Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations (Book)
| Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations | |
|---|---|
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| Book Information | |
| Author | Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi |
| Subject | Political jurisprudence |
| Language | Persian |
| Volumes | 1 |
| Pages | 484 |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Imam Sadiq University |
| Publication Place | Tehran |
| Publication Date | 2023 (1402 SH) |
| Printing | First |
- Abstract
Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations (انتخابات و فقه سیاسی شیعه؛ مبانی و الزامها) is a book in the field of political jurisprudence, authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University. In this work, considering the close connection between the foundations of political thought and the formation of political structures, the author begins his discussion with the foundations of elections. Given the importance of the foundations of the state's legitimacy in Shia political thought, he examines and analyzes it in a separate chapter. Subsequently, bearing in mind that jurisprudential research means issuing a Sharia ruling for subjects—or issues—he addresses the issues of elections.
Relying on the principle of monotheism (tawhid) and the presumption of the absence of guardianship (istishab 'adam al-wilayah), the author rejects any domination over human beings without rational or transmitted evidence (dalil naqli). He argues that guardianship is granted only to certain individuals due to the judgment of intellect and the necessity of governance, making obedience to them obligatory. He considers social life without a government impossible because some affairs cannot be managed individually and require a ruler. He places the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency (khilafat Allah) as the foundation of popular sovereignty and considers political participation an undeniable right, without which a government is not legitimate. He rejects dictatorship and views the people's participation in decision-making as the best way to combat tyranny; elections are a means to preserve people's rights and their participation in decision-making, although their nature is more about shaping decisions. The author considers the duties of the Islamic government to be gaining public satisfaction, social discipline, and guidance. He views the majority vote not as a definitive authoritative proof (hujjah), but as a preferable option (tarjih), considering it valid only in the absence of other preferrers. He considers the right to be elected negated in affairs pertaining to guardianship (umur wilayi) and permissible in non-guardianship affairs (umur ghayr wilayi). Of course, only qualified individuals—such as Muslims, Shias, those of integrity, and those possessing religious knowledge—can become candidates, and he does not consider announcing candidacy without the approval of elites to be appropriate. Regarding voting, although the foundation of divine vicegerency might lead to unequal voting rights, the principle of the absence of guardianship creates challenges for the right to vote in guardianship matters, which can be answered by distinguishing between guardianship (wilayah) and compliance (tawalli).
Overview and Structure Report
The book "Elections and Shia Political Jurisprudence: Foundations and Obligations," authored by Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq Kazemi, a faculty member at Imam Sadiq (a) University, is a work in the field of political jurisprudence that examines the issue of elections from the perspective of Shia political jurisprudence. This work, the first edition of which was published in 2023 (1402 SH) by Imam Sadiq (a) University Press, is organized in 488 pages.
The structure of the book is arranged into three chapters. At the beginning, the table of contents and the introduction are presented, and at the end, the sources and indices are included. The first chapter is dedicated to examining the role of the people and the foundations of the legitimacy of the Islamic government in the thought of contemporary jurists (fuqaha). In it, the author introduces and analyzes four categories of theories in this field during the contemporary era; including the appointment theory (nadhariyyat al-nasb), the appointment and election theory (nadhariyyat al-nasb wa al-nakhab), the assumption of responsibility theory (nadhariyyat al-tasaddi), and reactive theories (pp. 33–128). The second chapter addresses the foundations of elections in Shia jurisprudence and discusses various principles and foundations such as the principle of the absence of guardianship, humanity's divine vicegerency, the negation of dictatorship in Islamic thought, the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the status and effect of the majority vote, the rule of preserving the system (hifz al-nizam), etc. (pp. 129–286). In the third chapter, the obligations of elections from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence are examined. Among its topics are the right to be elected, announcing candidacy, the qualification of candidates, voting, campaign requirements, financial issues of campaigns, transparency, and supervision (pp. 287–448).
Examining the Foundations of Elections from a Jurisprudential Perspective
The Principle of the Absence of Guardianship
Relying on fundamental principles such as monotheism (tawhid), the free creation of humans, the presumption of the absence of guardianship (istishab 'adam al-wilayah), as well as verses (ayat) and narrations (riwayat) that restrict guardianship to God, the author rejects any domination and guardianship over human beings, unless rational or transmitted evidence proves otherwise. In his view, standing opposite the "principle of the absence of guardianship" is the judgment of intellect regarding the necessity of the existence of a government and a ruler; therefore, God Almighty, by virtue of this necessity, has excepted certain individuals from the rule of the absence of guardianship and granted them guardianship. Consequently, obedience to these individuals is obligatory and necessary (pp. 129–145).
By resorting to the rational proof regarding the impossibility of realizing social life without the existence of a governmental system, the author deduces the necessity of forming a government. He believes that in social life there are matters that neither possess the capability of individual management nor can be left unmanaged; hence, an individual must be appointed as the "ruler" to manage these affairs (pp. 145–151).
Humanity's Divine Vicegerency
The author founds the proof of the right to popular sovereignty on the unconditionality (itlaq) of the evidences for the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. The result of this viewpoint is unconditionality in humanity's succession (khilafah) from God. This unconditionality, in the realm of creation (takwin), means the permissibility of human disposal over the earth to build and develop it, and in the legislative realm (tashri'), it means humanity's right to govern the earth. Based on this, human beings possess the right to govern, and this very right is considered the foundation of their political participation. Therefore, in this theory, the right to sovereignty and political participation is counted among the undeniable rights of the people, such that without referring to public votes, no government will possess legitimacy (pp. 152–166).
Negation of Dictatorship and Tyranny in Islamic Thought
After elucidating the condemnation of tyranny (jabariyyah) in Islamic narrations, the author analyzes the concept of "tyrant" (jabbar) by referring to its lexical and exegetical meanings, and then presents solutions for the ruler to be freed from this title. These solutions form the foundations of electoral thought in an Islamic government. In his belief, the participation of the people and the involvement of a group of them in the ruler's decision-making removes the description of tyranny from him. Elections are one of the effective tools toward observing the people's rights by the ruler, and simultaneously, involving the people in some of the macro-political decisions. The author clarifies that elections in their current form have more of a "decision-shaping" nature than "consultation" (mashwarah); nevertheless, delegating a part of decision-making to the people can be a path to exit despotism (pp. 183–209).
The Duties of the Islamic Government Towards the People and the Status of the Majority Vote
In elucidating the duties of the Islamic government towards the people, the author enumerates three main duties that can be considered the foundation for the formation of the institution of elections: first, gaining public satisfaction; second, disciplining and bringing order to society; and third, education and guidance (pp. 209–228).
In the discussion of the majority vote, the author proposes a theory in which the majority vote is posited not out of independent authority (hujjiyyah), but as a criterion and a preferrer (murajjih). Based on this viewpoint, whenever an issue has the capability of being referred to public votes, the option that the majority leans towards is recognized as the final choice. The proofs that the proponents of this theory have established to prove it are: the proof of intellect, the practice of the rational people (sirat al-'uqala'), certain narrations, as well as the practical conduct (sirah) of the Holy Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a).
However, in his own analysis, the author raises an objection to the rational proof and the practice of the rational people. He states that a government can be designed in such a way that it is realized without resorting to force and without relying on the majority vote, and even under conditions of public silence and apathy. Furthermore, he doubts the claim of the perpetual preference of the majority vote over the minority and considers it unacceptable.
Subsequently, the author engages in a detailed critique of the reliance on the narrations and the conduct of the Prophet (s) and Amir al-Mu'minin (a), and based on this, considers the reasons presented regarding the authority of the majority vote insufficient and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the only case where the majority vote has the capability of being relied upon in his view is the reliance on the Maqbula of Umar b. Hanzala. In this specific case, if there is a disagreement among experts and other preferrers are unavailable, the majority can be considered as a preferrer, provided that it can rationally discover reality and the more correct opinion. In such an assumption, paying attention to the majority vote is rationally commendable; but beyond this, neither rational proof nor transmitted proof has the capability to prove the authority or general praise of the majority vote (pp. 236–265).
Obligations of Elections in Shia Jurisprudence
The Right to Be Elected
In elucidating the status of the right to candidacy for assuming positions, the author initially, by citing the principle of the absence of guardianship, states: In the realm of guardianship affairs, the primary principle is the absence of guardianship; hence, the principle is that no individual member of society, initially, has the right to candidacy and entry into such positions; unless valid evidence is established contrary to this principle. Because candidacy for this position is, in fact, a claim to the right to exercise guardianship, and this matter is considered negated by principle. Conversely, in non-guardianship affairs, the principle of the absence of guardianship does not apply; therefore, regarding these affairs, there is no prohibition on the existence of the right to candidacy for the general public, and the principle is its possibility and permissibility (pp. 287–298).
Following this, the author expresses his viewpoint in light of the theory of humanity's divine vicegerency. From his perspective, if we consider the position of divine vicegerency to be acquired, then the unconditionality of vicegerency for all human beings will not be acceptable. In this understanding, the claim that was based on the unconditionality of vicegerency and, consequently, equality in the right to sovereignty, participation, and other political rights for all humans, becomes invalid. Because even though the scope of the vicegerent's authorities and disposals on earth is absolute, the scope of this position's inclusion regarding individuals is limited and only includes those who possess the necessary competencies to bear this position. Therefore, only these individuals possess the right to sovereignty and naturally benefit from rights such as the right to be elected (pp. 287–298). Regarding the right to be elected in guardianship positions, the author believes in limitation, bringing attention to two characteristics (being non-Muslim and non-Shia) and (maleness), and explains the evidence for them. (pp. 298-300)
Announcing Candidacy
After examining three groups of narrations that have warned against seeking positions and leadership (riyasah), the author, by way of summation, states: Considering the spiritual dangers of leadership, such as the possibility of otherworldly punishment and its difficulties, the primary principle for every individual is fleeing from leadership. As a result, one who volunteers to accept this position must possess high certainty regarding the competence of their own soul; whereas such certainty is not only rationally difficult but also contrary to numerous narrations that have placed humans in a position of accusation and suspicion toward themselves. Based on this, a person should not expose themselves to leadership and should not initiate the announcement of candidacy.
He suggests that one must move toward rational methods for legitimizing candidacy, such as the candidate entering the electoral arena upon the insistence of the wise elders of the community, qualified jurists, or religious and political figures. This model must be incorporated into the electoral structure; for example, the process of registering for elections and announcing candidacy should only be possible with the approval of religious and political elites (pp. 300–316).
Qualification of Candidates
The author introduces "Islam and Shi'ism," "not being a transgressor" (fasiq), "knowledge of the divine rulings related to the duties and authorities of the position for which one is a candidate," and the "condition of maleness" as transmitted (naqli) characteristics. He subsequently points to rational characteristics, including "competence in administration," "popularity and the influence of one's word among the people," "being free from effective accusations of financial corruption," "non-dependence on the enemy," "alignment with religious values," etc. (pp. 316-322).
Voting
Regarding the equality or inequality of people's voting rights, in the author's view, although based on the foundation of humanity's divine vicegerency the result is unequal voting rights, it does not prevent the emergence of other foundations. This is because this foundation only proves the voting rights of individuals who have acquired the attribute of humanity's divine vicegerency and does not negate the voting rights of other individuals. Furthermore, the preservation of the system also only proves the right to vote in cases where preserving the system requires it and does not negate other cases. But the problem of the principle of the absence of guardianship remains. The principle of the absence of guardianship eliminates the right to vote in guardianship affairs. The answer to this is distinguishing between guardianship (wilayah) and compliance (tawalli). In compliance with affairs, the people have the right to vote; but in guardianship, this right does not exist. Based on this, the right to vote is only in these affairs and based on what was stated regarding public satisfaction, with the condition of not contradicting Sharia (pp. 322-328).
The Right to Vote in Narrations
Kazemi clarifies that the narrations related to consultation and participation refer to differences in the status of consulting and decision-shaping, not differences in the right to vote. In his belief, in many religious texts, equality among the people is assumed; including in the evidences related to allegiance (bay'ah), wherein no difference is observed among those giving allegiance. Therefore, the principle is the equality of people's political rights, although in practice certain limits might be considered for it (pp. 328–332).
The Obligation of Participating in Elections, Voting for the Most Qualified and the Accepted Qualified
From the author's perspective, voting is not a right, but a prescriptive ruling (hukm taklifi); therefore, it cannot be waived, and participating in elections is obligatory. If non-participation means declaring a vote (e.g., a negative vote), it might fall outside the scope of abandoning an obligatory act. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of an Islamic government, this abandonment could fall under a secondary title, such as weakening the Islamic system, and consequently become forbidden (haram).
Kazemi considers voting for the most qualified (aslah) to be obligatory based on rational preference and the expediency (maslahah) of the Muslims. If voting for the most qualified causes a greater corruption (mafsadah), the Sharia duty is to remove that corruption and provide the groundwork for the qualified (salih) individual to receive votes (pp. 339–347).
Campaign Requirements
The author examines topics such as deception through ignorance (ighra' bi al-jahl), fraud (tadlis), seeking fame (shuhrah), campaigning for someone who is not the most qualified, critique, painting a bleak picture (siyah-namayi), and defamation (takhrib). According to him, taking action to gain fame in electoral campaigns and prior to it does not have a Sharia prohibition; however, in designing the ideal electoral system in the Islamic system, and due to the severe reprehensibility of seeking fame in the narrations, it is fitting that this issue be given attention. For this reason, taking action to gain fame is reprehensible (madhmum). He views the way out of this problem to be rational solutions; such as others campaigning for the individual, or the individual's entry into the competitive arena being based on a sense of duty derived from the wise believers. These instances remove the act of seeking fame from being reprehensible in Sharia (pp. 347–396).
Financial Issues of Elections
In Kazemi's belief, since elections, like judgment (qada') and jihad, are considered among public interests, using the public treasury (bayt al-mal) to cover their costs is permissible. However, if a candidate is in a state or position that customarily holds no benefit for the elections, the funds spent on them from the public treasury are considered a form of wasting public wealth, and the candidate will be responsible for compensating these costs. Here, the criterion of benefit for the elections is a rational matter, and security, political, media, and cultural dimensions are involved in it (pp. 396–405).
Regarding financial campaign contributions in the form of gifts (hadiyyah), Kazemi states that if the gift is not concerning a forbidden subject and does not cause corruption in the transaction, accepting it is not problematic. Therefore, receiving a gift for electoral campaigns is also unproblematic (pp. 405–414).
He places the jurisprudential examination of the ceiling for electoral expenses within the framework of two secondary titles: "extravagance" (israf) and "corruption" (fasad). In his view, the fundamental act of spending for campaigns has no problem in itself, but if these expenses reach the level of extravagance or occur in a situation that customarily leads to corruption, it falls under the Sharia prohibition. The criterion for identifying corruption is custom ('urf) and previous experiences of elections, and it is determined based on the practice of the rational people (pp. 414–428).
In conclusion, Kazemi emphasizes the necessity of financial and behavioral transparency in elections and considers it necessary from two aspects: first, the people's right to know and preventing deception through ignorance; second, preventing probable corruptions. Based on this, he believes transparency must be seriously considered in electoral laws and executive bylaws (pp. 428–433).
Supervision
Kazemi clarifies that one cannot conclude the lack of duty to examine the qualifications of candidates by citing the principle of exoneration (asl al-bara'ah), which is applied in cases of doubt. The reason is that electoral qualifications do not solely pertain to negative attributes (such as not being corrupt), but also have positive attributes, such as "good management" (husn al-tadbir), which must be ascertained (ihraz). Therefore, in the supervision process, the principle is the ascertainment of the necessary characteristics, not merely the negation of obstacles (pp. 433–440).
In the author's belief, principles such as the principle of correctness (asl al-sihhah), the principle of justice (asl al-'adalah), or having a good opinion (husn al-zann) are also insufficient to prove the existence of qualifications. These principles are only applied in cases where we want to negate the effects of ugliness (qubh), not to attach effects such as proving goodness and qualification to them. In other words, the Lawgiver (Shari') has not obliged us to arrange the effects based on goodness, but has only forbidden arranging the effects based on ugliness.
The author also clarifies that executing the principle of correctness in supervising elections is similar to executing it in examining the conditions of candidates, meaning it is inappropriate and invalid. This is because the principle of correctness applies where correctness or corruption is established from the perspective of Sharia, whereas regarding the correctness of elections, what is at stake is legal validity and governmental legitimacy, not a direct Sharia ruling. For this reason, one cannot employ the principle of correctness as a valid foundation in the process of supervising elections (pp. 440–448).