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* '''Abstract'''
* '''Abstract'''


*'''Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh''' is a book written by [[Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]] in the field of [[Political Fiqh]]. In this work, the concept of jihad is explained in an argumentative-critical manner based on the views of [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]]. By critiquing Khoei's perspective on jihad, the author delineates the legitimacy and scope of jihad in Islam. Khoei divides jihad into three types (jihad against polytheists, the People of the Book, and rebels) and considers it obligatory in these cases.
*'''Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh''' (in Persian: [[:fa:جهاد_در_فقه_معاصر_شیعه_(کتاب)|جهاد در فقه معاصر شیعه]]) is a book written by [[Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]] in the field of [[Political Fiqh]]. In this work, the concept of jihad is explained in an argumentative-critical manner based on the views of [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]]. By critiquing Khoei's perspective on jihad, the author delineates the legitimacy and scope of jihad in Islam. Khoei divides jihad into three types (jihad against polytheists, the People of the Book, and rebels) and considers it obligatory in these cases.


In contrast, the author critiques this view, arguing that jihad against polytheists is obligatory only if they commit hostile acts, and fighting the [[People of the Book]] is obligatory only if they fail to adhere to the dhimma pact. He also critiques Khoei's view on the [[Guardianship of the Jurist]] and his role in the decision-making process for jihad.
In contrast, the author critiques this view, arguing that jihad against polytheists is obligatory only if they commit hostile acts, and fighting the People of the Book is obligatory only if they fail to adhere to the dhimma pact. He also critiques Khoei's view on the [[Guardianship of the Jurist]] and his role in the decision-making process for jihad.


In the discussion of [[rebellion|rebels]] (*bughat*), Soroush Mahallati, by critiquing the views of jurists and their evidence, considers the rebels to be among the believers and believes that they only leave the religion if they become [[Nasibi|Nasibis]]. By examining the narrations about rising up against an [[unjust ruler]], the author concludes that these hadiths only prohibit violent actions.
In the discussion of [[rebellion|rebels]] (BaghybughatBaghy), Soroush Mahallati, by critiquing the views of jurists and their evidence, considers the rebels to be among the believers and believes that they only leave the religion if they become [[Nasibi|Nasibis]]. By examining the narrations about rising up against an [[unjust ruler]], the author concludes that these hadiths only prohibit violent actions.


== Introduction and Structure of the Book ==
== Introduction and Structure of the Book ==
*Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh* is a book in the field of [[Political Fiqh]] that examines the issue of jihad from a jurisprudential perspective. In this text, the fatwa-argumentative writing of [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]] on the subject of jihad (published within the book *Minhaj al-Salihin*) is the central focus, and the author provides an argumentative-critical explanation of it. In addition to a detailed examination of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's views, the author also considers the opinions of other contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Vahid Khorasani]], [[Jawad Tabrizi]], Dia' al-Din al-'Iraqi, [[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah]], [[Hussein-Ali Montazeri]], and [[Murtada Mutahhari]].
*Jihad in Contemporary Shia FiqhBaghy is a book in the field of [[Political Fiqh]] that examines the issue of jihad from a jurisprudential perspective. In this text, the fatwa-argumentative writing of [[Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei]] on the subject of jihad (published within the book BaghyMinhaj al-SalihinBaghy) is the central focus, and the author provides an argumentative-critical explanation of it. In addition to a detailed examination of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's views, the author also considers the opinions of other contemporary jurists such as [[Husayn Vahid Khorasani]], [[Jawad Tabrizi]], Dia' al-Din al-'Iraqi, [[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah]], [[Hussein-Ali Montazeri]], and [[Murtada Mutahhari]].


The discussions in this book are organized into two main parts. The work lacks a list of sources and a detailed table of contents; a general table of contents is provided at the beginning of the book. The first part examines the types of jihad and the conditions for its obligation during the era of the Imam's presence, and the second part discusses the legitimacy or illegitimacy of [[offensive jihad]] in the era of occultation. The first part covers jihad against polytheists, jihad against the People of the Book, jihad against rebels, and the conditions for the obligation of jihad. The second part consists of five discussions: the legitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the illegitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the philosophy of the Imam's permission for jihad, guardianship over jihad, and rising with the sword against an unjust ruler.
The discussions in this book are organized into two main parts. The work lacks a list of sources and a detailed table of contents; a general table of contents is provided at the beginning of the book. The first part examines the types of jihad and the conditions for its obligation during the era of the Imam's presence, and the second part discusses the legitimacy or illegitimacy of [[offensive jihad]] in the era of occultation. The first part covers jihad against polytheists, jihad against the People of the Book, jihad against rebels, and the conditions for the obligation of jihad. The second part consists of five discussions: the legitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the illegitimacy of offensive jihad in the era of occultation, the philosophy of the Imam's permission for jihad, guardianship over jihad, and rising with the sword against an unjust ruler.


The author of the book, [[Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]] (b. 1340 SH), is a teacher of jurisprudence and its principles in the seminary and a researcher in the science of jurisprudence, especially political fiqh. The books [[The State and the Implementation of Sharia (Book)|*The State and the Implementation of Sharia*]] and [[Instruments of Diversion and Music (Book)|*Instruments of Diversion and Music*]] are among the author's other works. The book *Jihad in Contemporary Shia Fiqh* was published by Miras-e Ahl-e Qalam publications in 1396 SH in 184 pages.
The author of the book, Mohammad Soroush Mahallati (b. 1340 SH), is a teacher of jurisprudence and its principles in the seminary and a researcher in the science of jurisprudence, especially political fiqh. The books [[The State and the Implementation of Sharia (Book)|BaghyThe State and the Implementation of ShariaBaghy]] and [[Instruments of Diversion and Music (Book)|BaghyInstruments of Diversion and MusicBaghy]] are among the author's other works. The book BaghyJihad in Contemporary Shia FiqhBaghy was published by Miras-e Ahl-e Qalam publications in 1396 SH in 184 pages.


== Jihad against Polytheists ==
== Jihad against Polytheists ==
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In Soroush Mahallati's view, based on Quran 2:190 and 9:13, fighting polytheists who pose no harm to the believers is baseless. He also believes that, according to Quran 60:8 and 9, fighting polytheists is only justified if they have killed or exiled Muslims. However, regarding polytheists who have not exhibited such behavior, good conduct towards them is recommended (pp. 23-25).
In Soroush Mahallati's view, based on Quran 2:190 and 9:13, fighting polytheists who pose no harm to the believers is baseless. He also believes that, according to Quran 60:8 and 9, fighting polytheists is only justified if they have killed or exiled Muslims. However, regarding polytheists who have not exhibited such behavior, good conduct towards them is recommended (pp. 23-25).


The author responds to the objection that the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah relate to a time of Islam's weakness and have been abrogated by Quran 9:5 ("kill the polytheists wherever you find them" - the verse is not quoted correctly in the book). According to him, firstly, the verse of Surah al-Tawbah is general and the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah are specific, and a general rule is specified by a specific one. Secondly, the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah cannot be abrogated because they call for justice and good conduct and are among the clear verses (*muhkamat*) of the Quran (pp. 25-27).
The author responds to the objection that the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah relate to a time of Islam's weakness and have been abrogated by Quran 9:5 ("kill the polytheists wherever you find them" - the verse is not quoted correctly in the book). According to him, firstly, the verse of Surah al-Tawbah is general and the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah are specific, and a general rule is specified by a specific one. Secondly, the verses of Surah al-Mumtahanah cannot be abrogated because they call for justice and good conduct and are among the clear verses (BaghymuhkamatBaghy) of the Quran (pp. 25-27).


=== The Incorrectness of Reducing Offensive Jihad to Defensive Jihad ===
=== The Incorrectness of Reducing Offensive Jihad to Defensive Jihad ===
[[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i]], in arguing for the absolute obligation of jihad against polytheists, has reduced [[offensive jihad]] to [[defensive jihad]]. According to him, since monotheism is rooted in human nature (*fitra*), and polytheists are deprived of this right due to the oppression of tyrants or due to imposed ignorance, it is necessary for Muslims to eliminate all polytheism, because defending innate rights is obligatory, both for those deprived of those rights and for others (pp. 27-29).
[[Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i]], in arguing for the absolute obligation of jihad against polytheists, has reduced offensive jihad to [[defensive jihad]]. According to him, since monotheism is rooted in human nature (BaghyfitraBaghy), and polytheists are deprived of this right due to the oppression of tyrants or due to imposed ignorance, it is necessary for Muslims to eliminate all polytheism, because defending innate rights is obligatory, both for those deprived of those rights and for others (pp. 27-29).


The author, who considers jihad a form of interaction between Muslims and other nations, does not find this argument presentable to the world. He also sees this interpretation as conflicting with the Quranic view that humans are free to accept religion (pp. 31-35). According to Soroush, [[Quran 2:256|the verse "There is no compulsion in religion"]] indicates human freedom in accepting religion, and other interpretations of this verse (like Mr. Khoei's interpretation based on a distinction between freedom and choice) are not acceptable (pp. 38-44).
The author, who considers jihad a form of interaction between Muslims and other nations, does not find this argument presentable to the world. He also sees this interpretation as conflicting with the Quranic view that humans are free to accept religion (pp. 31-35). According to Soroush, [[Quran 2:256|the verse "There is no compulsion in religion"]] indicates human freedom in accepting religion, and other interpretations of this verse (like Mr. Khoei's interpretation based on a distinction between freedom and choice) are not acceptable (pp. 38-44).
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According to some jurists, the [[verses of fighting]] are not absolute; rather, other verses have restricted them to cases where the disbelievers attack Muslims. In contrast, other jurists believe that the verses of fighting abrogate those restrictive verses, and for this reason, the ruling on jihad against the People of the Book is also absolute. Soroush Mahallati prefers the first opinion and believes that the restrictive verses cannot be abrogated because fighting non-aggressors is an instance of [[transgression]].
According to some jurists, the [[verses of fighting]] are not absolute; rather, other verses have restricted them to cases where the disbelievers attack Muslims. In contrast, other jurists believe that the verses of fighting abrogate those restrictive verses, and for this reason, the ruling on jihad against the People of the Book is also absolute. Soroush Mahallati prefers the first opinion and believes that the restrictive verses cannot be abrogated because fighting non-aggressors is an instance of [[transgression]].


The author, who considers the [[Jizya|collection of jizya from the People of the Book]] to be relevant only to those residing in the Abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), deems fighting the People of the Book who are in the Abode of Disbelief (*Dar al-Kufr*) to be baseless (as long as they have not attacked Muslims). He also believes that the Abode of Disbelief cannot be turned into the Abode of Islam by force and pressure (pp. 55-63).
The author, who considers the [[Jizya|collection of jizya from the People of the Book]] to be relevant only to those residing in the Abode of Islam (BaghyDar al-IslamBaghy), deems fighting the People of the Book who are in the Abode of Disbelief (BaghyDar al-KufrBaghy) to be baseless (as long as they have not attacked Muslims). He also believes that the Abode of Disbelief cannot be turned into the Abode of Islam by force and pressure (pp. 55-63).


==Jihad against Rebels==
==Jihad against Rebels==
Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei divided [[rebellion|rebels]] (*bughat*) into two categories: 1. Those who rebel against an infallible Imam; 2. Those who rebel against a group of Muslims. In Khoei's view, according to the [[Quran 9:9|verse of rebellion]], those who rebel against Muslims should be invited to reconciliation, and if they do not accept peace, they should be fought. However, since individuals who rebel against the Imam have left Islam and their blood is unprotected, they are not included in the verse, and they must be fought without being invited to reconciliation (pp. 65-68).
Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei divided [[rebellion|rebels]] (BaghybughatBaghy) into two categories: 1. Those who rebel against an infallible Imam; 2. Those who rebel against a group of Muslims. In Khoei's view, according to the [[Quran 9:9|verse of rebellion]], those who rebel against Muslims should be invited to reconciliation, and if they do not accept peace, they should be fought. However, since individuals who rebel against the Imam have left Islam and their blood is unprotected, they are not included in the verse, and they must be fought without being invited to reconciliation (pp. 65-68).


In Soroush Mahallati's opinion, in Quranic terminology, rebels are a group of believers and are within the fold of Muslims. He believes that as long as the rebels have not become Nasibis, they are not subject to the proofs of disbelief and impurity and are not jurisprudentially considered disbelievers. Indeed, Imam Ali (a) also called those who rebelled against him, and even the Syrians, his brothers. Therefore, those who rebel against the infallible Imam are also included in the verse of rebellion and must be invited to reconcile before being fought. According to the author, since the verse of rebellion includes rebels, it will, *a fortiori*, also include rebels against a just, non-infallible ruler (pp. 73-77).
In Soroush Mahallati's opinion, in Quranic terminology, rebels are a group of believers and are within the fold of Muslims. He believes that as long as the rebels have not become Nasibis, they are not subject to the proofs of disbelief and impurity and are not jurisprudentially considered disbelievers. Indeed, Imam Ali (a) also called those who rebelled against him, and even the Syrians, his brothers. Therefore, those who rebel against the infallible Imam are also included in the verse of rebellion and must be invited to reconcile before being fought. According to the author, since the verse of rebellion includes rebels, it will, Baghya fortioriBaghy, also include rebels against a just, non-infallible ruler (pp. 73-77).


==Conditions for the Obligation of Jihad==
==Conditions for the Obligation of Jihad==
Khoei stated three conditions for the obligation of jihad: 1. Being legally accountable (including having reason and reaching puberty), 2. Having the ability, 3. Being male. Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, based on the *sirah* and the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah, does not consider jihad obligatory for women. In the author's view, the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah is problematic in its chain and indication and cannot be relied upon. He raises the question of whether jihad is not obligatory for women or is forbidden for them, providing inconclusive evidence for both possibilities. In the author's opinion, even if jihad is forbidden for women, in emergency situations, jihad and defensive training may become obligatory for them (pp. 81-90).
Khoei stated three conditions for the obligation of jihad: 1. Being legally accountable (including having reason and reaching puberty), 2. Having the ability, 3. Being male. Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, based on the BaghysirahBaghy and the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah, does not consider jihad obligatory for women. In the author's view, the narration of Asbagh ibn Nubatah is problematic in its chain and indication and cannot be relied upon. He raises the question of whether jihad is not obligatory for women or is forbidden for them, providing inconclusive evidence for both possibilities. In the author's opinion, even if jihad is forbidden for women, in emergency situations, jihad and defensive training may become obligatory for them (pp. 81-90).


In Soroush Mahallati's view, the conditions for jihad differ from the conditions for other obligations. Although the conditions for obligations like prayer and fasting are purely devotional, in jihad, these conditions are subject to the [[exigencies of time and place]] and it is possible for the Islamic ruler to set a different age requirement for jihad. Similarly, the condition of ability (physical and financial power) must be considered in proportion to the time and circumstances; having the ability for hand-to-hand combat in the past is different from having the ability for war in the present time. The ruler can also, within his sphere of authority ([[unregulated domain|mintaqat al-faragh]] or broader), set other conditions for participation in jihad (pp. 91-94).
In Soroush Mahallati's view, the conditions for jihad differ from the conditions for other obligations. Although the conditions for obligations like prayer and fasting are purely devotional, in jihad, these conditions are subject to the [[exigencies of time and place]] and it is possible for the Islamic ruler to set a different age requirement for jihad. Similarly, the condition of ability (physical and financial power) must be considered in proportion to the time and circumstances; having the ability for hand-to-hand combat in the past is different from having the ability for war in the present time. The ruler can also, within his sphere of authority ([[The unlegislated zone|mintaqat al-faragh]] or broader), set other conditions for participation in jihad (pp. 91-94).


==Examining the Proofs for the Legitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation==
==Examining the Proofs for the Legitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation==
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==Examining the Proofs for the Illegitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation==
==Examining the Proofs for the Illegitimacy of Offensive Jihad in the Era of Occultation==
For the majority view (the illegitimacy of offensive jihad), arguments have been made based on consensus, narrations, and the legitimacy of collecting jizya in the era of occultation. Khoei considers the consensus to be unproven, and if proven, he considers it to be a derived consensus (*madraki*) (p. 112). However, in his view, given the legitimacy of taking jizya from the People of the Book in the era of occultation, one can argue for the permissibility of offensive jihad in this era (p. 125).
For the majority view (the illegitimacy of offensive jihad), arguments have been made based on consensus, narrations, and the legitimacy of collecting jizya in the era of occultation. Khoei considers the consensus to be unproven, and if proven, he considers it to be a derived consensus (BaghymadrakiBaghy) (p. 112). However, in his view, given the legitimacy of taking jizya from the People of the Book in the era of occultation, one can argue for the permissibility of offensive jihad in this era (p. 125).


Soroush Mahallati agrees with Khoei regarding the consensus and does not find such a consensus provable (p. 112). However, in his opinion, since the permissibility of taking jizya in the era of occultation is not a matter of consensus, the permissibility of offensive jihad will also be questionable (pp. 125-126).
Soroush Mahallati agrees with Khoei regarding the consensus and does not find such a consensus provable (p. 112). However, in his opinion, since the permissibility of taking jizya in the era of occultation is not a matter of consensus, the permissibility of offensive jihad will also be questionable (pp. 125-126).
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==Guardianship over Jihad==
==Guardianship over Jihad==
Contrary to the usual view of jurists, who consider guardianship over jihad in the era of occultation to be one of the functions of the guardian of the affair (*wali al-amr*), Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, in a section of the book *Minhaj*, has entrusted the management of jihad to experts, and in another section, he has entrusted it to the jurist under the rubric of [[matters of hisbah]] (*umur hisbiyyah*). In explaining the second statement, Khoei believes that the jurist must consult with experts and, if necessary, issue an order for war and personally take command of the war to prevent chaos (pp. 141-142).
Contrary to the usual view of jurists, who consider guardianship over jihad in the era of occultation to be one of the functions of the guardian of the affair (Baghywali al-amrBaghy), Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, in a section of the book BaghyMinhajBaghy, has entrusted the management of jihad to experts, and in another section, he has entrusted it to the jurist under the rubric of [[matters of hisbah]] (Baghyumur hisbiyyahBaghy). In explaining the second statement, Khoei believes that the jurist must consult with experts and, if necessary, issue an order for war and personally take command of the war to prevent chaos (pp. 141-142).


According to the author, Khoei does not believe in the textual proofs for the guardianship of the jurist and seeks to solve the issue through rational means. For this reason, his view is problematic, because governance is a specialized matter, and a jurist as a jurist has no expertise in administering the country, and his view is the same as that of a non-jurist. In the author's opinion, the final decision by the jurist after consultation does not resolve this issue, because a person who is not an expert does not become knowledgeable and an expert after consulting. Also, in Soroush's belief, there is no connection between jurisprudence and preventing chaos. The author, who believes that jihad is carried out based on apparent interests and not on real interests, gives precedence to the diagnosis of experts over that of the jurist. Therefore, Soroush Mahallati considers Khoei's first view defensible and his second statement incorrect (pp. 143-157).
According to the author, Khoei does not believe in the textual proofs for the guardianship of the jurist and seeks to solve the issue through rational means. For this reason, his view is problematic, because governance is a specialized matter, and a jurist as a jurist has no expertise in administering the country, and his view is the same as that of a non-jurist. In the author's opinion, the final decision by the jurist after consultation does not resolve this issue, because a person who is not an expert does not become knowledgeable and an expert after consulting. Also, in Soroush's belief, there is no connection between jurisprudence and preventing chaos. The author, who believes that jihad is carried out based on apparent interests and not on real interests, gives precedence to the diagnosis of experts over that of the jurist. Therefore, Soroush Mahallati considers Khoei's first view defensible and his second statement incorrect (pp. 143-157).
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# The jurist must make the final decision in consultation with experts (such as the Supreme National Security Council). This foundation faces the same previous problem, as the guardian jurist does not become an expert after consulting.
# The jurist must make the final decision in consultation with experts (such as the Supreme National Security Council). This foundation faces the same previous problem, as the guardian jurist does not become an expert after consulting.
# The jurist must delegate these matters to experts, as [[Sayyid Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] did. In the author's opinion, this theory moves governance away from centralism and individualism, provided that the political arena is genuinely open to political parties and groups (pp. 144-146).
# The jurist must delegate these matters to experts, as [[Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini|Imam Khomeini]] did. In the author's opinion, this theory moves governance away from centralism and individualism, provided that the political arena is genuinely open to political parties and groups (pp. 144-146).


==Rising up against an Unjust Ruler==
==Rising up against an Unjust Ruler==
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In Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's view, the narrations about rising up against an unjust ruler are not related to the discussion of jihad. However, the author, with the argument that fighting injustice is more important than inviting to Islam, and also with the explanation that rising up against an unjust ruler is a defensive jihad and is more important than offensive jihad, considers these narrations relevant. According to this explanation, jihad against disbelievers is not permissible, because in these hadiths, rising up against an unjust ruler (which is more important than jihad against disbelievers) is forbidden. However, after examination, the author concludes that in these hadiths, only violent actions are forbidden (pp. 159-162).
In Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei's view, the narrations about rising up against an unjust ruler are not related to the discussion of jihad. However, the author, with the argument that fighting injustice is more important than inviting to Islam, and also with the explanation that rising up against an unjust ruler is a defensive jihad and is more important than offensive jihad, considers these narrations relevant. According to this explanation, jihad against disbelievers is not permissible, because in these hadiths, rising up against an unjust ruler (which is more important than jihad against disbelievers) is forbidden. However, after examination, the author concludes that in these hadiths, only violent actions are forbidden (pp. 159-162).


The first narration is the *Sahihah* of 'Is ibn Qasim, which the author considers incomplete in its indication because in this narration, only the character and motive of Zayd ibn Ali are confirmed, but given the circumstances of the time and place of the uprising, the uprising itself was not approved. The second narration is the *Marfu'ah* of Rib'i, which has a problem in its chain of transmission. The author raises various possibilities about the content of Rib'i's hadith, and ultimately confirms its indication of the impermissibility of rising up and responds to its problems. The third narration (from the introduction to the Sahifa Sajjadiyya) does not have a reliable chain. Some jurists, based on the qualifier "from us" (*minna*) in this narration, believe that this narration refers to the uprising of the Imams and the Sayyids close to them and does not include the uprising of Shias. But Soroush does not see this view as consistent with the goal mentioned in the narration (the emergence of the Sufyani) and believes that this narration includes all Shia uprisings (pp. 162-176).
The first narration is the BaghySahihahBaghy of 'Is ibn Qasim, which the author considers incomplete in its indication because in this narration, only the character and motive of Zayd ibn Ali are confirmed, but given the circumstances of the time and place of the uprising, the uprising itself was not approved. The second narration is the BaghyMarfu'ahBaghy of Rib'i, which has a problem in its chain of transmission. The author raises various possibilities about the content of Rib'i's hadith, and ultimately confirms its indication of the impermissibility of rising up and responds to its problems. The third narration (from the introduction to the Sahifa Sajjadiyya) does not have a reliable chain. Some jurists, based on the qualifier "from us" (BaghyminnaBaghy) in this narration, believe that this narration refers to the uprising of the Imams and the Sayyids close to them and does not include the uprising of Shias. But Soroush does not see this view as consistent with the goal mentioned in the narration (the emergence of the Sufyani) and believes that this narration includes all Shia uprisings (pp. 162-176).


The author compares the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil with the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, and believes that these narrations are not contradictory and that the narrations prohibiting uprising state an instance where [[enjoining good and forbidding evil]] is not permissible. According to Soroush Mahallati, the jurisprudential and practical approach of jurists of not getting involved with the wielders of power, especially in situations that may have dangerous and corrupting consequences, is not only influenced by the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, but they have also been influenced by the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil (pp. 177-183).
The author compares the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil with the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, and believes that these narrations are not contradictory and that the narrations prohibiting uprising state an instance where [[enjoining good and forbidding evil]] is not permissible. According to Soroush Mahallati, the jurisprudential and practical approach of jurists of not getting involved with the wielders of power, especially in situations that may have dangerous and corrupting consequences, is not only influenced by the narrations prohibiting rising up against an unjust ruler, but they have also been influenced by the narrations on enjoining good and forbidding evil (pp. 177-183).


[[Category:Bibliographical Articles]]
[[category: books by Mohammad Surush Mahallati]]
[[Category:Books by Mohammad Soroush Mahallati]]
[[Category:Books on Political Fiqh in Persian]]
[[Category:Books on Political Fiqh in Persian]]
[[category:book review]]
[[Category:Bibliography Articles]]
[[fa:جهاد در فقه معاصر شیعه (کتاب)]]
[[fa:جهاد در فقه معاصر شیعه (کتاب)]]