The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule (Book)
| The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule | |
|---|---|
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| Book Information | |
| Author | Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi |
| Subject | Human Dignity, Inherent Human Rights in Jurisprudence |
| Style | Ijtihadi (Independent Reasoning) |
| Language | Persian |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Saraee |
- Abstract
The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule (in Persian: اصل کرامت انسان به مثابه قاعدهای فقهی) is the title of a book written by Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi, an Iranian Shia jurist (Faqih) and Quranic researcher. This book examines the relationship between the foundations of Shia jurisprudence and the concept of inherent human dignity (Karamat Dhatiyyah). The fundamental question of the book is whether a principle titled "human dignity" can be derived from certain verses of the Holy Quran—such as Quran 17:70—so that it governs over other religious rulings in case of conflict.
The author, in explaining the concept of dignity (Karamah), distinguishes between the two concepts of inherent dignity and contingent (Iqtida'i) or potential (Isti'dadi) dignity. In his view, the concept of "inherent dignity" can be deduced from the religious foundations of Islam and can be the basis for establishing a jurisprudential principle. The book's claim is that in addition to reason and the Quran, several hundred narrations (Riwaiyat) from the Infallibles (a) contain explanations of inherent dignity and its related domains.
This work presents a report of the views of those who oppose human dignity being a principle and responds to them. It also argues that proving such a principle causes it to govern over all religious rulings, similar to the "principle of justice." This matter will have a significant impact on the jurisprudential rulings regarding women, minorities, slavery, and political and governmental rulings. Among the positive points of this work are its concise volume, simple expression, and explicit arguments. On the other hand, some of the author's statements cause a conflation of the meaning of inherent dignity with accidental ('Aradhi) concepts of dignity, such as "the prohibition of insulting human beings," which can be considered among the work's points of critique.
Brief Overview
The book The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule takes a jurisprudential look at this rational principle. In this book, the author attempts to: 1) clarify the concept of dignity in Quranic literature and customary usages; 2) distinguish the two concepts of "inherent dignity" and "contingent (potential) dignity" from one another; 3) prove that "human dignity" must be a principle governing religious rulings; and 4) answer the objections of the critics of this theory. This book is one of the few works specifically dedicated to this subject and its impact on Shia jurisprudence.
Author
The author of the book, Sayyid Mohammad Ali Ayazi, born in 1954 (1333 SH), is an Iranian Shia jurist and Quranic researcher. He is a jurisprudential and Quranic researcher at the Islamic Seminary of Qom and a faculty member at the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran.
Structure
In the introduction of the work, the author addresses the lexical definition of dignity and its terminological meaning in the religious texts of Islam. Then he clarifies the position of the principle of dignity among other principles such as justice. He also explains to what extent the recognition and acknowledgment of the existential dimensions of the human being is necessary for achieving a coherent jurisprudential system.
The main body of the work begins by examining the effects and results of deriving the principle of human dignity and shows what impact this principle will have on the jurist's understanding and interpretation of verses and narrations, what effect it has on the jurist's utilization of the principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh), how it transforms rulings that violate human dignity, and how it answers doubts and objections regarding issues such as "jurisprudence and human rights", "jurisprudence and citizenship rights", and "women's right to vote". In the next chapter, the evidence and foundations of the principle of dignity are examined, evidence such as the verse "And We have certainly honored the children of Adam" (Wa laqad karramna bani Adam) (Quran 17:70) and "Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you" (Inna akramakum 'inda Allahi atqakum) (Quran 49:13). After formulating the content of the mentioned verses, the issues that exist in the path of deriving the principle from these verses are examined: the inherent nature of human dignity, human dignity being a principle, the possibility of using a theological (Kalami) principle in deriving a religious ruling, the scope of the principle of dignity, the method of discovering the criterion of dignity, and examples of conflict between the principle of dignity and jurisprudential rulings.
In concluding the work, the author presents his proposal regarding the establishment of a "Chapter on the Jurisprudence of Dignity" (Bab Fiqh al-Karamah). According to his proposal, in this chapter, those secondary jurisprudential rulings (Furu' al-Fiqh) that will undergo change considering the principle of dignity can be compiled and reviewed.
Methodology
The book The Principle of Human Dignity is fundamentally related to the "foundations of the science of jurisprudence" (Mabani Danish Fiqh); therefore, the possibility of a purely jurisprudential discussion did not exist in it. The author begins his work with a conceptual analysis of "dignity", then states its philosophical and theological position—alongside Quranic evidence and its exegesis—and finally proceeds to show the effects of such a principle in the science of jurisprudence and the process of deriving religious rulings. At this stage, the author enters into independent jurisprudential (Ijtihadi) discussions and utilizes the principial (Usuli) method.
Claims
The author's main claim is that "dignity" is a principle pertaining to the human being and derived from his essence. In the literature of this work, being inherent (Dhati) means: 1) its actual existence in the human being; 2) its commonality among all human beings of any race, religion, etc.; and 3) its exclusivity to the human being and not other creatures. Therefore, firstly, dignity is a matter related to the quiddity (Mahiyyah) of the human being qua human being, and the discussion of acquiring dignity through effort and endeavor is not applicable. Secondly, no ruling in the Sharia can violate the principle of human dignity. Proving this principle will cause a revision in rulings that are based on gender, racial, ethnic, and even religious superiority.
Opposed to this view, there is a theory that, firstly, does not consider dignity inherent to human nature; rather, it maintains that the religious evidence for dignity merely refers to a human being who possesses the conditions of Islam's value system or even the (Shia) denomination (Madhhab), not all human beings. Secondly, it does not consider it a jurisprudential principle and says that it belongs to other fields of knowledge.
The importance of proving the "inherent nature" of human dignity lies in the fact that the "concept of dignity" can only be a jurisprudential principle through this way. Potential and contingent dignity lacks the capacity (Sha'niyyah) to establish the jurisprudential principle of dignity. If dignity were potential and contingent, the door would be left open for inappropriate behavior with non-Muslims, and this matter is contrary to the conduct (Sirah) of the Infallibles (a) (p. 74).
Argument for Inherent and Contingent Dignity
Using rational evidence, Quranic proofs, and narrational reasons, the author argues for inherent human dignity. According to the rational argument, the distinction of humans from other creatures and their nobility over them is due to human will, meaning that which causes human free will (Ikhtiyar) to accept or reject the divine ruling, to agree or disagree with the good, and to choose Heaven or Hell. The main reason for human dignity is this very inherent characteristic of the human being. Therefore, dignity is inherent to the human being. From the content and sometimes explicit statements of the author, it also appears that he considers "human dignity"—alongside the principle of the sovereignty of the will and justice as fairness—a philosophical or ultimately theological principle that governs religious rulings, not that it is itself a jurisprudential principle.
The Quranic argument for the principle of dignity is based on Quran 17:70. From the content of this verse and verses with a similar theme, it appears that dignity fundamentally belongs to God, and He has bestowed it upon the human being. This verse begins with the expression "O children of Adam" (Ya bani Adam); thus, it is a ruling about the human species and not a specific group of humans. Also, this verse is not in the position of reporting an event in the past; rather, it enumerates dignity as an inherent characteristic of the human being. Other Quranic signs for inherent human dignity can be listed as follows: the verse of bearing the trust (Amanah), being God's vicegerent (Khilafah Allah) (in the sense of manifesting divine names), the praising of human creation, and the breathing of the divine spirit (Nafkh Ruh Ilahi). It seems the author's final view is that, from the perspective of the Quran, the meaning and importance of dignity—alongside concepts like justice, good (Ma'ruf), and benevolence (Ihsan)—are clear to its audience, and it only points to it by way of guidance to the ruling of reason (p. 83).
The third argument of the book is an argument based on narrations. According to the author, contrary to the claim of opponents of human dignity being a principle, several hundred narrations from the Infallibles (a) contain explanations of dignity and its domains. Although the concept of dignity is not explicitly stated in some of these narrations, they include concepts such as the preciousness of the human being and the safeguarding of human rights, including disbelievers, the dead, and even human fetuses (p. 69). In addition, many other concepts that are called jurisprudential principles today—such as the principle of permissibility (Hilliyyah) and purity (Taharah)—did not appear under the title of a principle in Shia narrational literature.
Responding to the Arguments of Opponents of Dignity as a Principle
The author attempts to briefly state the arguments of the opponents of human dignity as a principle and respond to them. The summary of the objections and the author's answers is as follows:
- Conflating description and prescription: Some maintain that one cannot derive a legal and jurisprudential prescription from the description of a factual matter (the preciousness of the human being) (p. 103). The author responds that due to the sensitivity and importance of the subject, there is a strong connection between this existential truth and the prescriptive command derived from it, and if this were not the case, mentioning it in the Quran would be futile (Laghw).
- Lack of connection between a theological principle and a jurisprudential rule: The principle of human dignity—assuming it is proven—is a theological principle, and a legal or jurisprudential derivation from it is not possible. In response, the author, pointing to various verses, shows that normative (Hanjari) jurisprudential and legal propositions can be derived from descriptive theological propositions.
- Conflict with definitive and essential rulings: This principle conflicts with definitive rulings such as retaliation (Qisas), stoning (Rajm), etc. The author replies: (First) The principle of dignity only conflicts with Ash'arite-style interpretations of the Quran, not with the explicit text of the Quran. (Second) A careful examination of the narrations shows that the claimed conflicts do not actually exist. (Third) Ultimately, many rulings that are contrary to human dignity and are assumed to be definitive are fundamentally based on solitary (Wahid) or multiple but not widely transmitted (Mutazafir) reports.
Effects of the Principle of Dignity on Jurisprudence
According to Ayazi's viewpoint, accepting human dignity as a jurisprudential principle is effective in deriving a religious ruling in various ways. 1) It will direct interpretation. 2) It is effective in applying jurisprudential rules; for example, it can serve as one of the main factors of preference (Murajjihat) in resolving conflicts of evidence (Ta'adul wa Tarajih). The application of inherent dignity to its instances is typological (Naw'i) (meaning it depends on the discernment of the human species, not individual discernments) and customary ('Urfi) (meaning its instances are variable depending on changes in time and place).
This principle can also be the basis for many principial (Usuli) rules, such as the principle of non-guardianship (Asalah 'Adam al-Wilayah) (that no one is inherently the guardian of another), the principle of validity (Asalah al-Sihhah) (that the actions of individuals possess legal and religious validity), the principle of exemption (Asalah al-Bara'ah) (the initial innocence of a human being from crime or error), and the principle of purity (Asalah al-Taharah) (the principle of the non-impurity of a human being, whether Muslim or non-Muslim).
Proving this ruling also has a serious impact on the rulings of slavery, whether this issue was imposed on Islam—and the rulings of "emancipation" ('Itq) were Islam's way of gradually freeing society from slavery—or whether it is a reality endorsed by Islam. Also, this principle opposes rulings that are based on gender discrimination and male superiority. This principle negates rulings that humiliate the people of the covenant (Ahl al-Dhimmah) or rulings that negate the citizenship rights of those born of fornication (Walad al-Zina) (pp. 141-157).
The Principle of Dignity Among Contemporary Jurists
The author cites the opinion and understanding of some contemporary jurists as corroboration for his own understanding. In his view, Morteza Motahhari's rational argument for the principle of justice governing the secondary rulings (Furu') is like arguing for human dignity as a principle. Hussein-Ali Montazeri, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and Yousef Saanei have also pointed to this issue being a principle. In the view of some of them, the principle of human dignity fundamentally includes a set of principles that present the type of worldview governing religious rulings in the station of derivation (p. 95).
Evaluation of the Work
Concise volume, avoidance of verbosity, explicit arguments, and clear expression are among the merits of this work. However, considering that this book is one of the first works to specifically address this subject, it has the potential for improvement and enhancement in various aspects. For example, the structure of presenting the materials is such that it has sometimes led to repetition. Also, the author has included Arabic quotes in parts of the book, which would have been appropriate to use their Persian translation in a Persian-language book.
Possibility of Bestowing Dignity
The most fundamental claim of this book is the "inherent nature of human dignity." Proving this claim will cause it to be a principle governing all jurisprudential principles and rules; because no principle or rule can contradict the inherent characteristics of its subject.
In philosophical literature, human dignity refers to inherent attributes in a human being whose negation is equivalent to negating human identity.[1] In legal literature as well, based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human dignity refers to fundamental rights that are common among all human beings—regardless of any kind of difference—and their deprivation is not permitted under any circumstances.[2] Raising discussions such as examining the cremation of corpses, financial assistance to the needy, and insulting ideological opponents alongside and on the same level as the discussion of freedom of choice and the negation of gender and racial discrimination shows—even though all these have been distinguished from some instances of contingent dignity—that the foundation of the book is not based on this fundamental distinction. This lack of distinction has caused a conflation between inherent and contingent dignity in some cases. Examples such as examining the issue of women's hijab, the sanctity of the family, fulfilling covenants, delaying benevolence, and forgiveness (pp. 133-136) under the concept of dignity indicate that this concept has been considered on par with magnanimity or ultimately the proximity of human status to God (p. 62).
Also, from some of the author's propositions, it appears that "human dignity" is the effect of God's bestowal (p. 55) or, in other words, an adornment with which the human being has been "adorned" (p. 61). Such a claim will lead to the non-inherent nature of this principle, and ultimately, other jurisprudential principles might prevent its application. Therefore, it seems that in parts of this work, there is no clear distinction between human dignity and concepts such as the sanctity (Hurmah) of human beings, the negation of insult, humiliation, and disrespect to human beings.
Exegesis of Narrations
Throughout the work, the importance of the narrations of the Infallibles (a) in the discussion of human dignity is pointed out; but these narrations are not addressed in detail in any chapter. One of the possibilities that could have led to greater richness of the work was to examine the narrations using a research method—such as the semantics of narrations, or their historical analysis—and to show the importance of the discussion of human dignity in the literature of the Infallibles (a).