Jurisprudential Foundations of Martyrdom Operations from the Shia and Sunni Perspectives (book)
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| Book Information | |
|---|---|
| Author | Amir Molla Mohammadali |
| Style | Reportorial-Analytical, Argumentative Fiqh |
| Language | Persian |
| Pages | 256 |
| Publication Information | |
| Publisher | Zamzam Hidayat |
- Abstract
Jurisprudential Foundations of Martyrdom Operations from the Shia and Sunni Perspectives is a Persian-language book that addresses the documentation of martyrdom operations from the perspective of Shia and Sunni jurisprudence. The author, Amir Molla Mohammadali, presents discussions such as the concepts of jihad, martyrdom, and martyrdom operations, as well as the jurisprudential evidence and conditions for martyrdom operations and related objections, in two parts and a conclusion.
The author, citing verses from the Quran, narrations, the consensus of jurists, and rational argument, argues for the permissibility of martyrdom operations, considering them an instance of defensive jihad. Citing the opinions of Shia jurists, he states three conditions for the permissibility of martyrdom operations: 1) the preservation of Islam and Muslims, 2) the permission of the Guardian Jurist (*Wali al-Faqih*), and 3) not killing innocents. According to him, the Sunnis have also proposed conditions such as the exaltation of Islam, the permission of the religious ruler, and the interest of Islam for the permissibility of martyrdom operations. He also provides documentation for the permissibility of martyrdom operations by presenting a number of fatwas from jurists, such as the obligation of defensive jihad, the necessity of preserving the military secrets of Muslims, and the permissibility of a single-person attack into the heart of the enemy's army.
Finally, the author, while noting the apparent similarity between martyrdom and suicide operations, believes that due to the difference in intention and goal between these two operations, they cannot be considered the same.
Introduction and Structure
The book *Jurisprudential Foundations of Martyrdom Operations from the Shia and Sunni Perspectives*, penned by Amir Molla Mohammadali, was authored in 1385 SH and published by Zamzam Publications in Qom. The book consists of eight chapters in two parts and a conclusion. In the first part, under the general title "Generalities," the author examines discussions such as the concepts of jihad, martyrdom, martyrdom and suicide operations (p. 17), the value of a martyr, the concept of seeking martyrdom, and the position of martyrdom-seekers in early Islam and the contemporary era (p. 30), the jurisprudential evidence for the obligation of defense (p. 70), and the nature of martyrdom operations (p. 85).
The second part of the book addresses the jurisprudential evidence for martyrdom operations (p. 103), the reasons for the permissibility of this type of operation (p. 135), and the fatwas of contemporary Shia and Sunni jurists (p. 170). In the conclusion, the author examines three objections regarding martyrdom operations (the similarity of martyrdom operations to suicide, the killing of innocent people, and the use of women in suicide operations) (p. 191).
Reasons for the Obligation of Defense
Before delving into the issue of martyrdom operations, the author, as a preface, examines the reasons for the principle of the obligation to defend one's life, property, honor, homeland, and religion. According to him, defense is either personal, which is discussed in the book of *hudud* (prescribed punishments), or it is the defense of the entity of Islam and Islamic lands, whose place is in the book of defensive jihad. The command to defend, in the author's view, either refers to defensive readiness, which is before the enemy's attack, or to defensive action, which occurs during the attack (pp. 68-69).
The author considers the four main reasons for the obligation of defense in religious texts to be reason, Quranic verses, narrations, and the consensus of jurists. According to him, defending one's life, property, honor, religion, and homeland is a rational and innate matter (p. 73). He considers Quran 2:190 (p. 74) and Quran 22:39 to be among the Quranic evidence for the obligation of defense (p. 75). He also uses several narrations to prove defensive jihad (pp. 76-77). Finally, he introduces the consensus of Muslim jurists as the last reason for the obligation of defense (p. 77).
According to the author, Shia jurists believe that offensive jihad is only permissible during the time of the presence of an infallible Imam (a); however, defensive jihad is executable whenever Islam and Muslims are attacked (p. 77). He then proceeds to examine the opinions of jurists such as Shaykh al-Tusi, Ibn Idris, 'Allama al-Hilli (p. 78), al-Shahid al-Thani (p. 79), the author of *Jawahir* (p. 80), and Imam Khomeini regarding the obligation of defense (p. 84).
Conditions for Martyrdom Operations from the Perspective of Shia and Sunni Jurists
In the fifth chapter of the first part, the author first explains the nature, characteristics, and effects of martyrdom operations. He considers martyrdom operations to be a new defensive method where Muslim combatants, to confront the enemy, usually attack with lethal tools not common in the past, causing the death and injury of a number of enemy individuals, during which they themselves are also killed (pp. 85-86). He has also examined the conditions for martyrdom operations from the perspective of Shia and Sunni jurists. According to him, Shia jurists have mentioned three main conditions for this type of operation: first, the operation must be for the purpose of defending and preserving Islam and Muslims, and its performance must be considered necessary for this goal; second, the operation must be carried out with the permission of the Guardian Jurist, the religious ruler, a qualified mujtahid, or a legitimate leader; and third, during the operation, innocent and non-aggressive individuals must not be killed (pp. 92-93).
On the other hand, he states the conditions for martyrdom-seeking operations from the perspective of Sunni jurists as follows: first, the goal must be for the exaltation of Islam; second, the executor of the operation must have certainty or a strong presumption that this action will lead to the defeat or weakening of the enemy; third, the operation must be carried out against infidels who have declared war against Islam or are currently at war (p. 95); fourth, this operation must be carried out with the permission of the religious ruler (p. 97); and finally, it must be for the good and in the interest of Islam and Muslims (p. 98).
Reasons for the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations
In the second part of the book, the author examines the jurisprudential foundations of martyrdom operations. He presents the reasons for permissibility under two chapters: independent jurisprudential evidence, and jurisprudential discussions cited for the permissibility of this type of operation.
Independent Reasons for the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations
At the beginning of the second part of the book, the author examines two types of evidence, scriptural and rational, to prove the permissibility of martyrdom operations. The first Quranic evidence cited by the author is Quran 8:60, which encourages Muslims to prepare forces and war equipment to frighten the enemy. In the author's belief, martyrdom operations can strike terror into the heart of the enemy in the best way, so they would be an instance of this verse (pp. 103-108). He also, based on other verses of the Quran, including Quran 2:207 and verses 41, 111, and 120 of Surah al-Tawbah, considers martyrdom operations to be among the best examples of jihad. He believes that in this type of operation, divine pleasure, creating fear in the enemy, and supporting the divine religion are clearly seen, and he introduces it as the most prominent form of jihad with one's life (pp. 108-116).
Continuing with scriptural evidence, the author examines 13 narrations from Shia and Sunni sources (pp. 117-125) and, by analyzing their chain and content, concludes that the objectives mentioned for jihad in these narrations also exist in martyrdom operations. Therefore, he rules for the permissibility of this type of operation (pp. 125-126). The author also refers to the practical conduct of the prophets and divine saints and believes that figures such as Prophet Zakariyya (a), Prophet Yahya (a), and Imam al-Husayn (a) defended religion and their followers with self-sacrifice. He considers this defense to be similar to martyrdom operations, in which individuals sacrifice their lives to preserve religion and Muslims (pp. 126-128). He also mentions stories such as the incident of Pharaoh's daughter's hairdresser and the People of the Ditch (*Ashab al-Ukhdud*) as evidence for the permissibility of martyrdom operations. In his belief, these individuals sacrificed their lives for the survival of the divine religion, and this can be considered evidence for the legitimacy of such operations (pp. 128-133).
After presenting the scriptural evidence, the author presents rational argument as the fourth independent reason. He says that in situations of conflict between preserving one's life and preserving religion, reason prioritizes the survival of religion. For this reason, in martyrdom operations as well, the actions of individuals who prioritize religion over their own lives are rationally justified. (p. 133) Some Shia jurists have also confirmed the permissibility of martyrdom operations based on this same rational argument (p. 134).
Jurisprudential Fatwas Cited for the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations
The author of the book considers the second type of evidence cited for the permissibility of martyrdom operations to be fatwas from jurists issued in various jurisprudential discussions, such as the obligation of defensive jihad in all circumstances, the necessity of steadfastness until victory, preserving military secrets to the point of death, the permissibility of a single-person attack into the heart of the enemy's army, the permissibility of choosing a death from which there is no escape, and *tatarrus* (killing people who have been used as human shields). However, the author traces all these reasons back to the rational and scriptural obligation of preserving religion with one's life and property (pp. 135-168).
- Obligation of Defensive Jihad and Steadfastness Against the Enemy Until Victory
The author, citing the opinion of many Shia jurists from the third Islamic century onwards, including Shaykh al-Tusi, Ibn Idris, 'Allama al-Hilli, al-Shahid al-Awwal and al-Thani, and the author of *Jawahir*, who have considered the defense of life, property, honor, homeland, and religion to be obligatory (pp. 136-137), believes that martyrdom operations, as a type of defensive jihad, are permissible (p. 138), just as some Sunni scholars also permit this type of operation (p. 139).
Another reason the author raises is the obligation of steadfastness against the enemy. According to the fatwa of Shia and Sunni jurists, resistance against the enemy, even to the point of death, is obligatory. The author introduces martyrdom-seeking operations as one of the methods of steadfastness and confrontation with enemies (pp. 141-145).
- Preserving Military Secrets
Preserving military secrets to the death is another reason put forward. The author states that according to the fatwa of Shia and Sunni jurists, if a prisoner of war anticipates that under torture, they will reveal the secrets of the Muslims and cause their defeat, their suicide is permissible (p. 145). Based on this, under special circumstances, martyrdom operations can also be permissible to preserve the military secrets of Muslims (p. 147).
- Permissibility of a Single-Person Attack into the Heart of the Enemy's Army
The permissibility of a single-person attack into the heart of the enemy's army is another fatwa based on which the author argues for the permissibility of martyrdom operations (p. 147). According to the author, based on some narrations (p. 149) and the fatwa of some Sunni jurists (pp. 147-150), if a person knows with certainty or strong presumption that by attacking the heart of the enemy's army they will be killed, but this action is for the pleasure of God and will lead to the destruction of the enemies, their action is permissible (p. 149). The author explains that in a martyrdom operation as well, the person is certain that with this action, the enemies will be destroyed and they themselves will also be killed. He believes that it makes no difference whether the agent of martyrdom is the enemy or the person themselves, because in both cases, this action is done with the intention of God's pleasure and inflicting damage on the enemy (p. 151).
- Choosing an Inevitable Death
The author, citing the fatwa of jurists that if a person is trapped on a burning ship, they can throw themselves into the sea, even if they know they will also lose their life in the sea (p. 152), believes that individuals who carry out martyrdom operations have no other choice, despite being aware of their own martyrdom (p. 153).
- Tatarrus (Killing People Shielded by the Enemy)
The author refers to the opinions of Shia jurists such as Shaykh al-Tusi, Ibn al-Barraj, Ibn Idris, and 'Allama al-Hilli, who have issued fatwas that if the enemy uses people (whether enemy men and women or Muslim prisoners) as defensive shields, Muslims can take action with the intention of killing the enemy, even if the innocent people who are being used as shields are killed (pp. 154-157). Also, jurists like Muhaqqiq al-Ardabili, the author of *Jawahir*, al-Khu'i, and Imam Khomeini have stated that if the only way to overcome the enemy is to kill the human shield, this act is permissible (pp. 158-160). Sunni scholars hold a similar view, but they emphasize that the intention must be to kill the enemy, even though innocent people may also be killed (pp. 160-163). The author concludes from this jurisprudential ruling that if, to prevent harm from the enemy and to overcome them, killing innocent people is permissible, then in circumstances where the only way to confront the enemy is a martyrdom-seeking operation, this operation is also not problematic, even if it leads to the killing of innocent people (pp. 164-168).
Difference between Martyrdom Operations and Suicide Operations
In the concluding section, the author examines several objections, including the apparent similarity between martyrdom operations and suicide operations. By explaining the nature of suicide and the evidence for its prohibition from the perspective of the Quran, narrations, and reason, he points out in explaining the difference between these two types of operations that martyrdom operations are used against aggressors on Islamic land and are a type of defensive jihad. Although they have an apparent similarity to suicide operations, because the intention is different, the ruling will also be different (pp. 191-215).
The author also refers to two other objections regarding martyrdom operations: one is the killing of innocent people during the operation, and the other is the participation of women in such operations. He, referring to the higher goals of jihad, considers the killing of innocent people to be permissible in a state of necessity, similar to the issue of *tatarrus*, and states that in defensive jihad, there is no difference between men and women, so there is no obstacle to the participation of women in martyrdom operations (pp. 215-231).