The Nature and Juridical Foundations of Ghina in Music (book)
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| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Reza Ranjbar |
| Language | Persian |
| Pages | 119 |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Nowshenakht |
- Abstract
The Nature and Juridical Foundations of Ghina in Music is a Persian book written by Reza Ranjbar, which presents and critiques the arguments of Shia jurists on the prohibition and permissibility of Ghina. After examining various definitions of ghina, the author considers it a function of the concepts of *lahw* (idle amusement), *laghw* (vain talk), and *zur* (falsehood). He then points to the evidence, including consensus, Quranic verses, and narrations from the Infallibles, which Shia jurists—such as the author of *Riyad*, Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi, and Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin al-Hilli—have relied upon in arguing for the prohibition of ghina. Subsequently, he mentions the arguments of jurists who have rejected the intrinsic prohibition of ghina, including Shaykh al-Tusi, Muhaqqiq Sabziwari, and Fayd Kashani. They argue that ghina itself is not forbidden, but has been prohibited because of what it was customarily accompanied by, such as false and idle speech and musical instruments.
In a separate section, the author also addresses the jurisprudential views of Imam Khomeini on ghina, explaining his reasons for opposing the exception of the ruling of prohibition for ghina on Eids, as well as ghina in elegies, Quran recitation, and lamentation.
Introduction and Structure
The book *The Nature and Juridical Foundations of Ghina in Music*, written by Reza Ranjbar, was published by Nowshenakht Publications in 124 pages. This work examines the jurisprudential aspects and theoretical foundations of ghina in music. The book is organized into a preface and six chapters:
- Chapter One: Concepts and Terminology (pp. 17-33): Conceptual analysis of ghina, music, tone and melodies, *tarab* (ecstasy/lightness) and the performer (*mutrib*), and voice.
- Chapter Two: The Nature and Category of Ghina (pp. 35-47): Presenting the views of Shia jurists on the nature of ghina, and whether ghina is a type of speech or a quality of the voice.
- Chapter Three: Opinions of Shia Jurists on Ghina (pp. 49-83): Examining the views and arguments of those who believe in the intrinsic prohibition of ghina, and the intrinsic permissibility of ghina.
- Chapter Four: Opinions of the Four Schools of Thought on Ghina (pp. 85-90): Examining the views and arguments of Sunnis for the permissibility of ghina.
- Chapter Five: Opinions of Islamic Mystics on Ghina (pp. 91-100).
- Chapter Six: Music from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini and Contemporary Jurists (pp. 101-116): Presenting the fatwas of Shaykh Baha'i, Sayyid Husayn Burujirdi, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Imam Khomeini, Mirza Jawad Tabrizi, Muhammad-Taqi Bahjat, and Yusuf Sani'i.
The Concept of Ghina
Drawing on lexical, hadith-based, and jurisprudential sources, the author presents over 30 definitions of ghina, including: stretching the voice, trilling the voice in the throat, singing that induces *tarab*, and singing that is accompanied by a forbidden act (pp. 37-42). In this context, he quotes from the Sahib al-Jawahir that ghina is a voice with a specific quality, the identification of which is left to custom (*'urf*). Muhaqqiq al-Ardibili also held that whatever custom considers to be ghina is forbidden, even if it is not ecstasy-inducing and does not involve trilling (p. 43).
However, relying on the principles of ijtihadi jurisprudence in the Quran and Sunnah, and drawing from Quran 31:6, Quran 23:3, and Quran 22:30, as well as a narration from Imam al-Sadiq (a), the author concludes that forbidden ghina is a combination of singing in the manner of *lahw* and *laghw*, and singing with false words (pp. 43-44). He also clarifies that a group of Shia scholars, including Shaykh al-Ansari and Imam Khomeini, have considered ghina to be a quality (*kayf*) that is an attribute of the voice. However, the author himself, referring to narrations on the matter, considers ghina to be related to the speech. Ultimately, the author believes that in either case, there is no difference in the ruling, because ghina is only forbidden if the titles of *lahw*, *laghw*, and *zur* apply to it (pp. 44-47).
According to the author, the word "music," which entered from Greek, is not mentioned in Islamic sources. However, in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (*Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa*), music is considered the same as ghina, and ghina the same as music, with no difference seen between them. Nevertheless, he ultimately clarifies that there is a relationship of absolute generality and specificity between ghina and music; for every ghina is music, but not all music is ghina (pp. 31-33).
Arguments for the Prohibition of Ghina
A group of Shia jurists consider ghina to be intrinsically forbidden. The author quotes and critiques the evidence of this group, which relies on consensus, Quranic verses, and narrations from the Infallibles.
Consensus (Ijma')
The author of *Riyad* spoke of a consensus of Islamic scholars on the prohibition of ghina. Mulla Ahmad Naraqi referred to "no disagreement, but rather consensus" on its prohibition. Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi, in addition to stating that he found no opponent to the prohibition of ghina, claimed that both transmitted and attained consensus exist on its prohibition, and added that it might even be considered one of the necessities of the school of thought (*daruriyyat al-madhhab*) (p. 51). In this context, Shaykh al-Ansari has described the prohibition of ghina as generally non-controversial (p. 52).
In his critique of this argument, the author first states that only devotional consensus (*ijma' ta'abbudi*) is authoritative and valid, whereas documented consensus (*ijma' madraki*) has no validity. Since the basis for the jurists' prohibition of ghina is Quranic verses and narrations, we must refer to the jurists' evidence. Furthermore, the criterion for the devotional authority of consensus is not the consensus itself, but its ability to reveal the opinion of the Infallible. However, in this case, it is not clear that the consensus reveals the opinion of the Infallible. The author ultimately argues that with the existence of various opinions and jurists who do not consider ghina to be intrinsically forbidden, how can one claim a consensus on the prohibition of ghina? (p. 52).
Quranic Verses
Referring to 6 verses of the Quran and their interpretations, the author rejects reliance on these verses to prove the prohibition of ghina. The verses mentioned are Quran 22:30, Quran 31:6, Quran 23:3, Quran 25:72, Quran 17:64, and Quran 53:59-61 (pp. 53-57). However, in none of the cases does the author refer to the jurists who have used these verses to prove the prohibition of ghina, and only presents interpretive opinions. The author then critiques the use of these verses, stating that none of them are explicitly about ghina and were revealed in relation to general concepts that can be applied to certain types of ghina (pp. 57-58).
Narrations (Riwayat)
The author holds that many narrations have been cited to prove the prohibition of ghina, and among them, the author of *Jawahir* and Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin have claimed frequency of narration (*tawatur*) on this matter. However, according to Muhaqqiq al-Ardibili, there is no authentic narration that explicitly indicates the prohibition of ghina. The author then quotes and critiques 14 interpretive narrations related to the interpretation of Quranic verses, as well as 12 other narrations that have been narrated concerning ghina, and clarifies that the chain of transmission of some of these hadiths is weak, and others, although reliable, indicate the prohibition of idle singing (*lahwi*) and music accompanied by amusement and play, not ghina itself (pp. 58-68).
Ultimately, the author holds that the principle of the prohibition of ghina can be generally understood from the mentioned narrations, but its concept and instances are not clarified in the verses and narrations (p. 68).
Arguments for the Permissibility of Ghina
A group of Shia jurists, contrary to the majority opinion, believe in the permissibility of music and ghina, because they see the reason for the prohibition of ghina and music not in themselves, but in their being mixed with other forbidden things. The author first presents the views of Shaykh al-Tusi, Muhaqqiq Sabziwari, Fayd Kashani, and Allama Sha'rani on this matter, and then presents the jurisprudential and narrative arguments of this group.
According to Shaykh al-Tusi, if a song does not contain false speech and musical instruments, there is no problem with it and it is not forbidden (p. 69). Furthermore, Muhaqqiq Sabziwari considered the source of the prohibition on ghina to be the forbidden matters that were associated with the singing. However, he clarified that if the prohibition of ghina and idle singing in contexts other than the Quran is a matter of consensus, we also accept it; otherwise, it will be permissible. Muhaqqiq Sabziwari ultimately concluded with a recommended precaution (p. 70). Fayd Kashani, like Allama Sha'rani, does not consider music and ghina to be intrinsically forbidden unless something forbidden is added to them (pp. 71-73).
Fayd Kashani, relying on contextual scope (*insiraf*), holds that the prohibition of ghina is limited to this phenomenon during the time of the Umayyads and Abbasids, when female singers would typically be present in the gatherings of corrupt men and provide them with entertainment. Consequently, such an act was forbidden, and the prohibiting hadiths were directed at such ghina (p. 74). The author then quotes and critiques the narrative evidence regarding beautiful voices, the permissibility of ghina on Eids, joyous occasions, weddings, etc. (pp. 74-82).
The author also refers to the arguments of Sunnis for the permissibility of ghina, some of which are: Quran 7:32, Quran 31:19, and narrations from Aisha and Umar ibn al-Khattab (pp. 89-90).
Ghina from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini and Contemporary Jurists
In the author's view, the jurisprudential views of Imam Khomeini have brought about a significant change in the way divine rulings are understood and interpreted in the current era, and one example of this is the issue of ghina. This is because he had an ijtihadi and contextual approach to the subject of ghina and music and emphasized the importance of time and place in jurisprudence. Imam Khomeini first defined ghina as "a delicate and fine human voice" that has the potential to create *tarab*. This definition differs from the famous definitions of ghina which refer to stretching the voice and thrilling trills, because in many forms, ghina is neither a stretched voice nor a thrilling trill, and the mention of these two conditions in some definitions was merely a reflection of the custom of the time (p. 103).
Imam Khomeini holds that since ghina is a category of voice or a quality of voice, not speech or words, it makes no difference in the occurrence of ghina whether the speech is false or wisdom and Quranic verses. Rather, whenever the voice is delicate, soft, fresh, and causes *tarab*, it is ghina. Imam Khomeini also holds that what has been attributed to Fayd Kashani and Muhaqqiq Sabziwari regarding the denial of the prohibition of ghina stems from a lack of understanding of their arguments (pp. 104-105).
Referring to a hadith that is the basis for excepting the ruling on ghina for the Eids of Fitr and Adha from the general prohibition, the author presents Imam Khomeini's view on this matter. According to him, the chain and indication of the hadith are critiqued, and Imam Khomeini believes that one cannot act upon the apparent meaning of this hadith, because none of the jurists have transmitted this exception regarding these days and Eids. He finally concludes that the obligatory precaution, or rather the fatwa, is that based on the stronger opinion, the days of Eid and joy are not excluded from the prohibition of ghina. Regarding the exception of ghina in elegies, Quran recitation, and lamentation, Imam Khomeini holds that since the absolute evidence for ghina applies to a delicate voice that induces *tarab*, and on the other hand, the content of the speech has no role in the prohibition of ghina, therefore he states the stronger opinion to be that the ruling of prohibition is not excepted for ghina in elegies, supplications, and Quran recitation (pp. 105-107).