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei does not consider it necessary. He calls jihad one of the pillars of religion and a factor in the spread of Islam, believing that restricting such an obligation to a specific period is incompatible with the special attention the Quran gives it. However, the author does not consider the nature of offensive jihad to be aggressive, but rather a means to create a free environment for presenting Islam (pp. 97-100).
Although the author considers jihad to be a pillar of religion without any doubt, he counts not aggressive jihad, but absolute jihad (both defensive and offensive) among the pillars of Islam. Also, in his opinion, there is no reason to call jihad a factor in the spread of Islam; rather, such a claim is one of the accusations against the religion of Islam. The author, over six pages, lists the verses related to jihad and considers them to be related to the historical conditions of the time of revelation, which cannot be generalized to a permanent and timeless ruling (pp. 100-110).
Examining the Proofs for the Illegitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation
For the majority view (the illegitimacy of offensive jihad), arguments have been made based on consensus, narrations, and the legitimacy of collecting jizya in the era of occultation. Khoei considers the consensus to be unproven, and if proven, he considers it to be a derived consensus (*madraki*) (p. 112). However, in his view, given the legitimacy of taking jizya from the People of the Book in the era of occultation, one can argue for the permissibility of offensive jihad in this era (p. 125).
Soroush Mahallati agrees with Khoei regarding the consensus and does not find such a consensus provable (p. 112). However, in his opinion, since the permissibility of taking jizya in the era of occultation is not a matter of consensus, the permissibility of offensive jihad will also be questionable (pp. 125-126).
The Narration of Suwayd al-Qalansi Being Specific to the Era of Presence
The first narration that the author examines for the illegitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation is the narration of Suwayd al-Qalansi. According to this narration, fighting without the presence of the Imam whose obedience is obligatory is forbidden. Khoei, in addition to criticizing the chain of the narration, considers this narration to be in the context of negating the legitimacy of the caliphs' fighting, not the rational decisions of Muslims in the era of occultation. Therefore, if religious people engage in jihad for the exaltation of religion in the era of occultation, this narration does not negate it (pp. 111-116).
The author does not accept Khoei's critique of the chain. Regarding the indication of the narration, he agrees with Khoei's view and, like the Maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala, does not consider this narration to be about the era of occultation. However, he questions why Khoei fills the vacuum of the infallible with collective wisdom in the discussion of jihad, but in the discussion of the guardianship of the jurist, he has not explicitly entrusted the formation of a government to collective wisdom. According to Soroush, with Khoei's explicit view on jihad (which is more important than establishing a government to implement the prescribed punishments), one can also derive his view on the formation of a government. In the author's opinion, in rising against an unjust state, permission must also be sought from the Imam whose obedience is obligatory, but such permission is not necessary for defensive jihad (pp. 113-120).
The Narration of Abdullah ibn Mughirah Being Specific to Defensive Jihad
Another narration that has been cited is the narration of Abdullah ibn Mughirah, according to which jihad must be stopped until the rising of the infallible Imam. Khoei considers this narration a temporary ruling related to the circumstances of the Imam's (a) time. However, the author does not accept this view of Khoei and considers this narration to be related to defensive jihad, not offensive jihad (pp. 120-125).
The Philosophy of the Imam's Permission in Jihad
There are two jurisprudential approaches regarding the Imam's permission: 1. Giving permission or not is the Imam's personal right, which is why in the past some jurists who did not have permission from the Imam to spend the khums would bury it; 2. Giving permission is a means to observe the rulings and the interest of the ummah. The author, accepting the second view, considers the Imam's permission in the matter of jihad not his personal right, but necessary to secure the interest of society. Similarly, he believes that in the matter of governance, the best way to preserve the interest of society is to entrust it to the Imam, but in the time of occultation, necessary and non-suspendable social affairs (like governance) that do not require divine inspiration are entrusted to the just jurist (pp. 127-139).
Guardianship over Jihad
Contrary to the usual view of jurists, who consider guardianship over jihad in the era of occultation to be one of the functions of the guardian of the affair (*wali al-amr*), Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, in a section of the book *Minhaj*, has entrusted the management of jihad to experts, and in another section, he has entrusted it to the jurist under the rubric of matters of hisbah (*umur hisbiyyah*). In explaining the second statement, Khoei believes that the jurist must consult with experts and, if necessary, issue an order for war and personally take command of the war to prevent chaos (pp. 141-142).
According to the author, Khoei does not believe in the textual proofs for the guardianship of the jurist and seeks to solve the issue through rational means. For this reason, his view is problematic, because governance is a specialized matter, and a jurist as a jurist has no expertise in administering the country, and his view is the same as that of a non-jurist. In the author's opinion, the final decision by the jurist after consultation does not resolve this issue, because a person who is not an expert does not become knowledgeable and an expert after consulting. Also, in Soroush's belief, there is no connection between jurisprudence and preventing chaos. The author, who believes that jihad is carried out based on apparent interests and not on real interests, gives precedence to the diagnosis of experts over that of the jurist. Therefore, Soroush Mahallati considers Khoei's first view defensible and his second statement incorrect (pp. 143-157).
According to Soroush, those who have accepted the guardianship of the jurist based on texts like that of Umar ibn Hanzala have two foundations regarding guardianship over jihad:
- The jurist must make the final decision in consultation with experts (such as the Supreme National Security Council). This foundation faces the same previous problem, as the guardian jurist does not become an expert after consulting.
- The jurist must delegate these matters to experts, as Imam Khomeini did. In the author's opinion, this theory moves governance away from centralism and individualism, provided that the political arena is genuinely open to political parties and groups (pp. 144-146).
Rising up against an Unjust Ruler
In Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's view, the narrations about rising up against an unjust ruler are not related to the discussion of jihad. However, the author, with the argument that fighting injustice is more important than inviting to Islam, and also with the explanation that rising up against an unjust ruler is a defensive jihad and is more important than offensive jihad, considers these narrations relevant. According to this explanation, jihad against disbelievers is not permissible, because in these hadiths, rising up against an unjust ruler (which is more important than jihad against disbelievers) is forbidden. However, after examination, the author concludes that in these hadiths, only violent actions are forbidden (pp. 159-162).
The first narration is the *Sahihah* of 'Is ibn Qasim, which the author considers incomplete in its indication because in this narration, only the character and motive of Zayd ibn Ali are confirmed, but given the circumstances of the time and place of the uprising, the uprising itself was not approved. The second narration is the *Marfu'ah* of Rib'i, which has a problem in its chain of transmission. The author raises various possibilities about the content of Rib'i's hadith, and ultimately confirms its indication of the impermissibility of rising up and responds to its problems. The third narration (from the introduction to the Sahifa Sajjadiyya) does not have a reliable chain. Some jurists, based on the qualifier "from us" (*minna*) in this narration, believe that this narration refers to the uprising of the Imams and the Sayyids close to them and does not include the uprising of Shias. But Soroush does not see this view as consistent with the goal mentioned in the narration (the emergence of the Sufyani) and believes that this narration includes all Shia uprisings (pp. 162-176).
The author compares the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil with the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, and believes that these narrations are not contradictory and that the narrations prohibiting uprising state an instance where enjoining good and forbidding evil is not permissible. According to Soroush Mahallati, the jurisprudential and practical approach of jurists of not getting involved with the wielders of power, especially in situations that may have dangerous and corrupting consequences, is not only influenced by the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, but they have also been influenced by the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil (pp. 177-183).